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Abstract
The mutually hostile historical and political ethno-nationalist projects of the Sinhalese and the Sri Lanka Tamils,
and, the fierce competition for resources have combined to produce an intense ethno-nationalist conflict in Sri
Lanka. By the mid-1950s the animosity between the two major ethnic groups had begun to manifest itself in
ethnic violence. By the early 1970s the Tamil Secessionist insurrection began at a relatively low level of
violence. The United National Party (UNP) won the general elections of July 1977 and became the governing
party of the country. In July 1983 occurred a destructive anti-Tamil pogrom-riot. After that the Tamil
insurrection escalated to a high level of intensity from which it did not reduce except for brief periods when
ceasefires were in effect. Up to the year 1987 five Tamil guerilla groups were active. After July 1987 the
secessionist insurrection was prosecuted only by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). As a
consequence of the pogrom-riots Tamil Nadu and the Indian central government insisted on intervening in the
Sri Lankan conflict. The Indian central government's stated policy was that it did not want a separate Tamil state
in Sri Lanka. However, Sri Lanka Tamils and others in Tamil Nadu lobbied for India to intervene and partition 
Sri Lanka.
During the 17 year period from 1977 to 1994, two UNP governments ruled Sri Lanka. The first under President
Jayewardene, from 1977 to end-1988, and the second under President Premadasa from January 1989 onwards
(Premadasa was assassinated by the LTTE in May 1993). A caretaker President governed till November 1994
when the UNP was voted out of office. Up till that time, this 17-year period was the longest single period that 
any political party or coalition had governed Sri Lanka.
These 17 years can be divided into three clear phases, each separated by very clear and dramatic breaks from the 
other. The first phase is from the UNP’s election victory in 1977 to the pogrom-riots of July 1983. The second is 
from the pogrom-riots to the exit of the Indian army from Sri Lanka in March 1990. The third is from the re-
ignition of the Secessionist insurrection by the LTTE (the main secessionist group) in June 1990 till November 
1994 when the UNP lost both parliamentary and presidential elections and therefore ceased to be the 
counterinsurgent. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 deal with these three periods in chronological order.
The objective of this Thesis is to analyse the efforts by the UNP government of Sri Lanka to counter the Tamil 
secessionist insurrection during these 17 years. The analytical framework utilised for this task is grounded in 
counterinsurgency doctrine which spans approximately 50 years from work pioneered in the 1960s to the most 
recent US and British Army doctrine. After obtaining insights from this literature seven research questions were
identified by the present author. The counterinsurgency campaigns of the Sri Lanka government 1977-1994 are 
analysed using these seven research questions.
Our analytical work is deeply complicated, however, by the fact that in the second of the above two phases, i.e.
die phase dealt-with in Chapter 4, the Indian central government was a central player in the process. Eventually
in July 1987, India used pressure on both the Sri Lanka government and the Tamil secessionists to arrive at an
Agreement called the Indo-Lanka Accord. However, that could not be implemented and eventually the Indian
forces left Sri Lanka in March 1990, and the secessionist insurrection resumed with the LTTE fighting the Sri
Lanka government. In the other two phases too, i.e. Chapters 3 and 5, the picture is not straightforward as
President Jayewardene made massive mistakes by tacitly facilitating the pogrom-riots and in the period after
June 1990 President Premadasa is faced with enemies from within his government and also revealed that he was 
at a loss as to what strategy could defeat the LTTE.
Furthermore the three main counterinsurgents -  President Jayewardene, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and 
President Premadasa -  made serious errors of judgment (especially of the LTTE) and also on many occasions 
worked at cross purposes with one another. In the case of the errors on the LTTE, ex-Prime Minister Gandhi and 
President Premadasa paid for them with their lives. Working at cross purposes was, in a sense, inevitable when 
the Indian central government gave sanctuary and military training to Tamil insurgents. And also -  as can be 
seen when the Indo-Lanka Accord, its Annexures and Letters are examined -  India wanted to obtain geopolitical 
advantages over Sri Lanka. These matters had no direct connection whatsoever to the Tamil insurrection.
By 1994 it could be stated that neither the Sri Lanka government nor the LTTE had won conclusively A 
situation akin to a stalemate existed but the advantage was with the LTTE, when compared to the situation in 
977: it controlled large swathes of land in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and at least 300,000+ Tamil 
civilians. The LTTE's increase in military capability in a period of ten years (1984-1994) is very clear when its 
main attack of 1983 (when it ambushed and killed 13 soldiers) is compared to 1993 (when it attacked a large 
Army-cum-Navy base in Pooneryn and killed at least 650 military personnel and stole truckloads of weapons
This being said, however, the Sri Lankan government doggedly hung on and refused to cave-in and allow the
country to be partitioned. Something akin to a stalemate existed at the end of 1994 at which point the UNP was 
ejected from government by the voters.
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1Chapter. Introduction
Introduction
The objective of this Thesis is to analyse and assess the efforts by the government of Sri 
Lanka to counter the Tamil secessionist insurrection between the years 1977 to 1994. The 
analytical framework utilised for this task is grounded in counterinsurgency doctrine which 
spans approximately 50 years from the work pioneered by British, French and US scholars 
and counterinsurgents in the 1960s, to the most recent US Army (2006) and British Army 
(2009) doctrine.' After obtaining insights from this literature, seven research questions were 
identified by the present author. The counterinsurgency campaigns of the Sri Lanka 
government 1977-1994 are analysed using these seven research questions.
The Tamil secessionist insurrection was by far the most serious political-military threat to its 
security and territorial integrity that the postcolonial Sri Lankan State has faced. It was 
primarily an internal threat but during specific periods of time the regional hegemonic power, 
India, was also deeply involved. This included the presence in Sri Lanka of approximately
forces, paramilitary and police personnel.2 The destruction of 
government buildings, bridges, railway lines, trains, buses, private residences, private vehicles 
and such like during 1977-1983 is incalculable.
armed
One reasonably accurate indicator of the seriousness of the threat can be inferred from the 
details of armed forces’ and police casualties which have been collated by the government. 
See below the total armed forces’ and police casualties of the Tamil insurrection (1977-1994) 
compared with the same indicators for the 1971 Insurrection which is the next most serious 
internal security challenge the Sri Lankan state has faced (see Tables 0.1 and 0.2 below).
Thompson Robert, 1966, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam; Galula,
David 1964, Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice; British Army, 1973, Land Operations, Vol 3
Counter Revolutionary Operations; US Army, 1990, Field Manual FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low
Intensity Conflict; US Army, 2006, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency; British Army, 2009, Field Manual, Volume I 
Part 10, Countering Insurgency’.
See Rikhye, Ravi, 1989: 606, ‘How Many Troops in Sri Lanka?’ and Singh, Pushpindar, 1990/91 26 
Peacekeepers in Sri Lanka’. * ’
Killed Injured
Army 19 91
Navy 3 15
Air Force 4 5
Police 37 194
Total 63 305
In the case of the 1971 insurrection (which lasted approximately 3 months), the total
government forces killed were 63 and 305 wounded. In contrasts, during the Tamil
insurrection for the period 1977-1994 (17 years), the total Sri Lankan government casualties
killed was 6,796 and 2,757 wounded. Indian casualties were a further 1,155 killed and 3,153
wounded. It needs to be mentioned that many tens of thousands of civilians were also killed 
but verifiable figures are difficult to locate.
Table 0.2. Total Number of Sri Lanka Army, Navy, Air Force and Police personnel
Kjlled or Wounded, 1977 to November 1994. the tenure of the UNP government under 
Review
Army
Navy
Air
Force
Police
Total
1972 to 
Feb.1977 (a>
Included 
within the 
subject matter 
of Chapter.2
KIA
0
WIA
0
Total for Entire 
Period
Feb.1977 to 
July 1983 ,bl
Included within 
the the subject 
matter of 
Chapter.3
WIA
29
July 1983 to 29 
July 1987 lcl
29 July 1987 to 
11 June 1990 ld)
11 June 1990 to 
16 Nov 1994 (f)
Included within the the subject matter of
Chapter.4
Included within the 
the subject matter of 
Chapter.5
0
0
WIA
30
KIA1
563
WIA' KIA
433 312 4 ,2 3 0 2,121 1
1 2 228 55
20 r r 118
l 0 9 " 12 714“ 5 0 1
WIA
329 5,290 2,297
1,155 (0
Wounded = 2,757
3,153 (C)
IPKF____________________
Source for Sri Lankan forces and police: 'Official Roll of Honour - 1977 to 2 0 o i\ 2005!Sri Lanka Rancmru 
—ansaya. Source for IPKF: The Sunday Observer (Sri Lanka), I I July 2010.—  ---------— — — —   — :-----------------------------------------------------------  -------------------------- , /  I I j u i y  Z . U 1 U .
Notes: KIA -  Killed in Action. WIA = Wounded in Action (WIA refers to those wounded to some degree of
seriousness. There were many thousands of others wounded to lesser degrees, but data on these cases is 
unavailable). IPKF = Indian Peace Keeping Force.-7- t  -  - -
, ■" IS a miIestone m the Tamil insurrection. Tamil secessionism further intensified after the enactment of 
the 1 Republican Constitution in 1972 and various other policies taken by the then government, and, 
autonomous political radicalisation within Tamil youth. The Tamil New Tigers (TNT) an embryonic Tamil 
insurrectionary group came into being in 1972. In May 1973 the Tamil United Front (TUF) began drafting a 
Constitution for a Separate Tamil state (discussed in Chapter. 1). A great deal of political work conducted
Killed =V total W o tZ d e7 -0 ' "° aCt'°nS agai"St amlCd f°rceS 0r police- During this Phase- total
From 1977 up to June-July 1983 the Tamil insurrection gradually increased (see analysis in Chapter.3). It
was in February 1977 that the first policeman was killed -  a Tamil, as were most of the policemen killed in
those initial years. They knew the language and knew how to identify insurgent cadres. During this phase
total Killed = 53; total Wounded = 0. The pogrom-riots of July 1983 is a watershed in the Tamil insurrection
and postcolonial Sri Lanka history. Reliable figures for Tamil insurgent casualties and Tamil and Sinhalese 
civilian deaths are unavailable. ____________
fcl “ --------------------------- -----------------------------------------------
The 4 years from the pogrom-riots of July 1983 to June-July 1987 was a period when the Tamil
insurrection greatly escalated to the detriment of the Sri Lankan State. During this phase, total Killed = 890;
total Wounded = 131. Reliable figures for Tamil insurgent casualties and Tamil and Sinhalese civilian deaths
are unavailable. The pogrom-riot increased Tamil recruits to the insurgents by many thousands. It also paved
the way for Tamil Nadu and the Indian government to get directly involved in promoting negotiations between
the Sn Lanka government and the Tamil secessionist (discussed in Chapter.4). This process ended with India
forcing the Indo-Lanka Accord on Sri Lanka and the arrival of the Indian government to Jaffna and the 
Eastern Province in July 1987.
From July 1987 onwards the Sri Lankan armed forces were limited to their bases and camps in terms of the
Indo-Lanka Accord. Furthermore, the 2nd JVP Insurrection occurred from approx. July 1987 to November
1989, and it was the JVP which caused the majority of the Sri Lanka Armed Forces & Police casualties during
,hese 2 h  years- The resl were caused by the LTTE prior to its ceasefire with the SL Government in April 
1989 (explained and discussed in Chapter.4). During this phase, total Killed = 563; total Wounded = 329.
Reliable figures for LTTE casualties and Tamil and Sinhalese civilian deaths are unavailable 
(e) _  . . " -------------------------- -
Fighting between the IPKF and the LTTE began from October 1987 onwards. The last IPKF soldier left Sri 
Lanka in late-March 1990 (The Guardian, 26 March 1990, ‘Bananarama serenades Delhi’s departing troops’). 
The LTTE re-ignited the insurrection against the Sri Lankan government on 11 June 1990 The casualty 
figures for the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) are Killed = 1,155 (including 51 Officers). Wounded = 
3,153 (including 163 Officers). Source: The Sunday Observer (Sri Lanka), 11 July 2010. Reliable figures for 
LITE casualties and Tamil and Sinhalese civilian deaths are unavailable.________
This was the period when, after the IPKF left, the LTTE deliberately re-ignited the insurrection During
these 4 years from June 1990 to November 1994 occurred the most intense fighting between the Sri Lanka
government forces and the LTTE during this entire period if 17 years. During this phase, total Killed =
5,290; total Wounded = 2,297. Reliable figures for LTTE casualties and Tamil and Sinhalese civilian deaths 
are unavailable.
It was due to the Tamil insurrection that the longest and most widespread use of military force by 
the Sri Lankan government occurred. The growth of the Sri Lankan armed forces and police,
increases
strategic, operational and tactical levels are all directly related to the Tamil insurrection.'1 From a
military
LTTE
warfare. Consequently the Tamil insurrection proved enormously difficult to cope with and
For example, m 1978 the Sri Lanka Army's Regular Force strength was 481 Officers and 8,489 Other Ranks.
Other F° rCe 'I 'L T ™ ? 0 ' ° f ‘he Brit'Sh Army s Territorial Army) were 59 Officers and 1,280
°  " ^ " kS' Th,S. r flCerS 3nd 9,769 ° ther Ranks' In 1994 Am,y’s Re8ular Force strength was
tota^o?4 074 Off h ^  'Volunteers' were 970 Officers and 29,539 Other Ranks. This was a
978 l  s , r rI  n,u RankS’ 3 654% and 785% increase' respectively, when compared to
air force ^  ^  906' 907’ Sn U nka A rm>': 50 Yea™ On. 1949-1999. The figures for the navy,
air force and police could no. be located. (Note: all of Sri Lanka's armed forces are made of volunteer recruits
Vol I T 0" °r ,COmpu'SO; y “ al service have "ever been implemented in Sri Lanka. The use of the word 
fRri kh A f  ha"g° v,er.fror" Bntlsh colonialism to refer to the Sri Lankan equivalent of the 'Territorial Army'
number ofTrmvVe ^  m,1‘lary)' Fr°m 1881 10 1945 ,he British colonial government raised a
workinp in i t7  R®glments Gantry) which were composed of British planters and other British civilians
Cevlonfse Thpv ° ny *1i ^ 7 7  6W SeleCted Wea“hy Ceylonese as Officers. The Other Ranks were 
y onese. They were called Volunteer units to differentiate them from the Regular British Army units too
which happened to be based in Ceylon at various times. y
outlasted numerous political, diplomatic, and military developments and changes in both Sri 
Lanka and India during 1977-1994,4
1. The Tamil Secessionist Insurrection
Sri Lanka gained Independence (i.e. Dominion status within the British Commonwealth) in 
February 1948. The Sri Lanka Tamils were dissatisfied with the political system that was 
established in 1948 which had many characteristics of a Unitary State. In 1949 a new Sri 
Lanka Tamil political party, the Illankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi (the correct translation of which 
is ‘Lanka Tamil State Party’) 5 was formed by breakaways from then existing Tamil political 
parties and other Tamils. ITAK’s main demand was the creation of a Federal state system in 
Sri Lanka.6 This demand was determinedly opposed by the majority Sinhala ethnic group and 
both main political parties -  the UNP and SLFP. A Federal form of government was not 
established. The suspicion and opposition to Federalism from the Sinhala majority was so 
strong that the 1 Republican Constitution adopted in 1972 emphatically stated that Sri Lanka
Republican Constitution adopted in 1978 whichUnitary
nd
remains the Constitution of the country to date. 8
From the early 1950s onwards relations between the majority Sinhala ethnic group and the Sri 
Lanka Tamils, the second largest ethnic group -  which, even then, were not the most cordial - 
gradually worsened due to their inability to agree to the constitutional order under which the 
island would be governed. These relations were aggravated by mutual suspicion of each
Examples of these are (1) President JR Jayewardene's many efforts at a negotiated solution; (2) the ‘two-track' 
pohcy of both Prime Min.sters Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi; (3) numerous agitations and involvements by 
Tamil bladu; (4) the arrival and departure of Indian armed forces in to Sri Lanka; (5) the assassination of Rajiv 
andht. President Premadasa, and other important political leaders; (6) the death of many thousands of Tamil
^ ‘ ‘a"S’ e“ er "uj nbeJ s of Sinhala and Muslim civilians; accurate numbers impossible at present to establish;
, , a‘h of 6’796 armed forces and police personnel and the wounding of 2,757; (8) many changes of 
political leaders in the Indian central government -  Rajiv Gandhi defeated in the general elections of 1989
assassinated by the LTTE in 1991 - and Tamil Nadu state government levels -  the death (through natural causes
of MGR Mr. M.G.Ramachandran, a staunch supporter of Sri Lanka Tamils; (9) the worsening of diplomatic
I J n k w tm  r Cn Sn ,LT ka, a,nd I"dia WhlCh eventually led 10 the arrival of the Indian armed forces in to Sri
t I lf  £“  '™ " dr  eace Keeping F0rce (IPKF); (I1) the assassination of President Premadasa;
. the de^ at °[ ,he UNP ln both Parliamentary and presidential elections in 1994. The Tamil insurrection 
outlasted all of the above.
lln k a  P™ !Cal party iS inCf0ITeC1tly and mlSlcadlngly ca,led the Federal Party' in a great deal of literature on Sri 
emoted ,S Slgmf,Cantly misleading. While it agitated for a Federal system in its initial days, it later
nd noute FedernTp^1-1 Tamil Arasu K M  should be called ‘Lanka Tamil State Party'
nd not the Federal Party . This error exists even in the title of the book in the footnote below
m iZ T ' '*» °rs,‘ n f ”  « *  « • * *  * » * »
e n°a a  <!d r  m e r  n '  ‘ >3 " a  ' 972: m Cons,i,u,i°n ° f  the ^public  o f Sri Lanka (Ceylon). Adopted and
enacted by the Constituent Assembly of the People of Sri Lanka on the 22nd of May 1972.
overnment of Sn Lanka, 1978:5, The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.
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others' political agendas. The situation was further worsened by two episodes of anti-Tamil 
rioting, one in 1956 and the other in 1958.
The Tamil insurgency’s political origins began along with a civil disobedience campaign 
launched by ITAK in 1961. There is considerable evidence that at least by 1961-62 
secessionist ideas were already being actively canvassed and discussed within the Sri Lanka 
Tamils.^ During 1961 some relatively minor but symbolically and politically significant 
armed actions against the Ceylon Army and the police were conducted by small Tamil groups 
or individual Tamils.10 There is evidence of a small organisation called Pulip Padai ( ‘Army of 
Tigers ) being formed in 1961 but it remained embryonic.11 The Tamil insurgent groups 
originated within the womb of Tamil parliamentary political parties, primarily the ITAK 
(Illankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi, the correct translation of which is ‘Lanka Tamil State Party’. This 
party is also mistakenly referred to as the ‘Federal Party’).12
The enactment of the l sl Republican Constitution in 1972 was strongly opposed and boycotted 
by Tamil parliamentary parties and the embryonic Tamil secessionist political factions which 
had begun to emerge by that time.13 In May 1973 a Tamil United Front (TUF)14 Action 
Committee presided by the ITAK’s founder and leader, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, decided on a 
range of actions, one of which was the drafting of a constitution for a Separate Tamil State.15 
Discussions and plans on how to solve the economic problems of a future separate Tamil state 
composed of the Northern and Eastern Provinces of the island also began in 1973 amongst
9 See discussion in Chapter-1.
10 See discussion in Chapter. 1. See Ceylon Daily Mirror, 24 April 1961:1, ‘Army Patrol fired on. Kopay M.P., 
five others detained*. Ceylon Daily News, 29 April 1961:1, ‘Patrol parties shot at in Jaffna, Batticaloa*. Partial 
strikes on two Estates’. An organisation called Pulip Padai (which means ‘Army of Tigers’ in Tamil) is reported to 
have been created in 1961. This organisation seems to have remained largely inactive but is significant as an early 
sign of Tamil militancy. See Narayan Swamy 1994:24. Tigers o f Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas.
The use of the symbol of the Tiger is, however, politically and militarily significant because the Tiger was the 
primary emblem of the Chola empire of South India, one of the several South Indian empires which invaded and 
occupied large areas of the island for decades at a time between 300 B.C. and 1200 A.D.
‘ llankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi is the actual Tamil name of this party. Its accurate English translation is ‘Lanka Tamil 
State Party’. As mentioned earlier its main demand was the creation of a Federal State in Sri Lanka. As a 
consequence it began to be referred-to by English language newspapers as the ‘Federal Party’. This was a convenient 
short-hand compared to ‘Lanka Tamil State Party’. But later-on by the late 1950s onwards this inadvertently 
benefited the party because it served to camouflage the transformations which began taking place within the party. 
From the early 1960s onwards secessionist trends developed within this party. It formed the Tamil United Front 
(TUF) on 14 May 1972 which in turn evolved into the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) on 14 May 1976. See
Hoole, Rajan. 2001: 17, Sri Lanka: the Arrogance of Power- Myths, Decadence & Murder. It was the TULF 
which in 1976 passed the Resolution to create a separate state.
See Tamil United Liberation Front, 1977: 322, Election Manifesto of 1977 where the Tamils’ opposition is
strongly reiterated. See also De Silva, K.M., 1986: 240-241, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multiethnic Societies:
Sri Lanka 1880-19X5 for an account of the role this 1972 Constitution played in deepening the fissure between 
the Sri Lanka Tamils and the government and the Sinhala people.
TUF (Tamil United Front) was an umbrella Front of several Tamil parties. It evolved in to the TULF (Tamil 
United Liberation Front) a few years later.
15See Jupp, James 1978: 159, fn.9, Sri Lanka -  Third World Democracy.
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prominent Jaffna University academics.16 Although the majority of Sinhala voters may not
have been aware of these political developments, the leaders of the major parties -  the UNP
and SLFP -  would have. It was political developments such as these which solidified the
conviction amongst Sinhala political leaders that ITAK’s real agenda was to create a separate
state in Sri Lanka, and that the demand for a Federal system was the initial phase of this
project. And that this project had to be opposed. This in-turn resulted in both the SLFP and
UNP resisting Tamil demands for ‘devolution’ of power to a territorial ‘Unit’ of devolution’
larger than a District, and definitely not to a territorial ‘Unit’ comprising the Northern and 
Eastern Provinces.
In the meantime Tamil insurgents began armed actions at a very low intensity in the early- 
1970s. The initial insurgent actions were intimidation of their opponents within the Tamil 
community and not a single policeman or military person was attacked. The Tamil New
(TNT) was formed in 1972.17 Pro-government Tamil politicians were intimidated and 
sometimes assassinated. The first such high profile assassination occurred in 1975 -  the then 
Mayor of Jaffna -  who was a very prominent Tamil supporter of the SLFP government.18
Most significant of all, during 1972-1976 a great deal of pro-secessionist political lobbying 
took place within the Sri Lanka Tamil population.1 Due to the lack of ‘newsworthiness’ of 
this clandestine political work these political developments were largely unknown to the 
majority Sinhala electorate. The police and the government knew that small embryonic guerrilla 
groups were in existence but they too did not pay too much attention to the movement because 
the violent actions against the government was nil. Furthermore, the then SLFP-led coalition- 
government was distracted by other far more immediate economic and fiscal nrnhlpms T h ,.^
16 See Manogaran, Chelvadurai, 1987: 179-180, Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka and Shastri,
Am*ta, 1990: 74, The Material Basis for Separatism: The Tamil Eelam Movement in Sri Lanka’ Discussed in 
detail later in Chapter. 1 of this Thesis.
See Narayan Swamy, M R 1994:91, fn5. Tigers o f Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas. The TNT was created by
Vellupillai Prabhakaran. There is some debate regarding whether the TNT began in 1972 or 1974 See page 91
for the details of the debate. It was from the TNT that the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) were created 
on 5 May 1976, see Narayan Swamy, M.R., 1994:58.
This was the assassination of Jaffna Mayor Alfred Duraiappah. See Hoole, Rajan. 2001: 17-19, Sri Lanka: the
Arrogance of Power- Myths, Decadence & Murder for a comprehensive account of the Tamil secessionist
political background to this political assassination. This assassination was a huge controversy at that time.
Political mobilisation is crucially important at all stages of any insurrection (and any counter-insurrection);
this will be discussed in Chapter.2. The vast majority of such mobilisation, however, takes place through
conversations and small-scale meetings. These conversations don’t get recorded in any text and it is only via
conversations and discussions with Tamil colleagues that the present author can state that these conversations did
occur during these years. That information too is a small fraction of the hundreds of thousands of conversations
which would have taken place amongst the Tamil population during those years. A primary reason for such
conversations to not get recorded is because they did not (and do not) have any ‘newsworthiness’ to justify
a location of column space in a newspaper or broadcast time on radio or TV. And also because most of them are
clandestine and meant to be kept secret they never get revealed. However, in the case of an assassination such as
a fna Mayor Duraiappah s (mentioned earlier), due to the fact that a person was killed and the political
significance of the victim such events have newsworthiness and get printed in newspapers and published in 
books and thereby get recorded for posterity.
problems necessitated the drastic reduction of food imports.20 These policies had immediate 
political consequences on the government. It was only in 1979, under a different government, 
that legislation specifically aimed at ‘preventing terrorism’ was passed.21
The pro-secessionist mobilisation amongst Tamils was clearly revealed at the TULF’s annual 
Convention of 1976 held in Vaddukkoddai, a town in the Jaffna peninsula. This Resolution 
called for the creation of a separate Tamil State. It asserted that the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces were the ‘homeland’ of the Tamils.22 This Resolution was a landmark in the 
country s politics. It was a manifestation of intense lobbying by militant secessionist youth of 
the TULF’s youth wing, other radical youth groups and clandestine guerrilla groups which were 
actively agitating and mobilising public opinion within Tamil society at that time. This 
Resolution, in-tum, provided a substantial political boost to the secessionist tendency as it 
legitimised the call for a separate Tamil State. It set the foundation for further accelerated 
political agitation with the Tamil people. This Resolution can be assessed as the end of the 
precursory phase of the Tamil insurrection. After 1976 Tamil insurrectionary activities 
increased somewhat. The targeted killing of Tamil police personnel began in February 1977.23 
By 1982 five insurgent groups -  i.e. LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), EROS (Eelam 
Revolutionary Organisation of Students), TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation), PLOTE 
(Peoples’ Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam), and EPRLF (Eelam Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Liberation Front) - were in existence.
The Land Area Claimed for the Proposed Separate State. The Tamil secessionist
insurrectionV4 aim was to create a separate state called Tamil Eelam in the Northern and 
Eastern Provinces and Puttalam District of Sri Lanka (See Maps 0.1 and 0.2).25
K.A. Da Silva, 1973: 381, ‘Mrs. Bandaranaike's government in trouble: Economic failures, diplomatic 
successes’. During 1973-1976 Sri Lanka was in serious economic difficulty. The government was compelled to 
curtail its import of vital foodstuff and there were serious food shortages in the country and food rationing. The
SLFP led government became increasingly unpopular. These were among the reasons which led to its defeat to 
the UNP in the parliamentary elections of July 1977.
See Government ol Sri Lanka, 1979, Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, No. 48 of 1979. 
Colombo: Department of Government Printing. Amended in 1982 by Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) (Amendment) Act, No. 10 of 1982. Colombo: Department of Government Printing.
See De Silva, K.M., 1986: 406, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multiethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880-1985. See
pp.403-406 for the complete text of the Resolution. This Resolution is often referred-to as the ‘Vaddukkoddai 
Resolution in Sri Lankan history and social science publications.
24 ‘Official Roll of Honour - 1977 to 2003’, 2005: 1660, ‘Sr/ Lanka Ranaviru Wansaya .
Tamil insurgents and their supporters and sympathisers used (and use) the following phrases for self- 
ldentification: ‘Tamil Liberation movement’; Tamil Liberation struggle’; ‘Tamil Freedom movement’; ‘Tamil 
Freedom struggle* etc. Dead LTTE cadres were called ‘martyrs for the motherland’; ‘heroes for the motherland’. 
On the other hand the terms used by the government, military, police and the press in the Sinhala majority areas 
were Tamil terrorists and/or terrorism’; ‘Separatist terrorists and/or terrorism. Or just the single words 
terrorists or ‘terrorism’ when the Tamil insurrection was the only insurrection occurring in Sri Lanka (this is to 
flag to the reader that during the period July 1987 to November 1989 (2 «/2 years) the 2nd JVP insurrection was 
also underway in the country). The present author has not yet been able to locate a single instance when the 
erms insurgency’, ‘insurgents’ and ‘counterinsurgency’ ever used by the government or military. During
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revolutionary
which had as their objectives the capture of State power in Sri Lanka 26 The goal of the Tamil
penods when there were peace talks and ceasefires the government used the term ‘Tamil militants’ on TV Radio
nra r er em uW PT SS t0 refer t0 the Tamil insur2enls' The privately owned press followed government 
pntcuce. When the ceasefires broke-down, and during 1977-1994, all of them eventually broke d o w T 'h e  
government reverted to using terrorism and ‘terrorist’.
1 ■ Nortliern Province is the area in the north of the island shaded in pink The Eastern Province is 
“ ! » “ <•-! e d g e o fa . island. The h au ls,,, l sZ g , h e ™  I f
,S 101* w *"• “  **—  >— * — *.1*
*  Jhe Ja,!arha Vimuhhi Peramuna (JVP) was a Marxist revolutionary movement which arose from within the 
majonty Sinhalese. Twtce it attempted violent revoluttons to capture state. The first in 197T  whTch ^ e d  3
S t S T c X T ?  12 «  •>«!• were defeated h , S l g
Gunaratna Rohan I QQn c 7  V  \  T " ' M  aCCOUnt °f  the APril insurrection in Sri Lanka-
199, VW /’ 7' J l  ’ Sr‘ U,nka’ A ^ s t  Revolution?: The Inside Story o f the JVP; Chandraprema C A
"9 ’ Srl The Years o f Terror - The JVP Insurrection 1987-1989 oraprema. c .A.,
secessionist insurrection was to secede and create a separate state, not capture state power.2
The population group from within which the insurrection arose was the Sri Lanka Tamil ethnic 
group which constituted 12.6% of Sri Lanka’s population in 1981.28
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The dark green coloured area in Map. 0.2 constitutes the area claimed for the Separate Tamil
State. The outline given in Map 0.2 is the map which appears in all the literature, posters and 
pamphlets of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
However, during the course of the insurrection Tamil secessionist insurgents carried out many attacks 
government infrastructure in Colombo, its environs and in other Districts and killed many armed forces noli
I  !heC 198?^  f "1h r nhala C'VllianS ‘iVing ° UtSide the Nonhern and Eastern Provinces.Poor to 1994, the 1981 all-island Census was the last Census that could be held in the country In 2012 a comprehensive 
u t S ^  " •  *  -  V - e n .  the 20,2 Census data d o ,  he
Escalation of Insurrection after Pogrom-Riots of July 1983. After the General
Elections of July 1977 insurrectionary activities increased by another few notches.
Subsequently, the insurrection slowly worsened until the pogrom-riots29 of July 1983 which
was a watershed event in the country’ history. Up to July 1983 the total number of police and
armed forces personnel killed was 53. The first army soldier was killed only in October 1981
with one more killed by the end of that year.30 The first two air force airmen were killed only in
June 1983. The first three navy seamen were killed in action in 1984, the first death occurring in 
July of that year.31
After July 1983 the casualties increased to unanticipated levels. Up to November 1994 the
total casualties of the armed forces and police were 6,743 killed in action and 2,757
Wounded-in-Action.12 This increase was due to thousands of Tamil youth joining the different
insurgent groups and the insurgency escalating to a very high level of guerrilla warfare which
was qualitatively larger than anything before July 1983, and also due to military tactics which
the Sn Lankan armed forces had never experienced before.33 Civilian political leaders and
government, and the armed forces and police had never experienced an insurrection of this
magnitude. It took many years for Sri Lanka’s governmental system, armed forces and police 
to learn and imnrove them^plvpc
During the years immediately after the 1983 pogrom-nots, 1984-1985, there was a marked 
increase in the number of Tamil guerrilla groups. One writer mentions 35 groups while another 
notes a total of 42 groups.34 Numerous internal conflicts occurred within and between these 
guerrilla groups. In due course through internecine killings this plethora of guerrilla groups 
was reduced to the original five groups. In July 1987, along with the Indo-Lanka Accord, all
LTTE
LTTE
with the Indo-Lanka Accord, it later reneged and re-ignited the insurgency. In October 1987 
fighting began between the LTTE and the Indian forces. From October 1987 onwards the
LTTE 35
I lJ p 6 W° rd ‘P° gr° m’ |f  used intentionally to signpost the very high probability that influential sections of the
? S E 7 K 5 ? '  » org,“ '"E - “ -T“ " 1 * . ,d
ome S t h e  O V !  an organtsed massacre, especially of Russian Jews, and the word originated
sometime in the 19 Century (See Chambers English Dictionary, 1990:1125). S
3. t  . o u°nOUr ' 1977 ,0 2003’’ 2005: 873’ Sri Lanka Ranaviru Wansaya.
| |  See T a b le d  be°iow f"  J 977 ‘°  2° ° 3’’ 20051 ^  '6 2 ' ’ 5" Umka Ranaviru
34 J hel e event* and underlying strategies are discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5
Sri Unka"8And S  I S T l  ^  8 PeaCefU' S° luti° n t0 the Eth"IC Conflict
See Senaratne, 1997:89-102 Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1977-1990: Riots, Insurrections
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Capability to Conduct Protracted Guerrilla Warfare. From 1987 it was the
LTTE alone which prosecuted the insurrection. The LTTE’s number of trained cadres was a 
very closely guarded secret by the organisation for obvious reasons.36 It had to have thousands 
of armed and combat experienced cadres to have carried out the military attacks described in 
this Thesis and these cadres would have had to be supported by many thousands of other 
personnel who gave logistic and other types of support.37
The LTTE’s ability to wage protracted warfare coupled with the support and assistance from
fellow Tamils in Tamil Nadu and the Tamil ‘Diaspora’ elsewhere in the world gave the LTTE
the ability to continue. That in-tum led to a range of consequences for the Sri Lanka State
(discussed later in this Thesis). Such protracted guerrilla warfare -  as discovered by many other
governments throughout the world - proved extremely difficult for the Sri Lankan state to cope 
with.38
By this it is not implied that the LTTE were experts in protracted guerrilla warfare from their 
inception in 1972-1976 and that they merely implemented a pre-designed master plan of 
protracted guerrilla warfare. On the contrary the initial actions of the LTTE (and the other Tamil 
militant groups as well) were amateurish and they committed many mistakes. However, as the 
pro-secessionist political mobilisation of the Tamil people continued at a gradual and steady 
pace, the Tamil insurgent groups had the advantage of time to gradually develop some of the 
characteristics of protracted guerrilla warfare.39 During 1977-1994 different combinations of 
Strategic Defensive, Strategic Parity and Strategic Offensive can be discerned in the Northern 
Province, the Eastern Province and in Colombo.
While insurgent leaders would undoubtedly have had some plans for future political and military 
actions, such plans could not have foreseen the complex trajectory of the insurrection from the 
early-1970s onwards. What the insurgent leaders, especially the LTTE’s leaders, were able to do 
was to manoeuvre and counter-manoeuvre and adapt themselves to new conditions and 
challenges which they faced from time to time from the Sri Lankan government and the Indian
Counterinsurgencies, Foreign Intervention for a discussion of this period.
Otherwise the government would be able to deduce the LTTE's capability to recruit, the support for the LTTE 
within ethnic Sri Lanka Tamils and popularity of the secessionist project.
38 ^ owever’ l^e Present author cannot locate dependable data on numbers of cadres.
This capability is in stark contrast with the two JVP insurrections (3 months in 1971 and 2‘/2 years, July 1987-
November 1989) and all the other Internal Security problems faced by the postcolonial Sri Lankan State such as the 
anti-Tamil nots of 1956 (about 1 week) and 1958 (about l'/2 weeks).
It is apposite to mention here that the LTTE developed only some of the characteristics of Maoist protracted 
guen la warfare. Due to the need lor brevity this is a subject which cannot be discussed in depth in this Thesis.
government. Concurrently they made use of whatever support came forth from the Tamil 
people living on the island and financial support from the Tamil Diaspora.40
2. Research Questions
Counterinsurgency is a complex and specific sub-category of warfare. Most of the time-tested 
Doctrines and military manuals are from Britain and the USA which are the two countries 
which have done the greatest amount of work in this area. In the Universities and military 
institutions of these two countries counterinsurgency is a subject which is given serious 
consideration.41 Sri Lanka army officers are aware of this literature and all middle-rank and 
senior officers who have completed training courses abroad and in Sri Lanka have also been 
exposed to this literature. Sri Lanka’s political leaders, however, have no systematic 
instruction in this literature other than through their own initiatives.42 Henceforth in this
Thesis when phrases such as 'counterinsurgency doctrine’ and ‘counterinsurgency theory’ are 
used, they refer to British and/or US literature.
The analytical framework utilised in this Thesis is grounded in counterinsurgency doctrine 
which spans approximately 50 years from the work pioneered by Robert Thompson in 1966 to 
the most recent US Army (2006) and British Army (2009) publications. These have been 
adapted to the Sri Lankan context by the present author. The process through which the 
following 7 research questions were identified is explained in Chapter 2. The following 
questions pertain to the Sri Lanka government of 1977-1994.
1. Did the Sri Lanka government have Political Purposes?
2. Did the Sri Lanka government give security to the Tamil population?
A clear example of this strategic and tactical adaptability was the LTTE's ceasefire with President
Premadasa’s government in June 1989. The LTTE wanted the IPKF to leave Sri Lanka as soon as possible as the
LTTE had realised that it could not keep fighting the IPKF indefinitely. The Indian government had the
personnel and military resources to keep the IPKF in the Northern and Eastern Provinces indefinitely, if it
wanted to. President Premadasa too wanted the IPKF to leave take away the main demand of the JVP’s 2"d
insurgency which was underway at that time and thousands of Sinhalese from the UNP, SLFP, JVP and a
variety of other political parties had already been killed and soldiers and policemen also killed. In June 1989 the
LTTE agreed to a ceasefire with the Sri Lanka government. Immediately the reason for the IPKF’s presence in
Sn Lanka disappeared. President Premadasa made this point and asked the IPKF to leave. After initially
baulking the Indian government withdrew the IPKF by March 1990. On 11 June 1990 the LTTE re-ignited the
insurrection against the Sri Lanka government (see discussion in Chapters 3 and 4 of this clever tactical ploy bv 
the LTTE). e r r
See Chapter.2 for a literature survey of counterinsurgency and discussion and critique of the literature within 
the context of Sri Lanka. A certain amount of literature from France has been accessed by the present author via 
translations to English. There may be equivalent counterinsurgency literature in Chinese and Russian academic 
and military institutions. But due to the present authors inability to read these languages or locate English
translations it has not been possible to peruse such literature. These matters are explained further in Chapter 2
Explained and discussed further in Chapter.2.
3.
5.
Did the Sri Lanka government neutralize the Tamil insurgents?
4. Did the Sri Lanka government gain and maintain popular support of the Tamil 
people?
base?16 SH Lanka 8° Vernnient seParate the Tamil insurgents from their support
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6. What were the relationships the Sri Lanka government’s counterinsurgency 
operations had with the Law?
7. Did the Tamil Nadu and the Indian central government impact upon the Sri Lanka 
government s efforts to counter the secessionist insurrection?
The Time Period Dealt-With in this Thesis. The year 1977 is a suitable start-date
for this research study as it was the beginning of the new UNP government’s tenure. The 
Tamil insurgency was also still (relatively) low in intensity. However, the approximately 16- 
year precursory phase’ of the Tamil secessionist insurrection from the early-1960s to 1976 is 
crucial for understanding the insurrection. This is discussed in Chapter. 1. The end date of the 
Thesis, November-December 1994, was chosen because it was then that the UNP lost power 
both in parliament and in the presidency. Incidentally this period of 1977-1994, a period of 17 
years, was, in 1994, the longest period that any political party had continuously governed Sn 
Lanka after Independence in 1948. In 1994 the UNP was defeated in both parliamentary and 
presidential elections and a new SLFP-led coalition government came to power. This new
government adopted an entirely different set of policies towards the Tamil insurrection. 
Accordingly, 1994 was determined as a suitable end-date for this Thesis.
3. The State Security System the NSC, M inistry of Defenrp
MoD) and the Armed Forces and Police
The agencies of the Sri Lankan government and state which were constitutionally, politically, 
militarily and operationally responsible for dealing with external and internal threats to the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country can be collectively referred to as Sri 
Lanka s ‘State Security system’. The army, navy, air force and police were the four main 
departments of this system. The apex body of the State Security system was the National 
Security Council (NSC). The NSC was the most important policymaking body of the State 
Security system and consequently had a great impact on all matters pertaining to security 
policy. The President -  who is the Head of State, Head of Government and the Commander- 
in-Chief of all the armed forces -  was the chairperson of the NSC. Traditionally, he or she 
was also the Minister of Defence. The other members of the NSC were the Deputy Minister
for Defence (at times when such a post existed in a particular government); the Secretary to
the President, the Secretary to the Deputy Minister for Defence, the Secretary to the MoD and 
the commanders of the army, navy, air force and police.
The commanders of the army, navy, air force and police were the principal advisors to the 
NSC on matters pertaining to their departments. Their advice may or may not be accepted in 
full or in part by the President and the NSC. Or their advise may be modified through the 
general discussion in the NSC. The director(s) of various intelligence agencies could be 
instructed to be present at an NSC meeting as and when required.43 In addition, the President 
had the option of co-opting for NSC meetings other Ministers, military officers, civilian 
bureaucrats and advisors as the need arose. Depending on the security situation the NSC
armed
modified as seen fit by the NSC. On other occasions the President and/or the Deputy Minister 
along with their advisors conceived plans which were then discussed at the NSC and the 
opinions sought from the commanders of the armed forces. When requested by the NSC or 
MoD to do so, the Operations Branches of the respective armed forces prepared detailed 
military appreciations and assessments. Ultimately the President, by virtue of all his/her 
constitutional responsibilities had to bear the final responsibility for all NSC decisions.
One tier down from the NSC is the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The MoD was in overall day- 
to-day control of the army, navy, air force and the police. The MoD was responsible for all 
armed forces and police promotions, appointments, budgetary allocations and procurements. 
The army, navy, air force and police were organised below the MoD as separate departments 
with their respective commanders being the chief executive officer of each institution. The 
order of precedence in State ceremonies and official publications was: army, navy, air force 
and police, in that order. The army was the ‘senior’ service.
After overall policy and strategy were decided at the NSC then the MoD ordered the armed 
forces and police to implement such policies and operations. Each armed force was 
responsible for implementing the missions which fell within its purview. Any operation which 
required the coordinated effort of more than one armed force was conducted as a ‘joint 
operation’. The army was the dominant organisation in the Sri Lankan state security system 
when armed insurrection was underway. The army was responsible for preparing the
Up to 1994/95 the primary state intelligence agency was the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB), which was 
pa o t e Police. The police also has the CID (Criminal Investigations Department) and TID (Terrorist
n T ,  gTh°nS IV'S'?n)' The Army’S MiM,ary Inte,l’gence Corps (MIC) was created in 1990 and is operational 
o date. The navy and air force too have created intelligence sections of their own. All relevant information from 
these organizations can be made available to the NSC.
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Operational Plans and Operation Orders for ground operations. These plans excluded the
details of close air support or logistics operations which happened to be the responsibility of
the navy and/or the air force, as the case arose. The navy and the air force prepared such plans 
and these were then incorporated into the overall plan.
For large military operations Army headquarters (AHQ) in Colombo prepared the overall 
plans and Operation Orders, and the Divisions deployed in the North and East were then 
ordered to implement these. In the case of strategies which were to be implemented over a
LTTE
in a specific jungle area in the North or East - AHQ would issue an ‘operational directive’
which indicated the result sought by the government. The Division commander of that
particular area, along with his staff, then prepared ‘Operation Orders’ to implement the
directives received from AHQ. These operations were implemented through the Brigades and
battalions that happened to be placed under their command at that time. In conclusion, as can
be seen, in Sri Lanka the use of military force by the armed forces extends downwards from
the President and the NSC, the MoD, the army commander, the Divisional commanders, the
Brigade commanders and downwards. Equivalent chains of command operated for the navy 
and air force as well.
4. Geo hie and Demo hie Factors Relevant to the Tamil
Secessionist Insurrection, and. Government Counter Actions
Geographical, demographical and forest cover are factors which were highly relevant to 
understand how and why the Tamil insurgency developed 1977-1994.44 Concurrently, these 
factors were equally relevant to counterinsurgency military and police operations as well. In
this section we will examine some of the relevant factors. One of the most important aspects 
of this section is to compare and contrast Map 0.2 and Map 0.3.
The Northern Province is composed of the Districts of Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaittivu, 
Mannar, and Vavuniya. These are the Districts in which the heaviest fighting occurred. The 
Jaffna District consists of the Jaffna Peninsula and the islands which lie off the North-Western 
coast of the peninsula. The peninsula proper is densely populated -  predominantly by ethnic 
Tamil people - and experienced repeated bouts of very heavy fighting and population
"  Sn, La,nka is 30 island in the Indian 0 c ean situated approximately 22 miles off the southern coast of India. It 
has a land area of 65,610 Sq.Km. In 2007 it had an estimated population of 20.01 million (thee last census was 
conducted in 198 . The 1991 and 2001 censuses could not be conducted over the entire island due to the Tamil
insurgency. Population estimates are projections based on the 1981 figures). The country is divided into 9 
Provinces within which are encompassed 25 Districts.
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These Districts are very much less densely populated than the Jaffna Peninsula. However, 
among the four of them, too, there are demographic differences. From 1987 to 1994 large 
areas of these four Districts were under the dominance of the LTTE.
The Eastern Province consists of the Districts of Trincomalee. Batticaloa, and Ampara. These
three Districts have a demographic composition widely different from the Northern Province.
Significant numbers of Muslims and Sinhala people are settled in these three districts. During
the period 1983-2001 different parts of these three Districts came under the dominance or
control of the LTTE. Although this dominance was never as strong as it was in the Northern
Province, it did mean that for many years at a stretch the writ of the government did not hold
sway over large tracts of land and many thousands of Tamil people. It is from the above 8
Districts, along with Puttalam District (see below) that the secessionist movement aimed to
create the separate state of Tamil Eelam. These were the 8 Districts where the fiercest fighting of 
the secessionist insurrection occurred.
The North Western Province is composed of the Districts of Puttalam and Kurunegala. Of
these two Districts the secessionist made a claim for Puttalam District which had some Tamils
settled within it. Kurunegala District which is to the east of Puttalam District is a predominantly
and densely populated by Sinhalese. During the insurgency there were a number of (relatively)
small attacks in Puttalam District. But there were no attacks or military operations of the
magnitude, for example, as discussed in Chapters 5 (i.e. the 1990-1994 period) because the
Tamil insurgents could not have base camps so far into the south of the island. The main reason
for this was the substantial numbers of Muslims and Sinhalese civilians who lived in this
District. Any movement of large numbers of LTTE cadres would be noticed and information
given to the government. However, individual LTTE cadres on their way to and from Colombo
and small groups of cadres which carried out ambushes did survive in the Puttalam District. But
not large numbers of LTTE cadres as in the case of areas north of the Mannar-Vavuniya-Welioya 
line.
North Central Province consists of the Districts of Anuradhapura and Pollonnaruwa. The 
predominant population of these Districts are Sinhalese. These Districts border the Northern and 
Eastern Provinces. The LTTE had bases and supply routes which sometimes ran along the 
borders of these Districts. Sinhala villages along the borders of these Districts were frequently
attacked by the LTTE to induce out-migration from these areas. Both the army and the LTTE 
patrolled and ambushed each other in these border areas.
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The Uva Province is composed of the Districts of Badulla and Monaragala. The LTTE had 
bases in the thick jungles which straddled Monaragala and Ampara Districts and attacked 
villages in both districts to induce out-migration, dissuade civilians from going into jungle areas 
and also to intimidate the civilians into non-cooperation with the government.
The remaining four provinces were only rarely affected by the insurgency. These were the 
Central Province: composed of Matale, Kandy, and Nuwara Eliya Districts; Western 
Province: composed of Colombo, Gampaha, and Kalutara Districts; Sabaragamuvva Province: 
composed of Kegalle and Ratnapura Districts; Southern Province: composed of Galle, Matara, 
and Hambantota Districts. Of the above, it was only Colombo District -  along with a few rare 
attacks in Kandy and in Hambantota Districts -  that was affected by the insurgency. Colombo 
city was the target for many bomb attacks from 1984 onwards.
A comparison of Maps 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4 gives a clear idea of the demographic and forest 
cover reasons for the secessionist movement’s overall strategy. When Map 0.2 is set side-
by-side with Map 0.3 the correlation between the settlement pattern of ethnic groups and the 
Tamil secessionist demand for the Eastern Province becomes apparent.
As is evident from Map 0.3, the Sinhalese majority are concentrated in the south and western
parts of the island. But many also live in the Eastern province. The Northern Province is
predominantly populated by the Tamil ethnic group. The Northern Province is also the
province where secessionist ideas were the strongest. The Northern Province was also the area
in which the fiercest fighting occurred. The Trincomalee District has all three ethnic groups
within it, while the Batticaloa District has a large percentage of Tamils, some Muslims and a
very few Sinhalese. The yellow areas denote areas where all three ethnic groups have less
than 50% of the population. The yellow coloured areas are in Puttalam and Ampara Districts.
This demographic character is the most important reason why Tamil insurgents were not able
to make much impact in both the Puttalam and Ampara Districts. The blue areas in the centre
of the island denote Upcountry Tamil settlements in and around the Tea Plantations of that 
area. These areas were largely unaffected by the insurrection.
A comparison of Map.0.3 and Map 0.4 illustrates the link between the secessionist 
insurrection and the Forest Cover of the island.
»
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As can be seen a great area of the Northern Province and considerable areas of the Eastern 
Province are under forest cover. The LTTE was greatly assisted by these forests within which 
it established numerous camps. However, it needed access to Tamil populated towns and 
villages for essential supplies such as food and medical supplies. The LTTE had supply
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sources from the sea through which weapons, ammunition, medicines in bulk and other 
non-perishable items could be brought. But perishable food was obtained via numerous 
methods from within the country itself. These jungle bases offered sanctuary to the LTTE to
carry
insights can be gained by comparing Maps 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4 with each other.
5. Structure of the Thesis
This Thesis is composed of the Introduction and six Chapters. Chapter. 1 deals with the history 
of Ethnic Competition and Violence in Sri Lanka, and, the politically and militarily salient 
features of the Tamil secessionist mobilisation from the 1950s to 1976. It is useful to discuss 
these matters before discussing insurgency and counterinsurgency and the 7 Research 
Question, as is done in Chapter.2. This is because Chapter. 1’s subjects set the specific 
historical, political, regional political and military context to discuss counterinsurgency 
doctrine in general and also the specific problems posed by the Sri Lankan case.
Chapter.2 is devoted to a discussion of counterinsurgency theory, including published 
academic books and military manuals of the defence establishments of the USA and Britain, 
and, the development of the 7 Research Questions. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 deal, in chronological 
order, with the three mam phases the 1977-1994 period can be divided into. Each phase is 
separated from the other by qualitative changes in the insurrection.45 Each of these Chapters 
incorporates empirical information assembled from a wide range of sources. The Chapters are 
in chronological order as each period has within it the antecedents and consequences of 
insurgent and counterinsurgent military strategies, tactics, military set-backs, military 
victories and attempts at political discussions and negotiations which preceded them. The 
strategies and set-backs of each period impacted upon the period that followed it.
Chapter.3 analyses the first seven years of President J.R. Jayewardene’s government from 
1977 to the 1983 pogrom-riots. These riots were a watershed in the entire insurrectionary 
process, and the escalation of the Tamil insurgency was a distinct break from the previous 
period. Chapter.4 deals with the period from the pogrom-riots of July 1983 to the exit of the
Y  i  •
LTTE
From July 1983 the Tamil insurgency underwent a massive increase in intensity. During the
Chapter-3 begins with 1977 and ends with the pogrom-riots of hilv to s t t w , ■ • ,
an immense escalation of the insurrection »nH ;e tu ® e , , . ^ ^ 1S P°gr°m-not is the catalyst for
insurrection and therefore the b e T n 7 o f r h  ^  beglnninS ° f a" entirely new phase of the
re-ignition of (Hp u A .  , - L I Ch pter' 4 ' ChaP‘er-5 begins with the exit of the Indian forcere-ignition of the insurrection byjhe LTTE a„ain"o„nl7^7"'‘ n T "  " 'e eX“ ° r tne lnd,an forces and the
5 ends with the total electoral defea n 7 L  ■ Cha"8£S th£ PoIitica|-military situation. Chapter.defeat ol the UNP government.
initial four years (late 1983-early 1987) Tamil insurgents unleashed a wide range of classic2 ' 
guerrilla style attacks on the Sri Lankan armed forces and police. The government found it 
very difficult to deal with these mobile, dispersed rural guerrilla type attacks, which were 
coupled with attacks in the primary urban centre, Colombo. From late-1983 onwards the 
Indian central government implemented a ‘two-track’ policy where on the one hand it was 
deeply involved in putting diplomatic pressure on the Sri Lanka government to give 
concessions and negotiated a settlement with the Tamils. On the other hand the Indian 
government allowed Tamil insurgents safe sanctuary in Tamil Nadu and set-up training camps 
in India for Tamil insurgents. In July 1987 the Sri Lanka government was compelled by 
Indian government pressure to sign the Indo-Lanka Accord and the Indian Peace Keeping 
Force (IPKF) arrived in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of the island. The following 33 
month period - from July 1987 to March 1990 -  was an anomalous period when the Sn 
Lanka government and armed forces were not involved in military operations in the North and 
East and hence a detailed discussion of this period is excluded from this Thesis.
After the Indians left in March 1990 the LTTE re-ignited the insurrection in June 1990. 
Chapter.5 describes and assesses the government’s attempts to cope with the LTTE’s 
insurrection during the 4‘/2 years from June 1990 to November 1994. By 1994 the UNP had 
been in power for 17 years and had become highly unpopular amongst the majority Sinhala 
electorate. The LTTE’s secessionist insurrection had also escalated to alarming levels, and 
this was a primary factor in UNP government’s unpopularity. In August and November 1994 
the UNP completely lost governing power, first when it lost the Parliamentary elections (in 
August) and then it lost the Presidential elections in (November 1994). Chapter.6 is devoted 
to the overall Conclusions. The Annexures are all at the end of the Thesis.
6. Research Methodology
Data and information regarding the 7 Research Questions were located from diverse sources.
A great deal of empirical information regarding these 7 Research Questions are available in
the public realm but are scattered throughout newspapers, parliamentary Hansards, published
books, Reg,mental Souvenirs and journal articles. However, information regarding military
strategies, military operations, battlefield set-backs and defeats and accurate information on
rmlitary casualties proved difficult to assemble. Sri Lanka does not have a Freedom of
Information on military aspects of government policy had to be collected, over many years,
from a diverse range of sources and carefully cross-checked. Other than maps specifically
sourced to other publications, all the other maps in this Thesis were drawn by the author using 
this empirical date.
Every attempt was made to corroborate information on the 7 Research Questions gleaned 
from one source with information from one or more other sources. There was no one single 
complete’ data set accessible to academic research. Each category of information had its 
strengths and weaknesses. It is the combined force of all the information from all the 
following diverse sources which enabled the construction of the empirical foundation of this 
Thesis. Special mention needs to be made of the ‘Official Roll of Honour-1977 to 2003’ 
published in 2005 by the then government which proved to be an invaluable empirical source.
6.1: Interviews with some retired officers of the armed forces. Semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with some retired army officers whose names are mentioned in footnotes.
6.2: Proceedings of the Sri Lanka Parliament. The proceedings of the Sn Lanka parliament
are published as the ‘Hansards’. During important debates such as the monthly debate on the
extension of the ‘State of Emergency’ -  which existed during the entirety of the period
relevant to this Thesis -  matters related to military strategy, military offensives, set-backs and
such like were debated. The Opposition would gather information from its own sources and 
challenge the government in these debates.
6.3: Sri Lankan and British Newspapers from the 1950s to December 1994. Newspapers
were an invaluable source of information as they record with considerable accuracy the date
(and approximate extent) of incidents. They were contemporaneous accounts largely devoid
of second thoughts. Often there are inaccuracies in details such as the number of casualties,
wounded, extent of damage, and amount of weapons lost or gained etc. However, a
remarkably accurate contemporaneous record of military operations can be obtained via
newspapers. When carefully read over a significant period of time, newspapers enabled the
present author to deduce government military strategies, their success or failure, and strategies
of the Tamil insurgents. It was also possible to deduce changes in government strategies
during different periods of their tenure. Such matters would be considered highly secret and
hardly ever reached the public realm. The method adopted by the author was to read the
newspapers at various archives in Colombo, make (provisional) deductions and subsequently
have detailed interviews and discussions with retired military officers regarding the trends and 
strategies identified from newspapers.
British newspapers such as The Guardian, The Times and Observer
were extremely useful as, first, they provided coverage devoid of the prejudices and biases
specific to Sri Lankan newspapers. Second, they had correspondents in Delhi and Colombo23 
who had very good sources in both governments. Third, they managed to go into insurgent 
dominated areas in Sri Lanka and report from those areas whereas reporters from Sri Lankan 
newspapers were not tolerated by Tamil insurgents. The newspaper information was also 
cross-referred to the Casualty data in the ‘Official Roll of Honour-1977 to 2003’.
There are, of course, some disadvantages in newspapers. Deliberate misinformation can be
spread through newspapers. There was also official censorship and self-censorship via the
journalists or the newspaper company’s political and ethnic prejudices and biases. However,
on balance, newspapers are an invaluable resource of contemporaneous information provided
they are carefully used. They can provide empirical detail for obtaining insight into 
government and insurgent military strategies.
6.4: Regimental souvenirs, books and other publications by the armed forces and police.
The armed forces and the police publish souvenirs at various occasions commemorating
anniversaries or past events of significance. Some of these are termed as ‘Journals’ published
by various infantry, artillery and other regiments of the army. Newsletters are also published.
The author has perused as many of these as were possible to locate. Although they do not
discuss strategies or anything remotely relevant to contemporary operations, some of them
have accounts of past military operations and other events in the life of the respective
regiment which is of historical significance. Information in these souvenirs was useful when 
collated with information from other sources.
6.5: Detailed Utilisation of the ‘Official Roll of Honour, 1977-2003’. The ‘Official Roll of 
Honour’ is a large 860-page Book published by the then government in 2005. It is not 
available for purchase but kept, with very restricted access, in some Archives in Sri Lanka. It 
records the names, service numbers, date and location of the event which led to the death or
injury of all army, navy, air force and police personnel from 1977 to 2003. For the purpose of 
this Thesis, only the data from 1977 to 16 November 1994 was utilised.
The ‘Official Roll of Honour’ enabled the present author to make an independent assessment 
of the true personnel losses suffered on a day, a week or over months and years. It also 
enabled an independent corroboration of data and information obtained from newspapers and 
interviews. While newspapers were generally accurate in reporting the date and place a 
military event occurred, some other details were often vague and government casualty figures
were often under-reported and (alleged) LTTE casualties46 were over-reported. Often th e ^  
army’s only source of LTTE casualties was (alleged) LTTE radio broadcasts as the LTTE 
generally made it a practice to take away the bodies of their dead cadres. Often several
^  a
LTTE
released government casualty figures and these were exaggerated in the converse direction.
The date and location where each soldier, airman, seaman or policeman died or were injured
proved very useful. Although in a large number of cases this identification proved difficult to
establish, in any event this information was finally established and correlated with
information from newspapers, interviews and data and information extracted from Regimental
souvenirs. This enabled the reconstruction of an accurate and comprehensive account of the 
military operations conducted during these
The Tables of military casualties needs to be assessed correctly as they depict only the 
casualties of State personnel. As the State was concerned that was the data important to it and 
also because it just so happened that this data could be easily collected and preserved by 
routine State bureaucratic processes. These Tables do not give any indication of the most 
important acts of the insurrectionary process, i.e. the subversive processes underway within 
Tamil society, which were mostly verbal processes. During these years many hundreds of 
thousands of acts of subversion would have been carried out by the secessionist insurgents 
and their supporters within the Tamil population. These would have comprised of numerous 
acts of persuasion -  i.e. many tens of thousands of political discussions conducted in secrecy 
by Tamil secessionists at work places, gathering of friends and in homes. And acts of 
coercion -  i.e. numerous acts of intimidation, threats, beatings, serious injury and murder by 
Tamil secessionists against fellow Tamils who did not agree with them. In the vast majority of 
cases -  i.e. except murder, and that too mostly in the case of prominent individuals - these 
acts of subversion were completely ‘invisible’ to the State and the population at large because 
these incidents did not get mentioned in the press as they were not public acts and also 
because they were not newsworthy. This is a dimension of any insurrection which researchers 
need to constantly kept in the forefront of their minds because: first, these ‘invisible’ 
processes are essential for the growth and progress of the insurrection. Second, the number 
and nature of these very important processes can never be known by researchers as the 
insurgents who conducted these discussions and their audiences cannot, many years later be 
located. And even if located they will be reluctant to admit these discussion. Furthermore, due
-.eased lothe press by the MoD or ,he army. Second, ihe 
LTTH radio mtereep* as ^
to the long-drawn-out nature of many insurgencies -  including the Sri Lankan case -
individuals die of natural causes, get killed, move abroad as refugees or leave politica
activism altogether and refuse to discuss these earlier events in their lives. This is whj
recording of actual acts of insurrection -  i.e. attacks of vaiying severity, ambushes, casualties
of armed forces and police personnel and such like -  are highly significant because they give
an indication of the severity of the insurrection and the processes of subversion which 
underlie such acts.
6.6: Empirical information and data on the Sri Lankan conflict extracted from
published literature. Data and information scattered in different Books and Journal Articles 
have been utilised in this Thesis.
6.7: Cartographical Sources. Information from many maps from various sources have beer 
utilised in this Thesis. The sources of all published Maps are noted below each map. All the 
other maps without a specific source mentioned in this Thesis were prepared by the presem
author.
7. Scope and Limitations of this Thesis
This Thesis analyses and assesses the counterinsurgency policies of Sri Lankan government
from 1977 to 1994. To the knowledge of the author there is, at present, no other comparabl
study on this subject. It is therefore substantially original. However, the following limitation
of this Thesis must be acknowledged. First, this Thesis ends in November 1994. But th,
insurgency was militarily defeated on Sri Lankan soil only in May 2009, 15 years later. Th<
demand to secede has been pursued by Tamil secessionists in the Tamil Diaspora’ up to th<
present day. There are still numerous internationally active Tamil front organisation:
including those in Tamil Nadu which call for the creation of a separate Tamil state in Sr,
Lanka. The 1977-1994 period represents a discreet period in the insurgency when the country 
was governed by one political party, the United National Party (UNP).
A second limitation is the need to research and understand the inherent problems and
difficulties governments face when implementing counterinsurgency campaigns in ethnically
deeply divided societies like Sri Lanka. The persistent difficulties faced by postcolonial Sri
Lanka, as discussed to some degree in this Thesis, is a good example of this. This is a vast and
complicated subject which require many case studies and volumes in their own right and 
could not, due to the need for brevity, be included in this Thesis.
A third limitation of this Thesis is that i, does not deal with the guerrilla operations of th e ^
Tamil secessionist insurrection but focuses primarily on the actions of the Sri Lankan
government. The operations of the Tamil secessionist insurrection are assessed only insofar as
they shed light on this topic. While it would be desirable to consider their activities in depth, the
complexity of the Tamil secessionist insurrection are such that this would necessitate a separate 
volume of its own.
A fourth limitation is that humanitarian concerns and the human rights violations of the Tamil 
insurgents, and those committed by the Sri Lanka government and IPKF could not be touched 
upon. Again the need for brevity was the main factor, because to adequately describe and 
evaluate these violations requires an entire thesis-length study by itself. A fifth limitation of this 
Thesis emerged from the fieldwork, i.e. why is it that Sri Lanka army officers who have received 
extensive training and exposure to British and US counterinsurgency doctrine did not use the 
language and concepts of ‘counterinsurgency’ in the Sri Lankan context? An in-depth 
exploration of this question, however, cannot be done in this Thesis as it requires more time 
for detailed interviews with many officers -  both retired and presently serving -  more 
resources, and also works against the need for brevity of this Thesis.
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Chapter. 1
Ethnic Competition and Conflict,
and,
the Origins of Tamil Secessionism, 1950s-1976
This Chapter is devoted to an exploration of the competition and tensions between the two 
main ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese and the Sri Lanka Tamils. And, the inception 
of Tamil secessionist mobilisation. Part. 1 will deal with the former and Part. 11 the latter.1
Part. I gives an overview of the historical roots of Sinhala-Buddhist identity and how it was
forged in the midst of persistent invasions from South India and the prodigious efforts to keep
alive a hydraulic civilization built-up over many centuries. We will also deal with Sri Lanka’s
ethnic composition, ethnic competition and conflict, emergence and political mobilisation of
the Sinhala, Sri Lanka Tamil and other ethnic groups. Special emphasis will be on Sinhala-
Tamil ethnic competition in the postcolonial period. Part II will deal specifically with the
emergence of Tamil secessionism in the 1950s and a chronological account of the main
milestones which led to the call, in 1976, by the main Tamil parliamentarian party -  with
intense behind-the- scene lobbying and intimidation by nascent Tamil guerrilla groups which 
had already secretly formed -  for a separate Tamil State.
The subject matter of this Chapter is very relevant and needs to be kept firmly in focus whei 
in Chapter.2, we discuss counterinsurgency warfare and develop an analytical framewor 
suitable to assessing the Sri Lanka government’s efforts at countering the Tamil insurrectio 
1977 to 1994. This is the main reason why this Chapter precedes Chapter.2.
nJrh  SUbh "la“  f  ° f ^  3nd 11 ^  VCry 'arge ,n SCOpe' There is 3 8reat deaI of published secondary mated; 
on he J Ubh , there are manV debates and areas of contestation. Entire books and theses have been white
* e  level essential for this thesis due to the specific research questions and the need for brevity. This Chaptei
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Sn Lankan society is composed of four major erhnic groups - ,he Sinhalese, Sri Lanka Tamils 
(many of whom self-idemify rhemsel.es as 'Ceylon Tamils'1), upcountry Tamils, and Ihe 
Mushms.' The percentages of these erhnic groups in rhe ro„l population am: Sinhalese-74%, Sri 
Lanka Tam,Is - 12,6%, Upcountry Tamils - 5.6%, Muslims - 7.1% and other very small ethnic
rrrrvnrvo ____r \  - 1 s y * ^  . . Agroups
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The vernacular
Tkey have sealed and lived on the island for many hundreds of years. 'Upcounuy Tamils' are 
labourers brought to Sri Lanka by the British dunng the 19* centuty as labour for their Tea and 
Rubber plantations. In terms of relrgious composition. Buddhists - 69.3%, Hindus . 15.5%, 
Muslims - 7.6%, Christians - 7.5%, and other religions - 0.1% of the total. . . . .  ...........
languages spoken in the country are Sinhala and Tamil. Sinhala is the language of the
Sinhalese ethnic group and is widely spoken only in Sri Lanka.* Tamil is Ihe language of both 
sets of Tamil people and of most of the Muslims as well.7
Religion and language - e.ther singly or combined - are the primary markers of ethnic 
.dentity. The majority Sinhala ethnic group speak Sinhala8 and are Buddhists. Accordingly
S f  w iT te™  u ^ r iL WB „ S ,^ r  iS ir l f “ "kCd ,0 Sinhala-Taml. ethnic tensions. ‘Ceylon 
to be used. When Ceylon became a Republic in" 19 7 ^ "  formal mdependenc® ln 1948 lo°  lhis te™ continued 
majority of government and State institutions and corporations replaTeTceTlo'n Tfoth ^  V3St
be called ‘Ceylon Tamils’. But within Sri Lanka in governm 2 ^  ,nS,Sted lhal they continue to
themselves ‘Ceylon Tam.ls’, or just ‘Tamils’ or ‘H e l l  Tamils’ m,gr '  ‘heir descendants ca"
w “  r s  T yr allMh,nie groups-see *
Burghers, Malays, and Colombo Chettis Most of ihesl ^ ^  SmdhlS’ MalayaIees’ Dutch and Portuguese
groups who arrived on the island during the colonial p e r i ^ T h ^  deSCe"da"tS of various migratory trading
politically mobilised and are not discussed in this Thesis ^  ‘C gr° UpS are "0t col|ectively
4 Government of Sn Lanka 1982:32, S t o i c a l  Abstraci o f the Democratic Socia l*  Republic o f Sri Lanka -  
1982. mem °f Sn LanKa '982'34’ S,atls“cal Abstract o f the Democratic Socialist Republic o f Sri Lanka -
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1 Tamil is also the language of about a n l u t „ 2 l  Ch‘ldren the Sinhala language.
South Indian state of Tamil Nadu. English is undemoodTnd 'T ®  S'0be' m°S‘ ° f Wh° m live in the
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their identity is termed ‘Sinhala-Buddhist1. Sinhala-Buddhist Nationalism is a
powerful nationalist ideology which combines the Sinhala language, Buddhist religion and the
territory of the entire island into a complex entity. This worldview is the lived ideology which
infuses the majority of the Sinhala-Buddhist people who live on the island.9 Sinhala-
Buddhists are by far the single largest group in the country and assert that the island is a
Sinhala-Buddhist country' (Sinhala-Baudhha Ratak) and ‘belongs’ to them. They assert that
Sn Lanka is the country of the Sinhalese-Buddhist people.10 The history of postcolonial Sri
Lanka has witnessed the Sinhala-Buddhists, through their electoral dominance, gradually
occupying all the important institutions of government including president, prime minister,
parliament, the judiciary, the civil service, police and the armed forces. A significant minority
of Sinhalese are Christians, a majority of whom are Roman Catholics and the rest are 
protestants.
In the case of Sn Lanka (or ‘Ceylon’) Tamils the ethnic markers are primarily the Tamil
While
Catholics and a smaller proportion are Protestant Christians. Tamil ethnic identity and Tamil 
Nationalism is the second most powerful political force in Sri Lankan society. The Sri Lanka 
Tamils were, even before Independence in 1948, apprehensive of the political dominance of the
years
alienated from the Sinhalese and also from the (Sinhala dominated) Sri Lankan State. This was 
partly as a reaction to the mobilisation of the Sinhala-Buddhists and partly due to autonomous
processes 
separate 1
backgrounds. Middle class and above are proficient in English. But in rural areas the teaching of English is
w h f  live or do h ° f A feW Sinhalese “  mosl ° f whom are involved in trade and fishing and
Tamil!Ve "  d°  bUSmeSS ' n “ “  Where there are numbers of Tam,Is -  can speak and understand
9 The Sinhala-Buddhists were not, and are not, a politically homogenous entity. On the contrary the Sinhalese are
and especially ppy I M - m '1’ Ja"e’ Communal Pol,ncs Under,heDonoughmore Constitution 1931-1947,
SnFL l ^ elS nn sfFArtrCleS p d b°0kS ^  Hellmann‘Rajanayagam, D 1986, The Tamil T igers’ in Northern
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secessionist insurrection originates from within the Sri Lanka Tamils. A small
number of Tamils can speak all three languages. Sri Lanka Tamils and the Sinhala-Buddhist 
both have deep cultures -  different languages, different alphabets, different religions,
Map 0.3: Geographic Concentration of Sri Lankans Major Ethnic Groups
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b o u n d a r i e s
(Source: Richardson, 2005: 25. This Map is a colour version given to the author by Prof. Richardson.)
Map 0.3 shows the geographic concentration of the various ethnic groups. As can be seen, the Northern Province is 
primarily composed of Sri Lanka Tamils. They are also a significant proportion of the East too, but with considerable 
numbers of Muslims and Sinhalese living in the Province as well. These demographic factors and jungle cover 
contributed in important ways to the manner in which the Tamil insurrection wa«; conducted
Upcountry Tamils are the descendants of South Indians brought as plantation labour by the
British from mid-19th to the early 20th century. Most of them were brought from
31
the so-called depressed (i.e. “scheduled”) castes in South India. The Tamil language and 
Hinduism are their ethnic markers.1’ Economically they are very underprivileged although 
some among them have been able to leave the plantations and find employment and housing 
outside the Estates.14 This ethnic group is referred to by a range of names such as ‘Indian
Tamils
concentrated in the tea plantations of the central highlands in Sri Lanka.
Although there is some disagreement amongst social scientists regarding the matter, it is the
are
be conflated with the Sri Lanka Tamils. However, because the Tamil language and Hinduism are
common to both there is a special ‘affinity’ between the Sri Lanka Tamils and upcountry Tamils
which does not exist between any two other ethnic groups on the island. On the other hand,
because of the relatively recent origins and their so-called low caste status, the Sri Lanka Tamils
consider themselves far superior to the Upcountry Tamils and there is veiy little inter-marriage
between them. At the same time, however, fully realising the strategic significance of the central
hills and the plantations, several Tamil secessionist guerrilla groups have attempted to
incorporate the Upcountry Tamils into the secessionist project. When in their plantations areas
Upcountry Tamils have not associated with the secessionist insurgency but some of those who
moved or were displaced to areas of the Northern and Eastern provinces did join secessionist 
groups.
For Muslims the primary identity marker is Islam.15 All Muslims speak Tamil while most also 
speak Sinhala. A significant number, especially in urban centres such as Colombo and Kandy 
speak English as well. The Muslims are of heterogeneous origin. Some are descendants of early
arrived
---- ----  ^  ^  W ^  v x  0  ■  ■  ■  M ■
Muslim migrants from India known as Indian Moors or Coast Moors. Others are of Malay
origin. The sole cohesive factor within this community is their religion, Islam. Muslims speak
Sinhalese when living in districts where the majority of people are Sinhala-speaking, and speak
Tamil when living in districts where the majority are Tamil-speaking. The language spoken in 
many Muslim households is Tamil.
Z i S S y g f  » »  i 57, , " '  ~  Workers Sli ^  Welf„ e „ d
Historical Perspective / Z o / O n Z  ’ mmtgran, Plantation Workers in Sri Lanka: A
g-oup. 3 comPrehenslve account of the origins and problems faced by this ethnic
S W R' * * -  l988: H P l a n l a t i o r t s  Workers i„ Sri U f a ,  W ,lf„ ,
15 De Silva, K.M., 1988(b): 202, ‘Sri Lanka’s Muslim Minority’.
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1.2: The Historical Background to the Crises Facpri hy Sinhnio. 
Buddhist Civilization, and, the Invasions from South India
The relationship between the postcolonial state and the Sinhalese-Buddhist people is the core of 
a great deal of political disagreement and controversy in Sri Lanka. What should be the 
relationship between the Sinhala-Buddhist citizens and the state? What should be the relationship 
between non-Sinhala-Buddhist citizens and the state? What should be the relationship between
the Buddha Sasana What
which are in Sri Lanka consequent to invasions from south India and European imperialism -
and the postcolonial State? How should Sinhala-Buddhist people assess the conversion of
Buddhists to Christianity or Islam and thereby their gradual numerical reduction? Unresolved,
these questions reside in the tumultuous core o f the postcolonial Sri Lankan state and society.
They are the fount from which myriad violent political tensions and conflicts originate. These
processes generate and continue to reproduce the nexus between Buddhism, the Sinhala-
Buddhist people, non-Sinhala-Buddhists, and political violence in postcolonial Sri Lanka.
Buddhism per se (i.e. Buddhism of the Canonical texts, the Tripitakal7) is not material to
political violence in Sri Lanka. However, mediated through Sinhala-Buddhist ethnic political
mobilisation and the growing affinity between the Buddha Sasana and the state, 'actually
existing Buddhism’ (i.e. the total of Buddhist institutions, beliefs, practices, and adherents) is 
intricately entwined with political violence in Sri Lanka.
Sinhala beliefs in their origin on the island are rooted in the Mahavamsa, (the 'Great Chronicle’) 
of the Sinhalese, written around 400-500 A.D.18 It says that the Buddha (allegedly) bequeathed 
the island to the Sinhalese . In the first chapter of the Mahavamsa are recorded accounts of three 
visits by the Buddha to Sri Lanka - one each in the north, east and south of the island - during 
which he is said to have visited sixteen locations. These sixteen places consecrated by the
Solosmasthana
be visited by hundreds of thousands of Sinhala-Buddhist pilgrims -  along with Buddhists from 
other countries - during various holy days of the year up to the present day. Prince Vijaya, a
’S l u ! ’ I f ^ PerSi“  of Traditlons in ‘Post-Traditional’ Buddhist
property. IUs virt^a^^analogous t^Ch^irch’°^ BUddha)’ ^  ^  ^  m° " ksh° od> a"d - “ I
Buddhi^Canon1 is' called^ ^ iU^Trin'l ^ dpr^ f . ice: lraditional buddhism in the rural highlands o f Ceylon. The
5 =5? 3523s 3£E£££ 2 s?
Getger, W.lhelm (trans.), .912, The Mahavamsa or,he Grea, Chronicle of Ceylon
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north Indian Prince and his followers who are
arrived
the mythical ancestors of the Sinhalese are
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Buddha is supposed to have declared that it was in Sri Lanka that his Dhamma (‘Teaching’) 
would flourish, and the Mahavamsa says the Buddha bequeathed the island to Prince Vijaya and 
his followers. They, along with the Buddha’s Dhamma, were to prosper and flourish on the 
island.19 This is the origin of two very powerful formulations of Sinhala-Buddhist identity, the 
concept of Dhammadipa (‘Island-of-the-Teaching’) and Sinhadipa (‘Island-of-the-Sinhalese’; 
‘Sinha’ means Lion in the Sinhalese language. Thus, the Sinhalese are ‘The-People-of-the- 
Lion’). This, very briefly, is the charter-myth of the Sinhalese. This story is well-known to all 
Sinhala-Buddhists to this day and is a very powerful element in the identity of the Sinhalese.
The Mahavamsa goes onto to narrate (with improbable embellishments) numerous epic events 
centred around the fate of Sinhala Kings, their efforts to keep the island a unified polity under 
one Buddhist monarch, the resistance against invaders from South India, the furtherance and 
protection of the Buddha Sasana, and wars of unification. The Mahavamsa is not a modern 
history book and should not be judged as such. The fundamental message of the Mahavamsa is 
to advocate the indissoluble unity that should exist between the Sinhala people, the Buddha 
Sasana, and the entire territory o f the island. The land, the people, and the religious system are 
seen as fused into one entity.20 The need to unify the entire island under one Kingdom, i.e. one 
State, was an important component of this set of exhortations. This same message is found in
literary 21 and, as
Kemper usefully draws our attention to, within a wide range of other secondarily significant texts 
such as poetry, Ayurvedic medicine volumes, astrological treatises, monastic rules, and stories of
the Buddha. literary
Buddhist kingship which persisted - with periodic declines23 and resurgences - for approximately 
22 centuries from about 300 B.C. to 1815 when the entire island was captured by the British.
It is especially important to note the periods of decline and decay. The history of Sinhala- 
Buddhist civilisation is a story of long periods of struggle against invaders from South India
»  C* f :  W helm  (trans.), 1912, The Mahavamsa or the Great Chronicle o f Ceylon
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interspersed with periods of peace when the (relatively) small kingdoms built-upon
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the previous achievements of their hydraulic civilisation and managed to progress some
distance.-4 They would then be invaded again from South India and have to expend scarce
blood and treasure to beat back the invaders. Except for the European invaders which began
with the Portuguese in 1505, all the previous invasions and threats to Sinhala civilisation
came from India.-5 It is these periods of decline that under-gird the existential anxiety of the
Sinhalese up to the present day and consequently, is one of the primary political and cultural 
founts which nourishes Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism.
A case can be made that a type of Sinhala-Buddhist (proto) nationalism had developed in the 
precolonial period. Even if not as old as when the Mahavamsa (i.e. the Great Chronicle) was 
written, i.e. 400-500 A.D., a number of scholars consider that by the 10,h century A.D. an 
identifiable Sinhalese-Buddhist ethnic consciousness had formed.26 This fact itself is significant
because
The ideology of nationalism among the Sinhalese derives substance, strength and historical
legitimacy from the Chronicles. The Mahavamsa asserts that a unified state encompassing the
entire island is the ideal which should be achieved and preserved. The act of compilation of the 
Chronicles themselves was an act of political significance.*
[■••]. the Ceylon chronicles gave political lessons from the past applicable only to the 
particular situation of the Sinhalese nation. In this way, a form o f nationalism originated
in ancient Ceylon which was rather close to modern nationalism with its conception o f
a united nation with common linguistic, cultural and religious traditions. The
chronicles served as educational works to cultivate this consciousness of national identity 
[emphasis added], 3
It should be noted that Bechert talks of a form of nationalism. He assesses that the fact that 
Sinhala-Buddhist ideologues (the Buddhist monks who compiled the Chronicles) wrote these 
texts in 400-500 A.D. is, by itself, a profoundly significant issue. 400-500 A.D. is approximately 
a 1,000 years before the development of capitalism in western Europe and the imperial 
expansion which, according to conventional wisdom, is the supposed origin of all contemporary
l S e d etobuildKu ^ n  the9 h H28'.32 * °[  Lm ka' for descriPd°ns of Sinhalese kingdoms wh.ch
HpL c J ?  8 ’ a u u 59"64’ TH dlQn FacWr in the SecLiri'y Perspectives o f Sri Lanka for accounts of the 
devastation caused by the most damaging of invasions from South India.
A S ^ y a T fiam\EeVA S '  °J D e  Si,va' Chandra Richard- I9«7- Sri Lanka :
S X  1 * * < »  ' S S L *  r » ,  good
27 Bechen, 1978: 8, ‘The Beginnings of Buddhis. Historiography: Mahavamsa and Political Thinking'.
third world nationalist movements.28 While it is correct that it was European imperialism
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which brought constitutionalism, the Roman-Dutch legal system, Christianity, representative 
democracy, the political party system, the plantation economy, the Court system, ‘print 
capitalism , and the modem road and railway system to the island, pre-colonial (i.e. pre-1505) 
Sinhalese-Buddhist beliefs related to the ‘sacred’ association between the Sinhala people, the 
Buddha Sasana and entire territory of the island Lanka also continued to exist, side-by-side with 
the transplanted institutions'"' that the Europeans introduced. These pre-colonial set of ideals 
and concepts continuously inspired Sinhala-Buddhist activists, writers, Buddhist monk-cum- 
scholars, Sinhala-Buddhist politicians and the general public: “certain institutional arrangements 
in Sri Lanka, from very early times, gave further expression to the idea of a Sinhala-Buddhist
nation”.30
Bechert argues that the writing of the Mahavamsa Chronicles was a part of intentional political 
activity of a (proto) nationalist kind. The Chronicles are among the few tangible objects which 
have been preserved up to the present day.31 These Chronicles themselves are unique in south 
Asia and have no counterparts on the Indian mainland.32 Bechert’s judgment that the Chronicles
are
be given thoughtful consideration:
The origination of a historical literature in Ceylon in the existing form was an intentional 
act of political relevance. Its object was the propagation of a concept of national identity 
closely connected with a religious tradition, i.e. the identity of the Sinhala Buddhists. 
This idea has shaped the history of Ceylon from the days of the earliest chroniclers to the 
present day in its particular way. Without the impact o f this idea, the remarkable
• .» | • r . , - as well as o f the political traditions in spite o f the vicissitudes 
in the history o f the island would have been impossible [emphases added].33
The last sentence in the above passage deserves very close reading and reflection. It is precisely 
this idea that under girds the claims by present-day Sinhalese.
29 Anderson, 1983 Imagined Communities.
Democracy. ° f Chap,er8 '^ p l a n t e d  Institutions’ in Sri Lanka -  Third World 
ChSange0beyeSekere' Ga"anath' 286’ Vicissitudes ° f Sinhala-Buddhist Identity through Time and
political and W° U'd ^  beC" embedded in the nu“ s ‘non-textual‘
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The Impact of the Invasions from South India, circa 300 B.C. to
1200 A.D. In addition to the above, the many invasions of the island by South Indian
regional Empires and Kings added to the creation of the Sinhala-Buddhists’ worldview. The 
invasions were sometimes successfully resisted but on numerous occasions South Indian 
invaders managed to control large areas of the island and stayed for considerable periods of 
time. In any event these invasions were a frequent occurrence from at least 200 B.C. onwards. 
In 177 B.C. two South Indians’ captured power at Anuradhapura and ruled for 22 years. A 
decade later this was followed by another named Elara who ruled for 44 years.34 Elara was 
defeated by a strong Sinhalese King, King Dutugemunu, who is honoured with high praise in 
the Mahavamsa and venerated to this day by Sinhala-Buddhists. During the subsequent 
centuries strong and capable Sinhala kings arose at various times and managed to unify the 
entire island. Simultaneously they expanded the Hydraulic civilisation of the Sinhalese. They 
expanded and repaired the irrigation system of reservoirs and canals which sustained rice 
cultivation. The mam function of these reservoirs was the storing and managing of rain water, 
managing rivers and canals and the cultivation of rice. This irrigation system won high praise 
from British colonial archaeologists and irrigation scientists, one of whom wrote in 1859 that:
It is possible that in no other part of the world are there to be found within the same space the
remains of so many works for irrigation, which at the same time, of such great antiquity and of
such vast magnitude as in Ceylon.35
The invasion and occupation of large parts of the island by South Indians continued at 
periodic intervals and less capable Sinhala Kings succumbed to these invasions.36 However,
turmoil
seem to have cemented a growing historical tradition in the core of which was ingrained a
territorial
independence [emphases added].”37 In the eleventh century the Chola empire of South India
invaded. They occupied the region where the rice-growing hydraulic system flourished, the
Anuradhapura-Pollonnaruwa region in the north centre of the island, while the Sinhalese were 
forced to retreat to the south of the island.38
After the Chola Empire declined there occurred an invasion from South Indian in 1215 A.D.
“  De Silva, K.M., 1981: 12, A History o f Sri Lanka
36 See De ^  ° £ Si‘Va’ K M ’ 1981: 27^  o f Sri Lanka.
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which dealt a death-blow to the Hydraulic civilization of the Sinhalese of the north-
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central region of the island. This was the invasion by Magha of Kalinga who ruled till 1236
A'0 -39 His rule was especially destructive as he deliberately destroyed large sections of the
hydraulic system built-up over centuries -  the reservoir, the canals, the diversion of river
tributaries and the nee fields. Thereby he permanently and grievously damaged the hydraulic
civilization the Sinhalese had painstakingly constructed from at least 500 B.C.40 From
Magha s invasion onwards the Sinhala Kings and their 'Kingdoms’ were compelled to
abandon the hydraulic system and gradually moved southwards on the island, away form the
direction from which the invaders from India always came. Therefore it is a historical fact that
for approximately 1,500 years (300 B.C. to 1200 A.D.) the Sinhalese civilization was subject
to invasions from South India at periodic intervals. The ‘memory’ of these invasions and their
consequences on the Sinhala people were handed down from generation to generation of
Sinhalese through folktales, poetry works, narratives by Buddhist monks and the texts such as
the Mahavamsa. In the 14Ih and 15,h Centuries too there were smaller incursions from South
India. It was with the arrival of the first European invaders, the Portuguese in 1505 that the 
incursions from South India finally stopped.41
The modem Sri Lankan state system, political party system, administrative system, mass media,
Sinhala-Buddhist pressure groups, Sinhala ethnic entrepreneurs are all modem, post-19th Century
phenomena. As Jupp insightfully says, they are ‘transplanted institutions’ 42 And from at least the
late 19th Century onwards Sinhala-Buddhist’s have been inventing ethno-specific narratives and
practices and these have been grafted onto the older traditions and this process continues up to
present day Sn Lanka. Novels, poetry, newspapers, cinema, radio, and television all play a part
in the contemporary situation. However, these modem technologies and inventions do not 
exclude some level of cultural continuity with the pre-1505 past.
It can be argued that contemporary Sinhala-Buddhist ethnic identity is a complex form of 
nationalism which has distinct threads of continuity reaching back into the pre-1505 past along 
with attributes and innovations of 19th and 20th century vintage. There is continuity amidst the 
change: the inventions and innovations of the 19th and 20th centuries bear the mark of the 
colonial impact and the precolonial past. Both strands of Sinhala-Buddhist ethnic identity -
n l el l UPP: Jam6S ' 978: 2 ' 9-257‘ Ch» -  ‘Transplanted Institutions', in Sri Lanka -
in the Security Perspectives of Sri Lanka. De Silva, K.M
rspectives o f Sri Lanka; De Silva, K.M., 
76, 89-92, Sri Lanka: A History.
, Chandra Richard, 1987: 89-106, Sri
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continuity as well as change - have to be focussed
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on synchronously if
contemporary Sinhala-Buddhist ethnic identity, and ethnic political mobilisation in Sri Lanka is 
to be comprehensively understood
1.3: The Continuation of Colonial Attitudes and Structures after 
1948: the bases of Sinhala-Budrihists’ Grievanrps
When Sri Lanka gained independence in 1948 the dominant political party was the United 
National Party (UNP) and it had already won the general elections held in 1947.43 It was to a 
UNP government that the British government peacefully transferred power in 1948. The 
SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party) came into existence only in 1951. In 1948 the SLFP’s 
leaders were members of the UNP. There were hardly any outward signs of the ethnic conflict 
which were to engulf the polity barely within a decade. The transition from a colony to an 
independent state was a peaceful and smooth process which slipstreamed behind India’s 
freedom struggle and the British Empire’s exhaustion at the end of World War II.
UNP
dominated by highly westernised, English-speaking, disproportionately Christian, middle and
upper class Sinhalese. The UNP also had a considerable amount of wealthy upper class
Tamils, Muslims and Burghers (descendants of Dutch-Sinhalese, Dutch-Tamil, mixed
parentage) within it.44 Christian influence was considerable in the ruling circles in 1948, and
the English language and English culture dominated social intercourse. Those Sinhalese
amongst this group who were still Buddhists had also invariably gone to the same elite,
Christian dominated, English-language Colombo schools. They had Christian relatives and
friends and had imbibed British values of democracy, liberalism and the separation of Church
and state. They also looked with disdain at the Sinhala-educated and Buddhist middle and 
lower classes.
On the other hand the majority of the mass electorate was composed of Sinhalese who had 
been born into Buddhist families, had attended Sinhala-language schools and were imbued 
with the culture of the villages and small provincial towns in which the vast majority of 
Sinhalese lived, learnt, and worked. They were greatly aggrieved at the lack of recognition 
given to the Sinhala language and the Buddhist religion during the colonial period.45 They 
wanted this to change after 1948. From 1948 onwards this congealed into resentment against and
l  S '* De Silva- K M -. 1981: 489-493, 4 History o f Sri Lanka.
andlts^elhe composition. ^  ^  WmU Democracy- for an overview of the origins of the UNP
45 See De Silva, K.M., 1988(a): 68-70, ‘Nationalism and the State in Sri Lanka’.
opposition to the UNP government and also 
similar to the colonial years.46
against Christians who still had influence
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After 1948
Electoral Dominance and the Acquisition of Political Power by the Sinhala
Majority. After 1948 this large discrepancy between the rulers and the ruled was too 
volatile and unsustainable to continue, the pivotal factor being the Government-Voter- 
legitimacy relationship. To explain briefly: under colonialism the relationship between the 
rulers and the ruled was one of non-representative domination. The colonial government 
derived its authority from the British parliament in London and was not sustained by 
legitimate authority derived from votes of the Sri Lankan people it ruled.47
governments of Independent Sri Lanka were faced with an entirely separate political dynamic:
they had to obtain votes and be sustained by the support of a majority of the people they
governed. They had to win elections and thereby gain the legitimacy to govern the people
from the people who lived on the island. An overwhelming majority of voters were, of course,
ethnic Sinhala-Buddhists. And they collectively organised themselves into political
movements and parties. Leading up to and immediately after decolonisation, ethnic Sinhala-
Buddhists demanded the restoration of the pre-colonial status of their religion (Buddhism) and 
their language (Sinhala).
After 1948 electoral majorities determined governmental power and consequently political
which had a considerable number of Tamils, Muslims and Christians within it, in addition to the 
majority who were Sinhala-Buddhists, managed to retain governing power.48 But the Sinhala- 
Buddhists politically mobilised and supported the SLFP. An SLFP-led coalition won the General 
Elections of 1956, a watershed in postcolonial Sri Lanka. It can be argued that the Sinhala- 
Buddhists ‘captured state power’ in 1956.49 Once political power flowed into their hands the 
Sinhalese politicians set-about ‘rectifying’ their grievances: Buddhism and the Sinhala language 
were give prominence and public sector employment became dominated by Sinhalese. This 
‘rectification’ inevitably impacted upon all the other ethnic groups living on the island. The
46
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legitimacy of any Sri Lankan government began to be measured in relation to how
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effectively a government promoted the Sinhala-Buddhist ethnic project. If a substantia] 
number of Sinhala voters came to the conclusion that a government was not ‘sufficiently’ 
promoting their interests, then a shift of the votes of even a modest number of Sinhala voters 
was sufficient to defeat a governing party at a parliamentary election.
This was the precise fate which befell the UNP at the watershed general elections of 1956 (a 
mere 8 years after decolonisation) when the SLFP’s pro Sinhala-Buddhist electoral campaign
defeated the UNP. The UNP could not remain unaffected by the SLFP’s success with Sinhala-
Buddhist voters. The UNP too quickly learnt the lesson of its 1956 Electoral defeat. From this
time onwards it took measures to align itself with the Sinhala-Buddhist electoral bloc.
The rise of the SLFP as a competitor to the UNP in the 1950s went hand in hand with appeals 
to Sinhalese ethnic sentiment. After the resounding victory of an SLFP-coalition in 1956 
binnala Only legislation was passed, making the Sinhala language the only official 
anguage and Tamil civil servants were discriminated against on linguistic grounds. Rebuffed 
at the polls, the UNP responded by becoming as ethnically exclusive as the SLFP was.50
UNP
the competition posed by, and the need to emulate, the more overtly Sinhala-oriented SLFP (a
UNP
Buddhism Given Prominence by the Government and the Sinhala People. An
important part of Sinhala-Buddhist mobilisation was for Buddhism to be given the ‘foremost’ 
place in Sri Lanka. Organisations of Buddhist monks and Buddhist lay organisations lobbied 
for this. From the early-1950s onwards political mobilisation by Sinhala-Buddhists in tandem 
with, and sometimes on behalf of, the Buddha Sasana was a continuous process. Among the 
important milestones was the creation of the Buddhist Affairs Investigation Commission by 
the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress (ACBC) in 1953. This was the unofficial equivalent of the 
official inquiry which was requested from the UNP government in 1948 but which was denied
UNP
o -----*
Jaffna and some of the other Districts of the Northern Province) from June 1954 to May 1955 
and published its Report in 1956." It pointed out a wide range of grievances of the Buddhists. 
The victory of the SLFP at the general elections of April 1956 was a great fillip to the re- 
assertion of Buddhism. The new SLFP-led government led a year-long series of celebrations
5i ° ° nald b  ‘989: 6’ Incen,ives and Behaviour in the Ethnic Politics of Sri Lanka and Malaysia
and observances of the Buddha Jayanti (the 2,500th anniversary celebration of the
passing away of the Buddha) in 1956. The new government appointment an official Buddha
Sasana Commission in 1957 52 This trend set by the SLFP had to be emulated by the UNP if it 
were to retain any capacity to win Sinhala votes.
The UNP has Earned a lot since 1956, and it was anxious to establish its fundamental Sinhalese
Buddhist identity. Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake therefore pledged to restore Buddhism to its 
ancient glory and strengthen the Sangha.53
When Sri Lanka became a Republic and adopted the Is' Republican Constitution Buddhism 
was accorded foremost’ position (while formally acknowledging religious freedom of all 
other religions). This happened when a SLFP-led government was in power. In 1978, under a 
led government, the 2nd Republican Constitution was enacted. That too affirmed theU N P
foremost position to Buddhism. In 1977 a Department of Buddhist affairs was formed.54
This was upgraded to a full-fledged Ministry of Buddha Sasana in 1988, with President 
Premadasa himself as the Minister.55
During the last forty years the state has restored and preserved many ancient Buddhist ruins,
renovated places of Buddhist worship, built Buddhist temples, financially assisted temple
building projects, given government owned land to monks to begin temples, and built or
financially helped in the construction of numerous religious-school buildings within temple
premises. The massive programme of state assistance to the Buddha Sasana in
commemoration of the Mihindu Jayanti5b which took place during 1992-1993 is a case in
point: it was government policy to restore or repair 2,300 temples all over the island, induct
2300 novice monks into the Order and conduct numerous other activities. These are examples
of the hundreds of thousands of constitutional, organisational, and ceremonial events through
which the Buddha Sasana and the postcolonial state have associated with each other,
especially from 1956 onwards. It needs to be said that Hindu, Christian and Muslim places of
worship too were given some government resources but not similar to that given to Buddhist 
places of worship.
Reform mfohr SlnhalcseBuddh,st Revolution’ and Smith 1966b The Political Monks and Monastic
Ketorm , lor detailed discussions of the occurrences during this period.
54 Smith, 1974: 117, ‘The Dialectic of Religion and Politics in Sri Lanka’.
55 .^empl! r’ 1990: 194, JR‘ Jayewardene, righteousness and realpolitik’.
See Premadasa 1990, Inaugural Address of His Excellency R. Premadasa, President of Sri Lanka at the
S E n k T  °n FUnC,imS °f ,h e  Min‘Stry °fBuddha Sasam' and Ministr> of Buddha Sasana, Govt of
brought B ^ddhfl ’ u “T date,°n Which Emperor Ashoka's Emissary Mahinda is recorded as having
Poson Poya day (note, a Poya day ts a day of the Full-Moon). In 1992 this fell on 14 June 1992 was given
special recognition by the government because it was the 2,300lh anniversary o this event Year-long celebrations 
were conducted by the government from Poson Poya day 1992 to Poson Poya day 1993 §
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1.4: Grievances of the Tamils -  a fundamental cause of the 
secessionist insurrection
As the postcolonial Sri Lankan government and the State gradually developed a close ‘affinity’ 
with the majority Sinhala ethnic group, the gap between the government and the Sri Lanka 
Tamils grew larger. The close relationship between the Sinhala-Buddhists majority and the 
postcolomal government and State is central to the grievances of the Sri Lanka Tamils.57
Up to the present day Sri Lanka has functioned under three different Constitutions. First was 
the Soulbury Constitution’ of 1946 which conferred Dominion status to the island. From 
1948 onwards a significant number of Tamils wanted the creation of a Federal system. This 
was opposed by the Sinhalese and was not established. The second Constitution was the 1st 
Republican Constitution of 1972. And the third was the 2nd Republican Constitution of
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1978. From 1972 onwards the Sri Lanka Tamils have vehemently disagreed with both these
republican constitutions.59 Therefore it would be accurate to say that a significant proportion
of Tamils have never agreed with the constitutional set-up of postcolonial Sri Lanka from
1948 onwards. And as inter-ethnic competition for resources, especially for land, and
secessionism gained momentum within the Sri Lanka Tamils, more Tamils joined that
segment. Another Tamil grievance is in relation to the use of the Tamil Language in
government administration. A third grievance is State-aided settlement of Sinhala people in
the Eastern Province. A fourth grievance is employment of Tamils in government jobs.60
These disagreements have been going-on from the early-1950s and it has not been possible to 
arrive at any resolution.
Sn Lanka is a relatively small island with an estimated population of 20.01 million in 2007 61 
It has a relatively underdeveloped economy with agriculture being the main occupation of a 
majority of the people. A significant reason underlying the grievances between the Sinhalese 
and the Tamils is the fierce competition for most types of resources in Sri Lanka. -  e.g. access to 
university education, employment in the government sector, and land for all manner of purposes,
57, Se® RuSSe11’ J,ane' l982> Communal Politics Under the Donoughmore Constitution 1931-1947• 194-267
which discusses the political mobilisations of the Tamils and the Sinhalese in great detail.
59 Vy iS<,),n’ A' Jeyaratnam I980> The Gaullist System in Asia: The Constitution of Sri Lanka
, m  322 32M28' •* 1,77 r» « » ™ r ‘
“ t “ “ d “  8,e"  in T""“ U“ ' d Fro*. 1977: 324-328. BecU.m
9  In 2007 the estimated population was 20.01 million. The last census was conducted in 1981 The 1991 and 
are pro“ s based T th e  ^  '° ^  Tam" inSUrge"Cy' P°PU'ati0n eSt“
primarily for small-holding subsistence family-farms. This competition is systemic
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and was underway from even before Independence in 1948. A considerable amount of scholars
have worked on each of these areas. The competition for university education has been and 
continues to be intense.62
Out of all of them land is the most volatile and has the closest connection to the Tamil 
insurrection. There are very large economic issues at stake in the Eastern Province where there is 
a great deal of arable land and water has been made available via government-funded irrigation
'3
However, the Northern and Eastern Provinces are claimed by Tamil secessionists asschemes.
their -homeland’.64 This claim is not accepted by the Sinhalese or the government due to the non-
existence of any credible historical evidence for such a claim. Furthermore it is assessed as being
considerably unfair because a relatively small percentage of Sri Lankan Tamils are claiming sole 
access to a disproportionately large amount of land:
The Northern and Eastern Provinces which constitute about 29% of the total area of Sri Lanka are 
inhabited by 72.6% of the Sri Lankan Tamil population. This latter is equivalent to 
approximately 9% of the total population o f the country. In a densely peopled country like Sri 
Lanka, where the prevailing pressure of population on land is intense, 9% of its population 
claiming exclusive rights over 29% of its territory is itself somewhat unfair [emphases added].65
Migration took place within the island from the 1950s onwards and aggravated Tamil-Sinhala 
relations. As Kearney and Miller wrote in 1987:
There is little doubt that internal migration over recent decades has exacerbated ethnic tensions in
n Lanka. The movement of population within the nation has been the subject o f impassioned
political contention for at least three decades, sharpened and dramatized by the growth over the past
dozen years of a demand for a separate state on the island for the Sri Lankan Tamil minority 
lemphases added]. J
In any event there was no agreement between Sri Lanka Tamil politicians and parties and the 
Sinhalese and their political parties on these contestations for resources. In all negotiations with 
the Sri Lanka government -  all of which were brokered by the Indian central government (see
62
,he f^ ing f0r ba'anced anal>ses of ,he issues: De Silva, Chandra Richard, 1984, ‘Sinhala-Tamil 
ations and Education in Sri Lanka: The University Admissions Issue - The First Phase, 1971-7' in R B
oldman and A.J. Wilson (eds) From Independence to Statehood: Managing Ethnic Conflict in Five African and 
r T c o T  a a  \  ur," 1984' 'UmVerSily AdmiSSi° nS and “  tensions in Sri Lank7 M 1 S 2  t
L T a T a  I mn / T c  SllVa- chandra Richard’ and Daya de Silva, 1986, Education in Sri L ik a  1948- 1985. An Analysis of the Structure and a Critical Survey of,he Literature.
See De Silva, K.M., 1981: 505 and 562, A History of Sri Lanka for
“  T?mi|0UnimaeTmh ( l^50s) and the-accelerated Mahaweli Development Programme (late 1970s onwards)
6 Tamil United Liberation From, 1977: 323, Election Manifesto of 1977.
G H p1 G;!I :  T p 34;  ‘An APPraisal of the C ^ e p t  of a Traditional Tamil Homeland in Sri Lanka' Professor 
G.H. Pei ns was the Professor of Geography, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka.
cL s7queynces ^  D ia" e ^  ' '987: 911'•In,ernal R a t i o n  in Sri Lanka and its Social
discussion in Chapter 4) - the Tamils’ inflexibly demanded that the Northern and 
Eastern Provinces be joined together.
II
The early Political and Military Origins of the Tamil 
Secessionist Insurrection: From the Demand for a Federal 
State, 1949 to the Resolution calling for a Separate Tamil
State, 1976
Part II of this Chapter deals with the most important political and military conditions and 
developments which under girded the origin of the Tamil secessionist insurrection from the 
early-1960s up to 1976. A chronological approach facilitates the comprehension of the complex 
sequence of events. This also assists in understanding how each act of discrimination increased 
the alienation and disaffection felt by Tamils. The increasing sense of alienation gave impetus to 
Tamil political mobilisation and agitation and the parallel increase in the tendency towards 
secession. All insurrections are articulated, verbally, years before the first violent act occurs. 
While Tamil political mobilisation of the 1960s was not violent, this precursory period must be 
given due recognition as it laid the foundation for the subsequent phases of the insurrection.
The core of an insurgency always begins with the political disenchantment and alienation of a 
significant section of the citizenry (be it ethnic group, religious group or social-class) against the 
prevailing government. This is a political phenomenon and is initially non-violent and a great 
deal of talking and discussion precedes armed actions. This disenchantment, if not properly 
addressed, initially leads to the political mobilisation of a small ‘vanguard’ section of the people 
against the government and state. Such mobilisation could, if faced with more acts of 
discrimination from the government, lead to more people of the disaffected group becoming 
alienated and hostile towards the government and State. This can lead to the development of an 
insurrectionary movement. It needs to be immediately pointed out here that a government may 
not be able to concede - fo r  very valid reasons -  all (or even most) o f what is demanded o f it.
In Sn Lanka from at least the early-1960s onwards this was what happened within a significant 
minority of the Tamil people. While the secessionist political mobilisation of this period was by 
and large non-violent, this precursory phase is very important and must be given due recognition 
when analysing the Tamil secessionist insurrection. It was this precursory phase which laid the 
foundation for the subsequent phases of the insurrection. There was no direct violence against the
state, but Tamil secessionists intimidated Tamils who held moderate views. One can
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also see some of the early signs of Maoist-style protracted guerrilla warfare in the actions of 
these rudimentary secessionist groups.
This being said, however, it is not implied that the subsequent complex political and military
trajectory of the Tamil secessionist insurrection from the early-1960s was consciously planned
from the early-1960s onwards. The secessionist insurrection developed in a complex dialectical
relationship with the acts of commission and omission of the governments of Sri Lanka during 
these years.
The Tamils Demand a Federal System in 1949 and the Sinhalese Oppose that
Demand. The formation of the ITAK (.Illankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi a.k.a. Federal Party) in 
1949 began the active mobilisation of Sri Lanka Tamils’ for a Federal form of government. But 
this movement was actively opposed by the Sinhalese. Most Sinhala politicians and voters were
ITAK/Federal
— A --------------------7 — ^  A M I  V / U V
viewed the Tamils’ demand for a federal constitution as nothing less than the thin edge of the
wedge of a separatist movement.”67 There is a considerable amount of evidence which 
corroborates this assessment.
The ITAK/Federal Party continued with its political mobilization and gradually increased its 
support within the Tamil electorate. The apprehensions of the Sinhalese were increased by the 
increasing secessionist radicalisation that was active within ITAK. For example the following 
was said by the ITAK President at its Annual Convention in 1961:
We are a nation by all standards. We inhabit a geographically compact and iveil-defined
Z u T '  We SPeak 2 C°mT n hnSuaSe’ ^  are proud inheritors of a common heritage and 
culture as ancient as man himself; and above all we are bound together by that feeing of
oneness which is a necessary ingredient for nationhood, that consciousness winch you and I and 
all of us share whatever the part of the country we may live in [emphases added].68
The message which was clearly implied in this text was that the Tamils were a Nation and
therefore it followed that they should have a State of their own (and this was precisely the
trajectory Tamil politics took in the subsequent decades). Such views inevitably impacted 
upon and alarmed Sinhalese politicians and voters.
67
68 De Silva, K.M., 1981: 513-514,/I History of Sri Lanka.
From 1956 to 1961: Watershed Elections, Anti-Tamil Riots and
46
Tamil Civil Disobedience Campaign. In the meantime, the Sinhalese ethnic group too 
was politically mobilizing itself along the lines of more power and recognition for the Sinhala 
language and Buddhism. The general elections of April 1956 are widely recognised as a 
watershed in the politics of Sri Lanka and has been extensively researched.69 At this election
UNP
(SLFP) 70 SLFP
ideas and was successful in rallying a significant percentage of Sinhala voters to itself.71 It is the 
assessment of the present author that in these elections the Sinhalese majority ‘captured state
SLFP
language and Buddhism to their positions of pre-eminence lost to them as a result of 
colonialism.
Two especially volatile political issues lay at the centre of political agitation at this time -  what
was to be the ‘official language’ and discontent regarding the inadequate recognition of
Buddhism in the postcolonial order. There was a great deal of disagreement and debate about
these issues. In any event, two months after coming to power the new SLFP-led coalition
government enacted the ‘Sinhala Only’ Bill on 5 June 195 6.72 Outside the Parliament building
Tamil parliamentarians were involved in a peaceful Satyagraha (i.e. civil-disobedience) 
demonstration in opposition to the Bill.
These Tamil parliamentarians were assaulted by supporters of the government. That evening 
itself anti-Tamil riots began in Colombo and in the ensuing days the riots spread to areas of the 
Eastern Province. Six days after the rioting began in Colombo, rioting began in the Gal Oya 
Valley area of Ampara District in the Eastern Province. These riots were deeply shocking to the 
Tamil people.73 A ‘State of Emergency’ was declared by government and the regular army plus 
mobilised reserves were deployed to help the police quell the rioting and disorder. Sinhalese
See Wriggins, W. Howard, 1960, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation- Ju d d  James 1978- 7 l l m  a a  c - 
Lanka -  Third World Democracy, De Silva KM 1981 510 524 C J '  I '
Arti’r w ’ uW hXPt dlent- Z ‘an: Bandaranaike and Ceyi™- In addition there are many other books and Journal 
Articles which substantiate the crucial character of this election.
SLFP ifsSaS RD HHhn<!aranf f  Wh° had’ 195 *’ br°ken awa>'from lhc UNP and formed the
Front’) were able m J I t  f  m°"ks,  °rgamsation the Eksath BE‘kk» Penmuna (EBP, 'United Bhikku 
71 See Manor James 1990f 41^25 S,nhala-Buddhlst voters against the incumbent UNP.
73 Its correct title is Official Language Act no.33 of 1956
r lr? 2006: 272’ 5r/ Lankain ^ m o d ern  age: a history of contested identities. “The June
of 1915 They broke om in'the°wakeCUf renCe ^  V‘° len.Ce betWeen communities since the Sinhala-Muslim riots
some 200 ^  ° "  T ^  * “ *  Gree"  by Tam il Parliame"tartans and
disrupted the protest and oon ami t !  ? language policy whtch gave Sinhala a privileged position. Mobs 
P protest and soon anti-Tamil violence spread throughout Colombo; 150 people died."
mobs were the aggressors in a vast majority of cases. The army and the police acted
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impartially to quell the disturbances. Vittachi says that around 150 people were killed during
these disturbances.74
While the 1956 riots soon subsided, the underlying ethnic tension continued to persist. In 1957 
Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and the Federal Party Leader S.J.V. Chelvanayakam
had negotiations. On 26 July 1957 they arrived at an Agreement which is known as the 
‘Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact’ (also referred to as the ‘B-C Pact’). The Pact reached 
tentative agreement on a range of issues including the setting up of regional councils and 
devolving some powers to Tamils living in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, provisions for 
the use of the Tamil language, and land settlement.75 But Sinhala political parties and Sinhala 
pressure groups opposed the ’B-C pact’. The UNP played the most prominent role. Excessively 
inflammatory language was used: the UNP leader Dudley Senanayake said that it was “an act if 
treachery which would lead to the "partition of Ceylon”. J.R. Jayewardene characterised it as a
“betrayal of the Sinhalese”.76 The government was opposed by a long and relentless campaign 
which culminated with a non-stop demonstration by Buddhist monks outside the Prime 
Minister’s residence in Colombo. Finally Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike suirendered to 
the campaign and unilaterally abrogated the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact in April 1958.
Two months later the Sinhala-Tamil ethnic tensions which had built up with the ‘B-C Pact’ 
controversy and the Sinhala mobilisation against it exploded in violent rioting against Tamils in 
late-May and June 1958. These riots were much more widespread and serious than those of 
1956. This time throughout the island at least 400 Tamils were killed and tens of thousands 
were displaced.77 Organised groups were seen to be active. A state of Emergency was again 
declared and troops deployed alongside police to quell the rioting and disorder.
These riots encouraged the emergence of Tamil secessionist tendencies. These riots had a 
corrosive effect on the sensibilities of Tamils, created a high sense of insecurity amongst them 
and also poisoned whatever remained of Sinhala-Tamil relations.
Anti-Government Civil-Disobedience (Satyagraha) Campaign, January to
75 y “ta6hi’J ar'?ie’ l958:20’ Emergency '58: The Story o f the Ceylon Race Riots'.
S“  ^  f ' ,Va’ l^ 6:398' 400’ Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multiethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880
the complete text of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact’
77 5“  Man°r. James, 1990: 270, The Expedient Utopian: Bandaranaike and Ceylon. 
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April, 1961. On 1 January 1961 the ITAK/Federal Party began a
Satayagraha (civil disobedience campaign) in Jaffna. There is an element of irony here
because this was the re-activation of the Satayagraha campaign which had been planned
consequent to the 1956 ‘Sinhala Only’ Act and intended to be launched in August 1957. It
was shelved by ITAK in July 1957 with the signing of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam
Pact. But the Pact was abrogated in April 1958 and anti-Tamil riots occurred in May 1958.
This further alienated Tamils and enhanced their political mobilisation and by 1961 ITAK 
reactivated its agitation campaign.
The Satyagraha began on 1 January 1961 in Jaffna and soon spread to all the towns in the
East such as Trincomalee, Vavuniya and Batticaloa. Pamphlets were distributed and
demonstrations, meetings and marches were held. One of the objectives was to bring the
government’s administrative system to a halt and this objective was achieved. The
government could not normalise the situation for 3‘/2 months. On 17 April 1961 government
declared a State of Emergency and deployed the army in Jaffna and the Eastern Province.78
Throughout the rest of April and over the following months the army continued to be in
control of Jaffna peninsula and other towns in the North and East. Due to the Satyagraha
campaign and the government’s counter-actions, radical secessionist tendencies within Tamil 
youth witnessed a further heightening.79
The cumulative effect of the 1956 elections, the ‘Sinhala Only’ Act, the abandonment of the 
Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact, the anti-Tamil riots of 1956 and 1958, and the Satyagraha 
campaign of 1960/61 was to deepen the fissure between the Tamils and the Sinhalese people and 
the government. These were the years when the secessionist radicalisation of Tamils was born 
and increased. Tamil youth organisations were in the forefront of political agitation.80 It was in 
these organisations that one can discern the roots of the Tamil guerrilla groups which emerged to 
the fore in the 1980s. The demonstration effect of the JVP’s insurrection of 1971 against the Sri 
Lanka government and the secession of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh both added 
momentum to the nascent insurrectionary tendency within Tamil politics.81 Research done in
( J a f f n a f / T S o n e T / P'aCed io command of the resPect,ve districts: Lt.Colonel. A.R. Udugama
T S  B LnW M ann ' 7 m  (Tnncomalee), Lt.Colonel P.D. Ramanayake (Batticaloa). Major
T.S.B. Sally (Mannar), and Major C.F. Fernando (Vavuniya). See Ceylon Daily News. 19 April 1961 • I 'Armed 
Forces in North, East ; Sri Lankan Light Infantry 1975:179.
g0 Ceylon Daily News of 11 April 1961, TAMIL EELAM in 1962’.
ano^TMlTedThe r h , 7  PartyV ° Uth wi"g Tamil llainar ^ k k a m  (Tamil Youth Movement) and
£ £ £ £  * * ■ ■ ■  T- "  T W  -  Nonhem Sn J T X S S ' S S Z
81 Jeyaraj, D.B.S., 1985:17, ‘How Strong are ‘The Boys’?’, Frontline, 23 March-5 April, 1985.
subsequent years revealed that an
49
organisation called Pulip Padai (which
means Army of Tigers in Tamil) was created in 1961. This organisation withered away in a few 
years but was an interesting forewarning of developments to come.82
By the early 1960s even irredentist ideas of joining the North and East of Sri Lanka to Tamil
Nadu had also emerged within Tamil politics. Professor Myron Weiner’s Political Change in
South Asia published in 1963 mentions that Tamils wanted their language to be on par with
Sinhala and Federal state of their own. This was, of course, the ITAK’s demand. Significantly
some Tamils “threatened to separate Tamil areas from Ceylon and join them with the Tamil
areas of South India.”83 This is a contemporaneous observation made by a scholar and
incontrovertible evidence of the existence of irredentist sentiments amongst some Sri Lanka 
Tamils by 1962/1963.
Tamil Secessionist begin planning for a Separate State, 1972-1973. In the
UNP
Coalition, the United Left Front (ULF) came to power.84 Some policies of the new government 
served to further aggravate Tamil sentiments. Foremost amongst these was a new Republican 
Constitution enacted on 22 May 1972. Called the 1st Republication Constitution in publications 
on Sn Lanka85 This Constitution gave Buddhism the ‘foremost’ position while saying that all 
other religions had the right to be practiced. The Sinhala language was enshrined as the official 
language.86 The passage of the new Constitution was boycotted by Tamil parliamentarians and 
this Constitution definitely played a significant role in increasing secessionist tendencies within 
Tamils. In 1972 a significant number of Tamil parliamentarians decided to set-aside their 
political differences and formed the Tamil United Front (TUF).88 It was composed of the 
ITAK/ Federal Party’, some member of the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), the CWC 
(Ceylon Workers Congress) and individual Tami secessionists.
In May 1973 a TUF Action Committee was tasked with drafting a Constitution for a Separate 
Tamil State [emphasis added].8' This was a premonition of what was to come. This was 3
82
83 Narayan Swamy 1994:24. Tigers o f Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas. 
Weiner 1963:62, Political Change in South Asia.
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1978, which remains the Constitution of the Country to date. aepiemoer
87 ^ r Sinf he’ Sr' Lanka the modern age: a histor>' of contested identities.
t a S S r  Republican Constitution. Tamil United Liberation From, 1977: 322, Election
89 See Jupp, James, 1978: 20, Sri Lanka -  Third World Democracy.
ee Jupp, James 1978. 159, fn.9, Sri Lanka -  Third World Democracy. This Action Committee was chaired by
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years before the Vaddukkoddai Resolution (discussed below) when the Tamil 
United Liberation Front (TULF) passed a Resolution calling for the creation of a separate 
state of Tamil Eelam. As briefly noted in the Introductory Chapter, planning for the economic 
basis for a future separate Tamil state had also begun by 1973.90 This needs to be analysed at 
greater depth at this juncture and is done so below.
Tamil Plans for the creation of a Separate State, circa 1973. By 1973 influential
sections of Tamil parliamentarians and academics had begun to discuss and plan for the 
creation of a separate Tamil State. They paid special attention as to how to make such a state 
economically viable. Manogaran and Shastri are two sources which give useful details about 
these developments. Shastri had learned through her research that leading academics from 
Jaffna University had begun developing ideas from 1973 on how to make a separate state 
composed of the Northern and Eastern Provinces economically viable.91 To the best of her 
knowledge she writes that this had not been publicly revealed - except the aspects dealt by 
Manogaran in 198692 - until she published in 1990.93.
TULF
great detail how the Northern and Eastern Provinces combined into one ‘entity’ would be
economically viable. He had said that rice, fish production and subsidiary food crops were
sufficient for consumption and that there would be a surplus available for trade. Trincomalee
was to be developed as an industrial processing zone and once that happened the “lack of
modern industry in the north and east was no longer an insuperable hurdle to modern 
statehood [emphases added].”94
Foreign capital, foreign technology, and expatriate capital from the substantial Sri Lankan Tamil
Diaspora in the advanced industrial countries would help to set up not only the industries in the
processing zone but also the advanced infrastructure like telecommunications and airports that
were required to run a modern state. Most important, the new government would be free to
mobilize revenue and direct expenditure for the benefit of the local region and its population.
Equally important, it would be free to negotiate with and procure funding from foreign sources 
as an independent state [emphases added].95
Shastri wrote that she was also able to corroborate this information from other sources as
w oV' 9 helvanayakam- the leader of the ITAK. Already mentioned in the Introductory Chapter.
91 e26 ouaStn’ l99° ; 74’ The Matcrial Basis for Separatism: The Tamil Eelam Movement in Sri Lanka'.
92 ShaStn' 1990: 74' ‘The Material Basis for Separatism: The Tamil Eelam Movement in Sri Lanka’.
Manogaran, Chelvadurai, 1987: 179-180, Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka, Honolulu- 
University of Hawaii Press.
Lanka ShaStn’ AmUa’ ?4' f" '6’ Material Basis for SeParatism: The Tamil Eelam Movement in Sri
m ^ aStri’ * mita’ | 990: 73’ ‘The Material Basis for Separatism: The Tamil Eelam Movement in Sri Lanka’ 
Shastri, Amita, 1990: 74, The Material Basis for Separatism: The Tamil Eelam Movement in Sri Lanka’.
well. She says that these ideas had already emerged by the 1976 ‘Vaddukkoddai
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Resolution . Shastri reports that she also had extensive discussions with politically active 
Jaffna Tamil students and expatriates in the USA and came to realise that they were well 
aware of these concepts and plans.J6 It is pertinent to note here that it is not a surprise that 
these ideas had begun to be discussed as early as 1973 because, as mentioned earlier, a Tamil 
United Front (TUF) action committee had begun drafting a Constitution for a Separate Tamil 
State in May 1973.97 Manogaran explains the need to join the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces. He points out that the Northern Province is unable, by itself, to agriculturally 
sustain the population of even the North. This is due to the scarcity of water to expand 
agricultural production. He argues that it is from the land and water resources of the Eastern 
Province that food could be produced to feed the people in both Provinces.98
The reader needs to keep in mind that these published research texts are just a small fraction 
of the total amount of conversations, small-group meetings and secret documents and ‘think 
pieces’ that would have been prepared during those years. Of these the conversations and 
meetings are very important but have left no tangible evidence of ever having taken place 
unless some of the participants reveal this to a researcher. Shastri was fortunate enough to 
gain access to some of these conversations via the Tamil expatriates she was able to
interview.
The Underlying Strategic Reasons for Tamil Demands that the Northern and
Eastern Provinces be merged. TULF parliamentarians and Tamil insurgents who 
agitated for greater devolution of power from 1977 consistently and inflexibly insisted that 
they wanted the Northern and Eastern Provinces joined together into one ‘Unit of
• QQ
The economic, agricultural and food security factors discussed above in 
Manogaran and Shastri give an insight into the underlying reasons for this consistent
When the UNP government offered the District Development Councils (DDCs) 
during 1979- 1980 the TULF very reluctantly agreed to give them a chance to work but the 
Tamil insurgent movements completely rejected the DDCs (discussed in Chapter 3).
Devolution’.
demand.
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The Sri Lanka government was not agreeable to merging the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
In the government’s state security assessments such a merger and devolution of power to a
Unit comprising of the Northern and Eastern Provinces was seen as being highly dangerous
to the territorial security of the State. Especially as this was the area being claimed as a Tamil
homeland’ by Tamil secessionists. The government’s offer was to devolve power to the 
District level. This was rejected by Tamils.101
We can gain useful insights if, for a moment, we go forward 10 years to 1987. During the
crucial period July 1983 to July 1987 when the Indian government was involved in trying to
facilitate a negotiated solution (see Chapter.4), the Tamils were inflexible in their demand that
the Northern and Eastern Provinces must be merged. This was the main factor why numerous
attempts at negotiations broke-down. Eventually, in July 1987, via the enormous pressure
exerted on Sri Lanka by India (the Indo-Lanka Accord) the Northern and Eastern Provinces
were merged.10- The Tamils obtained their main demand We will stop here and renew
investigation of this issue in Chapter 4. What needs to be flagged here is that the joining
together of the Northern and Eastern Provinces is an issue of the highest priority to the 
secessionist project.
L5: The TULF Resolution Calling for the Creation 0f
Tamil State. 1976 and its Electoral Utilisation ;
arate
uly 1977
In May 1976 the TULF adopted a Resolution demanding a separate Tamil State. This Resolution 
explicitly endorsed armed struggle.104 It was couched in exceedingly radical and provocative 
language and sent a clear message to the Tamil people and Tamil youth in particular that the 
Tamils must embark upon an armed rebellion against the (Sinhala dominated) government 
and state. The Vaddukkoddai Resolution was a fateful turning point in Tamil politics. With this 
Resolution the established Tamil parliamentary parties threw in their lot with the militant 
secessionist movements. Although the wording of the Resolution suggested that the TULF was 
the Leader and it was calling upon the Tamil youth to come and fight under its banner, the reality
account. ForfurtherM apslnd de“ ee th riL T u c to r7 ch ap .e rD,StnCtS Whe" b° th Pr° VinCeS ^  take" in‘°
merging 'did* not t S y ' X T S S  in Sri ^  Clause 2.2. Bu, even .his
discussfon in Chapter 4  ^  figh' lng the lndian armed forces from October 1987. See
I  in“ urrVecdonen ‘hlS " "  "0l SUffiCien' ^  LTTE' 11 wanled "°lhi"g >«* ‘han a separate state and re-ignited
104 o
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was that it was the TULF which was being led by militant secessionist groups.105
The Resolution served to further politically mobilise the Tamil people in general and Tamil 
youth in particular. It raised high the political expectations of Tamil youth that a separate Tamil 
state could be near at hand. There is no documentary evidence that the danger of this rhetoric to 
the established political party leaders, the Tamil youth and to the Tamil people in general was 
understood at that juncture.106 While some analysts periodise the beginning of the Tamil 
insurrection with the ‘Vaddukkoddai Resolution’ the present author’s assessment is that the 
Tamil secessionist insurrection actually began in 1972 and the Resolution itself was a 
manifestation of the gradual ascendancy of militant Tamil secessionism within mainstream Tamil 
politics. The Vaddukkoddai Resolution was clearly a significant watershed in a 30 year long 
process which began with the formation of the ITAK/ ‘Federal Party’ in 1949. Following the 
Resolution political agitation by Tamils and selected armed attacks - such as killing of Tamil 
policemen which began in February 1977. While the armed actions got the larger share of 
publicity, the political agitation and promotion of secession was equally important.107
The TULF uses the Parliamentary Elections of 1977 as a ‘Referendum ’ for a
‘Mandate’for a Separate State. In July 1977, seven years after the previous elections 
in 1970, elections to Sri Lanka’s parliament were held. During the electoral campaign the 
TULF deliberately placed only one issue on its platform -  a demand for ‘mandate’ from 
Tamil voters to establish a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka. There was nothing on greater 
educational facilities for Tamils; nothing on better health, public transport, government sector 
employment, or establishment of employment generating enterprises in the North and East. 
TheTULF did not make a single request from the new incoming government - which every
ucmn oy tne ‘'once of a Tamil student duri
seriousness of their condition some were force-fed in the prison hospilal
’’ Pnsoners of Conscience: Mr Ponnathurai Sa(hiyaseelan’). In mid- 
rrv nnnr,«,t,™ staged a walkout of parliament in protest against the 
ml student during the previous week (see The Times (London), 24 May1976, ‘Sri Lanka walkout’).
voter in Sri Lanka knew would be a coalition or single party government of
5 4
the SLFP or UNP. The TULF addressed itself only to the Tamil people. In effect, the TULF 
transformed’ the 1977 parliamentary elections into an (unofficial) Referendum on the 
creation of a separate Tamil state. This demand for a separate state was opposed by all major 
Sinhala political parties including the UNP and the SLFP, served to agitate and inflame the 
apprehensions and emotions of the mass Sinhala electorate, and was a very dangerous 
political stratagem. The danger was primarily to the Tamils themselves but also to the 
Sinhalese too, as both ethnic groups eventually lost many tens of thousands of lives.
This action of the TULF was a deliberate political tactic as it was widely known that as the
main Tamil parliamentary party hundreds of thousands of Sri Lanka Tamil’s would vote for it.
Therefore whatever the TULF’s platform, the majority o f Sri Lanka Tamils would vote for the
TULF. By placing this single issue in front of the Tamil electorate the TULF’s pre-planned
strategy was to be able to claim that it had obtained a ‘mandate’ from the Tamils for the
creation of a separate state. Which, after winning the majority of the Tamil vote, was
precisely what the TULF did in speeches in parliament, public meetings and press
conferences. The TULF won 18 of the 23 seats it contested. It obtained 421,488 votes and won
18 seats. On the other hand the SLFP received 1,855,331 votes but obtained only 8 seats.108
Because of the then prevailing ‘first past the post’ electoral system it was the TULF which
won the second largest number of seats. Thereby the TULF leader also became the Leader of
the Opposition in parliament. This was a sore point with the majority Sinhala electorate and 
served to further inflame Sinhala antagonism towards Tamils.
Concluding comments
The mutually hostile ethno-nationalist projects of the Sinhalese and the Sri Lanka Tamils,
and, the intense and growing competition for resources have combined to produce an intense
ethno-nationalist conflict within the island. All the ethnic groups in society are politically
mobilized along ethno-nationalist lines. There is no common Sri Lankan identity. The
Sinhalese ethnic group has firm control over the Executive, the Legislature, the entire State
apparatus of the armed forces, police, and the government officials. The vast majority of the
Judges are Sinhalese although there still remains some degree of the independence of the 
judiciary.
108
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Chapter.2
Counterinsurgency: Concepts, Problems, Issues
and
Their Contextual Application to Sri Lanka
Introduction
There are two aims to this Chapter: first, to analyse the doctrines, theories and problems ol
counterinsurgency warfare as it evolved over the last 50+ years. Second, to develop a
framework of Research Questions with which we will analyse the counterinsurgency
campaigns of the Sri Lanka government, 1977-1994. These are the seven Research Questions
which were briefly introduced in the Introductory Chapter. The best and clearest way to
proceed with the subject matter of this Chapter is to divide the material into two Parts. In Part
I we will discuss and analyse counterinsurgency theory in general, from the writings of Robert
Thompson to the most recent US Army and British Army doctrine. The emphasis of the
discussion is on counterinsurgency but insurgency too will be touched upon as and when 
needed.
In Part II we will apply the insights gained in Part I to the specific problems of the Sri Lankai
context and develop a set of Research Questions. Our analysis of Sri Lanka’s ethnic
competition, Sinhala-Buddhist identity, the history of invasions from South India, the
inception of the Tamil insurgency, and the problems created by the close presence of Tamil
Nadu and India preceded this Chapter. This was done so that our discussion of
counterinsurgency in the present Chapter could be located within the political, historical and
South Indian regional tensions within which the Sri Lanka government had to try and cope 
with the Tamil insurrection.
Part II will also reveal how some sections of general counterinsurgency theory do not apply tc
the Sri Lankan case. One example is the large sections that British and US army doctrine
devotes to the Host Nation (HN).' In Sri Lanka’s context these issue have no relevance
because in Sri Lanka the counterinsurgent is the Sri Lankan government and its armed forces 
and police.
i
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Counterinsurgency: Concepts, Problems, Issues
contemporary
theory, practice and doctrine. This is a result of the on-going conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Yemen, Syria, Libya, Lebanon, Mali, Nigeria and in many other countries in the Middle-East
and North Africa. The attacks in New York on 11 September 2001 by Al Queda, the US-led
coalition’s invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the on-going internal conflicts in both countries
and the emergence of numerous Islamic fundamentalist organisations around the world
inspired by Al Queda provide the primary policy impetus for such interest. These government
policy requirements have triggered-off parallel interests in academia, professional military 
academies and intelligence agencies.
In the immediate years after the September 2001 attacks the USA’s approach against Islamic
fundamentalist groups was a pure counter-terrorist approach. This was conducted under the
rubric ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWOT). GWOT was -  and is -  primarily using conventional
warfare weapons and tactics to hunt down insurgents. However, seven years after GWOT
began, influential US strategic analysis organisations have come to the conclusion that a more
nuanced counterinsurgency approach would have been, and is, superior to GWOT. This was
one of the main conclusions of the RAND Corporation’s very large and exhaustive 2008
research project War by Other Means: Budding Complete and Balanced Capabilities for 
Counterinsurgency. RAND concluded that “As a
[counterinsurgency] is superior to GWOT because it calls our attention 'to the underlying
guiding principal, COIN
contest and the capabilities needed to win59 Two years before RAND’s final
counterinsurgency report the US Army’s new counterinsurgency Manual FM 3-24, 
Counterinsurgency was published in 2006. It, too, is a reflection of the new interest in 
counterinsurgency in the USA’s defence establishment. And it too advocates a nuanced 
counterinsurgency approach when dealing with insurgents versus a conventional warfare 
approach.3 Parallel developments have been underway in Britain as well.4 A large section of 
the US Defence Establishment’s understanding is that Islamic fundamentalist jihadism is a 
global insurgency and consequently it needs a counterinsurgency programme that that is 
2
3 RAND, War by Other Means, 2008: xxv.
4 £ee m  3"24’ US Army, 2006, Counterinsurgency.
Fidd Manuaf ^  U n d Operations. and British Army, 2009,
global in scope.5 This is the first time in world history that it has been argued that
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an insurgency could exist on a global scale. And, likewise that a global counterinsurgency
campaign has to be fought. The current international interest in counterinsurgency studies is 
under girded by these concerns.
However, it is the present author’s understanding that ‘global insurgency’ did not apply to the 
Tamil Secessionist Insurrection of Sri Lanka (and therefore the Sri Lankan State did not have
LTTE
countries does not lead to the conclusion that the Tamil insurrection is a global insurgency - it 
merely indicates how Tamils (from Tamil Nadu, Malaysia, Africa, Sri Lanka and other 
countries) have migrated to affluent western countries such as the USA, Canada, Australia, 
Britain, Norway, Sweden and a total of about 30 different countries and the efficiency with
LTTE
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insurrection was a ‘traditional’ insurrection of the type which was common in the 1950s-
1970s.
LTTE
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adopted some of the main principles of Maoist protracted guerrilla warfare. In the LTTE’s 
military and political conduct we can see evidence of many of the strategies and tactics of a 
Maoist-type protracted rural guerrilla warfare; with, in addition, suicide cadres who operated 
on land, sea and in the air. Second, the insurrection’s goal was the creation of a separate 
territorial State in a very specific area constituted of the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri
e LTTE 
LTTE.
power in Sri Lanka.
LTTE
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the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and the killing of some leaders and members of competing
LTTE
LTTE
-- — — vvwi  ^ a pail
Of the movement’s international fund generation network. This network played an important 
part in the propaganda mobilisation of the insurrection but i, was did not carry-out any armed 
actions against the Sri Lankan government abroad, such as attacks on Sr, Lanka embassies, or
RAND, War by Other Means, 2008:14-15.
That was attempted by the two JVP insurrections of 1971 and 1987 19X9 The i v p  u ,
ethnic Sinhala origin d h S,nhala nat|onahsm. The vast majority of the JVP were of
diplomatic personnel.7 A large proportion of 58
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fashion. The supreme leader was Velupillai Prabhakaran who had a group of ‘senior leaders’ 
of approximately 20+ persons assisting him in running the organisation. These individuals 
were the de facto ‘central committee’ of the LTTE. Unlike a communist guerrilla movement
 ^ A
LTTE
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similar internal political structures but was hierarchically arranged under its leader
Prabhakaran.
LTTE
LTTE
and medium level decisions were taken by its leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran or had to be 
taken with his approval or knowledge. Minor level tactical operations were left to the various 
commanders’ responsible for different areas of the North and East of Sri Lanka. While the
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
a secular ‘weapon system’ and there was no attempt to link such suicide actions with 
Hinduism or Christianity -  the two religions of the Sri Lanka Tamils. However, there was a 
great deal of motivational audio-visual material and printed texts such as songs, poems,
video films, booklets, and news sheets which glorified these cadres as having sacrificed their
% • ^
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Consequently, current debates on 'global insurgency' and 'global counterinsurgency' have
LTTE
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campaigns of the Sn Lanka governments analysed in this Thesis. Therefore these need not be 
discussed in detail in this Thesis. It is the counterinsurgency literature and doctrine which 
originated in the 1960s-1970s and contemporary theoretical manuals of the US and British 
military such as FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (US Army, 2006) and Field Manual, Volume 1 
Part 10, Countering Insurgency (British Army, 2009) which are relevant to the Sri Lankan 
case. While some sections of these manuals too touch on global counterinsurgency, even
a r cy where u reaiised ,hai ^  ■«»
and (b) the western countries warning (he LTTE that polkLlTri1  ^m‘:rely jeoPard,se lts fund raising activities, 
bombings of Sri Lankan targets would no, b lT Ira . T  aCl,°nS ^  “  assassi"a‘—  and
those sections and theoretical approaches 
experiences of the earlier period.
are built-upon literature and
Insurgency: a brief survey
Insurgency is a form of warfare generally perpetrated by non-State actors. These non-State 
actors are very much weaker than the States that they are fighting against. But. although they 
are weak when they begin the insurrection, a significant number of insurgent movements have 
been able to achieve their goals. Bard O’Neill suggests that insurgencies can have diverse 
objectives. He suggests nine types of insurgencies.8 The category relevant to this Thesis is
■ m _
secessionist insurrection.
Insurgency is a seemingly simple and straightforward phenomenon. Some incorrectly equate
insurgency to guerrilla warfare, or consider guerrilla warfare as a synonym of insurgency.
This is erroneous. While guerrilla warfare can be, and often is, a very important component in
an insurgency, the political objectives of an insurgency are much larger in scope than guerrilla
warfare. Furthermore, guerrilla warfare can exist without any specific insurrectionary
objective and be a part of a larger inter-State conventional conflict. Numerous instances in 
World War II are good cases in point.9
We will now examine some definitions of insurgency. In the analyses of insurgency and
counterinsurgency the approach adopted in the present text is to examine academic literature
and military manuals of the US and British armed forces. The military manuals are significant
as they are documents meant to guide the military operations of tens of thousands of actual
military practitioners of counterinsurgency warfare. These manuals have been discussed and
developed though the collective efforts of hundreds of military professionals who have a
direct professional interest in the subject. Therefore they have a policy orientation which may
sometimes be lacking in pure academic publications. Furthermore, UK and US manuals are 
widely available in the Sri Lanka army.
O’Neill’s defines insurgency as:
R"“ ; r  line,
In the case of Russia it was in support of the Re \ A " 7 ^  1 L dlliancc oi Britain» and Free French forces 
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Insurgent may be defined as a struggle between a non-ruling group and
the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously employs political 
sources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and
reformu,a,e' °r ■— -  *L  -
This formulation has considerable merit and enables the incorporation of the subtleties which
ex,st in many insurrectionary situations. The British army's Operation., 2005 definition 
of insurgency is:
An insurgency is defined as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a
c « e d  government through the use of subversion and armed co n ffic tT is  an
armed political struggle the goals of which may be diverse. Some insurgencies aim to
zc power through revolution. Others attempt to break away from state control and 
establish an autonomous state within ethnic or religious boundaries."
This definition is useful for our purposes. It alludes to two types of insurgencies, one which 
aim at capturing governmental power and the other which are secessionist in nature. In Sri 
Lanka both types of insurrection have been experienced.12 The first sentence of the above 
definition is identical to the US army’s definition given below. However there are some 
crucial differences between the British army’s formulation and the US army’s formulation as
FM
insurgency is:
J°int doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the
c l T c i l p ’ 1 -OzT^tated'  " *  USe ° f Subversion and ai™ d
S‘rU88le deSi8"e<l “  the control
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Although the above quote says "stated in another way", the meaning of the second sentence in 
the above quote ,s no, equivalent to the meaning of the fire, sentence. The second sentence 
includes "occupying power" and "other political authority" whereas the firs, sentence does 
not. According the present author's assessment the above US definition is fundamentally 
flawed when i, places an "established government” on par with an "occupying force".
An “occupying power" could mean the forces of any invading State or an alliance of invading
tates. Wha, does "olher political aulhority" mean? I, clearly means an, political force
(invariably w„h military power,, internal, externa, force, o, an alliance of internal and 
external forces, which ,s able to enforce its will on the people of a country.
“  n 'v e‘" ’ABard' 2005: l5 ' U r g e n c y  and Terrorism.
,2 BntIsh Army, Land Operations, 2005:17
The two JVP insurrections (1971, and 1987-1989) were 
•nsu .ect.n’s objecti^ was to secede and create a separate^e. 
Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency,2006:1 -1
attempts to capture state power. The Tamil
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In the present author’s assessment this formulation in FM 3-24 is the result of the US Army’s
need to accommodate the USA’s and its allies’ invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. In FM 3-24
the phrases “occupying power” and “other political authority” enables the justification of an
invading power (legal or otherwise) enforced upon a country. FM 3-24 was drafted and
written during the crucial years from 2003-2005 and published in 2006. These are years when
the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan occurred and when the US and its allied forces found
themselves under attack. While FM 3-24 gives ‘Legitimacy- the primary status in its
‘Principals of Counterinsurgency’, and by uses the phrases “occupying power” and “other
political authority” to try and claim some element of Legitimacy, in the assessment of the 
present writer this effort is not convincing.
On this crucial issue of invading forces British counterinsurgency doctrine differs in one very 
significant aspect from the US. The British too define an insurgency as “an organized 
movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion
^  «  —  .  ■  %  A  a  a
and armed conflict”
FM
above). However, crucially, a few sentences later the British manual states:
Cn 7 PT *  resistance differ from insurgencies in that they aim to liberate
m va^r ThTF r f  T r e,I/ ** a " ! nVader' or overthrow a government imposed by an 
added] i6 ° f th£ SCCOnd W°rld War is an examP'e [emphases
The mention of the French Resistance is of great significance. In the military history of the 
Second World War the French Resistance is not categorised as an ‘insurrection’ and the 
neither is the Nazi regime’s actions categorised as ‘countennsurgency’. The FM 3-24 makes a 
fundamental conceptual error when it conflates indigenously generated insurrections (which 
denve their origin from social-class grievances and/or ethnic grievances) with rebellions 
which fight against invading armies (whatever the reason for the invasion and however 
justified that cause may be in the eyes of the invading country or alliance of countries). Three 
recent examples of indigenously generated insurrections are the Maoist insurrection in Nepal 
which led to the demise of the monarchy in that country.'7 Second, the current on-going 
Maoist-style rural insurgency in large areas of North-Eastern and other eastern regions of
ndia Th'rd’ the Tam" Z i o n i s t  insurrection in Sn Lanka. In all three insurgencies it is 
the indigenous armed forces of the respective states that fought the insurgents: in Nepal the
is ^ U S A rm y .F M  3-24, 2006: 1-21, Counterinsurgency.
16 ^ ntlsh A™y- 2°05:17, Land Operations.
„ |Jr“ ,sh Am,y- 2005:17, Land Operations.
the 1 ighUrf communisMnfui!cyThconcs'an Tm od| jfilJb  e “ T ® *  ° f C °mmUnist Par,y °f  NePa‘ (Maoist) in 
18 Baruah, Sanjib ed 2009 /?^L / r  , Beaufrean extenor/,menor framework'.
J ’ ° 9’ Bey°nd Counler^ ns'urgency: Braking the Impasse in Northeast India
insurgents won a partial victory (in the sense ozthat the monarchy was toppled but a
socialist system was not established). In Sri Lanka the secessionist insurgents were militarily
defeated in May 2009 but internationally the campaign still goes on. In India there is on-going 
fighting in typical protracted Maoist fashion.
The British Army’s Countering Insurgency, 2009 defines insurgency as “An organised, 
violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to established
authority.”19 The RAND
1------- •
Insurgencies are movements in which opponents of established governing authorities 
a T o riS - 0th6r meanS t0 Wr6St the SUPPOrt ° f thC P°PU,at'°" «""* fromthose
Significantly, in the above definition there is no mention of, or attempt to justify “occupying
forces FM 3-24. But even the RAND
elected (and therefore politically legitimate) governments. In the case of Sri Lanka there was a
democratically elected government during 1977-1994. Briefly, to just illustrate the difference,
let us, as a ‘conceptual exercise’, modify RAND’s definition to fit democratically elected 
governments and see the result:
arC movements in which opponents of democratically elected and 
established governments use violence and other means to wrest the support of the 
population away from such governments.
Clearly, it is not possible to apply such a definition to post-October 2001 Afghanistan or post-
March 2003 Iraq (the months when each country was invaded). RAND, FM 3-24 and British
definitions have to be able to incorporate these examples. But it is possible to apply such a
definition to the Maoist insurrection underway in India, the Philippines faced with Islamic 
secessionists and Sri Lanka faced with Tamil secession.21
All the above definitions are useful for us to understand various aspects of the phenomenon of
insurgency in general, and the Tamil secessionist insurgency in particular. This is sufficient
for the purposes of this Thesis. A great deal more remains to be debated and analysed on the
subject of insurgency; entire theses have been written and more will be in the future. The
focus of this Thesis is on counterinsurgency and therefore we will not anymore debate the 
relative merits of various definitions of insurgency.
the dem ocrL y^^ ^  th.CSe countries wil1 ciueslio" the level and quality of
democracies. But the fact that competitive multi mrt 6 1C1Sms W1 1 be va,ld as none of these are perfect
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2.1: Overview of Counterinsurgency Warfare doctrine
Counterinsurgency is central to this Thesis. Concepts and strategies of counterinsurgency
warfare have developed in symbiotic relationship, so to speak, with the development of 
insurgency and guerrilla warfare. As noted by Beckett:
In response to guerrilla warfare, insurgency and terrorism, armed forces have developed 
counter-measures to defeat such challenges and prevent their resurgence. In many 
respects the development of counter-guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency has 
mirrored the development of guerrilla warfare and insurgency. Thus modem counter-
insurgency encompasses those military, political, socio-economic and psychological
activities employed by the authorities and their armed forces to defeat the threat in 
question.2
The approach adopted in this Thesis is, in Part I, to analyse a range of texts from the pioneers 
of the field such as Robert Thompson to the most recent doctrinal literature of 
counterinsurgency practitioners such as the USA and Britain, namely the US’s FM 3-24, 
Counterinsurgency (2006) and Britain’s Field Manual, ‘Countering Insurgency' (2009). 
Constrained by the need for the brevity, this literature has to be dealt with as concisely as 
possible in this Thesis. It needs to be flagged here that all this US and British literature is 
premised upon counterinsurgencies being conducted in a friendly Host Nation (HN). Such 
recommendations are irrelevant to this Thesis as the Sri Lankan government and state is 
counterinsurgent that we are assessing. From the insights we gain from our investigations in 
Part I we will move to Part II where we develop a framework for assessing the 
counterinsurgency efforts of the Sri Lankan government, 1977 to 1994.
We will begin with the literature ot the pioneers of counterinsurgency doctrine so as to place in
context current US and British Doctrine. Accordingly, we will analyse, to the degree practicable,
the writings of key authorities on counterinsurgency such as Sir Robert Thompson, Lt.Colonel
David Galula, General Frank Kitson, the British Army’s Land Operations Vol.3 manual, the US 
Army’s Low-Intensity Conflict (FM 100-20).
However, before beginning our discussion it would be useful to reflect on two matters. First the 
official inhibition to the use of the word ‘counterinsurgency’ from the 1970s to around 
2004/2005.21 In any event, by 2006 and 2009 the US and British military establishments have
22
^Bedcelt, 2001: viii, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their opponents since
I ™ '  haaPPeT d th£ Uf S disaStr°US inlcrvenlion in Vic‘"am- After .he defeat in Vietnam .here
seems to have ansen a react,on agamst the word itself within the United States. Quite independently American
reverted back to the use of ‘counterinsurgency’ and ‘countering
insurgency’ in .heir manual,’* Second, we need ,o Keep in mind ,he bloody and mess, reality of
warfare
~ ----- j  me same way actual
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Counterinsurgency is ,  form of warfare -  as is insurgency -  which is inherently messy, prone to
human trghts violations, extra-judicial killings, M ure, mistakes which result in the death of own
hoops and civilians, confusion, fear, physical exhaustion and all the frictions of war described by
warfare
warfare
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primary
postcolonial British Counterinsurgency doctrine is built and is officially accepted as such by ihe
Bnnsh army.- Thompson's writings have also influenced the development of US 
counterinsurgency theory and practice as well.
™ s  iS aCkn°WlMl8^  by ,he Us ,ra” 2'  FM 3-24. And the British team tha, wrote
Countering insurgency says: "The origins of these principles can be traced back directly
•hose pubiished by Sir Roberi Thompson in , 966 in his book Cononunis,
Insurgency: The Lessons o f Malaya and Vietnam."29
different to the o n e ^ v a n c S y  fhe p r e lT a m h i r s i !  B la u tb ' ° /  lhe under,y.inS r“ Sons are somewhat
Operations'; and ‘Low Intensity Conflicts (LICV as can h " T f " '  (,DAD); Pacification'; ‘Stability
Manual FM 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet AFP 3 20 M iZ r v  o T "  7  PUbl,,Cat,ons such US Army, 1990, Field
was counterinsurgency but that word was excluded. Terms such^s IDAD n H f  substance of all these manuals 
been chosen -  whether consciously or unconsciously -  to s o f t ™ ^  t  d U C  s>'non>'ms seem to have
plethora of terms was (and is) not useful and could lead to confusionaniTf^ ° !  counterinsurgency. This
Officers -  both young and old -  who found these new terms and nh™  h frUStratI° n devel°P‘ng in the minds of 
ihetr desks at irregular intervals. In the course of convmations and f  , g manUa'S which arTived
ranking Sri Lankan army officers from 1998 onwards the nrp u lnterviews w,lh many senior and middle
•he Sn Lanka army where US and B r i t i s h m a n u a l  f o r m a l n d i l  ?  ^  ° f  this g -
See US Army, 2006, FM 3-24 Counterincuro» a d  ■ 3nd ormal Parts of the teaching syllabi.
‘Countering I n s u r g e n c y ’ ' 8 HCy a"d BntIsh Army> 2009> Field Manual, Volume 1 Part 10.
26 Clausewitz, 1989, On War.
frictions cannot be “  ]eVe'S °f  abstraction where these
recommendations for ‘coherent counterinsurgency’ I p l r i a t e  mdi, ^  ‘°  be 3Ware ° f these fnc,ions "hen
Manual, Volume I Part 10, ‘Countering 7ns!Z en tv‘‘CaU°n ^  ° pera,ions and Bntish Army, 2009; 3-1, Field 
s7 t Brir^hTc’ FMoonn.' ^ l ^ y ^ t e r i n s u r g e n c y29
s“  ~  -  - *  >■' ■ M = ; ™ r  7 , „  w .
Thompson wrote of five principles of counterinsurgency.30 First, that the
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government implementing the counterinsurgency must have clear political objectives. Although
Thompson didn’t explicitly say so, it is clearly implied in his book that the government
identifying its political aim(s) is the primary principle. Counterinsurgency operations must be 
directed at achieving those political aim(s).
The first [principle] is that there must be a very clear political aim - that is you [i e the 
counterinsurgent] must know what political end you seek. [...] the key thing is that all 
actions and all operations must contribute to the political aim. If they do nof then they 
are at best wasted and at worst counter-productive [emphases added].31
The above formulation is in complete harmony with Clausewitz’s recommendation that
military force and operations should be used for the furtherance of a government’s overall 
political goals:
irimp keep infmind that War SpringS from SOme political PurPose’ it is natural that the 
prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it [ ]
Policy, then will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature 
Will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them.32
FM
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government fighting an insurgency having a clear political aim This can be traced right back to 
Thompson-”  In all instances this recommendation is directed at the friendly Host Nation (HN) 
that the US or British government is assisting, but that does not affect the validity of this
recommendation.
Second, Thompson recommended that the government must function in accordance with the law. 
This is a laudable goal but has not been entirely practicable. Every counterinsurgency campaign 
including the Malayan Emergency, Kenya through to Iraq and Afghanistan which have all 
witnessed excesses. Of course there is a way in which this principle can be adhered in ‘the letter 
of the U w ’ but not in ‘the spirit of the Law’ and that is for a government to enact draconian 
laws. - In any event this recommendation too is present in the lists in both the US and British
;• S r  s
33 ciausewitz 1989:87, On War.
S 'rf ia  B™“ " 3' 2 »  Reid
■ H?  Nt -  <m  is ~  “» . .  „  bP, «zsssr is “  s w s s f i s s ;  £  i f  2
Army’s doctrinal manuals. Thompson’s third principle is that the government must have
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an overall plan. This is very sound advise and has been taken on board and elaborated in great
detail in US and British Doctrine.
Thompson’s fourth principle was that the government must g.ve priority to defeating political 
subversion and not hunting-down insurgent cadres, i.e. dismantle the insurgent’s infrastructure 
and win the allegiance of the people and not waste time and effort chasing guerrillas through the 
jungles. Of course military and police operations against armed units of the insurgents have to go 
on. But priority must be given to severing the links between the insurgents and the extensive 
infrastructure system that they need -  food, medicine, infomtation, sanctuary and many other
carry
people need to be won over. This recommendation has been veiy comprehensively elaborated1 *  A  -  —
and absorbed into US and British Doctrine.36
recommended
^  1 1 1 , 0  1 0  a n  a A i u i l l
Which any competent government and its armed forces should adhere to, and is standard practice
armies
■ ^  uuu implement c
counterinsurgency campaign via a combination of appropriate political and military measures.
TnoT aP.P’y'ng Ul'S t0 action and operations on the ground, there will be four definite
a d d e d ] Ca" SUmmCd UP 38 Clearin8’ h° ,ding’ Winning and won [emphases
Lt.Colonel David Galula is the next writer we will briefly touch upon. Galula was a French 
army officer who fought in Vietnam and Algeria. His book Counter-Insurgency Warfare- 
Theory and Practice first published in 1964 is considered a standard work in the field After 
2001 it has been reprinted and widely read in the US Army and influenced the team which wrote 
FM 3-24.38 General Frank Kitson is another of the pioneers. His ^ - In te n s i ty  Operations 
(1971) and Bunch o f Five (.977) are based on his extensive knowledge and military 
experiences m Kenya, Malaya, Muscat, Oman, and Cyprus. These books were written while
S 2  r  8 Wh0,e range ° f 0ther very harsh poh.es.
IS ‘Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their C a u K ^ s Z p o n ' '  A k o ^  ^ ,nClp,es of counterinsurgency
Volume I Par. 10, Countering Insurgency Three ofl.U O  n l '  B" t,Sh 2009: 3' 2- ™ d Manual,
Insurgent’, ‘Gain and Maintain Popular Support’. ' P P 65 SeCUre ‘he PoPulat'on’- ‘Neutralise the
shown later, a similar 4 - p lw s ^ e q L n c ^  Malaya and Vietnam. As will be
and British doctrine a 3-phase sequence termed ‘ Clear Hold Build’ h ^  2°  yearS‘ And preSenl US
Afghanistan, Iraq and other lo g o n s w h e re h e  l h  l " W'th the exi8encies ,rooPs faces in 
be waged. ‘ 8 counterinsurgency against Islamic fundamentalism has to
38 See Us Army- FM 3-24, 2006: viii, Counterinsurgency
he was a serving officer in the British army, 
influenced the British army’s official doctrine. 39
Kitson’s concepts and ideas too have
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years the basic military
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The text which is directly relevant to counterinsurgency is Volume-3 titled Counter 
Kevotoionury Operations. "The conceptual substance of W  Volutne.3 and the
wnttngs of Kitson and Thompson share a great deal in common. Most mid-level and senior Sri 
Lankan Ariny offices am familiar with Volume.3 as drey have been introduced to it a. various
Lv t*1 n U   1 * A- _ % a
military academies such as RMA
anu tKoyai
College of Defence Studies). Other officers who have no, attended courses in Britain have access 
to Volume.3 a, militaty paining establishments in Sri Lanka. India. Pakistan, and Bangladesh 
Cop.es prmted m Sri Lanka are available in training establishments and various headquarters of 
the Sri Lanka Army. Sri Lanka's political leaders, however, have no systematic ins,me,ion in 
this literature other than through their own initiatives. I, needs to be noted tha, Volume 3 was 
mean, to teach counterinsurgency to British troops assisting friendly states or commonwealth 
states Which „ was the Britain government's policy assist. The term ‘government' below 
refers to the governments of such States and not to the UK government.
Prom 1990 onwards the US Andy's primary doctrinal tex, pertaining to counterinsurgency was 
ilitary Operations in Low Intensity Conflicts’ (Field Manual FM 100-20^42 Thic ^
FM
-  ^ ------— .t. ™ Uiicny noieci earner in
Chap“ r from ,he l970s 10 2“  VS military dropped the use of the tetm 
counterinsurgency. Temts such as 'Pacification', 'Stability Operations', 'internal defence', law
ntenstty Conflicl (LIC) and IDAD (Internal Defence and Development) all refer to
counterinsurgency or some aspect of counterinsurgency. These Manuals worn mean, to teach and
Piling TTQ ____ i .
« fn" r  r ° ' t  i*
important in their own right as they are a part of the history puf  catlons- However' these Manuals are
Uinka. y a pan the history of British military doctrine, and, they are still in use in Sn
pTn.2V is Puhlished in three parts. Part.. -
By 1990 the US Army and US Air Force h-.H h and.Part‘3 ’  Counter Insurgency, HMSO.
numbers are ‘Military Operations in Low Intensity C o S  Field ^  ,CXt’ ' tS fu" title and reference
3-20. It was published by the Departments of the Army and ..  d Mdnua' l0°-20/A''- Force Pamphlet AFP
superseded the FM 100-20 version published in 1981 For the T '  >Vai hlngton D<2. 5 December 1990. I,
to as FM 100-70’ in F iJ* 1' hor the sake of brevity henceforth thi* .11 i___ r___ ,
political objectives to guide the use of 
people were emphasised in these manuals.43
mihtary force, and, the centrality of the
US Army FM
.British Army. Fiplri
2009
. ,  ----------------  Counterinsurgency (7006
Manual, Volume 1 Part 10, «Countering
w . now tum o„r ...emion to ,he priaciples of counterinsurgency se, fonh in fhe US Am 
Field Manna, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency and the British Army’s Field Manna,, Volume I 
Par, 10. - C o r n , e r i n g I n s u r g e n c y ’. Due to the length of their tides these texts will h
en-ed to as FM 3-24 (US Army, 20061 and Countering Insurgency (British Army 2009) 
The footnote references will he more comprehensive. FM 3-24 was published 2006 and 
Countering Insurgency 2009. „  can be argued tha, these two manuals are the legatees of a 
0+ year old tradition of counterinsurgency though, and practice coming forward from the
days of Robed Thompson and David Galula. Thts does no, mean that they will necessarily be 
valid for an tndefimte period of time nor does i, mean that they do no,, even as they are have 
some inadequacies. the assessment of the present author." However, they are the best we 
ave . .  present and in any even, no tex, would be perfect. Al, counterinsurgency practitioners, 
annals and academic monographs caution us. there is no  universe, blueprint for success in
counterinsurgency. But, there are
some time and battle-tested concepts which a 
counterinsurgent would be well advised „ke into aeeoun, when designing a eampatgn plan.
There
are other publications too which deal with developing frameworks fo,
counterinsurgency campaigns. They too share a great deal in common with Thompson. Gain,a 
€t al.
The US and British manuals were chosen as they are the distillate of teams of Officers and 
academ.es. They bring together the experiences of a wide range of military officers who have
heen ____  .. .
counterinsurgency practitioners and academic researchers.46
They are very
^  FM 100-20, Chapter-2:7-8.
p r i^ ir r  x s i z  ,,em ° n  *
existence of awareness of the multi-ethnic character of manv of Vd exa™ ned- A second is the virtual non- 
COIN. A third are the problems a regional ‘superpower' (eg India) could S‘af S,. and the Problems 'hereof for 
Lanka government). But this is a factor which is dependent on t  1  , r for a^ counterinsurgent (eg. Sri
argued that each counterinsurgent will have to learn to m nr  m u " ° each insurgency and it can be
what the Sn Lanka government had to do! is  dTscussed i„^  Ch „ T “  beSt il Can (which «  exactly
critically examines these two Manuals while comparing and contra!!' TheSeS could be wri'ten which
into such detail in this Thesis. P 8 d contrast,ng each with the other. But we cannot *0
J f S i  Counterinsurgency Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan: Cntical
2007, pp.665-698. The primacy of having a clear A i t o ^ X ^ ^ * * * * * '  V° ' ' 18' No'4’ December 
of a good counterinsurgency campaign are spelt out. b Thompson 1966 ls quoted) and the shape
Development since 2001 ’ w h i c h ^ w ^ g o ^  Counter-insurgency Doctrine and its
““ B- “  * - * » ■  ^  “ '"p'
comprehensive in their coverage of most
aspects of counterinsurgency, and the
uy
present author loeates the analytical framework fo, assessing the counterinsurgency efforts of
the S„ lamka government ,977-1994 tv,7hin this body of literature. However, as noted earlier,
all recontmendattons and references to a "Host Nation' (of which them are a great many in
both manuals) do no, apply to the Sri Lankan case as the Sri Lankan government and state 
was the primal^ and sole Counterinsurgent.
FM FM
and Galula’s
---- ivicuiuai ior
both the US Amty and US Marine Cotps. I, is ,  large volume and is mean, fin ,  
counterinsurgency 'doctrinal gap' in both forces. In the case of the US Army 20 years had 
passed after the previous doctrinal manna, devoted to counterinsurgency and in the case of the 
US Marines 25 years are said have passed." ft is useful to note tha, in its
Acknowledgements, Thompson's D efy in g
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice are specifically mentioned."
FM 3-24 identifies 13 principles of counterinsurgency. These are what FM 3-24 identified as 
relevant to its specific target audience - the US Army and Marine Cotps, As can be seen the 
13 are dtvtded into two pans (see below). Principles 1 to 8 are said to have been derived from
^  ^  — _____________ I
are mentioned as ‘Contemporary Imperatives’ of 
Counterinsurgency." Some criticisms can be made about this separation into two parts.
Surely the need to 'Manage Information and Ekpectations', 'Use the Appropriate Level of
Force' and 'Learn and Adapt' are lessons learnt during pas, insurgencies as well, and no, only 
post 2001 Afghanistan and Iraq?
past insurgencies and 9 to 13
But we need no, quibble about these matters. The compilers of this Manual -  which it needs 
,0 be noted, ,s the combined effori of dozens of personnel -  may have had strictly pedagogical
rpnennc frv*. __b
FM
+ ------- «w,vviy J-M
reasons for creating these two segments. Doctrine is, after all, ‘that which is taught’
3-24 has a range of very specific tasks tha, i, is supposed to accomplish, among them bemg 
eutdmg planning Staff (from the highest level of a Army HQ to Battalion HQ) and increasing
US' General W s  F. Amu,.
4 8  ...... .............
49 ~ . 7 -------- FM counterinsurgency.
2  the need *  and
in past insurgencies as well? But we need no. quibble a b l .  2  X ,  “ * princiPles and/or lessons learn.
it needs .0 be noted, is the combined effort of dozens of per^nneT I  T f ' 6?  of ,his manual -  which,
for creating these two segments. Doctrine is after all P‘thai h' h™ 1, had slnc,ly Pedagogical reasons
recommendations or any references to a ‘HostNation’ (of w hlh  th ^  18 ‘aUgh‘ ' "  15 reiterated here that any
Bnhsh manuals) does not apply t0 this Thesis as the S n ^ t ^ T  ^  ^  ma"y b° th the US and lhe 
Counterinsurgent. ^  neS,S as thc Sn Lanka" government and state was the sole
Chambers English Dictionary, 1990: 418, Chambers English Dictionary.
the knowledge of individual officers. 70
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HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY (The following
principles are derived from past insurgencies).51
Legitimacy Is the Main Objective 
Unity of Effort Is Essential 
Political Factors Are Primary
Counterinsurgents Must Understand the Environment 
Intelligence Drives Operations
Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support 
Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential 
Counterinsurgents Should Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment
CONTEMPORARY IMPERATIVES OF COUNTERINSURGENCY.
9. Manage Information and Expectations
10. Use the Appropriate Level of Force
11. Learn and Adapt
12. Empower the Lowest Levels
13. Support the Host Nation
British Army’s ‘Countering Insurgency’. The British Army’s equivalent to FM 3-24
is ‘Countering Insurgency’. It mentions 10 principles. It clearly states that “The origins of 
these principles can be traced back directly to those published by Sir Robert Thompson in 
1966 in his book Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons o f Malaya and Vietnam."53
The 10 principles54 of counterinsurgency are:
1.
2 .
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Primacy of Political Purpose.
Unity of Effort.
Understand the Human Terrain. 
Secure the Population.
Neutralise the Insurgent.
Gain and Maintain Popular Support.
Operate In Accordance With The Law 
Integrate Intelligence.
Prepare for the Long Term.
Learn and Adapt.
izzii7J:7^::mrimurgency: me ^
Appropriate military and development operations need to be implemented on the ground to take 
Ihese ‘principles’ forty.,d. The earliest mention of such an implementation plan is in
” r i s ,  r i S r pre"  “ hor-
” ^  -  a  s s  £ 2  : e s  5  a s  ■
Thompson 1966. After earlier in the book referring to the five basic principals he
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recommends that a counterinsurgency should have Thompson went on to say:
When applying this to action and operations on the ground, there will be four definite
stages which can be summed up as clearing, holding, winning and won [emphases 
added].
He then went on to describe these four in detail.56 These four phases are the inspiration for the
counterinsurgency manuals FM 100-20 of 1981 and 1990.
army
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These same four phases appear, under different synonyms, in both US and UK doctrinal
Manuals, sometimes called ‘Pacification’, sometimes called ‘Internal Defence and Development’
(IDAD), sometimes called ‘consolidation operations’. In 1990 the US Army’s FM 100-20
manual mentioned four stages and named them Preparation, Offensive, Development and
Completion stages.58 The overall operation is termed ‘Consolidation Operations’ and was
defined as follows. Although the following is 24 years old, it is still a very credible and useful
guide as to how a counterinsurgency campaign should be organised and implemented:
Consolidation operations are interdepartmental, civil-military efforts which integrate 
counterinsurgency activities to restore government control of an area and its people. They 
combine military action to destroy or drive out the insurgents with programs for social, 
political and economic development. [...] Consolidation operations first establish firm 
control of an operating base area. Then they expand outward to enlarge the area of 
government control. This requires seizing, and consolidating control over contested areas. 
[...] Once the force has cleared an area of insurgent tactical forces, the government must 
maintain an adequate defence. The defensive mission shifts to police and paramilitary 
forces as the situation improves. But military units continue to provide security as long as 
a credible insurgent threat remains. Police and paramilitary action to neutralize the 
insurgents’ infrastructure ensures that the area remains secure. Balanced development seeks 
to mobilize the people to the government side [emphasis added].59
Army
‘Clear-Hold-Build A close examination of this sequence clearly reveals that they are the 
contemporary evolution of concepts articulated by Thompson in 1966 and FM-100-20 (above), 
adapted and modified to suit the circumstances of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan 40 years
56 'LhomPson- 1966: 111. Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam
E x ^ Z c T sZ  mZ ° Z  S L refer Th o m p so n ' 19 6 6 :111 - n  4 ’ D e fe a ' in« c —
,See V5. Afrmy> 1981 • 45‘66' Field Manual FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict. (Chapter 4- Host Country 
2 7 IS 2 n  f  |VHe! 7 me! '  Concepts and Doctrine) for an initial Doctrinal effort. See US Army 1990-
° FM 100-20, 1990: Appendix.E:4-6.
FM 100-20. IQQO* Annpnrliv
later.60 The phrasing is different and the US and British Army manuals go into great
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detail on numerous problems which officers and troops have had to face from the 2001 onwards,
especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reducing the phases from 4 to 3 also eases
counterinsurgency planning and aids clarity. In any event the conceptual ‘DNA’, so to speak, of
Thompson’s original formulations can still be discerned in the current doctrinal manuals.61 The 
US Army’s FM 3-24 says:
A clear-hold-build operation is executed in a specific, high priority area experiencing overt 
insurgent operations It has the following objectives: Create a secure physical and psychological
support “ ent; government control of the populace and area; Gain the populace’s
The British Army s Countering Insurgency’ says:
Clear-Hold-Build operations are part of the overall security effort; they are executed in specific
X T ie T s e , aieaS^Xpenenc‘nS overt insurgent operations. They have the following objectives: ’ 
Create a secure physical and psychological environment.
• Establish firm government control of the population and area.
ran^hp P0Pulation’s support. The extent to which popular support has been gained
be measured by its participation in local programmes to counter the insurgency for example
iZ rg In tT 6-’ y reCrU,ted CIV1' SgCUrity °rganisations and Providing useful information about the
As can be seen the phasing of the US and British formulations is almost identical. The 
principles’ articulated in these two manuals and the Clear-Hold-Build implementation model 
are the strategic essence of US and British counterinsurgency doctrine at present, and that is 
sufficient for this Thesis because it focuses on the strategic level of counterinsurgency.64 Of 
course these two manuals have numerous other sections which deal with operational and 
tactical issues (and some which fall within the ambit of strategy) such as supply and logistics 
problems, the use of artillery, the use of close air support, the need for ‘situational awareness’, 
the utilization of UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) as reconnaissance platforms for 
increasing situational awareness and many more subjects. According to Sri Lanka’s very 
limited budgetary capabilities some of these technologies have been acquired over the years
See CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD' in US Armv FM 3-24 2006’ s is c , D . . ,
20, Countering Insurgency. 2°°6' 5'  8 ‘° 5' 22’ and Bntlsh Army. 2009: 4-14 to 4-
62 th,s context DNA (Deoxyribonucleic Acids) is used in a metaphorical sense
24. It’s ‘CleanHoId-Build’ S i t ^ S S ' ?  T *  aCr° nym ‘' DAD' "  C° mp'etely absent in ™  3‘ 
of IDAD in earner M a L ^  The T "  °f ^  similar «° lha‘
Development’ (along with its acronym IDAD) werp ,nt n ^  why lhe Phrase ‘Internal Defence and
for pedagogical reasons to and also to establish FM 3 24 asTfre h i  T™ ^ i t 24' ThlS may have been done
who are ,he prtm, J S ' 2 ,h“ M, " , f  US “ d US M»“
64 ^  British Army- 2009: 4-14. Countering Insurgency.
~  !e,t of *■
capability al the Operational and Tactical levels Or ^  Undone by lncomPetence or sheer lack of
revealed by the French decision to establish i R ■ ' r / 6 " ^hu0wn 10 be deeP>y flawed as for example was
263, ArrW  *  BatllefiJ ; ~  ^  ^  ,99& 245’
by Sri Lanka’s armed forces. But such 
due to the need for brevity.
issues cannot be dealt-with in this Thesis
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II
Developing a COIN Assessment Framework
for
the Sri Lanka Government’s Operations, 1977-1994
We will now begin the task of developing a series of Research Questions to analyse and 
assess the Sri Lanka government’s counterinsurgency efforts 1977-1994. We will develop
FM
Army).
The following seven (07) Research Questions have been developed by the present author by 
critically examining counterinsurgency literature available65 to him, and, weighing and 
assessing such literature alongside the political, military, ethnic, and geopolitical context that 
Sri Lanka was ‘caught’ within during 1977-1994. The word ‘caught’ is used intentionally to 
flag the inextricable situations within which Sri Lanka was (and still is) in. For example, the 
multi-ethnic composition of Sri Lanka and the tensions between the Sinhalese and the Tamils 
(discussed in Chapter-1). And the many problems and tensions arising from the proximity of 
Tamil Nadu and India from which Sri Lanka cannot escape. Most aspects of the strategic 
context which existed in 1977-1994 still prevail.66 As noted earlier, the reason for having the 
subject matter covered on Chapter-1 ahead of this Chapter is to enable the reader to 
understand the political, historical and geopolitical context within which the Sri Lanka
the Tamil insurgency.
many flaws
It is acknowledged that there is an inevitable element of subjective ‘selection’ by the author in 
the following assessments and analyses. This is in consonance with contemporary 
understanding that absolute objectivity is impossible in social science texts and that the
p u £ h e T r f te la2M ir a<!idfhn0t h3Ve aCCeSS '?  m° St °f ‘he neW books on counterinsurgency which have been 
But such post-1994 discuss,ons fall outs.de the ambit of this Thesis and cannot be pursued in this text.
author’s is always ‘present’ within any text. This being said, however, the present
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author has strived to achieve as balanced and ‘objective’ an assessment as possible of both the 
literature and the insurgency and counterinsurgency in Sri Lanka.
T able 2.1: The Side-by-Side Comparison and Assessment o f the Principles of 
Counterinsurgency in the US and British Army M anuals, and, the identification 
of the Research Questions Applicable to Sri Lanka (in Blue Text, below
US Army FM 3-24 British
Counterinsurgency Field Manual
Vol.l 
Part. 10, 
Countering 
Insurgency
Army
Publication Year: 2006. 
Source:
See Pages 1-20 to 1-26.
1. Legitimacy Is the 
Main Objective.
2. Unity of Effort Is 
Essential.
3. Political Factors 
Are Primary.
(Note: the numerical order 
of this column is not in the 
same sequence as in the 
original Manual. This is to 
enable the principles to 
correspond -  where 
possible -  with the FM 3- 
24 column on the left.)
Publication Year: 2009 
Source:
See Pages 3-1 to 3-20.
2. Unity of Effort.
1. Primary of 
Political Purpose.
4. Secure the 
Population.
The present 
author’s 
assessments and 
analyses
of the principles in 
these two manuals, 
while also 
correlating with 
COIN literature 
from the 1960s 
onwards. These 
assessments are 
done from the 
perspective of Sri 
Lanka's specific 
needs and problems, 
1977-1994.
Legitimacy is the most 
important component of 
a stable political system 
and government. FM 3- 
24 placing Legitimacy as 
the first principle is 
laudable but somewhat 
Utopian and unrealistic. 
‘Creating’ political 
legitimacy is a very 
complex phenomenon 
and can take many 
decades to achieve. In 
any event FM3-24’s 
principle-1 can be 
subsumed within
principle-3._______
Intra-Governmental 
Cooperation did exist to 
an adequate level in Sri 
Lanka.
Political aim(s) of the 
government. Very 
relevant and Significant 
Matches Thompson’s 
(1966) lsl principle. 
Political, Military & 
Police measures. Very 
relevant and Significant
Research 
Questions which 
have been distilled 
to research the Sri 
Lanka
government’s 
efforts to counter 
the Tamil 
insurgency, 1977-
1994.2 These are 
the 7 questions 
which are in the 
Introductory 
Chapter.
The British 
formulation of 
‘Primacy of Political 
Purpose' is assessed as 
being theoretically and 
practically better 
grounded and is 
therefore assessed as 
being preferable.
Understood. No 
requirements for a 
specific Research 
Question in the Sri 
Lankan context.
1. Did the 
government have 
Political 
Purposes?
2. Did the 
government give 
security to the
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4. Counterinsurgents 
Must Understand the 
Environment.
5. Neutralise the 
Insurgent.
6. Gain and Maintain 
Popular Support.
Mix of coercive (police 
& military) and 
persuasive measures 
Very relevant and 
Significant.
Measures to build 
popular support for the 
government.
3. Understand the 
Human Terrain.
The Counterinsurgent 
must be aware of the 
political, historical & 
cultural context of the 
insurrection.
Tamil 
•opulation?
3. Did the 
government 
neutralise the 
Tamil 
insurgents?
4. Did the 
government gain 
and maintain 
popular support 
of the Tamil 
people?
This is well 
understood in Sri 
Lanka. No 
requirements for a 
specific Research 
Question.
Sri Lankan counterinsurgents -  i.e. political leaders, armed forces, police, intelligence 
organisations, civilian bureaucrats - knew (and know) the ‘Human Terrain’ of the Tamil 
insurrection to a very high degree. Of course it can be suggested that there is room for 
improvement. The Sri Lanka government, armed forces and police -  although dominated as 
they are by the majority Sinhala ethnic group -  have lived amidst the Tamils for decades.
5. Intelligence Drives 8. Integrate Intra-Govemmental Research Questions on
Operations. Intelligence. intelligence gathering 
and cooperation has 
developed in Sri Lanka. 
Strategic and tactical 
intelligence have 
gradually improved. 
However, intelligence 
organisations are a very 
difficult subject to 
research in Sri Lanka.
these subjects cannot, 
as yet, researched in 
Sri Lanka with 
adequate empirical 
rigour.
On Intelligence ‘driving’ Operations. It is possible that in the 1970s the government’s
cope with the challenge posed by the Tamil 
insurgents. These organisations are reputed to have improved from 1977 onwards. The
present author cannot state anything definite about this as this subject is difficult to research in
Sri Lanka because: (a) there is an 'aura of secrecy in the government regarding all such
subjects; (b) there is no Freedom of Information Act in Sri Lanka; and (c) politicians, armed
forces and police officers, most academics and journalists based in Sri Lanka are unaware of
the fact that ‘Intelligence’ has become an accepted area of academic research in other parts of
the World, and that there academic Journals devoted to Intelligence and the History of 
Intelligence.
Questions such as: (a) Were the operations conducted by the military ‘driven’ by Intelligence? 
(b) It so how? (c) II not, why not? (d) How well do these organisations coordinate with each
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other? (e) What were the governments Intelligence organisations in 1977? What 
were they in 1994? (f) Were these intelligence organisations developed over time? And if so
how? Questions such as these cannot be addressed at present as no substantial empirical or 
qualitative information regarding such issues can be located.
Over time, from 1977 onwards, the MoD, armed forces and police are reported to have 
developed intelligence services or improved services which existed before 1977. However, 
except for occasional comments in newspapers there is no public access to any of these 
subjects. Some of the armed forces operations (some of which are mentioned in this Thesis) 
would certainly have needed intelligence. As to whether there is ‘integration’ and/or ‘inter-
departmental cooperation' of Intelligence cannot be researched at present. From the military 
operations carried out by the armed forces it can be deduced that Intelligence had to have
played a role. The Tamil insurgents too developed intelligence gathering capabilities but that 
too is another subject which is inaccessible.
6. Insurgents Must be 
Isolated from Their 
Cause and Support.
7. Security Under the 
Rule of Law is 
Essential.
7. Operate In 
Accordance With 
The Law.
This FM 3-24 ‘principle’ 
in fact combines two 
distinct tasks: separating 
insurgents from their 
cause and separating the 
insurgents from their 
support base (i.e. the 
Tamil civilians).
Separating insurgents 
from their cause is a 
very arduous and time- 
consuming task. In most 
counterinsurgencies this 
can never be achieved, 
especially the leaders at 
all levels.
The best that can be 
achieved is to separate 
the insurgents from their 
support base (i.e. the 
Tamil civilians).
With the escalation of 
the insurrection Sri 
Lanka was placed under 
Emergency Law. A 
Prevention of Terrorism 
Act' came into effect. 
Over the years violations 
of human rights by 
government forces have 
been reported by various 
Human Rights 
organisations. The 
insurgents too have 
committed violations but 
governments and 
insurgents are not 
assessed by the same 
criteria. (Note: this last 
item is not well 
understood by the Sri 
Lankan armed forces, 
police and the Sinhala 
public.)
5. Did the 
government 
separate the 
Tamil 
insurgents 
from their 
support base, 
i.e. the Tamil 
people?
6. What were 
the
relationships
the
government’s 
counterinsurge 
ncy operations 
had with the
Law?
This is a very large 
subject and merits 
several Theses. Many 
Reports and Books 
have been published 
on this topic. This fact 
is mentioned in the 
Introductory Chapter. 
However this question 
will be addressed to
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the degree possible, 
given the need for 
brevity, in Chapter 6 
‘Conclusions’.
1 8. Counterinsurgents 
Should Prepare for a 
Long-Term 
Commitment
9. Prepare for the 
Long Term.
There was no public 
statement by the 
government that the 
counterinsurgency could 
be long-drawn. But 
when that turned out to 
be the case, the 
government stayed the 
course.
The government did 
not show any sign of 
giving-in to the 
insurgents and 
allowing a separate 
state to be created. No 
specific Research 
Question required.
9. Manage 
Information and 
Expectations.
Information Operations 
(IO) and attempts to 
“manage” the Media.
A diverse and mixed- 
bag of policies, 
mistakes, confusion, 
misinformation and 
censorship. No 
particular research 
question needed.
10. Use the
Appropriate Level of 
| Force.
By and large this is what 
occurred up to 1994.
No particular research 
question needed.
Use the Appropriate Level of Force. By and large this is what occurred up to 1994 and no
particular research question is needed. As the Tamil insurgents acquired RPGs, heavy machine
guns and some heavy weapons such as large calibre mortars and suicide boats, some of the
encounters during 1990-1994 became somewhat semi-conventional in character.
Consequently the army, navy and air force too acquired heavier weapons in due course. After
1994 both the LTTE and the government acquired heavier weapon systems. For example the
air force obtained Kfir fighter-bombers only after 1994. But these matters fall outside the 
ambit of this Thesis.
11. Learn and Adapt. 10. Learn and Adapt. A truism. Understood. No particular Research 
Question is required.
12. Empower the 
Lowest Levels.
Sri Lanka’s armed forces 
and police were, and are, 
organised in a somewhat 
old-fashioned and very 
hierarchical fashion.7
There was very little, 
if any,
“empowerment” of the 
lowest levels. A 
specific Research 
Question not required.
Empower the Lowest Levels. Sri Lanka’s armed forces were in 1977-1994 (and probably 
still are) similar to the US and British armies of the late-1950s and early-1960s. This is an 
impressionistic assessment as comparative scientific surveys have never been done. Nor 
would it have been practically possible to conduct such research surveys in the midst of the
insurgency during 1977-1994. In any event permission to conduct such surveys would not, in 
all probability, have been given by the Sri Lanka government.
13. Support the Host ‘Host Nation’ is This ‘Host Nation’ issue No particular Research
Nation. mentioned numerous 
times from pages 3-1 to 
3-20. And throughout
is one of the biggest
inadequacies of US and 
British
Question required.
counterinsurgency
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the British manual and 
FM 3-24. But the British 
do not mention it as 
‘principle’ as does FM 
3-24.
doctrine for countries 
such as Sri Lanka. This 
‘principle’ does not 
apply to Sri Lanka.
The Sn Lankan government and armed forces were not involved in assisting a ‘Host Nation’. 
They were the entities which were under attack by the Tamil insurgents.
Issue inadequately dealt-with by both Manuals
There is a virtual non-existence of how to deal with 
involvement of a regional power (i.e. Tamil Nadu and 
India in the case of Sri Lanka), and the problems and 
difficulties caused by that power.
But such matters are a part of the regional political 
context of an insurgency and it can be argued that 
such matters do not fall within the purview of the US 
or British Armies, but are within the realm of high- 
level inter-State politics.
And therefore have no place in counterinsurgency 
manuals. There is a great deal of accuracy in such a 
position.
How to combat the 
assistance an insurgency 
could get from a 
neighbouring country is 
not one of the 
‘principles' discussed in 
either manuals. The 
complex manner in 
which the policies of a 
nearby country (or 
countries) can assist an 
insurrection -  eg. 
sanctuary, popular 
support, supplies 
including weapons, etc -  
seriously affects the 
counterinsurgency 
efforts of a country such 
as Sri Lanka.
7. Did Tamil 
Nadu and the 
Indian central 
government 
impact upon 
the Sri Lanka 
government’s 
efforts to 
counter the 
secessionist 
insurrection?
(Although the role of 
adjacent countries and 
‘cross-border 
operations’ are 
discussed in these 
manuals -  eg. Pakistan 
in the Afghan conflict 
-  this issue needs far 
more emphasis by 
country such as Sri 
Lanka.)
Each insurgency and counterinsurgency is different from one another. This is a truism and a
caution which is mentioned in all counterinsurgency literature. The policies adopted by an
adjacent country -  eg. whether to allow safe sanctuary on its territory for insurgents; whether
to allow arms to be smuggled through its territory; whether to provide arms to the insurgents;
and numerous other policies will depend on the specific insurgency and the inter-state
relations existing in that situation. Such inter-state relations do not fall within the purview
of armies under civilian control within a democratic framework -  which are what the US,
British and Sri Lanka armies are. Therefore it not being a ‘principle’ in these manuals -  and in
most counterinsurgency literature -  is understandable. In the case of the Tamil insurrection
however, this is a very significant Research Question for Sri Lanka. It will be addressed in 
Chapter 6, ‘Consolidated Conclusions’.
Therefore, in conclusion, the following seven Research Questions are the core of this Thesis’s
concerns:
1. Did the Sri Lanka government have Political Purposes?
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2. Did the Sri Lanka government give security to the Tamil population?
3. Did the Sri Lanka government neutralize the Tamil insurgents?
4. Did the Sri Lanka government gain and maintain popular support of the Tamil 
people?
5. Did the Sri Lanka government separate the Tamil insurgents from their support
base?
6. What were the relationships the Sri Lanka government’s counterinsurgency 
operations had with the Law?
7. Did the Tamil Nadu and the Indian central government impact upon the Sri Lanka 
government s efforts to counter the Tamil secessionist insurrection?
All the above 7 Questions are analysed and discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. The overall
assessments and conclusions pertaining to the period of 1977-1994 are addressed in detail in 
Chapter 6, ‘Conclusions’.
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Chapter.3
The Tamil Secessionist Insurrection, July 1977 to 
anti-Tamil Pogrom-Riots of July 1983: President JR
Jayewardene & UNP Government’s Policies
Introduction
This Chapter is devoted to the assessment and analysis of the policies adopted by the newly
elected United National Party (UNP) government from July 1977 to July-1983. During these
six years the Tamil Secessionist Insurrection gradually grew and many aspects of the
strategic defensive phase of an insurrection can be seen. The chapter begins with the UNP’s
victory at the general elections of July 1977 and ends with the analysis of one of the most
crucial turning points in postcolonial Sri Lanka history, namely the anti-Tamil pogrom-riots
of July 1983. When referring to the violence which began in Colombo on 24 July 1983, it is
the present author’s assessment that ‘anti-Tamil pogrom-riots of July 1983’ is the most 
accurate description.1
As discussed in the previous chapter, the TULF’s 1976 Resolution which called for a separate
Tamil State was a clear and public political message to Tamil civilians in general and Tamil
youth in particular. The message was that the time had come for the Tamil people to embark
upon an armed rebellion against the (Sinhala dominated) government and state, it was ‘Call to
Arms’. The strategy of the TULF was to use the parliamentary elections as a springboard for
creating a movement within the Tamil people to create a separate state. This was openly and
publicly stated by the TULF in the months and weeks before the Elections. The party was
confident that it would win most the seats in the Northern and Eastern Provinces (which is
precisely what happened) and expected to benefit from these electoral gains. As The Times 
(London) accurately said:
The TULF leaders with victory assured, maintain that they regard the general election on July 21
as a plebiscite on whether the Tamils want a separate state [emphasis added]”.2
riots’6 ' ; t l le9n8£3thrio ts"L Phr Se' hT eVer’ alternaliVe phrases SUCh as ‘Ju]y 1983 an,i-Tamil ri° ts \  ‘anti-Tam,1 
The Times (London) 6 July 1977, Tamils hope to hold balance after Sri Lanka election’.
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The TULF turning of the general elections into a plebiscite for the creation of a separate 
Tamil state was seen by Sinhala parties and Sinhala voters as a profound misuse of the 
electoral and democratic process.3 A couple of weeks prior to the elections the TULF went 
further and stated in its Manifesto that its nominees elected to parliament would “constitute 
themselves into the Assembly of Tamil Eelam, the name they have chosen for their Tamil
To the majority Sinhala political parties and Sinhala voters these were very disturbing 
and inflamed anti-Tamil sentiments. In the months prior to the General Elections Prime 
Minister Mrs Bandaranaike had formal discussions with MPs of the TULF but no progress
state.
could be made.
February
targeted acts of insurrection had already began. One of the first targets were Tami policemen 6 
Theii killings were very clear messages to Tamil civilians that the insurgents groups -  quite 
small in number during this period - would not tolerate any Tamils working for the police nor 
working as police informants and also advertised the groups’ growing military capabilities. Most 
details of insurgent attacks and military tactical details are in footnotes and the Annexures.
ower3.1: General elections 1977 and the UNP conies to
The UNP won 140 of the 168 seats in parliamer
parliamentary majority . This majority gave the UNP the power to change the Constitution as it
wished. As can be seen from Table 3.1 the then prevailing ‘first past the post’ representation 
system gave wildly disproportionate results.
The Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) which had been in power from 1970 to 1977 was 
overwhelmingly defeated, its representation reduced to 8 seats.7 The large difference between the
UNP
UNP 5/ th majority in parliament was obtained from
 ^While it can be argued that that such a tactic is acceptable in democratic politics, in Sri Lanka this was the first 
S  u X  ^  ■b“  “ S '  T°  l' “  »  “*  '■» ['me -ha, such . S c  h."
5 T'mes <London)' 11 July 1977, ‘Independence plan of Tamils in Sri Lanka’
The Times (London) Tuesday, 22 Feb 1977, ‘Premier holds Colombo talks with Tamils’ In the present author’s 
assessment it was far too late for such discussions as the general elections were a few months away and the 
TULF would need to talk to the new government which came to power
Offtcta1 Roll of Honour-1977 to 2003’, 2005: 1660. The first policeman was PC Karunanithi on 14 February 
May ,977 ™ d m ”  M  of°l! "  «  ShaamuganaO,,. - were killed on IS
The Times (London), 23 July 1977, ‘Mrs Bandaranaike’s Party is crushed in Sri Lanka election’.
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50.92% of votes polled. As can be seen the SLFP obtained 29.7% which was the second largest 
number of votes polled. This needs to be kept in mind when evaluating UNP policy over the 
following years, and, when assessing the Tamil insurgency and anti-Tamil hostility by the
The huge parliamentary majority enabled the UNP to form a strong Government entirely by
itself for the first time after its electoral defeat in 1956, and also to change the Constitution as it
wished. But as the voting data shows, significant numbers of the Sinhalese electorate and a
majority of Tamils in the North and East did not vote for the UNP. Consequently, it can be
argued that the UNP should have conducted itself with far greater political circumspect. The left-
wing Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and Communist Party (CP) did not win a single seat,
although both of them received an aggregate of 349,173 votes, which was 82.8% of the votes 
won by the TULF (calculated from Table 3.1).
In relation to the Tamil insurgency the most significant consequence of the elections was that the 
pro-secessionist TULF won 18 seats, the second largest number, and this automatically resulted 
in TULF’s leader becoming the Leader of the Opposition. The TULF, however, had received 
only 6.75% of total votes polled which was far less than the SLFP’s 29.7% of votes polled (see
Sinhalese majority.
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Table 3.1). This freak result was yet another result of the ‘first past the post’ electoral 
representation system prevailing at that time. The SLFP’s total votes were actually 340% more 
than the TULFs total votes. The SLFP was unquestionably the foremost opposition party and its 
leader should have been the leader of the opposition. Millions of SLFP voters and even UNP 
supporters knew this. Ominously, that fact that the TULF had obtained the Leader of the 
Opposition appointment served to further amplify Sinhala anxiety and anti-Tamil feelings
because the Leader of the Opposition (i.e. theoretically the leader of an alternative government) 
had fallen into the hands of a Tamil party which advocated secession.
The new UNP government’s formal acknowledgment of Tamil Grievances. How
did the new UNP government understand the unrest and agitation amongst the Tamils? The
UNP’s Election Manifesto of 1977 provides the most cogent answers. This important document
was prepared under the UNP’s highest leadership.8 The UNP’s leadership would have keenly
observed the many political and militant incidents between 1972-1976 and the gradual
emergence of the Tamil insurrection. Most important of all was the 1976 ‘Vaddukkoddai
Resolution’ where the TULF decided on a policy of secession and called for the creation of 
separate State for Tamils.9
This secessionist mobilisation posed a grave threat to the unity and security of the entire
country. The UNP’s leaders were certainly aware of these tendencies. The Tamils were a large
segment of the electorate and the UNP’s 1977 Manifesto made a comprehensive set of 
promises to the Tamils:
The United National Party accepts the position that there are numerous problems confronting the 
Tamil-speaking people. The lack o f a solution to their problems has made the Tamil-speaking 
people support even a movement for the creation o f a separate State. In the interest o f national 
integration and unity so necessary for the economic development o f the whole country the Party 
fee s such problems should be solved without loss o f time. The party, when it comes to power 
mil take all possible steps to remedy their grievances in such fields as: ( I )  Education (2) 
Colonisation; (3) Use o f Tamil language; (4) Employment in the public and semi-public
“  A"-Pm» —  -  to
w Z a i a i T J V S l  o to sT h T M  °f JayeWardene’ R Preltladasa- ^  A.hula.hmudali, Gamini
Jayawardene went on to become the Executive President of the Country from 1978 to Dec 1988
killed"1 A^huladimud resl *989 UP t0 May 1993, when he was assassinated by the LTTE The LTTE
killed Athulathmudah in April 1993 and Dissanayake in October 1994 U i t
Unkan TamU Nati° nali™  Its O rigin  and Development in the
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Evidence of the Conceptual Existence within the UNP of a Potentially
Coherent Counterinsurgency Approach. The above is evidence of the existence
within the UNP -  albeit at a conceptual and potential level - of a balanced counterinsurgency
approach. That does not mean, however, that such concepts are automatically translated into
policy or that powerful sections within the government would not oppose such concepts. In
any event the Manifesto indicated to the Tamils that the UNP was ready to work towards a
political rapprochement with the Tamils. Th,s had the potential of giving birth to a coherent
■
UNP
experienced politician and it is useful to remind ourselves that it was Jayewardene who, 20 
years earlier in 1956, had warned the then government of the possibility of civil war and 
bloodshed in the future if the Sinhala Only legislation was enacted." And in 1966 he had 
publicly stated that a situation analogous to “civil war” existed between the Sinhalese and
Tamils.
UNP
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problems. The Manifesto used the word ‘grievances’ to refer to four grievances which had 
been articulated on numerous occasions and publications by Tamil parties for several
decades. The lour areas were access to university education; land settlement; the 
hindrances to the use of the Tamil language in official transactions; and government jobs
Second, the Manifesto stated that as a direct consequence of the non-resolution of these 
grievances (it was implied that this lack of resolutions were the responsibility of previous 
governments), that some Tamils had begun to support a movement to create a separate State. 
Here the UNP Manifesto was alluding to the TULF’s Resolution which demanded a separate 
Tamil State. Third, the Manifesto stated that “in the interest of national integration and unity
necessary
Of the Tamils needed to be remedied without any loss of time and that once it came to power 
.t would take all possible steps to remedy these grievances of the Tamil people.
CJ yl? n Dai}yNews. 4 June 1956:5, ‘J.R. jayewardene on Sinhale Bill’
.3 CZ f  ( “ y \ 22 Apri' l966:l’ ‘J R ’S fl™ proposals (o put Economy Right’
C p , . , ',  t ' . S S  r j / i  0 , ' r by T“ "  <« m » ,  d c c t e .
* •"  Bui b , ihis d m  ihe S  ,  ~  «  Z  TULFs 1,77 M“ f“ »  “
redress of these grievances from the government See Tamil Unhe H  'h" Mp mfes!o and not obta|ning any 
Manifesto 1977, [a tran s la te  from Tamil to English] Ltbera.ton Front, 1977: 323-326, Election
Fourth, there was no mention of ‘terrorism’ or ‘anti-terrorism’ in this Manifesto. Nor was 
there any statement to the effect that terronsm would have to be suppressed by the 
government before Tamil grievances were addressed. It was clearly stated that it was the 
Tamil people who had these grievances and that these grievances needed to be addressed.14
Several difficult issues faced by the new government need to be flagged at this point. The
government understood these as grievances of the Tamil people, but was faced with a range of
opposition which arose from within both the Tamils and its own Sinhalese constituents: First,
the Tamil insurgent groups did not want the government to successfully address these issues
because they had already passed the ‘point of no compromise’ and were driving towards full
independence. They did not want any solutions to be found through reform. For the Tamil
insurgents it was ‘no’ to reform and ‘yes’ to revolution.15 Second, the Sinhala-Buddhist voters
were greatly agitated about the secessionist movement and hostile to any signs of the
government weakening its stance against secession. It needs to be noted that at least 2 Million
Sinhalese had voted against the UNP (see Table 3.1). President Jayewardene had a very 
difficult balancing act on his hands.
The UNP Manifesto did make an , direct reference to the relatively low-intensity guerrilla 
acttons of Tamil insurgent groups winch had already begun to occur from 1972 onwards. 
Some pro-SLFP Tamil politicians. Tamil policemen and Tamil police informants had already 
been assassinated. Significant bouts of political agitation had taken place in the Nonhem and
Eastern Provmces from 1972 onward, along with the Tamils’ boycott of the Constitution of
1972. These occurrences were well known by the leaders of the UNP. However, the UNP did
no, raise the bugbear of ’terrorism’ and correlate i, in any w a, with addressing Tamil
gnevances (thts changed completely from 1978/1979 onwards with the gradual and
unstoppable escalation of the Tamil insurrection from the time the new government took 
office).
UNP
hese formulations incotporated a clear and unequivocal acknowledgement that the Tamil 
people had grtevances and that the absence of solutions these grievances had led to the
- “ ~  «  h. " 2 ,  S e e  priorSocialist/Communist Revolutions, and is numerous
refusal by (he ^  counterinsurgency w a r f a r ^
the Indo-Lanka Accord. Discussed later in Chapter-4 S d ° W3S c cdr y dcm°nstrated when it reneged on
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emergence of a movement to create a separate State. Such an acknowledgement is sine qua 
non for any process of negotiation and conflict resolution, and, for the formulation and 
implementation of coherent counterinsurgency policies within an insurrection. Such
government
M  ^ -------------------- r . r r v . r r v i *
coherent counterinsurgency programme.
On the day of the election victory itself UNP leader JR Jayewardene said that he would
summon a round table conference -  as promised in the UNP’s Manifesto - to discuss the 
problems faced by the Tamils.16 Several weeks later the UNP
country a new Constitution which would guarantee fundamental rights, freedom of the press 
and independence of the judiciary.17
At the same time, however, the TULF began to immediately work against the spirit of 
negotiation and reconciliation implicit in the UNP government’s promises. The TULF -
strengthened by its election victory - increased its agitations and demands for a separate
state.18 This, in turn, led to an increase in the level of anger and anxiety among Sinhala voters
and politicians. In response to the TULF’s political mobilization the UNP promised to hold an
all party conference and take all possible steps to address the grievances of the Tamils.19 A
caveat is appropriate here. The UNP’s 1977 election promises in relation to Tamil grievances
lagged far behind - fro m  the perspective o f many Tamils - the demand for a separate state.20
By 1977 a significant number of Tamils had moved beyond these grievances and wanted a 
separate state.21
Devolution of political power to the North and East was what Tamil parliamentarians had
UNP
on the devolution of power. Nonetheless, from the perspective of coherently countering the
£ :r gss&'s rr sxrs  ™?——- -  - -
r r  ——• -  - -
separate State. By 1977 a significant nmnnrfinn of t  i , yf K her’lor lheni the issue was to create a
agitation was had alreadyteen T i s T T ^  t0 3 separale Slalc’ Political
had made the demand for a separate Tamil state the sole n ln l  r , f 0pulalion- H> 1977 'he TULF 
earlier intended to interpret the general election’s i, P n,k ° f ,tS electoraI campaign, and, as mentioned
and t J Z h CenturiLv " '  T<mU Nati°™li™  Origins and D evelopJn , in M ,Nineteenth
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secessionist insurrection the new UNP government’s acknowledgement of Tamil grievances
was a good starting point for negotiations between the TULF and the new UNP government.
It was an initial step on which the new government and those in the TULF who were for a 
negotiated solution could have built-upon.
^  The anti-Tamil riots of August 1977: Further Snorri Sinhai* 
Tamil relations; Exacerbated Secessinnfcm
On 15 August 1977, hardly more than a week after the statements between the nev 
government and the TULF, serious anti-Tamil rioting began to occur in widespread areas oi 
the country. The disorder began in Jaffna and was reported as having begun subsequent tc 
police firing on Tamils who are said to have attacked the police during a school carnival. Foui 
Tamils were killed in the shooting.22 Horowitz says that Sinhalese police and armed forces 
personnel in Jaffna were involved in precipitating the initial violence in Jaffna.23 These riots 
occurred at the worst possible time -  when the new government had not even found its feet, 
so to speak. It is entirely possible that the initiation of these riots were done deliberately by
UNP
O------- UJ
Its tenure. And this objective was achieved as it and spoiled Sinhala-Tamil relations anc
exacerbated Tamil Secessionism.24 A state of emergency was declared, island-wide curfews
imposed and the armed forces and police were deployed on ‘internal security’ tasks to quell 
the rioting.25
Consequent to the 1977 riots the Tamil secessionist insurrection undoubtedly witnessed an
23 Tl>nes (London), 19 August 1977, ‘Curfew in Sri Lanka as 14 die in widespread riots'
^  Horowitz 1980:213, Coup Theories and Officers’ Motives P ’
^ m e  damage Tam,Is due to the secessionist platform of (he TULF. The rioting needed only a few sparks to
UNUs^nTn^MinTs’t e J r 11 ^ h " 8 Underway in a number of areas in the island, including Kandy. Tf 
government opposed a 3 5 ^  t Z l K  t h e ' w ^ o ^ ^  A u g tT S o O 0°T a m ilfUgU
s e s c s s s r  z z s ;  EaT  pror “ «  “  ~
I * . !  -  » « i .  j  ' V f m (i" ,h
least 54 people were reported killed For th,> Fifth • , Prov,nce)- I*1 l^e meantime by 25 August c
the entire island. The government arrested rioters^nd881^  1 f ,_night cur,ew was imposed throughou
disorder: by 26 AugusU 700 Sinhalese were re , , "d lmplemented law and order measures to suppress th
murder, arson, looring i l S  c rfew h e k £ ' 3 , \ UgUSl 4’° ° 0 W6re Under arresl for offences includin, 
(London) 20 Aug 1977 ‘Cabinet meets as rio t fn ? "  1 ,UgUSt 5' ° ° °  Were under arrest- (Sources: The Time. 
killed during week of violence in Sri Lanka T* 7~S Lanka spread ‘ The Times (London) 22 Aug 1977, ‘21
exodus of fear'; The Times (London) Friday’ Aug u V w T n m  T ""*!? eSC°r'ed ‘°  S3fety ir
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increase in intensity although still very much less than that which occurred after the July 1983
pogrom-nots
™  n° r  r  °WCd 'he eleCti0ns 0f 1977 and did much t0 encourage a Tamil
both a s e Z S,’ 3h l  ant'-Tamil riots of l983- which accelerated the armed warfare, were 
the UNP "  organised, at least in substantial part, by activists associated with
Historian Wickramasinghe says, The 1977 general elections, followed by anti-Tamil riots that 
left 128 dead, served to radicalise and further inflame the Jaffna peninsula.’27 This was also 
the assessment of both Hellman-Rajanayagam and Marks.28 These riots unquestionably 
hardened the Tamil secessionists and made the new government’s proposed conciliatory 
policies more difficult to take forward. Even moderate Tamil politicians became less 
amenable to compromise with the new UNP government. The ordinary Tamil people were
M  4  m m  ___
UNP
to just give-in to Tamil secessionist demands. In early September 1977 President Jayewardene
totally excluded the possibility of a separate state for Tamils and said that the TULF would
not be permitted to raise that Option in the forthcoming All Party Conference. The TULF took
a diametrically opposing view and said that the violence of the previous month had vindicated 
its demand for a separate state.29
By April 1978 relatively small scale ‘strategic defensive’ type guerrilla attacks were being
conducted by Tamil insurgents. On 7 April 1978 the LTTE killed 4 policemen in Murunkan,
Mannar District.30 Other hit-and-run type actions ensued in the following months. In response
to the escalating insurgency in May 1978 the Government passed several strong Laws to 
counter the gradually escalating insurrection.31
In mid-August 1978 the Sri Lankan parliament passed into law the 2nd Republican 
Constitution. It was scheduled to become law on 7 September 1978.32 Under this new 
Constitution Prime Minister JR Jayewardene became the Executive President with
27 ” 0r° WitZ' l989: 7' 8’ ^ m i v e s  and Behaviour in the Ethnic Politics o f Sri Lanka and Malaysia 
2g W.ckramasmghe, N.ra 2006: 283, Sri Utnka in the modern age: a history o f contested id e Z e s .
Programme's';Td MarkT lo i r e g  '"Teopks War" inSri N°rthCm “  L“ kB: ° ngmS’ FaCli°nS'
31 0ffic,al Roll of Honour-1977-2003’, 2005- 1660
89
unprecedented Executive powers. This new Constitution was bitterly opposed by the TULF 
which boycotted the entire proceedings.33 The new Constitution too retained the primacy given
to Buddhism while assuring all other religions their right to practice.34 This new Constitution 
contributed to the escalation of the Tamil insurgency.
On 7 September 1978 the exact day the new Constitution came into effect a bomb exploded
aboard an Air Ceylon airliner which was on the tarmac at Ratmalana Airport a few miles
south of Colombo. The aircraft was irreparably damaged. The bomb should have exploded
when the aircraft was in flight.33 One week later the LTTE claimed responsibility for the act
to The Times (LondonJ.36 At that time this was an unprecedented attack by Tamil insurgents.
During the subsequent months the Tamil insurgents kept up small scale attacks. They killed
two policemen in December 1978 and one each in February, March and July 1979, all of
whom were Tamils. The government introduced legislation to ban secessionist movements 
only in 1979 38.
President .Tavewardene Orders Arm
December 1979 (and the Human Rights Pitfalls of such an Order
By early July 1979 Tamil secessionist groups had killed a total of 13 policemen.39 In mid-July
President Jayewardene declared a ‘State of Emergency’ in Jaffna District and publicly issued a
Directive to Bngadier T.I. Weeratunga to eradicate terrorism from the Jaffna district by 31 
December 1979. This directive was given wide publicity at the time:
It will be your duty to eliminate in accordance with the laws o f the land the menace of 
terrorism in all its forms from the Island and more especially from the Jaffna district I will 
place at your disposal all resources of the State. I earnestly request all law-abiding citizens to give
34 I he T‘meS (Londonh  8 SeP l978. ‘Tamil Opposition boycotts Colombo celebrations’
H a h r t,tU!10HnK°f ihe ° e“ tic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 1978: 5. All other religions were assured the 
rights granted by Articles 10 and 14( 1 )(e) of the Constitution
J j ! L v Unt y T‘T  (Sn L? nka>' 6  Sep 1998’ ‘TomorTOW is the 20th anniversary: The day the Avro was 
bombed . It was due to a fortuitous unscheduled delay that the aircraft was not Hying somewhere above
Colombo when the explosion took place. If that had that happened the propaganda consequences for the 
woVr T H m W0 Ulrd have been many dozens of times worse as it would have made headHne newsTound the 
tha L e  Sri LankaT5 T  ‘°t ^  ^  Ratmalana airPort to Katunayaka a.rport (north of Colombo), at
S  <* *»"•'> Ratmalana J  K . ,a „ „ E  «
Raimplln' f i v  f h d 3y h£ m W0U'd haV£ exPloded while the aircraft was in the air between
been killed and S l T *  L" lha‘ eV£m ‘he 'W° P‘'0tS a"d any others who were on board would haveDeen killed and also some people on the ground as well.
The Times (London), 15 Sep 1978, ’Group claims it bombed aircraft’. The LTTE said that it had done so as an 
^ f n r r 10n, °J ?PP° S,t,° n ‘° the neW'y enaCted 2"  Ropoblican Constitution
Official Roll of Honour-1977-2003’, 2005: 1660.
Prevention o f Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, No. 48 o f 1979. This legislation did not stop the Tamil 
nsurrecuo" from escalating. But is here Bagged to indicate the government’s lack of preparedness and
unawareness o the secessionist threat that was developing in the country. P P J
Official Roll of Honour-1977-2003’, 2005: 1660.
90
their cooperation to you. This task has to be performed by you and completed before the 31st 
December 1979 [emphases added].40
During the next six months (July to December 1979) Jaffna was governed by Brigadier
Weeratunga and his staff under Emergency Regulations. There was a large military and police
presence in Jaffna and the security forces carried out what they thought were counterinsurgency
operations -  i.e. cordon and search operations, patrols, arrests and interrogation of suspects. It is
highly likely that some instances of torture, extra judicial executions and disappearances took
place. Although relatively small in comparison to what occurred in later years (which have been
documented by organisations such as Amnesty International) these cases were disturbing at the
time to the Jaffna people and human rights and civil rights organisations working in Colombo.
As press censorship was being enforced at that time through Emergency Regulations, these
statements critical of the government did not -  and would not have been allowed to -  appear in
the press. But concerned human rights activists in Colombo documented these allegations about
the army’s actions in Jaffna.41 Amnesty International’s 1980 Annual Report gave detailed
information of the names of the two Tamils whose bodies were found, the name of the Tamil
youth who died in hospital due to assault injuries, and the names of the other three Tamils who 
disappeared and were never seen again.42
The army’s harsh methods served to further alienate the Tamil people. As a result of support for 
the Tamil insurgents or fear of them, government forces did not receive cooperation from Tamil 
civilians. It rapidly became clear that the majority of Tamil civilians in Jaffna were either 
frightened or, worse, politically disinclined to help government forces. Whatever the 
combination of causes this indicated that the allegiance of a sizable segment of the Tamil people 
in the Jaffna peninsula had, by that time, already been lost by the government. There is no
« ^ eylon Dai‘y  News- 1 6  Ju|y 1979, ‘Root out terrorism Brigadier ordered'
gravel r ^ n c 'd  'a m h f n ' ' * *  ^  R'ghtS Movement (CRM> of-Sri Lanka in a statement said that- “CRM is
^ s s r r s s  s c a s s * ? ,  \ * r t m  crm ~  -• * » * • « .— « *
« ,  L S ; br,t ; ™  ■ Adne ,o T ” 1' " in ........■»and was able to give these details. § *  aCC°UnlS g,Ven ^  infor™nts. Amnesty International had more time,
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evidence that the significance of this was understood by either the government or the army at the
time.
army’s arrivalA large portion of the Army was deployed in Jaffna Peninsula.43 In the face of th<
in July 1979 Tamil guerrilla cadres tactically withdrew to Tamil Nadu. In 1980 insurgent armed 
_ •
M  »  •  A  —  —
ioldier was killed.44 The government and thearmy
army
been achieved. Newspaper interviews given by Brigadier Weeratunga proudly conveyed this
assessment to the general public.45 The government’s over-confident claims was what it actually
believed and were not made for public consumption. The Army’s Annual Report for 1979 sent
by the then army commander Major General JED Perera to the MoD - an official and Secret 
classified document - made this same assessment:
Anti-Terrorist Ops. In July 1979, H.E. The President appointed Brig. T.I. Weeratunga as 
Commander Security Forces Jaffna consequent on the declaration of a State of Emergency in 
the Jaffna district and the Army was committed on a considerable extent in Operations to 
combat terrorist activities in Jaffna. Throughout this period a major portion o f the Army was 
dephyed in the Jaffna peninsula, Battiealoa, Mannar, Trincomalee, Vavuniya in pursuance 
o f the Pres“lent s directive for the elimination of terrorism by 31 Dec.79. This objective was
realised and the emergency lapsed at the end of December 1979 [emphases added]’’
The army’s and the government’s assessment that terrorism had been eliminated was a gross 
misreading of the situation. In reality the Tamil insurgents had done a simple tactical
withdrawal to South India. Twenty years later the army kth Anniversary official history
admitted that “It was subsequently found that the rebel forces had crossed to India and set up
bases and training camps there’’.47 Some Tamil insurgents are said to have undergone military
training in Lebanon. At this time the number of hardcore insurgents was estimated as being no
more than 200 cadres.48 Once the majority of the army left the Jaffna peninsula during the course
of 1980 Tamil insurgents trickled back to Jaffna from India and insurgent activity again
gradually increased from 1981 onwards: six policemen and 2 army soldiers were killed in 1981 
and eight police and 3 army personnel were killed in 198249
44 Ll n,'ia A™y. 1999: 195, Sri Lanka Army: 50 Years On, 1949-1999: 290.
45 See Official Roll of Honour-1977-2003', 2005: 873 and 1660
E S S
48 w  V3”!?  Army’ 1999: ,95’ Sri Lanka Army: 50 Years On,1949-1999- 291 
See Official Roll of Honour-1977-2003', 2005: 873 and 1660.
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3.4: Evidence of the Existence within the Government of a
balanced Counterinsurgenc 
Tamils
trend and a ‘Pogrom apainst
UNP
proceeded rapidly with the creation of a new Constitution which included an Executive 
Presidential system. With the enactment of this new Constitution in September 1978 he 
became the Executive President (with vastly enhanced powers when compared with the Prime 
Minister of the previous decades). Another UNP leader R. Premadasa became the Prime 
Minister. Jayewardene worked with a large group of UNP, Sinhala and Tamil scholars, 
lawyers and advisors on the creation of the new Constitution. None of the Opposition parties 
(of which the most significant were the SLFP and TULF) supported the enactment of the new
Constitution. But the UNP passed it through Parliament with ease as it had 5/6 lh majority in 
parliament.
It has been acknowledged in print that during 1977-1980 Jayewardene worked very closely
with several Tamil scholars - prominent among whom was political science Professor A.
Jeyaratnam Wilson -  to draft the 1978 Constitution.50 Another was Dr Neelan Tiruchelvam a
Harvard educated legal scholar and an expert in Constitutional Law who worked alongside
Professor Wilson. Both had good links with the UNP and the TULF.51 It is relevant to note at
this juncture that radical pro-secessionist elements in the TULF and Tamil insurgents were
critical of the work of such Tamil scholars as they were seen as assisting the government to
develop political and Constitutional reforms within a united Sri Lankan state. These scholars
and others who worked to bring-about a negotiated solution were considered as 
‘collaborators’ at best and ‘traitors’ at worst.52
See W, son, A. Jeyaratnam, 1993: 75, The presidential idea in the constitutions of South A sia -A  response
to Jean-Alphonse Bernard . Here Professor Wilson says that it was as a response to a suggestion by President
Jayewardene that he wrote his book Gaullist System in Asia: The Constitution o f Sri Lanka ( 1980) This was
meant to be a guide and ‘handbook’ for the President to help him in performing his president,al duties Such
de ,1s reveal how closely Wilson worked with the Pres,den, a, that time. In later years Wilson became
dis, lusioned with Jayewardene and moved closer to secessionism as evidenced by books such as his 1988 
publication The Break-Up o f Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict
Professor Wilson was the son-in-law of S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, the leader of the lllankai Tamil A-asu Kadchi 
Lanka Tam.l State Party' (a.k.a. “Federal Party”). The “Federal Party” was the core amund whichThe TULF
f a m i r ^ f l e r  M T,nruth1lv1m ar a' “ T  *" “ “ h ^  NeelanTlruchclvam « m e  from an influential Tamil 
52 u n  ^  k d by an LTTE su,clde bomber in Colombo in July 1999
bom berTnSm bo0 m J ^ m  " atUral 200° ' TirUehelvam ^  “ ina(ed a"  LTTE suicide
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The Balanced Counterinsurgency Policy Trend. After the enactment of the 1978 
Constitution one of President Jayewardene’s urgent tasks was to try and develop a political 
institutional structure within which some degree of political powers could be delegated to 
Tamils. He now enjoyed full Executive powers of an Executive President. The TULF insisted 
that devolution of power had to be an essential feature of any settlement.53 After a great deal 
of consultations and discussions the District Development Councils (DDCs) were enacted in 
1980. The DDCs would devolve some political powers to each of the 25 Districts of the entire 
island. The government insisted that the District had to be the ‘Unit of Devolution’ and not a 
Province. The government was certainly not agreeable to combining the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces into one entity. The District was the institutional structure within which President 
Jayewardene and the Cabinet assessed that the Tamils could be granted a (modest) degree of 
autonomy. The President and the Cabinet were apprehensive that a larger ‘Unit of Devolution’, 
and/or greater powers would accelerate the secessionist insurgency. Analysts and scholars can 
(and should) question these assessments of any government. But ultimately it is governments’ 
which assess state security threats, make decisions, and are held responsible for all consequences
-  whether they be good, indifferent or bad. And this was the decision made by President 
Jayewardene’s government at the time.54
The TULF lobbied for a larger Unit of Devolution, and for more Powers of Devolution. But 
President Jayewardene and his Cabinet’s assessment of the threats to the security of the unity 
of Sri Lanka while balancing Tamil demands, was that the DDCs were the political reforms 
that the government could concede at that point in time. President Jayewardene wanted to 
proceed in a gradual and prudent fashion: “the President had promised [...] that i f  the scheme 
proved to be viable, substantive powers would be devolved to the District Councils 
[Emphases added]”. From a counterinsurgency perspective this was the government’s effort to 
reach out to the Tamil people, address their grievances, and thereby strengthen its Centre of 
Gravity in relation to the Tamil people. The TULF was eventually cajoled and persuaded to
54 Si,lva’ K-M-J98&  313, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multiethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880-1985
o t e o  r T tthe g0Vernmem ° n ° ne Side and the TULF and the Tamil insurgent groups on the
other on the Unit of Devolution is a continuous thread that runs from the DDCs and through the numerous
egotiations (with the involvement of the Indian central government) from July 1983 to July 1987 This matter
ve y important m the context of the Tamil insurrection and the UNP governments' threat assessments and
and E a s te r ^  erenCCS ° f Devolution’ and lhe Tamils insisting on a Unit which combined the Norther
and Eastern Provinces in the Introduction, Chapter-2 , and Chapter-4 .
Julvei98h3'DW h r  w"’ 2 0 I3 ’j rhe Sunday Leader, 4 August 2013, 'On The 30th Anniversary Of The Pogrom ( 
t , ’ ,W(; Ca.n m er rom th,s is thal President Jayewardene wanted to be prudent and careful
r  r ^ S ’,SteP ^  S,eP' ° ne Cann0t emirdy ,aU" him this as ^  Tamil* insurgen.^we already active and their goal was a separate state carved out of this same territory.
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DDCs, and agitated for its boycott, vowed to disrupt the entire process and also threatened 
death to Tamil politicians who came forward as candidates -  all actions which they
In mid-July 1983, at a time the insurrection was at a much higher intensity and just prior to 
taking very harsh measures (discussed later in this Chapter) the President publicly revealed 
that "at one time his party had been anxious to apply policies in the Northern regions in 
such a way as to attract popular support there [emphases added]”.58 The phrasing of the 
above was in complete consonance with British and US counterinsurgency Doctrine. It could 
have been a result of the President reading and studying insurgencies and how to counter 
insurgencies over the previous months (as publicly revealed by him in May 1983). And also 
the result of discussions and study with Cabinet colleagues such as Athulathmudali.59 
Although the word ‘counterinsurgency’ was never mentioned in any publicly available 
government document, speech or statement at that time or in the future (to the knowledge of 
the present author), what President Jayewardene said was tantamount to saying that his 
government had tried to implement a counterinsurgency strategy during the previous years. 
The fact that civilian leaders of the UNP government were studying counterinsurgency 
literature was further corroborated by Minister of National Security Athulathmudali who
specifically mentioned (in 1984) that policies similar to those implemented by General Gerald 
Templer in Malaya would be adopted in Sri Lanka.60
It is the present author’s assessment that if  the Tamil insurgents could have been satisfied with 
the DDC system in 1980 and had cooperated with the government in implementing them then 
the grievances of the Tamils may have been gradually addressed within a undivided Sri Lanka 
and without the deadly insurgency and counterinsurgency which engulfed the country for the 
next 30 years. But there was deadlock between the two sides: from the Tamil insurgents’ side 
the DDCs fell far short of the powers and territorial unit of self-government they wanted.
Lanka 1880-1985.
implemented.57
The Sunday Observer, 17 July 1983, ‘Stricter measures to combat terrorism', which 
text of the interview with the Daily Telegraph on 1 1  July 1983.
was a reprint of the full
Sun, 14 May 1983, ‘President vows to eliminate terrorism: Martial Law if necessary'. Lalith Athulathmudali
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From the government s side the DDCs were the maximum that it assessed that it could
concede to the Tamils without endangering the State and also losing support of its Sinhala 
voter base.
The Parallel (Covert) ‘Pogrom Against Tamils’ Trend, circa 1980 onwards.
Concurrent with the President s initiatives regarding the DDCs and other negotiations with
the TULF, there was evidence of a separate covert plan by some sections of the UNP’s
leadership to carry-out anti-Tamil riots to ‘teach Tamils a lesson’ and thereby, presumably,
bring an end to the insurrection. One of the UNP leaders whose name appears in many
publications is that of Minister of Industries Cyril Matthew.6" Matthew was the leader of the
UNP’s trade union organisation the Jathika Sevaka Sangamaya (JSS) which was very
publicly active in the anti-Tamil riots of July 1983 (discussed later in this Chapter).
The Jayewardene government also included, in very prominent positions, Sinhalese chauvinists 
who carried their anti-Tamil efforts to dangerous extremes. These leaders turned the ruling 
party s trade union [the JSS], which very large numbers of workers were enticed or often 
compelled to join after 1977, into something akin to a private army. This union engaged in 
widespread violence and intimidation against opposition parties, civil liberties groups [...] The 
use of violence by the union surfaced once again during the anti-Tamil riots of 1983.63
There would also have been other UNP leaders who would not have been averse to such 
policies if the Tamil insurrection could be brought to an end by such means. To confirm the
existence of this covert plan was very difficult to research and establish because of its political 
sensitivity but was useful for this Thesis. The evidence that has been marshalled to date by the 
present author come from many separate published and verbal sources stretching over a 
period of 33 years, from 1980 to 2013. The following are the separate items of evidence 
available at present to the author. They are arranged in chronological order from the oldest to
the most recent. The first three items are from before the July 1983 anti-Tamil riots. The 
fourth is a statement by a senior government Minister in 2012. (Other circumstantial evidence 
is analysed later in this Chapter when assessing the responsibility for the July 1983 riots.)
Chronologically the earliest and also one of the most significant items of evidence is a 
conversation which is reported to have taken place in 1980. Devenesan Nesiah who was a 
senior Tamil civil servant in 1980 published an article in 2013 -  the 30,h Anniversary of the
This was of course, a manifestation of the sheer ignorance that most civilian political leaders and military
HUP6™ n3d u1 tha' “rT6' In I979' 80 Sri Lankan civilian Political leaders of all political parties, not only the 
UNP and mthtary officers had no first hand experience of a protracted insurrection. The fact that attacking
62 m  Clvikans have a result that was the exact opposite that they wanted was not understood.
Meyer, Enc 1984:142; ‘Pnya Samarakone’ [pseudonym] 1984:115; Obeyesekere, Gananath 1984(a)-161 -162 
and extensively in Hoole, 2001. This is not an exhaustive list W
James Manor and Gerald Segal, 1985: 1172, ‘Causes of Conflict: Sri Lanka and Indian Ocean Strategy’.
pogrom-riots of July 1983 - where he says that he was informed by Professor A. J. Wilson and 
Dr Neelan Tiruchelvam that President Jayewardene had informed them that an anti-Tamil
pogrom was being planned. Nesiah published this account in August 2013 and because of its 
importance the relevant section is quoted in full below:
[...] My story starts earlier, around 1980, during the time that I was posted to the Sri Lanka
Institute of Development Administration. I had an unexpected visit from Prof. A. J. Wilson and
Dr Neelan Tiruchelvam. I did not know it then, but the pogrom was already in the making.
The objective of the visit of Wilson and Neelan was to inform me that the island-wide
District Development Council (DDC) elections were likely to be held soon, and that I was likely
to be posted as the Government Agent and District Secretary of Jaffna immediately after those 
elections.
They were keen that I should accept the appointment and help to develop the Jaffna DDC as
a model for all others. I expressed my opinion that the DDC scheme provided for little or no
devolution and that any decentralization was to the District Minister, U. B. Wijekoon, an
admirable man but who was appointed by, and answerable to, the President and not to the District 
Councils.
They agreed, but said that the President had promised them that if the scheme proved to be
viable, substantive powers would be devolved to the District Councils. That was why the Tamil
leaders were keen that I should be Jaffna's Government Agent and District Secretary. I asked 
them if they believed in that promise.
They confessed that they too had reservations, but that in addition to the unconvincing carrot 
of future devolution, the President had referred to a compelling stick in the form of a pogrom 
planned by unknown persons, of which the President came to know o f He had suggested that 
the way to avert the pogrom was to sustain an ongoing political partnership between the 
Sinhalese and Tamil leaders. In the circumstances, I agreed to accept the appointment if and 
when I received it [emphases added].64
The second item of evidence is a remarkably discerning article published on 5 June 1983 by 
the Sun's defence correspondent Ranil Weerasinghe.63 This was published shortly after the
Nesiah, Devenesan, 2013, The Sunday Leader, 4 August 2013, ‘On The 30th Anniversary Of The Pogrom Of 
July 1983’. Nesiah published this in August 2013, during the 30th Anniversary discussions and debates in the Sri 
Lankan press about the pogrom-riots of July 1983. This information is of high significance to research on the 
pogrom-riots of July 1983 (discussed later in this Chapter). A question can be raised as to how dependable is 
Nesiah’s account? Both other witnesses are dead, i.e. Wilson (in 2000 through natural causes) and Tiruchelvam 
(assassinated by a suicide bomber in 1999). The present author met Dr. Nesiah at his residence in Colombo on 
14 September 2013 where we had a two hour discussion where many subjects were discussed. During the course 
of this interview Dr. Nesiah guaranteed to the present author that everything in his article was true and accurate. 
The present author will continue to search for further evidence to corroborate Dr.Nesiah’s claims. Dr.Nesiah is 
fully aware of the need for complete accuracy in relation to specific events and conversations incorporated in his 
article. Dr.Nesiah has a B.Sc in Mathematics (University of Ceylon), an M.A. in Economics (University of 
Sussex). Some years after 1983 while still a government official he obtained official leave and completed his 
PhD from Harvard University, USA. He revised and published his PhD Thesis as a book, Discrimination with 
Reason?: The Policy of Reservations in the United States, India and Malaysia, 1997, USA: Oxford University 
Press. Dr.Nesiah has served as the Government Agent (G.A) of Mannar, Batticaloa and Jaffna, and many other 
government administrative posts. Although Dr. Nesiah may be criticised for not revealing this information much 
earlier, such critics must be mindful of the fact that Dr. Nesiah is a Tamil and had to be cautious when revealing 
such information. He had to think of his and his family’s security and furthermore, his government pension could 
be stopped or delayed at any time by the government via numerous administrative methods. Further research to 
corroborate Dr. Nesiah’s account is being continued by the present author.
The contents of many articles by the Sun's defence correspondent at that time, Ranil Weerasinghe, circa 1977- 
1983 were insightful and revealed that he had very good contacts and sources within the highest levels of 
government including the Cabinet, police and the army. The details and nuances of his articles are very 
insightful. The fact that these articles are contemporaneous texts written before the July 1983 riots - i.e. before 
the damage done to Sri Lanka’s international image and its reputation was realised by the government.
*
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killing of two airmen in Vavuniya and a day after the killing of a UNP local government 
candidate in Jaffna, and substantial segments are quoted below:
Terrorists last morning shot and killed another Northern UNP local government candidate in what 
defence analysts claimed was now emerging as an obvious attempt to invite military and public 
retaliation as a means to precipitate another bout o f ethnic violence.
The killing [...] they stated was definitely with the purpose o f fanning the unrest that has
been building throughout the country. [The killing of the two airmen, burning a bus in
Akkaraipattu, and last mornings killing] has now been identified as a co-ordinated sequence to
firstly create an atmosphere o f tension and then fan it into flames in order to envelope the
entire country in a communal conflict. [...] recent actions by the terrorists [...] has (sic) been
particularly brutal [...] with the intention being to incense the service personnel of all branches.
[...] The intelligence agencies have also not ruled out the possibility of a strike outside [the North
and East] with the sole intention of ‘setting fire to the fuse leading to the powder keg’ [emphases 
added].
The above Sun article has many sentences pregnant with meaning: (1) unnamed ‘defence 
analysts had claimed that there was an obvious attempt by the insurgents to provoke the 
military and Sinhala public into perpetrating another (the word “another” is probably a 
reference to the riots of 1977 and 1981 which occurred some years earlier) bout of ethnic 
violence. And this was precisely what occurred 1 '/2 months later. (2) That there was a co-
ordinated sequence by the insurgents... to envelope the entire country in communal violence. 
This too was precisely what happened in July 1983. (3) That there was an intention by the 
insurgents to enrage the personnel of all branches of the armed forces. This too happened in 
July 1983. (4) That all these attacks were being done by the insurgents with the intention of 
"setting fire to the fuse leading to the powder keg". What do the allegories “fuse” and 
“powder keg” mean? It is the present author’s assessment that within the context of the 
guerrilla attacks occurring in the country at that time “fuse” meant increasing the anger of 
Sinhalese people and the armed forces personnel, and “powder keg” meant anti-Tamil riots.
As can be seen, in the above article there was no mention of the Tamil insurgents’ campaign 
to create a separate State; no mention of the insurgents using guerrilla warfare tactics to make 
areas of the North and East ungovernable; no mention or even an allusion to ‘strategic 
defensive’ phase of an insurrection. There was no mention that the attacks could be a part of 
an insurgency where impressing and winning the support of Tamil people were important
journalists and the Sinhala public; before the damage done to Tamils and Tamil owned businesses became
widely known; before the total consequences to the country (discussed in detail, later in this Chapter) of the July
1983 anti-Tamil riots was realised by the government and establishment; and before the attempted ‘cover-ups’
by the government makes these Sun articles specially valuable. They are devoid of the attempts to diminish the
deleterious consequences of the pogrom-riots which appeared in some texts — both journalistic and academic — 
published after the riots.
6 Weekend, 5 June 1983, ‘Another UNP Organiser gunned down: Terror attacks with diabolic motive?’ Weekend 
was the Sunday paper of the Sun. The phrase ‘service personnel’ meant the armed forces and police.
political objectives for the insurgents. The assessments of the journalist were that the 
insurgents only objective was to provoke the Sinhalese to riot against the Tamils and to 
enrage the armed forces and police into aiding and abetting that rioting.67 The present 
author s deduction is that this journalist had picked-up information o f the planned attacks 
against Tamils from his political and defence contacts and that -  as a journalist -  he could 
not resist a scoop . But, as he realised that revealing this knowledge in clear-cut language 
would be dangerous to him, he chose to express himself using allegories and metaphors.
The third item of evidence is a conversation overheard by a Tamil lady in early July 1983 at a 
formal dinner in a hotel. She had overheard a government Minister seated at a nearby table
saying Just wait a few  weeks and they [i.e. Tamils] will be taught a lesson" [emphases 
added].68 This account was published in 2001 in Hoole’s book which is a landmark 
publication which documents the entire conflict. The entirety of Chapter. 11 of Hoole’s book
UNP
in the July 1983 riots. Hoole is very rigorous in his research and while he does not reveal the
name of the lady for obvious security reasons a substantial degree of dependability can be 
placed on his account.
The fourth item of evidence appeared in a book review published in May 2012. This was written
by a very knowledgeable and experienced former civil servant and later politician who has
served as a Minister in both UNP and SLFP governments. He publicly stated that the UNP
government was responsible for the pogrom-riots of July 1983.70 The fifth set of evidence -  but
by no means the last - is the large amount of detailed information and circumstantial evidence 
that Hoole has painstakingly gathered together.71
. The reas°"s for thls myopia could have been, first, unawareness of insurgencies and their phases such as 
strategic defensive’.
69 ” °°!e’ ^ ajan' 2001: 104’ Sri Lanka: lhe Arrogance of Power- Myths, Decadence & Murder
Hoole, Rajan. 2001, Sn Lanka: the Arrogance of Power- Myths, Decadence & Murder, Hoole’s book is 504 
pages in length and has a great deal of empirical information and analyses. Due to the need for brevity only 
mfonnabon directly relevant to this Thesis will be abstracted from Hoole’s book. Chapter.! I is titled Ju ly1983
fnforma, y Kl h'!, ”  SP0nta"e0U8 Mob Action?’ is 26 pages in length and has a great deal of empirical 
information published nowhere else. Hoole has gathered a great deal of circumstantial evidence including the use
electora lists by organised mobs to identify Tamil owned houses and a list of Tamil journalists’ whose houses
ere targeted, attacked and destroyed. Such lists -  specially the second mentioned above - could not have been
July ' l S  riots."13"6'  TheSC mat‘erS Wi“ b£ deaU With latCr When W£ analyse the responsibility for the
“ The reviewer was Minister Dr. Sarath Amunugama who worked as a Permanent Secretary to several
W s W a r "  I T  3 PH°liliCian' SeC The 'Sland' 19 May 2° 12’ b00k review’ ‘Whe" read the book rGota s War you learn that it does not mean Gota won the war single-handedly’.
ee Hoole, Rajan 2001: 144-177, Sri Lanka: the Arrogance o f Power- Myths, Decadence & Murder. This is a 
y significant book which has a great deal of meticulously gathered evidence.
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At this point we must stop discussing this issue as we have to deal with the same
subject when the responsibility for the July 1983 riots is analysed later in this chapter. Then,
many other items of circumstantial evidence which point to prior planning of the July 1983 
riots too will be analysed.
3.5 Government Attempts to hold DDC Elections Attacked b 
T a m i l ____________
Order. 1981 to early-1983
The government decided to hold DDC elections throughout the country in 1981. In the backdrop
grudging
TULF.
candidate or supported the government in any way was a traitor to the Tamil nation and therefore 
eligible to be killed. The elections in Jaffna were the most violence-prone. They were 
scheduled to be held on 4 June 198land some days prior to the elections a Tamil UNP 
candidate was assassinated. On 31 May several policemen were shot at during a TULF 
political meeting and at least one policeman was killed.7" The killing of policeman enraged
U N P
and private property.
They set fire to the Public Library in Jaffna. This Library was to have had one of the best
collections of Tamil books in the entire region.73 The Presidential Truth Commission of 2002
called it a wanton criminal act by police”.74 The fact that two important government
Ministers - Gamini Dissanayake and Cyril Mathew - were in Jaffna at this time coordinating
the government s election campaign fuelled speculation of government involvement. There 
was outrage over this incident.75
The Civil Rights Movement (CRM) Chairman Bishop Wickremasinghe visited Jaffna in early 
June 1981 and wrote to President Jayewardene. The Bishop itemised the destruction to the 
Jaffna Library, the TULF office, the residence and vehicle of the TULF’s Member of
”  ‘Official Roll of Honour-1977-2003', 2005: 1660.
■ Some 90,000 volumes were destroyed, along with many rare manuscripts and the loss was estimated as being 
irreparable. See Matthews 1982:1124-1125, 'District Development Councils in Sri Lanka’.
1984)Vernmem °f Sn LanKa’ 2002:27‘ Reporl of lhe Presidential Truth Commission on Ethnic Violence (1981-
75 Professor Gananath Obeysekere wrote: “The burning of the public library was a profoundly symbolic act- the 
library contained priceless manuscripts pertaining to the identity of the Tamils of Jaffna. On the Buddhist side it
^storv T u t  h f  r bariSm’ SinCC rarCly in Sri Lanka’S recorded histor* <and Perhaps even in the larger
,984(b>:47’ Violence and the FuTure o l
Parliament for Jaffna, the premises of the Eelanadu regional Tamil newspaper,
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and shops in the Jaffna bazaar. The Bishop reported that many eyewitnesses had stated that 
the perpetrators of these acts were policemen in civil clothes.76
One hour after the voting for the DDC elections ended, the government declared a State of 
Emergency throughout Sri Lanka effective from 5pm onwards on 4 June 1981.77 The UNP 
government won 11 of the 17 DDCs for which elections were held on 4 June 1981. The 
remaining six -  all in Tamil majority areas - were won by the TULF.78 But the government’s 
victory was hollow as the violence in Jaffna prior to the elections negated a great deal of the 
legitimacy of the elections in the minds of many Tamils. The government did not take any 
formal measures to inquire into or punish the perpetrators of the above violent acts in Jaffna.79 
Inevitably the fissure between the government and Tamil people widened. Insurgent attacks
gradually
army 80
Small-Scale Anti-Tamil Riots, August 1981. On 7 August 1981, relatively small scale
anti-Indian Tamil rioting began to occur in some Sinhala-majority parts in the country.81 In a 
large majority of cases the victims were Indian Tamils who worked on estates and 
plantations. On 17 August, ten days after the rioting began the government stated that 7
■ Cl,| ' l o ^ hlS Movement (CRM), 1981c: 2 , ’The events in Jaffna since 3 Is'M ay 1981-, text of letter dated 24 
June 1981 sent to President Jayewardene by CRM’s Chairman Bishop Laksman Wickramasinghe
, Th! r e, r enl alS0 mobiiised some of the army's ‘volunteer’ Regiments for duty. See The Times (London) 5 
June 1981, Emergency declared after Sri Lanka polling’. The ‘Volunteer’ Regiments are the Sri Lankan army’s
equivalents of the Bntish Army’s ‘territorial army’ Regiments. Many of these units -  along with other new 
battalions and units created over the subsequent years - continued to be mobilised till 2009.
The Times (London) 6 Jun 1981, ‘Sri Lanka rulers win’. On earlier dates the UNP had won control of 7 
Councils. Consequently the UNP government ended by controlling 18 of the 24 DDCs in the country.
1984)Vernmei1t ° f Sn Lanka’ 2002:27’ Report of !he Presidemial Truth Commission on Ethnic Violence (1981-
I  F7  ^ an?P‘e ■APri' 198,1 the Civi1 R‘Sh,s Movement (CRM) wrote to President Jayewardene highlighting
the death of an elderly Tamil man consequent to assault by army personnel, and, the lack of any information of
30 Tamils detained after an armed robbery. Those arrested had not been produced in front of a Magistrate their 
S T m ! 198. We.r' U.nkn0Wn and ,hey bad had no -cess  to Lawyers or families (See Civil Rights Movement
S eV d a ld  74 A ^  Z f  “Z 6 Mi"iSter fW DefenCe’ ™ S letter rem,nded Mr Werapi.iya of the earlier
letter dated 23 Apr, 1981 and gave the names of 24 Tamils who had been detained but whose whereabouts were
unknown, (see Civil Rights Movement (CRM), 1981b, ‘Violence in Jaffna and Secret Detention’, letter to Mr 
T.B  ^Werapitiya, Deputy Minister, Defence, 7 May 1981). (Source: CRM Archives, Colombo )
82 n e'a‘,Ve When compared with the rioting of 1977 and the pogrom-riots of July 1983
By 12 August the government had placed the army on alert and deployed them to assist the police (see The
“ m G ^ a h  T  'C0l0f °  army aler,,)- 0n ,hc n'Sh‘ army p e r Z e !  £  Z
personnel in those areas to maintain order. There were riots against Tamils in the Negombolrea (North of 
Colombo, or, the west coast) and Ratnapura (towards the centre of the country, renown for its gems) Personnel
workertTnVmom tha 3 0 0  ^  ^  depl<)yed ^  RatnaPura’s Rubber Plantations to prole. Tamil estate
deaths, 196 acts of arson, 35 instances of looting, and 15 robberies had occurred
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from 7 August onwards. Government announced that the death penalty would be imposed for
-------------- a  i ____  83arson and looting.
The sole Minister in the Cabinet from the Indian Tamil ethnic group -  of whom a majority
were estate workers - made a very significant statement in parliament. This was Minister S.
Thondaman, leader of the CWC (Ceylon Workers Congress), Minister of Rural Industrial
Development. He urged President Jayewardene to take measures to stop the violence and 
stated:
Plantation workers innocent of any political crimes have been singled out for murder and 
"?ay^m . The mob rule which seems to be the order o f the day in many parts o f the country 
should be brought to an end without any further delay as it has already resulted in the loss of 
many valuable lives and millions of rupees’ worth of properties(sic) [emphases added].84
As a Minister in the UNP government, Mr. Thondaman would have had access to information
from a wide range of information from his supporters, contacts and friends. The above
statement gives a useful contemporaneous insight into deterioration of law and order in some 
areas of the country.
army
army 86 Both soldiers were ethnic 
1981 the army was again
deployed to assist the police in the North. By this time the meagre progress the army had
achieved through its July to December 1979 deployment in Jaffna had eroded away. According
data released by the government between 1976 and July 1983 secessionist insurgents killed 73
persons, and from 1978 to 1983 insurgents were responsible for more than 265 bombings, 
robberies, and assaults.87
The Times (London), 18 August 1981, ‘State of emergency for Sri Lanka after unrest'. The reader needs to be 
™nsTdeha theSe flf  eS,C° uld have been considerably underreported by the government due to political 
con tro l f ,hnS S,UCh 3S' t0 ‘I0" ''63' 10 th£ PUb'1C and the internationaI community that the government was in
rimes bv S nh 1 (b) “I leSSe" a"Xiety and f6ar am0nSSt the Tam" s' ^  <c>to prevent s.milar ‘copycat
civiliansdid nofknow°and' As. ,press ,censorsh'P was in force throughout Sri Lanka a. that time most ordinary
oftavellmH toTheTroubled gH° VernmCm flgUres could be made at tbat ‘™e as reporters were apprehensive 
bnn hn IH tr° Ubl d due t0 COncerns about their own safety and security. A scholar wrote that about
r c " e * *  ™ s ” do,e ,o *  * •
; f”  “  u - »  -  
^  ‘Official Roll of Honour-1977 to 2003’, 2005: 873
Kearney 1985:906, ‘Ethnic Conflict and the Tamil Separatist Movement in Sri Lanka'.
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Although these numbers are relatively small these killings created a considerable
amount of agitation within the government and majority Sinhala people because, first, none of
the perpetrators were prosecuted and convicted. Very little information came forth from within
the Tamil community. Any Tamil who gave information ran the risk of assassination by the
insurgents. Second, the killing of police and especially army personnel in the course of a long
drawn-out political campaign was entirely new. Police personnel were occasionally killed by
criminals during the course of their normal duties. But the last time army personnel had been
killed was in 1971 during the JVP’s insurrection. Up to 1982 the navy and the air force had not 
suffered any casualties.
3.6: Increased Tamil Insurgent Attacks & Anti-Tamil mini Riots
Martial
Max & mid-July
In the first seven months of 1983 four army soldiers were killed on four separate occasions, 
one each in April and May and two in early July. One was killed in Kilinochchi and all the
others in Jaffna. In February 1983 two policemen, both Sinhalese, were killed in Jaffna
• • 88
District It was around this time that sporadic anti-Tamil direct actions by Sinhalese began to 
take place in different parts of the country: in May 1983 Tamil students at Peradeniya 
University, Kandy, were harassed -  but no student was killed - and the University became 
unmanageable and was closed in mid-July by the government; beginning in the first week of 
June there were mini-riots in Vavuniya, Colombo, Trincomalee and other parts of the country 
and in these incidents there were some deaths and injury.89 It needs to be noted that these 
direct actions began more than IV2 months prior to the anti-Tamil pogrom-riots o f July 1983. 
In literature on the conflict in Sri Lanka this fact is overlooked.
With the gradual escalation of the Tamil insurrection President Jayewardene and the 
government came under increasing pressure by the Opposition and the public to end the 
insurgency and restore public order. Each insurgent attack offered the Opposition an 
opportunity to score points against the government. In mid-May 1983 President Jayewardene 
publicly stated that he would consider introducing Martial Law to eliminate the secessionist
• 9Q
insurgency. President and the government was in a crisis due to the escalating guerrilla-type 
attacks carried out by small, mobile groups -  which, as is well known, are very difficult for
89
90
‘Official Roll of Honour-1977 to 2003’, 2005: 873 and 1660. 
See Annexure 3.1 for incidents and tactical details.
IH«’iJ4F ^ iy I98h3’ T f u ident VOWS ,oeliminate terrorism: Martial Law if necessary’. He said this at political 
,Eh y g0da.' Maharagai™ a"d Kesbewa, Colombo and Ratnapura Districts, where the vast majority of
rallies
the population were Sinhalese.
even an . . 103army with experience in counterinsurgency warfare to deal with.
At the time Sri Lankan forces and police had virtually none. The President and Cabinet
decided that harsh countermeasures were needed. The President asked the Sinhalese people to
be patient and that he was reading books and studying terrorist movements. He said that he
had a strategy to tackle the secessionist insurgents. It is insightful to quote him at some length:
Be patient. Though some accuse me o f being too weak and lenient with the terrorists who have 
adopted dangerous tactics to divide the country, I  have m y strategy to tackle them ” he said 
President Jayewardene said he could not fight terrorism alone. On behalf o f the government he 
called upon the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and the people o f Sri Lanka to assist him in the fight 
against subversives and terrorists. “I am reading books about various terrorist movements in the 
world. First I will try to understand their objectives, their tactics and means o f achieving their 
goals. When I know more details about them and their activities, 1 will act decisively to 
eliminate the terrorist m ovem ent before the end o f  the term o f  my office. [ ...]  It is a difficult 
task and cannot be solved overnight. [ ...]  it took more than ten years for Italy and over 15 years
for Germany to solve the terrorism problem in those countries. Still terrorism is causing problems 
for India, Ireland and a host o f other countries [Emphases added].91
In early July 1983 the President gave an interview to Britain’s Daily Telegraph. He again 
publicly revealed that he was contemplating the introduction of Martial Law.92 This statement 
was given wide publicity by Sri Lankan newspapers, a few days later the entire interview was 
reprinted in the government’s most prestigious English newspaper.93 The state-owned radio 
station -  at that time the only radio station in existence in the country -  quoted this Daily 
Telegraph interview at length and the possibility of government introducing Martial Law and 
broadcast it to the whole island.'4 This was a high powered government publicity campaign 
which had to have had the direction of the President and the Cabinet.
Killing of a Soldier & two Airmen, and beginning of mini Anti Tamil Riots,
May 1983 onwards. On the day on which local government elections were held in Jaffna, 
18 May 1983, insurgents attacked a polling booth located just two miles from Jaffna city and 
killed one army corporal and injured another corporal and four police constables.95 The 
insurgents escaped. That night soldiers of that battalion rioted against commercial 
establishments and residences in the area including Jaffna’s new market.96
«  14 ^  1983’ ‘Presidem vows to eliminate terrorism: Martial Law if necessary’.
93 CTe. y ° n Da,‘y  News’ 12 Ju|y l9g3. President announces anti-terrorist crunch: Martial Law in the North*’
Daily T efgZ pb Z Z e l  * 983’ ‘S‘nCter ‘° C° mbat “ s"1’’ repri"‘ed lhe fu" «*« of the
Sun, 12 July 1983 ,‘Martial Law in North not Ruled Out: All Party Conference to tackle Terrorism’ The Sri 
Lanka Broadcasting Corporation (SLBC) broadcasted this information via radio '
hn~ 9 ^  ' 98t3’ Tu,rm011 ™ the North: Terrorists Raid Polling Booth: Soldier Killed, Fire in Town’ The 
booth was located at Kandaramadam, very close to Jaffna city centre
>s useful^o' rp hu T , T e damaged by fire’ vehicles were se' on fire and arou"d 500 people fled their homes It
was the mnsT - / 35 T  m° mhS Pn°r 10 the ant'-Tamil pogrom-riots of July 1983. At that time this
most senous incident of army personnel behaving in this fashion. These were among the first Tamil
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On 1 June 1983 Tamil insurgents killed two and injured one airman of the Sri Lanka Air
Force in Tamil majority Vavuniya town’s main market area.97 These were the first air force
personnel to be killed by the insurgents and both of them were Sinhalese. A couple of hours
after this incident arsonists set fire to many shops in Vavuniya market area and caused
widespread damage.9" The government quickly stated that it would compensate Vavuniya
town’s residents who had suffered loss of property. President Jayewardene hurriedly said that 
Vavuniya town would be rebuilt.99
The funerals of the dead airmen were held a few days later and more than 5,000 people
attended one funeral held in the Kandy area and nearly 10,000 persons were reported as
having visited his mother’s house in a remote village in the area.100 Such numbers of
mourners was unusual for the funerals of Other Ranks. These unprecedented numbers are
indicators of significant numbers of the Sinhala electorate becoming politically agitated at the
deaths of armed forces personnel.101 After the killing of the two airmen on Is' June, anti-Tamil
mini-riots began to occur in widespread areas of the country. This is circumstantial evidence
of the existence of a significant number of Sinhala rioters in Sinhala predominant areas who 
were prepared to use violence on Tamils living amidst them.
These mini-riots which began in early-June 1983 and never entirely subsided but continued 
intermittently up to the riots of July 1983 riots.102 Colombo103 and Trincomalee104 are
P : l o T d i e r  “ plVin W ner ^  ^  ’983’ TUrm°" ‘^ o r t h :  Terrorists Raid Polling
Vavlniy“ ’ 2 ^  '983’ marke‘ TW° A'rmen shot dead’ 2 terrorists captured: Curfew in
l ! ! h b0v y WaS arreSterd °r prosecuted- 11 was wide|y believed that the arsonists were air force personnel from the 
nearby Vavumya air force base. But this information could not be published in the press due k> censorship The
conciliatory gestures by the government to make good the damage caused by the noting is an indicator that the
government (and the air force authonties) knew who the arsonists were. From the S  d a ™ r d s  h e T o !
was placed under a night-time curfew, see The ,stand, 2 June 1983, ‘New market ablaze Two Ammen sho "
i r v e d STHaPtHUred: CUrf6W in VaVUniya'' Ab°Ut 100 buildi"Ss —  damaged of whilh 35 r ^ c o m p S
News 4 June l VUm V ‘° Wn 3‘ ar° Und R°peeS 3‘3 million. See Ceylon Dailyrvevra, 4 June 1983, Damage toll taken as Vavuniya returns to normal’
>»T h liT c ^ d l  June’ £  COmpefnSated: Prcesidenl t0 d—  Vavuniya report with Cabinet’.
* «  c,,mi“ d ° ver .ions win,
more corroborative evidence. surgen s. e present author continues to research this period for
See Annexure 3.1 for the tactical details.
described in separate Tables due to the higher level of disorder which occurred
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in each of them and their strategic significance. The widespread geographical spread of these 
mini-riots have been forgotten or over-looked by most researchers due to the pogrom-riots of
July. Significantly, even the Presidential Commission which investigated ethnic violence 
during 1981-1984 made no mention of these mini-riots.105
Government Takes Security Measures in the Face of Widespread Disorder,
early-June 1983. By early June the government decided to take strong actions to try to stem 
the insurrection and also to stop mob actions by Sinhalese gangs. By early June the Police had
arrested
Panadura for arson and looting. Police had also opened fire at rioting mobs in Kurunegala.106 
The National Security Council (NSC) of the government adopted a range of proactive security 
measures. Some of the measures were aimed at containing and stopping the anti-Tamil disorder 
and rioting by Sinhalese mobs, while others were aimed at eliminating insurgents.107 (a) the 
establishment of a police command centre which linked-up with the operations rooms of the 
three armed forces headquarters in Colombo; (b) preventive arrest of known criminals and thugs 
around the country; (c) a contingency plan to deal with disorder & rioting in Colombo; and (d) 
police, army, and navy command rooms in Trincomalee were linked together. Curfews and the 
deployment of army, navy and air force personnel ‘in aid of the civil power’ was underway 
throughout the country.",h Table 3D (see Annexure 3.1) is proof that the armed forces were in 
action ‘in aid of the civil power’ seven weeks before the July 1983 riots.
During this same period (relatively) low-scale anti-Tamil disorder also began to occur in specific parts of
Colombo where a high concentration of Tamils lived intermixed with Sinhalese and Muslims. Colombo is a very
sensitive if not the most politically and security sensitive location in Sri Lanka. This is due to many criteria-
Colombo is where all ethnic groups live in close proximity with each other; it is the largest and most important
urban centre on the island; it is where numerous Ministries, businesses, government offices, parliament, the
president s Office and residence, Hotels and the headquarters of all the armed forces and police are located Any
inter-ethnic tension and disorder in Colombo very quickly gets known internationally and also throughout the 
island and can serve to encourage rioting elsewhere. 5
Ta"?^  dlsorde|' and noting also began in Trincomalee during this time. Trincomalee town has a 
population almost equally divided between all three ethnic groups, and the relations between the Sinhalese and
7 S. tenSe a", ,C° malCC 18 als° 3 ‘naval ,own’ because ,he Sn Lanka navy's largest and most
T T ncom alefl f  T ^ T  Tn"COOlalee harbour- Ma"y thousands of navy personnel wLe based in 
T ncorna ^ 'T h  ,am n° Ung 7 ch began in earlVJu"e 1983 was at its worst and most sustained in
an internal security aid to the civil authority’ to assist the police. y
°flhe Presi*en,ial Tru,h Commiss‘°n on Ethnic Violence (1981-1983), Sessional Paper No.III-2003 
Dept of Government Printing, Sri Lanka.
107 Ceyl°n Daily News, 8 June 1983, ‘Over hundred arrested’.
108 The Island* 4 June 1983, ‘Security Council to meet on Monday’
elements9 Act.IGp’- S ^  T  n T  ^  00 situatl0n - W o n  Daily News, 6 June .983, ‘Round up criminal 
rmai , /he Island, 4 June 1983, More powers to armed forced to fight terrorism’.
While aimed at curtailing Sinhalese mobs, if the
106
armed
implementing these measures then these tough measures would have been used against them too. 
It is in this context that the second set of policies need to be seen. The activation of the 
Emergency Regulations’ provision for the ’Disposal of Dead Bodies’ was one of these.109 This
Tamil
Province
On 3 June - two days after the killing of the two airmen in Vavuniya and the beginning of 
widespread disorder in the country - several provisions of the Emergency Regulations were 
gazetted by the government. These provisions applied only to the Northern Province and gave
armed
bodies. It suspended the need for a Coroner’s investigation with regard to persons killed by the
armed
It shall be lawful for any police officer of a rank not below that of Assistant Superintendent or for 
the oftjcer in charge of a police station or any other officer or person authorised by him  in that 
behalf to take with the approval of the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence all such measures as 
may be necessary fo r  the taking possession and burial or cremation o f  any dead body, and to 
determine in his discretion the persons who may be permitted to be present at any assembly for 
the purpose of or in connection with any such burial or cremation. [...] I t shall not be necessary 
or any officer or person taking measures relating to the possession and burial or cremation of a 
dead body under this regulation to comply with the provisions o f  any other written law relating 
to the inquest o f  death or to burial or cremation femnhases ariHedl 110
As is evident from the above although the decision as to whether or not to hold an inquest was
taken by the Secretary
to the Officer in Charge (OIC) of any police station or any other police officer delegated by such
Within Sri Lanka’s post-colonial political culture, however, these regulations have aan OIC.
JVP
suspects
insurrection.
In 1971, a group of citizens came together and lobbied the then government to get these 
Regulations revoked. This was how Sri Lanka’s oldest civil rights organisation - the Civil 
Rights Movement (CRM) -  came into being: “Revocation of this horrifying regulation was 
one of [the] main demands of CRM at its inception in 1971”. '12 In 1971 these Regulation
"o C*yl°n D“lly News- 6 June 1983, 'Rules governing disposal of bodies gazetted’.
in Da!ly ? ews' 6 June 1983’ Rules governing disposal of bodies gazetted’.
1121!16..Sl an?' 4 dune l983’ M° re P° wers t0 armed forced 10 f,ght terrorism’.
-T e 2 ™ gn P r T o ' (F RM)' l983a’ ‘ D i s p o s a l  of Dead Bodies without Postmortem’. 5 June 1983 I elegram to President J.R. Jayewardene’.
were used as virtually a ‘licence to kill’ by the police and armed forces. Adult
iu  /
political leaders, political party members and adult civilians who had lived through the 1971
insurrection were aware of this fact. In 1983 there was no public discussion of these matters
due to press censorship, the on-going (albeit low intensity) insurgency and the general sense 
of insecurity.
President Jayewardene s position was that these harsh provisions were necessary to protect
armed 113 The CRM»» u  v v i  i  V / 1 JL l  •  JL 1 1  ^  I \  I V 1
sent a very firmly worded telegram to the President (this one of the few contemporaneous 
documents of 1983 which it has been possible to locate).114
By activating this Regulation in June 1983 the government sent ‘messages’ to several
constituencies both Tamil and Sinhalese: the message to Tamil insurgents was that ‘the
gloves were off’ and that the government had authorised the armed forces to use deadly force
against Tamil insurgents and to destroy the bodies. Any armed actions against government
institutions such as police stations, post offices, buses and trains would be severely dealt-with.
Tamil politicians and citizens were on notice that the government’s intention of using deadly
force had been ratcheted upwards several dozen notches in one move and that they would be 
well advised to rein-in the insurgent groups.
^eyl0r n D“i ly "™ S:  4 June ,983’ ‘Anti-tei™nst emergency regulations: Security men to get more protection'. 
See Civil Rights Movement (CRM), 1983a, ‘Disposal of Dead Bodies without Postmortem’, 5 June 1983, 
Telegram to President J.R. Jayewardene’.
Disposal of Dead Bodies without Postmortems
/ h,e l ° d a y ’ 4J JJUne l9 8 3 ’ that Emer&ency  Regu.lotion are being promulgated to permit
disposal of dead bodies by armed forces in the North without Postmortem Inquiry. According to one report a
government spokesman said the morale of service and police personnel is low because under normal
circumstances if they shoot down a terrorist they have to face an inquest, remand and other constraints. Another
report says that the government wishes to ensure that servicemen and policemen doing their duty under difficult 
circumstances are “in no way harassed by the Law”. y UK
Working committee of Civil Rights Movement which met today expressed deep alarm at these reports It
ofT^'fher h g° Vher“ haS SefnOUS Problem of maintenance law and Order in the North and is not unmindful
there! ^ ^  ° f servlcemen- P ie m e n , politicians and innocent bystanders with which it is
™  u T h  * any govemn:em to deaL 11 is however precisely at such times that excesses are likely to be 
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against civilian population. Granting of such powers will create again the excesses o f 1971 when similar 
h rc e im m l , “nder torture, indiscriminate killings and executions without trial by the security
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Along with the PTA (Prevention of Terrorism Act) enacted in 1979 these Emergency
Regulations gave the police and armed forces’ a formidable array of powers."5 In spite of
objections by CRM and a few others, the government did not withdraw these Emergency
Regulations. Here we have an instance where a government was caught in a typical dilemma of
counterinsurgency warfare: how to balance civil rights and human rights while at the same time 
trying to deal with dispersed guerrilla warfare.
President Jayewardene Tells Senior Army Officers that he had increased their
powers. And that he expected them to enforce Discipline. On 10 June just prior to 
travelling overseas President Jayewardene addressed a large gathering of senior army officers in 
Colombo. This was a very important address where he laid out the broad contours of his policy 
and what he expected from the armed forces and the police. He said that he was addressing them 
not only as the Minister of Defence but also as Head of State and the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces. He said that serious terrorist acts had occurred in the recent past and that he 
expected the armed forces and the police to deal with the threat. He said that since 1977 a total of 
37 police and armed forces personnel, 9 UNP politicians and 14 civilians had been killed. 
Emergency laws had been introduced “so as to give those in charge of the government a chance 
to see that terrorism was wiped out completely in this country”." 6 Significantly, the President 
specifically mentioned the fact that the requirement for coroners ’ inquests had been changed and 
the powers of the police and the armed forces had been significantly increased."7 But then he 
said that he also expected the Officers to enforce discipline among the armed forces. He called 
upon the Commanders of the armed forces and the senior officers to convey to their subordinate 
officers and men that maintaining discipline was a matter of the highest importance.
It is the assessment of the present author that in this address the President conveyed two 
important messages to the army. First, he made it clear that he had allowed them to ‘take the 
gloves o ff, so to speak. He had increased the powers of the armed forces and the police, 
including the power to dispose off dead bodies without inquest. Every armed forces and police 
officer knew what that meant. Second, he wanted the senior officers to ensure that discipline was 
maintained in the armed forces: the events of the veiy recent past such as the rioting of soldiers 
in Jaffna and the arson and disorder in Vavuniya which followed the killing of the two air force 
personnel would have been fresh on the minds of both the President and the senior officers in the
w i " b e  a n a , y s e d  i n  d u e  c —
D,scipl,ne a must A™ed s— ’• -
audience. It is significant that many of the newspapers which reported this speech
iuy
had ‘discipline in the aimed forces’ prominently included in their headlines: ‘President tells
senior officers: Discipline a must for Armed Services’ and ‘President Stresses Need for 
Discipline’.1,8
Tamil Insurgents’ Concerted Guerrilla Attacks on Government Property and 
Transport Infrastructure, 1 July 1983 onwards. On 1 July 1983 the Tamil insurgents
began a concerted campaign of dispersed guerrilla style attacks in both the Northern and
Eastern Provinces targeted at destroying government property -  trains, buses, other types of
vehicles, equipment, and buildings. The government found these ‘Strategic Defensive’ type
guerrilla tactics very difficult to cope with as the police and army had never before
experienced geographically dispersed guerrilla attacks. This had an immediate negative
impact on the transport of goods and fuel supplies to and from Jaffna. On some days there
were attacks in five of the eight districts which constituted the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces.
On 1 July in a well-planned operation insurgents set fire and destroyed ten of the Colombo-
Jaffna-Colombo main passenger train at Kondavil railway station located a few miles north of
Jaffna C ity."9 The government immediately stopped Colombo-Jaffna train services till it
made an assessment of the security situation. The government warned Jaffna civilians that
such attacks would compel the government to restrict train services and that this would affect
the supply of fuel and goods to Jaffna and affect Jaffna’s civilian population, which was 
precisely what happened.120
The insurgents however continued with their attacks on government property. On 5 July a
group of 20 insurgents arrived at Jaffna’s main post-office at noon, told the employees that 
they would not be harmed and destroyed all the equipment. On 6 July a sub-post office in 
Tinnaveh, Jaffna was attacked and equipment destroyed. On the same day six insurgents
«  ^  Discipline a mast tor Armed Services’, and
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attacked and damaged equipment in the Nallur Assistant Government Agent’s 
(AGA) Office located just outside Jaffna City area.121
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Shortly after midnight on 6 July a 10 member groups of insurgents dressed in army type
uniforms masqueraded as army personnel and gained entry to the premises of the large
government-owned Kankesanturai Cement Factory. Then at gun point they stole detonators,
drills and other equipment. While government newspapers said that only equipment such as
drtlls had been stolen, a non-government newspaper said that three crates of explosives too 
had been stolen.122
On 7 July the government had announced that train services to Jaffna would resume the next
day. On 8 July three insurgents attacked the Cheddikulam railway station, Vavuniya District,
robbed it of cash, seriously damaged equipment and set fire to a government bus parked in the
station premises. This was a week after the burning of the Yal Devi train’s carriages in Jaffna.
Consequent to the Cheddikulam attack the government continued to stop all train services
between Jaffna and Colombo.12’ This, of course, was precisely the strategic aim of the
secessionist insurgents’ attacks on the railway.124 By mid-July there were acute fuel shortages
in Jaffna filling stations which compelled them to ration supplies.125 By the third week of July
the government completely stopped sending any fuel north of Anuradhapura city. The
Government Agent of Jaffna was instructed to obtain fuel from Anuradhapura using hired
civilian-owned fuel trucks.126 The insurgents did not attack these trucks as they were the 
private property of Jaffna Tamil businessmen.
i2] Sun, 7 July 1983, ‘Attack on another AGA’s Office’
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On 9 July armed gangs attacked three sub- post offices in Jaffna District and
destroyed telephone and other equipment.127 On 11 July ten insurgents attacked the Jaffna 
AGA Office, asked the employees to leave and destroyed its equipment; another group set fire 
to a bus on Jaffna’s airport road.128 Further, on 11 July night insurgents set fire and destroyed 
a government owned bus in Batticaloa, a police jeep of the Trincomalee station parked at the 
Irrigation Department premises, an anti-Malaria campaign jeep parked at the Mannar 
Hospital, and a Fisheries Corporation vehicle in Kalmunai (Ampara District).129
It is significant to note that the above six attacks occurred on the same day in five different
Districts -  Jaffna, Mannar, Batticaloa, Trincomalee, and Ampara -  i.e. three attacks in the
Northern Province (Jaffna & Mannar Districts) and three in the Eastern Province
(Trincomalee, Batticaloa & Ampara Districts). This revealed that the insurgents had active
cells in all these Districts and with these attacks they deliberately advertised this fact. The
insurgents would have known that both the police and army would have reported these attacks
in their ‘situation-reports (i.e. ‘SITREPS) to Colombo and that the President and the MoD
would be made aware of these attacks. The purpose of advertising can be deduced: the attacks
revealed to the government, Tamil civilians and Sinhala civilians that the insurgents had cells
in the territory from which they wanted to create the separate state of Tamil Eelam; the
attacks revealed that they could carry out attacks in five Districts on a single day. These
attacks were a part of a protracted campaign to weaken the government’s resolve against
secession. The message to the Tamil civilians was to encourage recruitment and/or support
and to warn them of the dire consequences of cooperating with the government. It is the
assessment of the present author that all these attacks from 1 July onwards were
manifestations of the Tamil insurgents’ increasing the tempo of the ‘strategic defensive’ phase 
of their insurrection.
As government owned buses continued to be burnt and destroyed130 the Minister of Transport 
was compelled to withdraw 55 brand new buses which had very recently been allocated to the 
Northern Province by the government. The government decided to terminate all bus services 
in the Northern Province at 4pm each day.131 By 18 July the government also decided that no
The Island, 11 July 1983, '3 SPOs attacked in north'
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, carriages and
measures created huge inconveniences to the
While the insurgents’ campaign of destruction of government property was underway the
arrested
were probably used, as has occurred in most insurgency/counterinsurgency situations.
Amnesty International accused the government of human rights violations, which were denied
by the government.134 On infrequent occasions armed fights also occurred between the army
and insurgents. The insurgents did not initiate these skirmishes because their tactics from 1
July onwards was the destruction of government property. The fights occurred inadvertently
due to information given by from informants. For example, on 15 July the army received
information that some insurgents were in a coconut estate in Meesalai, about 15 km east of
Jaffna City. Troops rushed to the location and a gun battle occurred between the group of 
insurgents and troops.135
Concurrent with the above direct armed actions by the insurgents, ‘front organisations’ of the 
insurgents and those sympathetic to the insurgents’ cause too were busy organising marches,
demonstrations and boycotts. In early-July organisations in Trincomalee agitated students
to boycott their schools. Posters appeared on walls near schools in Trincomalee calling the 
students to boycott school.137 By mid-July the boycott of Trincomalee schools had spread 
outside the city into Tamil villages outside the city. The police reported that attendance was
private cars. The vast majority used bicycles for short oTher Z T  ^
,34 C^ lon Daily News 19 July 1983, ‘No trains to Jaffna till safety is ensured’ .    p ” m  ° r  
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close to zero in Tamil schools.138 By mid-
Jaffna.
July the school boycott had spread to
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These activities are reminiscent of the Satyagraha civil disobedience campaign of 
1961 and added to the general political ferment in the northern and eastern provinces.
Government faced by Typical Dilemmas of Dispersed Guerrilla Warfare. By
mid-July 1983 the insurgents’ dispersed guerrilla style attacks on government infrastructure
and transport system were having a serious impact on the government’s ability to administer
and maintain Law & Order in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The government’s very 
credibility in the eyes of the Sinhala electorate was at stake.
The Sun's defence correspondent wrote an article in mid-July which gave a rare glimpse into 
the dilemmas then facing the government.140 The National Security Council (NSC) was faced 
with several dilemmas: first, whether to continue with the existing limitations on bus and train 
services. The serious inconvenience caused to the Tamil civilians was recognised and also 
that the blame for the inconvenience was being placed on the government. A second issue was 
whether to provide blanket security for all possible insurgent targets. This would include 
guards for all forms of rail and road transport, guards for all major installations (such as 
electricity transmitting stations, railway stations, government offices, government vehicle 
parks, etc). The cost of implementing such a programme would be very high and would also 
require the need to requisition vehicles for use by the armed forces from government-owned 
Corporation and Departments for the armed forces’ use. This measure would in-turn cripple 
the civil administration of these and Districts. What this clearly reveals is that by mid-July 
1983 the government was caught in the grip of one of the oldest dilemmas of fighting 
guerrillas, namely whether to (try and) guard every possible guerrilla target -  a task for which 
the government did not have the resources (personnel, vehicles, funds). Or to guard only the 
essential locations and restrict public services to civilians become unpopular with them.
In mid-July President Jayewardene attempted to form a broad political coalition with the 
Opposition parties to assist the government to defeat the insurgency. He invited all the 
political parties in parliament for ‘All-Party Talks’ and the only subject o f the Conference was
13
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to decide on how to eliminate terrorism.,41 
Conference never took place.
But the pogrom-riots occurred and the
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President Jayewardene divulges harsh new policies which would impact
severely on the Tamil People, 11 July 19S3. With the escalation of guerrilla attacks
many communitythe Sinhala electorate, Opposition parties, Buddhist monks and 
organisations were critical of the government because of the break down of law & order in the 
North and East. It was in this context that President Jayewardene publicly revealed that he 
was going to adopt harsh new strategies against the insurgents and when he openly said that 
he would not be able to give consideration to the security and lives o f Tamil people.
This new policy began with a strategically significant media campaign on 11 July when the
President gave an interview, in Colombo, to London’s Daily Telegraph. In this interview he
outlined how he assessed the situation and also the new policies that he planned to adopt to
deal with the Tamil insurrection.142 He described the guerrilla style attacks on trains, buses
and government property which had taken place during the previous 5 weeks and the
consequent near standstill of government administration in the Northern Province. He
described his frustration and disappointment with the TULF’s parliamentarians. Then the
President described the broad contours of his new strategy. This interview is extremely
valuable as it gives a great deal of insight into President Jayewardene’s strategic
conceptualisations of mid-July 198 3.143 It is a candid and very revealing contemporaneous
account and took place before the pogrom-riots later that month, and the devoid of the
misinformation and attempts at obfuscation which came after the riots. There were veiled and
overt threats in the President’s interview which most discerning analysts -  Tamils, Sinhalese,
Indian government -  took note of. Relevant sections of this interview are quoted below as
they give a very rare and unique glimpse of the strategic decisions which the President and 
Cabinet had arrived at by early-July 1983.
Referring to the role played by [...] the Tamil United Liberation Front which is seeking
separanon of the Northern Provinces (sic), President Jayewardene said that his ruling party once
'2 e s \ l l n f o V  163iu lve|W9 8 T ‘ I '°  “ “ S  ^  ^  Wide appr0Val: Al|-Pa^  Talks on July 20’. The
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Several important policy changes stand out in the above. First, President Jayewardene referred
to the negottations with the TULF in the past tense. This was not an accident or a
typographical error but an expression of government policy. It was reiterated a few days later
by Prime Minister R. Premadasa and a government spokesman went on to give even greater
details. The spokesman said that the government had decided that it would not dialogue with
any party which in any way supported secession and that the government “would not pursue a
path of finding a political solution with this party [i.e. the TULF], as long as it upheld the cry
for a separate state. [...] the government was adamant that it would not give a hearing to the 
militant views expressed by the terrorists even by proxy”.145
This was a major policy change as it was with the TULF that the government had been 
negotiating various formulations of political power devolution from the 1977 onwards. The
only tangible results were the DDCs but, as discussed above, this too was finally opposed by 
both the Tamil insurgents and the TULF and did not bear fruit. It is the assessment of the 
present author that President Jayewardene had come to the conclusions that (a) discussions 
with the TULF were ineffective in bringing a negotiated settlement to the Tamil insurrection
as the TULF could not control the Tamil insurgents, and (b) the TULF itself was under threat 
by the Tamil insurgents.147
The second policy was lhat the Tamil insurgents were to be 'dealt with' by the government 
"witf*,,,, any qum er  tong  gioen", i.e. very harshly b , the military and the
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implication this meant that in his assessment his government had up to that time 
utilised the armed forces and the police with restraint.
The third policy was that legislation would be enacted which required a signed affidavit 
eschewing secession from every parliamentary candidate. If this was not given then any 
parliamentarian would automatically be guilty of an offence if he or she advocated or 
supported secession and would face expulsion from parliament and prosecution. This was a 
measure which had been advocated by anti-secessionist Sinhala politicians -  both in the 
government and in the Opposition - for a long time but had not been implemented by the 
President in deference to the TULF as he realised that such a measure would create 
difficulties with their constituents, and, the insurgents. (A week later the President had 
relented on this policy and postponed enacting it saying that it would await the outcome of the 
‘all-party talks on countering terrorism’ (see below) before enacting this legislation.148)
In the final section of the Daily Telegraph interview President Jayewardene made a series of
policy statements which indicated a very high degree of harshness towards the Jaffna Tamil
people and also on the severe measures he planned to take. It is instructive to quote him in 
full:
[President Jayewardene] made it clear that whether the other party leaders chose to attend
the [anti-terrorist] conference or not, or whether they agreed with his proposals or not, he
would still go ahead with the new anti-terrorist measures. Speaking on the effectiveness
of government measures he said: “I have tried to be effective for some time, but cannot 1
am not worried about the opinion of the Jaffna people now." He said that at one time
his party had been anxious to apply policies in the Northern regions in such a way as to 
attract popular support there.
Now we can't think of them. Not about their lives or of their opinions of us. Nothing 
will happen in our favour until the terrorists are wiped out. Just that. You cannot cure an 
appendix patient until you remove the appendix [emphases added].149
In the above quote the aspects that stand out are, first, that the President would apply anti-
terronst measures unilaterally regardless of whether any other political party -  such as the 
SLFP - supported him or not.
Second, that he and his party had earlier been keen to attract the support of the Jaffna Tamil 
people and had even been anxious to tailor government policies as a means to obtain that 
support. The phrasing of these sentences are in complete consonance with British and US 
counterinsurgency doctrine and could have been a result of the reading and studying of
sixth^mendmern’ ' 983’ PreSident aWaitS outcome of all-party talks: Governs
0bserver:  >7 Ju‘y '983, ‘Stricter measures to combat terrorism', wt 
text of the interview with the Daily Telegraph on 11 July 1983.
shelves constitutional 
was a reprint of the full
insurgencies that the President had been doing over the previous months and
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nevermaybe years (as he had publicly revealed in May).150 Although ‘counterinsurgency’ has 
been mentioned in any publicly available government document or statement up to that time, 
nor mentioned in subsequent years, what the President said was tantamount to saying that his 
government tried to implement a counterinsurgency strategy during the previous years.
Third, the President said that he had abandoned this counterinsurgency approach. He said that
his government was (a) not interested in the opinion of the Jaffna people; (b) could not (or
would not) take into consideration their opinion of the government; (c) could not (or would 
not) think about the lives of the Jaffna people.
The most menacing and ominous statement was (c), above, where the President implied that 
he would not consider the lives of the Tamil people when implementing his future anti- 
terronst policies. President Jayewardene used the word “think” but did not explain what he 
meant by this word. It can be argued that it could have had any number of meanings including 
government cannot take into consideration’; ‘government cannot consider’; ‘government 
cannot be concerned about the security of ’; ‘government cannot be worried about the security 
of ’, etc. Whatever the President meant, when we consider this word’s use in the context of 
entire interview then the implications were ominous. When the last two paragraphs o f the 
above quote are closely examined there can be little doubt that the President had come to the 
conclusion that he had to take some actions which would have very serious impact on Jaffna 
Tamil civilians. It is the assessment of the present author that its acceptable for a country’s 
President, when faced with an insurrection, to tell his people that his anti-terrorist policies 
entailed harsh measures such as arrests, detentions, curfews and also that sometimes 
‘collateral damage’ could inadvertently occur. However, in a counterinsurgency campaign it 
is impolitic, and a violation of counterinsurgency doctrine and strategy for the Head of State
and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and Police to say that his government was not 
interested in the lives of the civilian population base of the insurrection.
Fourth, the President said that he had come to the conclusion that nothing would happen to 
benefit the government until the Tamil insurgents had been “wiped out”. Therefore, of course, 
the government’s strategy would be to catch and destroy the insurgents. Catching and 
destroying insurgents in an insurrection where (a) the insurgents have a significant amount of
popular support and (b) are implementing mobile guerrilla warfare tactics similar to Maoist 
protracted warfare (as the Tamil insurgents were doing at that time) was no easy task.
1
Sun, 14 May 1983, ‘President vows to el • •tminate terrorism: Martial Law if necessary’.
Whether President Jayewardene, the Cabinet and the armed forces and police fully
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realised this at that time is not known -  it needs to be recalled that this was the first time that 
any Sri Lankan government had faced such protracted warfare tactics. In any even, the 
President stated that this was going to be the policy of his government. From this interview it 
can be deduced that he realised that this policy would result in injury and death to some 
number of Tamil civilians, specially in Jaffna, but he had concluded that this was inevitable.
Immediate Diplomatic Protest by Indian Government. Shortly after President
Jayewardene’s statements about his government’s harsh new policies, the Indian central
government made a formal diplomatic protest expressing its concern regarding the escalating
violence in North Sri Lanka, to which the Sri Lanka government reacted with annoyance.15' .
This was a premonition of what was to come in the aftermath of the pogrom-riots. It is highly
probable that the President had not made a comprehensive assessment of the impact of his
new policies on India, or, decided to take the risk as he had concluded he had no option. This
was a serious mistake for which President Jayewardene and Sri Lanka would have to pay
dearly, in the years ahead.152 The total range of policies -  covert, overt, military, political,
diplomatic -  that the Indian government could adopt vis-a-vis Sri Lanka were formidable. Of
course he knew of the agitation in Tamil Nadu, the pressure by Tamil Nadu on the central
government in Delhi, the apprehensions that Sri Lankan politicians had had regarding India
from Independence (1948) onwards. But, given the insurrection he faced, President
Jayewardene decision was to adopt this hard line.153 This seemingly small diplomatic spat was
a foreshadow of very serious inter-State conflicts in the next 4 years future and is evidence of
nsing tensions between the Indian central government and Sn Lanka before the July pogrom-
riots which occurred a few days later. Subsequent to the pogrom-riots the relations between 
the two countries deteriorated drastically.
3 .7 : T h e  P o g r o m - r in t s  0 f 1 9 8 3
It was in the context of the growing Tamil insurgent attacks and mini riots by Sinhala 
civilians from April 1983 onwards that the pogrom-riots of July 1983 occurred. This pogrom- 
riot is widely recognised as a turning point in postcolonial Sri Lanka history. Its impact had 
consequences in the political, military, and international relations spheres which can be 
witnessed to the present day. On the night of 23 July 1983 LTTE insurgents ambushed a
152 V *  Times (L°"don), 22 July 1983, ‘Colombo Anger’.
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mobile patrol of the 1st Battalion, Sri Lanka
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Light Infantry on a street in Jaffna.
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Lieutenant and twelve other ranks were killed in the explosion and the ensuing
firelight while two other soldiers escaped with injuries.155 All the soldiers killed were
Sinhalese. Up till that day this was the single largest number of fatal (or non-fatal) casualties
any branch of the armed forces or police had suffered in any single incident from 1948 
onwards.
A few hours after the incident, on the morning of 24 July, large numbers of other ranks from 
the same Battalion broke-out of their camps in Jaffna and rampaged through some areas of 
Jaffna and indiscriminately killed Tamil civilians.156 The accurate number of Tamils killed in 
Jaffna was 51.157 On the same day navy personnel broke-out of their Trincomalee base and 
rioted in Trincomalee and killed at least one person, injured ten, and set fire to more than 125 
houses and shops.158 The Navy Commander himself who was the ‘Coordinating Officer’ of 
Trincomalee could not stop this from taking place. The TULF’s leader said that at least 40
Tamils had been killed by the army in Jaffna, and that in Trincomalee Sinhalese rioters and 
army and navy personnel had burnt nearly 200 shops.
Army personnel actively encouraged arson and looting of business establishments and homes in
Colombo and took absolutely no action to apprehend or prevent the criminal elements involved
in these activities. In many instances army personnel participated in the looting of shops. [...] We
strongly believe that the violence could have been contained if the government had taken prompt 
action to deal with the rioters and looters.159
The funerals of the 13 soldiers were scheduled to be held at the main Kanatte Cemetery in
Colombo during the early afternoon of 24 July. There was considerable delay in the arrival of 
the coffins and when they finally arrived several hours late at tho mmptp™
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and O f f i Z n f  IQ7 i T  H T ber ° f ‘°  T  C' V1' P0WW' dePloyments- But of course by <983 thc Other Ranks 
foe 1 s m o t h e r ?  r  '? ni smce re,lred' In terms of combal experience and the ability to absorb casualties 
I55 ‘ 0 thf r Ranks and officers were as '"experienced as the rest of the armed forces and police 
os T,mes ( ^ d o n ) ,  25 July 1983, 'Ambush kills 13 soldiers in Sri Lanka’.
e Times (London), 8 August 1983, ‘Sri Lanka troops went on rampage’. “There are reports of Sri Lankan 
uoops killing non-combatant Tamils in Jaffna on 24 July, the day after the previous night’s ambush The official
* * 20 c i,i,i“  -  <« - u  s s
^ b tL ^ n fs?ptemb“ 15 th C°mmiSSi°n °" ^  Vi°'enCe (l98'- ,984)’ Sessional Paper Nam-2003.
>59 SJ?te D^Partment 1984: 1419, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 19R3 
fhe Times (London) 5 August 1983, Tamils shot by soldiers, says leader’.
crowd had gathered at the cemetery
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falling. By this time a restive and angry
Some groups of people in the crowd deliberately fanned anti-Tamil hostility.
Inflammatory speeches were made and the crowd had become more and more agitated. As
dusk drew nearer the families of the dead soldiers were informed by the authorities that the
coffins would be handed over to the next-of-kin at army headquarters. The families of the
dead soldiers then departed from the cemetery. Then the large and boisterous crowd dispersed
in a disorderly manner.16' Groups amongst the crowd then began to attack Tamil stores and
residences in the vicinity of the Cemetery. By about 8 pm on 24 July rioting and arson was
underway in the commercial and residential areas of Borella, a quarter mile from the
cemetery.16- President Jayewardene’s private residence where he lived was located less than
half a mile from this cemetery. Gradually rioting and arson spread to other parts of the inner
city during the night. By the morning of 25 July widespread mob attacks were taking place in
diverse areas of Colombo city, with houses, shops and vehicles being set on fire.163 British
tourists staying in Colombo were eye witnesses to assaults, looting and arson.164 Others
staying in Negombo, a town north of Colombo close to the international airport were 
eyewitnesses to violence and property destruction.165
On 25 and 27 July a total of 53 Tamil political prisoners in Colombo’s main jail were killed by 
Sinhala prisoners. Although the government did not hold a comprehensive inquiry at that time or 
later, over the subsequent years researchers have found a great deal of information to show the 
collusion of government authorities at the highest levels, some prison officials and army officers 
in allowing these killings to take place.166 Kandy City in the central hills was greatly affected
™ e ' wo bf st empirical sources for the July 1983 riots are Hoole, 2001, Sri Lanka: the Arrogance o f Power 
Myths Oecadence & Murder and Government of Sri Lanka, 2002 Report o f  the Presidential Truth CoLmission 
on Ethnic Violence (1981-1984). Of these two texts, Hoole has exhaustive empirical information published
of eye witness accounts of retired and serving police
l i v i d u a l T Z  fC' V' '  r rViCe ° f uC? ’ ChriS,ia" Clergy’ academics- journalists, and numerous other
80'pages°Th^present"xhesis"carf4i '|?° *’ C^ terA]\ ‘Somc Missi"g Threads’, (pp. 171-180). This is'a total of 
u pages, ine present thesis can utilise only a small percentage of this material Chime™ QmH 11 j
anahlySeSHf Whether the g° Vernme,U had a ’roIe in the riots and is utilised"
and S t S S S i S * ”  ReP°rt alS° haS 3 deal ° f .estimony from eyewitnesses
162 8ee Hoole, 2001:105-108 for a detailed account.
163 RePort o f the Presidential Truth Commission, 2002 35
m l heZ imes (Londo4  26 July 1983, ‘Mobs burn shops in Sri Lanka’.
165^  Tl mes { L o n d o n 28 Ju,y l 983, ‘Britons tell of violence in Colombo’.
of holid,y “ ™ Sn L- k*'' N' s” b” 11 “f
by anti-Tamil violence. In the town there were rows of burnt shops and 6,000
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Tamils were in refugee camps.167 Rioting and killings continued in many parts of the country, 
including Colombo, Kalutara, Matale, Deniyaya, Chilaw and Nuwara Eliya throughout these 
days including the 30 and 31 July which was a weekend. This was in spite of a curfew 
imposed by the government which lasted nearly 60 hours.168 The destruction of many food 
wholesale establishments which were Tamil owned and the imposition of long periods of 
curfew impacted on the country’s food distribution system.169
The pogrom-riots resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Tamils. Given the scale of the rioting, 
a reasonable estimation would be between 800 to 1400 Tamils killed.170 Between 100,000- 
150,000 Tamils were made homeless, and of them 80,000 were from around Colombo.171
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well organised and went about their activities in an organised manner. Hoole gives a great deal of
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and apartments. There are many eye witness accounts from different parts of Colombo of gang
leaders cairying electoral lists. For example, one of the earliest attacks began at 5 a.m. on 25 
July, when organised gangs entered an apartment block in Colombo and using lists identified the
i6g Tl‘e Times (L°nd°n)' 30 July 1983, ‘Hill town scarred by orgy of violence’.
i6 9 (London)' I August 1983, ‘Killings continue despite curfew in Sri Lanka'.
no T'meS (London>’ 2 August 2013, ‘Shortage of food and jobs as Sri Lanka hope lies in ruins’
C o m m e n t  chose not to hold a public inqu.ry after the riots and hence it is impossible to give accurate
r l Z  n  1116 “T ’ 7  7  reSU'ted in 471 deaths' Accord'"S 10 him die highest number 227 o c c u S  m 
S : “ T : h£ ^ i s  of eyewitnesses and press reportfthe G o v e rn lm ’s ^ a t e  of £ t  under
' " r t o  000“  t e e StiT atI°11 (T  T n°r' James-119 8 ^ 5 0 ^ 3 3 ,5 ^ ^ aTn c T n g7 ,n d C r is '7  ^  ^  ^
20,000 Tamil owned bnsinesae, had i f  ao.eKed i„K  m " " - C  T  T *
that 116 Tamil or Indian Tamil owned7 n0t. transparen'' The government informed the US State Department
occupied homes were burm I r t n l d  7 1  da™ ged ° r deStro^ 'd and thousands of Tamil-owned or 
Department of State 19841418-th r  7  7  ^  4’° ° °  vehlcles were burned or destroyed (see US
8,077 acts of arson 3 835 c a se s  o f  1 7  ^  7 7 7  Hu>nan Rights Practices for 1983). Dissanayaka wrote that
Dissanayaka 1983 93 ' The Agony o ^ S r T tn k ^  7 ^  7 * 1  ° f  m‘Schief had occurred throughout the island, (see
evidence to be r e ^ T f o r  posterity P "  '" qU,ry’ m° S' beCaUSe lhe gov“  d 'd "«>« wish
M«rde/-H00lC ^  ' 00’ ’° 2’ 110' 152' l6 l ’ and 179. Sri Lanka: the Arrogance o f Power- Myths. Decadence &
specific apartments in which Tamils lived.
They then destroyed household items and
IZZ
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threw refrigerators and such like over balconies. They did not physically injure the Tamil
if they did not resist. Such electoral lists are government administrative documents 
kept in formal administrative offices of the government and also in the offices of registered 
political parties. The general public have the nght to come to such administrative offices and 
check whether their names are on the lists. But the general public does not have the right to 
possess copies of such electoral lists. Many eye witnesses who gave evidence to the Presidential
Commission of 2002 mentioned seeing organised gangs with lists which identified Tamil 
homes.174 As anthropologist Tambiah notes:
^ Z k  PrfhVi°US CthniC n0t’ the eruption showed organized mob violence at
frequently confiscated from passing motor vehicles) and, most intriguing of all, lecause it 
indicates prior intent and planning, carrying voter lists and addresses of Tamil owners and 
occupants o f houses, shops, and other property, descended in waves to drive out Tamils loot 
and bum  their property, and sometimes kill them in bestial fashion [emphases added].175
There is evidence that there was a separate list of the residences of well-known Tamil journalists.
This was not a part of the electoral lists but a separate one. Gangs were specifically tasked to
destroy these properties. A Tamil journalist’s Sinhalese neighbour who tried to protect his 
friend’s house was shown such a list by one of the gang leaders.
[ ...]  This was the case of a special list of prominent Tamils [...] the gang attacking these houses 
was one delegated to work on this list. It was not part of the general sweep based on electoral 
lists. This special list had undoubtedly been prepared well in advance [emphasis added]. 176
The fact that many of the organised riot gangs had electoral lists and other lists in their
possession is compelling evidence of prior planning and preparation of the pogrom-cum-riot. A
very respectable former senior Civil Servant and later the pioneer of a research organisation gave
evidence at the Presidential Commission and stated that:
He saw a gang o f people who came in a lorry. They were well organized and proceeded down the 
lane. ‘T here  was no question in my mind that it was orchestrated, later when we made some 
inquiries, it proved to be true. Thereafter they looted [...] the conduct of the political parties, 
particularly o f the ruling party, created the environment for the perpetrators to act with impunity 
[emphases added].”177
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Hoole, 2001: 152, Sri Lanka: the Arrogance o f Power- Myths, Decadence & Murder.
Government of Sri Lankan, 2002: 39 & 43, Presidential Truth Commission on Ethnic Violence 1981-1984. 
Tambiah, S.J., 1986: 21, Sri Lanka -  Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling o f Democracy.
Hoole, 2001: 152, Sri Lanka: the Arrogance o f Power- Myths, Decadence & Murder.
Government of Sri Lankan, 2002: 39, Presidential Truth Commission on Ethnic Violence 1981-1984. The 
former senior Civil Servant is Mr Godfrey Gunatilleke, who served in senior positions in several Ministries. He took 
early retirement and in 1972 started the MARGA Institute (Sri Lanka Centre for Development Studies). He is the 
author of several articles and book chapters. He was conferred with D.Litt by the University of Colombo in 1996.
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Hoole records a c o n s i s t  patren, how ,he gangs ,c e lle d  and moved from „ea “
° '™ b°Th^  f«”  « *  « «  were sen, ,o o.her areas of Colombo, and vice-versa so 
at Ihey could not be recognised by the victims or thei, Sinhala neighbours:
r Z '  b“‘ " "  iu s s ‘d  "
Of Parliament] kept away and remained ['" 1The local representatives [i-e. Members
from important Tamils in their circle it eSSI i °r arran8ed for distress messages to be taken
o p e r a s  that mushroomed in a fra ctio n T f ^
Most of the gangs of noters travelled in vehicles commandeered from well-known government 
owned corporations and departments™ These organised 'vanguard' gangs did no, loo, bn, bum, 
and destroyed Tamil residences and property. Tamils living in houses tenled from Sinhalese had 
their furniture and other possessions pulled out of the house and burnt, leaving the house
mil commercial and trading establishments were already well known, and wereintact.
UNP
union the JSS (Jathika Sevaka Sangamaya, National Workers Union) were deeply involved in 
the organised noting.'81 The use of Government vehicles was widespread. The possibility that 
such large numbers of vehicles could have been commandeered by spontaneous neighbourhood 
Sinhala civilian gangs was not credible as such vehicles are routinely garaged under the authority 
of responsible personnel and their drivers. Ordinary gangs of civilians would not have had the 
audacity to seize go'ernment vehicles in such numbers nor would they have had heavy vehicle 
drivers needed to drive these large trucks and buses. Most of these Government vehicles were 
owned by Corporations which came under the purview of the Ministry of Industries Cyril 
Matthew, the most overtly harsh anti-Tamil Cabinet Minister: “Cyril Matthew is well-known as 
a very hard man and is the most outspoken and virulent racist against the Tamils”.182 Matthew 
was also the Chairman of the JSS. The government never explained how these vehicles came to 
be used by the rioters in such large numbers. Spontaneous mobs did emerge later and took part i 
the rioting, but they moved around on foot.
in
3.8: Were sections of the government involved in starting the riots?
When the rioting began around 8pm on 24 July, a large number of police and army officers 
and other ranks were present in and around the immediate locality. Information of the rioting
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Hoole, 2001: 158, Sri Lanka: the Arrogance o f Power- Myths, Decadence & Murder.
Trucks of the (STC) State Timber Corporation, CWE (Cooperative Wholesale Establishment), CEB (Ceylon 
Electricity Board) and busses of the CTB (Ceylon Transport Board).
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Hoole, 2001: 152, Sri Lanka: the Arrogance o f Power- Myths, Decadence & Murder.
Hoole, 2001: 152-161 Sri Lanka: the Arrogance o f Power- Myths, Decadence & Murder gives detailed 
information regarding the growth and activities of the JSS before and during the riots. Hoole pp. 152-161 is the 
most comprehensive published account of the activities of the UNP’s Trade Union arm during the pogrom-riots.
182 Hoole, 2001: 154, Sri Lanka: the Arrogance o f Power- Myths, Decadence & Murder.
would have been conveyed to the Minister
in a very short time. Furthermore, his residen t ' '  PreS'dem Jay6Wardene’
cemeterv WdS °Cated less than 1 mile from thece etery
night?
The country was under Emergency Rule nt thic ,
taken verv raoid an , „ t " the MoD should (•*! could have)
, , top the dlsorder. From early-June onwards the
government had adopted a range of ‘law *  - ■
th f f , * 3W & ° rder rna,ntenance Internal Security policies in
, ■ These measures were supposed to be in
P In some areas . eg Trmeomalee and even in some parts of Colombo, the, had ahead,
been tmplemented. These Intent,, Secant, measares sh„a,d have been rapid,, ,„d  efflcient,,
implemented b , the government. However, the government was extreme!, remiss in its 
actions. Let us consider the following questions which arise.
First, why was a curfew encompassing the entirety of Colombo was not declared on 24 July
This question has been asked by many analysts including Hoole and was also asked 
during the Presidential Truth Commission of 2002l84. During the month prior to the pogrom-
riot many curfews had been effectively enforced in diverse parts of the country including 
Trincomalee, Kurunegala and Panadura. In Trincomalee, a daily night curfews were in operation 
for many weeks. On one occasion in Trincomalee a curfew was imposed for an uninterrupted 
penod of 65-hours. However, when the rioting began in Colombo on 24 July night, the 
government did not declare a curfew. The IGP (Inspector General of Police), Mr Rudra 
Rajasingham had, early on 24 July night, requested President Jayewardene to declare a curfew 
but the President had said that he would “think about it”.185 Dr. Ariyaratne, the pioneer of the 
Sarvodaya Movement had asked President Jayewardene on the morning of 25 July to
immediately declare a curfew. The President had said that he would do so but Dr Ariyaratne 
gave evidence that “when he declared the curfew it was too late”.186
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When faced with widespread rioting one of the most effective measures that any government can take is to declare 
a curfew which must then be firmly enforced. The mere declaration of a curfew alone will not suffice to quell 
disorder. When curfew is not declared the public thoroughfares are full of curious on-lookers, rioters and looters. The 
police and the armed forces cannot easily distinguish the rioters from innocent bystanders. A curfew clears roads, 
markets, by-lanes and all public thoroughfares of all lawfully engaged citizens. The only persons who violate curfew 
and move around public spaces are those intent on rioting. This is an enormous benefit to the police and armed forces 
as it is then possible to clearly identify rioters.
Hoole, 2001: 108, Sri Lanka: the Arrogance o f Power- Myths, Decadence & Murder and Government of Sri 
Lanka, 2002: 35, Report o f the Presidential Truth Commission on Ethnic Violence (1981-1984).
Hoole, 2001: 149, Sri Lanka: the Arrogance o f Power- Myths, Decadence & Murder. It needs to be noted that 
Mr Rajasingham was a Tamil.
Government of Sri Lankan, 2002: 39, Presidential Truth Commission on Ethnic Violence 1981-1984. Dr. A.T. 
Ariyaratne is its founder. Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement began in 1958 and has grown to be the largest non-
governmental development organisation in Sri Lanka, and one ol the largest in Asia.
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e government eventually declared a curfew effective from 2pm the following day, 25
July.187 This was approximately 16 hours after the rioting began in the vicinity of the cemetery
around 8pm the previous day. This curfew was announced via broadcasts over government
owned radio and television stations. By this time, however, the rioting and disorder had
developed a momentum and noting continued unabated. Even at 5pm many roads in Colombo
were crowded with rioters and sight-seers milling around. It was only by nightfall of 25 July that
most ordinary people left the streets; this was 24 hours after the rioting had begun the previous
night. But by this time the breakdown of order had gained momentum and many gangs of rioters 
and looters were active throughout 25 July night.
The question that arises was why did a government that had the capability to enforce a 65-hour
curfew in Trincomalee a month earlier (27-30 June 1983), delay the declaration of curfew for 16-
hours after rioting began at 8pm on 24 July 1983 in Colombo? This delay in the declaration of a
curfew was not, and has never been explained by the UNP government in the subsequent years.
The lack of a rigorously enforced curfew on the night of 24 July was the single most important 
factor for the unrestrained rioting in Colombo.
The second question is what happened to the four proactive internal security measures that 
were adopted in early-June 1983? One, the linking the main police command centre in
Colombo with the operations rooms of the three armed forces’ headquarters in Colombo.188 
Two, the preventive arrest of known violent criminals and thugs around the country.189 Three,
The Times (London), 28 July 1983, ‘Colombo rioting wrecks 20,000 Tamil businesses’. “Curfew imposed at
? iT  o 0, y’, U' y’,'.' A1S° ’ personally heard b>'the Present author broadcast on the government radio
hun, 9 June 1983, Police keep close tabs on situation'. This Command Centre was tasked to monitor and
T i t  ‘"C‘den‘S ° f n ° tlng and b o rd e r  taking place throughout the country. The police operation rooms in each 
of the other 22 D.stncts of the pohce were mstructed to send reports of any acts of violence at six-hourly 
intervals to the main command centre in Colombo. This command centre was linked to the armed forces’ 
command rooms to facilitate the deployment of troops into areas where disorder was likely or was taking place 
Each of the 22 district operations rooms would in turn be linked to all the police stations in their respective
ccn re n 6nh !,'rV7' a l"er r *  " ° Ung or dlsorder a"V Par‘ of the country would have reached the Colombo 
forward ,h U K Creating.this Centre was an important and significant measure and shows significant 
forward thinking by some Tamil officers in ihe police. Timely information of imminent or actual rioting was the 
most important factor m any effort by the police and armed forces to maintain order.
Ceylon Daily News 6 June 1983, ‘Round up criminal elements - Actg IGP’; Sunday Observer, 5 June 1983
forrwantNdVy keeP|° 'd ir ' ^  ' r ' ^ ’ 6 JUne ' 983, ‘Special police squads t0 round UP trouble makers -  Hunt on 
for wanted criminals In early June the then Acting IGP, Mr. S.S. Joseph -  significantly a Tamil - instructed all
divisional senior police officers and Ofticers-in-Charge of the 335 Police Stations throughout the island to
: f rCe the aw T  a"? Cnmmal aCtlV,ty SUCh as arSOn’ l00ting and ‘nc*temen>. The police were instructed 
U> arrest known criminals and keep them in preventive detention. There was information that criminal elements
wwe attemiHmg to arouse communal feelings with the aim of looting. By 5 June police had already begun to
arrest known cnmmals. By the end of the first week of June over one hundred persons had already been arrested
This preventive detention measure reveals that the security concerns of some government and police officers
were in the right direction - they were apprehensive of the disorder which had begun to occur and wanted to take
proactive measures. However, this measure was only a partial solution to the problem beclT e i, did not
appreciate the anti-Tamil feelings building up among significant sections of the Sinhala people -  eg supporters
“  k” W" “ d «" «  * ........... .. of • »  ™  noi option.'
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a contingency plan specifically designed to deal with rioting in Colombo.190 Four,
the police, army and navy command rooms in Trincomalee were linked together via 
telecommunications. 1 Why were these contingency plans ineffective?
The third question is why were the army, navy and air force personnel who had already been 
mobilised throughout the country to assist police on ‘aid to the civil power’ ineffective?192 
This deployment was already underway from early-June onwards under ‘Emergency 
Regulations . On the contrary the police and the armed forces did not act against the rioters 
but merely watched or moved around in vehicles and on a number of occasions were seen 
abetting the rioters. In any event under Sri Lankan Law neither the police nor the and 
armed forces need specific orders from the Ministry of Defence to stop the causing of death, 
injury, damage to property, looting and arson. These are serious crimes under any 
circumstances and the police and the armed forces are duty bound under all circumstances to 
stop such acts. While the guards at Ministry buildings, Ministers’ residences, police and 
armed forces headquarters and police stations were strengthened, it was widely observed that 
during the first 48 hours of the rioting the police and the armed forces did not act against the 
rioters. Once information of the rioting was received the police and the armed forces should 
have been immediately brought to the Borella area and firm action used to stop the rioting on 
the night of 24 July itself. Then, using the radio and television services, curfew should have 
been declared for the entirety of Colombo that night itself. If the rioting did not subside then
curfew should have been extended for the entirety of the next day. It was only after the first 
48 hours that police efforts to quell the rioting began to be seen. But public order was finally
restored only after a week had passed.
criminals could not completely pre-empt the potential for violence that were building-up within the anti-Tamil 
sections in the government, and, among other sections of the Sinhala people at that time.
Sun, 1 June 1983, ‘Sporadic incidents’. As a contingency plan for the security of Colombo and its suburbs. 
Assistant Superintendents of Police (ASPs) were placed in charge of different sections within Colombo and its 
suburbs. The government was well aware that the disorder experienced throughout the country had also been 
experienced -  albeit sporadically -  in Colombo suburbs such as Wellawatte, Bambalapitiya, Dehiwela and 
Ratmalana. These were areas which had relatively large numbers of Tamil residencies. Many government 
personnel and police officers (both Tamil and Sinhalese) would have been able to recall the anti-Tamil riots of 
August 1977 when these same areas of Colombo were grievously affected. This measure is evidence of foresight 
by some in the government and senior police officers, whose Chief, the IGP Mr. Rudra Rajasingham, was a
Sun, 10 June 1983, Trinco returns to normal'. As discussed earlier, the rioting In Trincomalee during June 1983
was so senous that it warranted the linking together of the command rooms of the police, navy and air force in the
Tnncomalee area. This was meant to enable co-ordinated and rapid action. The police command room would have
en in the main Trincomalee police station while the navy command room would have been in the navy base in
Tnncomalee harbour and the air force’s command room would have been at the air base in China Bay. This is a
measure that should definitely have enhanced the communication and coordination of ‘internal security' measures 
adopted to ensure order in Trincomalee. J
o r t e f 1™ ° aily 8 JUnC 1983’ ° VCr hundred arresled’- Sunday Observer, 5 June 1983, ‘Army, Navy keep
Hoole documents the army’s lack of action and on occasions aiding the rioters. See Hoole, 2001: 150-152 Sri 
Lanka: the Arrogance o f Power- Myths, Decadence & Murder.
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As already discussed in earlier in this Chapter a strong case can be made that some sections in
U N P 194 Information
regarding the government’s role have gradually emerged in books and newspapers published
many years after 1983. Hoole says in a section of his book (published 18 years after 1983) 
under the heading ‘Planned Violence and its Significance’:
In discussing the violence of July 1983 we have adduced four different kinds of testimony. 
The first are testimonies consistent with the violence being planned by the Government, but 
do not imply it, however tantalisingly close to doing so they may seem. [...] [these include] 
ayawardene s attitudes to declaring curfew, the Government's inaction regarding stopping the 
violence, [...] and so on. A second kind points to Government complicity in the violence once 
it started. Testimony of this kind is damagingly plentiful. A third kind of testimony tells us 
that the Government was driving towards a violent blow up. A number of statements and 
actions [prior to the July riots] indicate that the Government’s thinking on the Tamil problem 
was to place the Law in abeyance and teach the Tamils a lesson. The attack on the students 
at Peradeniya University and Jayewardene’s Daily Telegraph interview belong to this 
category. [...]  Th c fourth kind point to definite evidence o f planning. The instances are few 
but crucial. One is the mobs in Colombo on the 25th going street by street not just with 
electoral lists, but also processed and assigned lists [...] in the professional sectors -e.g. the 
media. Another is the arrangement of transport and assignment of mobs to other areas where 
they could not be identified. [...] Such actions did not come from a few hours of planning or 
from a spontaneous telepathic resonance among UNP members [emphases added]. 195
The phrase teach the Tamils a lesson is quite significant. It was a recurring phrase which 
appeared in many publications. Eric Meyer too mentions it in his research work on the
Hoole published the above in 2001. Eleven years later, in May 2012 a veryriots.
UNP
UNP
riots. In May 2012, he wrote that:
the state sponsored pogrom which was launched by the J.R. Jayewardene regime
through Cyril Mathew and his followers [...] was encouraged by the government
which felt that a “surgical strike” by Cyril Mathew’s goons would warn off the Tamils
of Colombo who were not unaware of what the “boys” were doing in the North 
[emphases added].197
The fact that Minister Amunugama used the phrase ‘state sponsored pogrom’ is extremely 
significant. As already discussed, Cyril Mathew was the Minister of Industries and the leader 
of the UNP’s trade union organisation, the JSS. Through both offices Mathew -  along with 
his close supporters -  could mobilise hundreds of toughs who were UNP supporters.
Refer discussion of Dr. Nesiah’s, Minister Sarath Amunugama’s, and other evidence earlier in this Chapter. 
See Hoole, 2001: 179, Sri Lanka: the Arrogance of Power- Myths, Decadence & Murder.
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Meyer, Eric 1984: 142, ‘Seeking the Roots of the Tragedy’, in James Manor (ed), Sri Lanka in Change and
y^ nsis •
Minister Dr Sarath Amunugama, The Island, 19 May 2012, book review, 'When you read the book “Gota's 
War you learn that it does not means Gota won the war single-handedly’. Dr. Sarath Amunugama is a Minister 
trom 2005 onwards and is a former very senior government bureaucrat who has worked at senior levels in several 
capacities including as a Ministry Secretary before becoming a parliamentarian.
Horowitz says that according to his research both the 1977 and 1983 anti-Tamil riots
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were organised, at least in substantial part, by activists associated with the UNP.” 198
From all of the above we can conclude that there is a great deal of evidence which points to 
sections of the government being involved in starting the riots. In the years prior to the riots there 
were instances where government forces indiscriminately targeted Tamil civilians in the 
aftermath of the death of a soldier or airman. Each such act by government forces alienated more 
Tamils from the government and created more recruits for the gueirilla groups. In effect, these 
actions of government forces were winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of Tamils on behalf of the 
secessionist insurgents. The July pogrom-riots multiplied this trend by several magnitudes. By 
initiating the pogrom-riots the government was in effect attacking its own Tamil Centre of 
Gravity. From the perspective o f developing and implementing a coherent counterinsurgency 
campaign this was the very opposite o f what the government should have done.
Table 3F: Armed Forces & Police Casualties, from 1977 1983
Killed-in-Action
Year 1 Army Navy Air Police
Force
1977 o- (T 0 3~‘
1978 0 0 0 7
1979 _____0_ 0 0 3
1980 0 _____0 , _____0_ 0 ‘
1981 1 2 6 '
1982 3 o~ (T 8 ~
1983 16 0 2 2 ‘
(to
July)
Total 1 21 0 2 2 9 |
Wounded -in-Action
Army I Navy Air Force Police
0 0
0
0 0
0 0
0 0
_  .  ---------------------------; -  .  —  »- "  in 17ou u i c i c  were no casualties at all. I his is due to the
iamil insurgents tactical withdrawal to Tamil Nadu when the President placed Jaffna under army rule from July
to December 1979, under the command of Brigadier Weeratunga. 1980 was a year of total absence of insurgent
military activity against government personnel (although political activities towards secession would have
continued. But as these would have constituted of secret discussion and meetings and as there was no violence
involved, they would not have come to the attention of the government). The government assumed that the
insurrection had declined. It is highly probable that insurgents would have intimidated and on occasion assaulted
and may even have killed Tamils who refused to support secession or whom they determined were informants or
government supporters. Empirical information regarding such incidents is difficult to locate as the victims would
have been frightened to report them to the police as the revenge from the insurgents would have been prompt-
such incidents did not reach newspapers; and now, 30 years later, it is difficult to locate and interview witnesses 
or victims as they may have migrated abroad or may have died.)
Table 3F summarises the total armed forces and police casualties from 1977 to July 1983, 
including, the ambush of the army patrol in Jaffna . As can be seen the casualties of this 
period were miniscule compared to what occurred in later years. This Table needs to be 
assessed correctly and caref ully as it depicts only the casualties of State personnel. As far as
198
Horowitz, 1989: 7-8, Incentives and Behaviour in the Ethnic Politics o f Sri Lanka and Malaysia.
the State was concerned that was the data important to it and also this is the data
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collected and preserved by routine bureaucratic processes of the State and therefore available 
to researchers. This Table does not give any indication of the most important acts of the 
insurrectionary process, i.e. the subversive processes underway in Tamil society.199
3.9: Conclusions: 1977 1983 period
When
that the UNP’s 1977 Election Manifesto encompassed a balanced and nuanced 
counterinsurgency perspective. The Manifesto acknowledged that the Tamil people had 
grievances and that when the party came to power these grievances would be addressed. It 
acknowledged that a campaign to create a separate state of Tamil Eelam had already begun. 
Once the UNP came to power it was faced with continuous low-intensity Tamil insurgents
attacks which gradually escalated. Consequently the government’s approach gravitated to 
anti-Terrorist type actions using the police and the military.
1. Did the Sri Lanka government have Political Purposes?
Yes, it did. The government stated clearly that a separate Tamil state was not going to be 
allowed to be formed in Sri Lanka. This was a non-negotiable political objective. At the same 
time the government offered District-level devolution and de-centralisation of power. But the 
Tamil parliamentarians and the Tamil insurgents refused this offer.
2. Did the Sri Lanka government give security to the Tamil population?
Yes, at the beginning of its tenure, from 1977 to approximately 1980. But there is evidence 
that around 1980 two policy trends had emerged within the government, one which was for 
negotiations with the Tamils. But the other was a sinister ‘Pogrom against Tamils’ trend. 
There is very substantial evidence that this trend existed. President Jayewardene should have
During these years numerous acts of subversion would have been carried out by the secessionist insurgents
of numerous acts of persuasion -
i.e. thousands of political discussions conducted in secrecy by Tamil secessionists at work places, gathering of 
friends and in homes - and coercion -  i.e. the numerous acts of intimidation, threats, beatings, and even murder 
by secessionist against fellow Tamils who disagreed with them. This is a dimension of any insurrection which
“  "“ d 10 constantly kept in the forefront of their minds because (a) these are processes which are 
essential for the growth and progress of the insurrection, (b) these processes don’t get mentioned or reflected in 
the press because these are not public or violent acts, and (c) because the number and nature of these verv 
important processes can never be known by researchers as those who conduct the discussions and their audiences 
cannot be located and even if located will be reluctant to admit these. And, due to the long-drawn-out nature of
any insurgencies -  including the Sri Lankan case -  individuals die, move abroad as refugees or leave political 
activism altogether and refuse to discuss these earlier events in their lives. P
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shown far more foresight and leadership and nipped this trend in the bud. But he did
n0t’ and thlS trend manifested itself in the pogrom-riots of July 1983. Therefore, it has to be
said that by June-July 1983 the government was not giving adequate security to the Tamil 
population.
3. Did the Sri Lanka government neutralize the Tamil insurgents?
No. Although the government tried to apprehend the (still) quite small number of Tamil
insurgents, it was unable to do so. During July- December 1979 when the army was placed in
charge of Jaffna District, Tamil insurgents made a tactical retreat to Tamil Nadu and thereby 
completely escaped the government.
4. Did the Sri Lanka government gain and maintain popular support of the 
Tamil people?
By and large, no. Although there were some Tamils who supported the government, on the
whole most Tamils were neutral towards the government or tacit supporters of the TULF or 
Tamil insurgents.
5. Did the Sri Lanka government separate the Tamil insurgents from their 
support base?
No. The Tamil insurgents lived amongst the Tamil people and they were well protected and 
hardly any were captured by the government.
6. What were the relationships the Sri Lanka government’s 
counterinsurgency operations had with the Law?
In early June 1983, after the killing of two airmen by Tamil insurgents, several very harsh
provisions of the Emergency Regulations were brought into force by the government. These
provisions applied only to the Northern Province and gave wide powers to the armed forces and
police. These provisions suspended the need for a Coroner’s investigation with regard to persons 
killed by the armed forces and police.
Within Sn Lanka’s post-colonial political culture, however, these regulations have a particular 
notoriety. It was under these Regulations that thousands of JVP insurgents and insurgent suspects 
were killed and their bodies disposed-off during the 1971 insurrection. All adult Sri Lankan 
citizens -  Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims -  knew what these regulations meant that the armed 
forces and police could use deadly force and destroy the bodies without any magisterial enquiry.
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President Jayewardene’s position was that these harsh provisions were necessary to protect
police and armed forces personnel from legal action being taken against them. From this time
onwards, as the Tamil insurrection escalated, legal provisions became increasingly more and 
harsher
7. Did the Tamil Nadu and the Indian central government impact upon the
Sri Lanka government’s efforts to counter the Tamil secessionist 
insurrection?
Yes, but at a relatively mild level. During July-December 1979 the Tamil Nadu state 
government and the Indian central government turned a blind eye to the ‘illicit immigration’ 
of Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents into Tamil Nadu, escaping from the Sri Lanka army in Jaffna. 
Sri Lankan Tamil secessionists conducted political work amongst the Tamil Nadu population
and began creating support networks. (Of course these networks increased immensely in the 
next phase of the insurrection, after the pogrom-riots of July 1983)
Chapter. 4
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The Tamil Secessionist Insurrection, from July 1983 
to March 1990: President Jayewardene, President 
Premadasa & the UNP Governments ’ Policies
Introduction
This Chapter deals with the 7 year period from the pogrom-riots of 1983 to the exit of the 
armed forces, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), in March 1990. These seven years 
were a period of immense political and military instability within the country. During a 
specific 2 'A year period there were two separate insurgencies underway in the country at the 
same time. These 7 years were a period of high complexity: insurgent attacks; government 
counter attacks; small group military operations; conventional type military operations; use of 
IEDs with the explicit intension of killing large numbers of civilians; Tamil Nadu and Indian 
central government political pressure; arrival of Indian armed forces; ceasefires and many 
periods of overt (and covert) political lobbying and negotiations.1
In spite of the complexity, however, it is possible to discern the action of five distinct entities,
each competing and manoeuvring against one another. These five ‘entities’ were: (1) the 5
major Tamil insurgent groups; (2) the TULF; (3) the Sri Lanka Government; (4) the Indian
central government and (5) the Tamil Nadu state government and Tamil Nadu politicians.
None of these entities were singular, monolithic entities. Each had proponents of 'hard' and
soft lines within them, many dozens of leaders, and were composed of many thousands of 
members, officials, and supporters as the case may be.
M ^ h  C19 Sr? T k iS POim:HfifSt' fr0m the Ind°-Lanka Accord of '987 up to the exit of the IPKF in
T h e ^ n  ‘.h UP°" ,h£ !TKR Th£ IPKFS a'temptS a‘ COUmerinS lhe ^11 outside t h ~  of this
government insurrection by the JVP (.,ana,ha Vimukthi Peramuna) which arose from within the majority S2 a  
n c group This is the second caveat. This insurrection falls outside the ambit of this Thesis and is therefore 
mentioned only as and when needed. The primary slogan of the JVP's insurrection was against the presence of 
Indian troops on Sn Lankan soil for which President Jayewardene’s government was condemned as a traitorous’
19R9W Dunng ‘he 7 year pm0d dlscussed thls ChaPter' w'th'n a specific 2*/, year period (July 1987-November
e Jyp  2 insurrection against the Sn Lanka government) were simultaneously underway in the country The 
insurrection ended when the JVP’s top leadership were destroyed in November 1989 1 It was then that this 
unprecedented 2'/a year period ended. However, the Tamil secessionist insurrection continued
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In historical retrospect i, is clear .ha, these seven years can be divided into two distinct parts: 
Part.1 ,s from the pogrom-riots of July ,983. the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987 and the Indian
T j  ▼ ^  ,
(IPKF) and the LTTE
LTTE
tactical alliance which resulted in the IPKF having to leave Sri Lanka.
Part I was a period brimming-over with overt and covert strategies, tactics and negotiations 
between the five ‘entities'. These negotiations were occasionally 4-party2, sometimes 3-party3 
and at other times 2-party n e g o tia te s4 While some instances of negotiation occurred with 
the knowledge of the public, and, there are documents and news reports to attest to them, the 
reader needs to keep in mind that the vast majority were conversations which left no 
permanent record - i.e. a continuous process underway behind closed-doors and behind-the- 
scene lobbying, attempts to persuade, attempts to coerce and threaten, cajoling and requests to 
compromise, and critiques of the other sides demands and proposals.5
and
, . ,.,,e,uuu uvervtew oj me Context within which the Sri Lanka Govern 
tned to Counter the Tamil Insurrection: Political Negotiations
Manoeuvring July m i - July 1987. The following overview is an essential overview 
of the manoeuvres of the five 'entities' during this crucktl 4 yea, p e r S  Th," L i  ' “
" m m  withTn wmch T e T  i° ' 'n<l' rSIand ,he comPlex P0™ ^  («"d sometimes militaty)
expanded ,n the rest of this Chapter (below). This should enable the readerTo understand^ 
tortuous pushing, pulling, threatening, cajoling, and lobbying underway at this time:
Indian central government asserted that as the Regional Power it now -  i e after the 
pogrom-riots of July 1983, the influx of refugees in to Tamil Nadu, the uproar m 
amil Nadu had to play a role in facilitating, a negotiated solution to the conflict 
between the Tamil secessionists and the Sr, Lankan slate.2 India also irnplememed a 
rac po icy where it applied diplomatic pressure on Sri Lanka while 
concurrently tramed and built-up the military capabilities of Tamil insurgents.8 As
3 p°r examP[e- ^ amil Insurgents & Sri Lanka government & TULF &Indian Government
s ts Ll —
~  T" " »  o r  Sn
COTcent^a^o^y^n^he^s^es^f^tl^rdated'to S h e ^ “ "“p "0t *" the PUbliC rea,m’ We wi"
psstr. ssssss- - ~  -
the minority T.nrils and majority S S K * " *
Sn Lanka: Demand for political solution to Tamil ethnic conflict’ ’ ’ 1SSUes Warnmg t0
Smgh, Major General Harkirat, 2006: 22-24, In,erven,ion in Sri Lanka: The IPKF Experience Re,old
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t,me passed the Indian government’s role underwent a subtle change
m gia H mCreaSed devo,ution f™  the Sri Lanka government. By July
8h? ! ' " Iani government had changed in to an enforcer, it compelled a ‘solution’ 
on both the Sn Lankan government and the Tamil secessionists. Both ‘entities’ did not 
get what each wanted. And both had to compromise: (i) the Sri Lanka government had 
o give-in to the extent of reforming its Constitution and establishing an entirely new 
layer of governance -  the Provincial Councils system. This is encapsulated in the 13,h 
Amendment to the Constitution, (ii) the Tamil insurgents were told that they must
undWWed Sr 'r°Vir ,al n ° r C'1S SyStCm and 3gree t0 reSolve their grievances within an undivided Sn Lanka. All the insurgent groups, except the LTTE, agreed to this.
Indian Central overnment was very clear that it did not want to c W p a 
separate Tamil state m Sn Lanka (due to a variety of reasons including concerns 
related to its own unity). Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said this clearly.10 Rajiv
Gandhi too reiterated this. He once said that if he were to allow Tamil Eelam in Sri 
Lanka he would have “15 Tamil Eelams on his hands in India”.11. --------------- - *** ahviia . This position was a
great disappointment to secessionist Tamils from Sri Lanka and in the Tamil Diaspora.
However, the Indian government exerted pressure on both parties: pressurising the
—  ^ . 1 < • - f ^ government’s proposals while
oncurrently cajoling and pushing the Sri Lanka government to concede the maximum 
amount of devolution.
However Tamils never stomwt lobb7 s " Jaill,ia 11CVC1 st»PPen ’QODVing India to partition Sri T anka But many 
ami Is i.e. insurgents from Sn Lanka, refugees from Sri Lanka, from Tamil Nadu
from elsewhere in the world -  continuously lobbied Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi ’
Ministers and officials in Delhi to militarily intervene and partition Sri Lanka12 (as
had been done in the case of Bangladesh). This lobbying was a continuous process.13
’ Geopolitical objectives of the Indian Central government Th.c. n „f
geopolitical issues on India’s Agenda which had nothing to do with the secessionist
insurrection. But India was concerned about the possible entry of the USA, Pakistan
and Israel -  to all of whom the Sri Lanka government had appealed for various types
of assistance to cope with the guerrilla warfare of the Tamil insurgents. These
geopolitical concerns officially manifested themselves in the text of the letter from
Prime Minister Gandhi to President Jayewardene.14 The Trincomalee harbour’s future
and the (alleged) intelligence gathering activities of other countries from Sri Lankan 
soil were among India’s concerns.
* — C Tamil Nadu government and politicians promoted and supported the 
secessionist project m numerous ways -  safe sanctuary, maintenance of training
camps, smuggling of weapons to Sri Lanka via Tamil Nadu and giving financial
Government of Sri Lanka, 1978, The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic o f Sri Lanka 13,h 
Amendment, certmeci o n , 4 ^vem ber ,987, Colombo: Dep. of Government PrinUng, Sri l in k !
,i ^  Times (London), 13 August 1983, ‘India opposes partition of Sri Lanka’
The Sunday Times (London), 6 July 1986, ‘Sri Lanka makes new peace push’ President JavewarHenP nm
Ga?dh ha^said S i c T "  ^  ° f U "'h A‘huIa“™"dali sa.d that Rajivuanani had said this to him in a conversation. J
The Guardian, 15 January 1985, ‘Why the Tamils are looking to Rajiv for their salvation- Sri r .mL., 
separatists are convinced it is only a matter of time before India intervenes’ n
I4 l he Times (London)y 25 March 1986, ‘Tamil exiles ask Gandhi to intervene’
assistance. 15 The Indian central 135thk ac it cnitoH government turned a blind eye to
M  ! . “  2 e d  on  ,  T  r  POli° ^  ^  d“ n8er “  ,n t“ a ' s o w " » “. «  u  assassination of Rajiv Gandhi (in 1991), subsequent lo
which the Indian central government’s policy towards the Tamil insurgency and to 
involving itself with the insurrection completely changed.
Ev id e n t  Jayewardene and the Sri Lankan government tried hard 
—  devolutlon of Power to the level of the District.16 The government was
:otiate
r ; efhenSiVC- ° ‘ devolution of power to a larger Unit. E v e n tu ^ , afle” g Z  
sastrous mistake of trying to militarily capture Jaffna (in May-June 1987)8 and 
thereby inadvertently creating an opening for direct Indian intervention, the Sri Lanka
E a l te T p  in ^  1987’ t0 ^ e  to a fusion of the Northern and
and re ln!t0eHSi r re Pr° Ven ^  ^  LTTE reJected the Ind° - in k a  Accordand re-ignited the insurrection from October 1987.
l a mi! insurgent that the Northern and Eastern Provinces had to he in.n.n
together
s z z r ™ w h i J  d i d =  = • £ * •
effective guerrilla attacks18 on the Sri Lanka
V  . ^ ___
Tamil insurgents carried-out ver 
armed forces and-------2ll££- These attacks in turn (a) increased the insurgents’ belief
“  .C Uld’ eventually, attain their objective of a separate state. In the case of the 
LI lb  this lead to the assessment that it could somehow create a separate Tamil state
even against the wishes of the Indian Central government; (b) the insurgents
o f X T r i l  ' I 6"  taCt'Cal achlf vements int0 strategic bargaining chips to the detriment 
or the Sri Lankan government’s position.
S ! ;  r U^ H S DiffiCUlt >Balancin^ Arf’~ The TULF was compelled to play a very 
p icated role trying to strike a ‘balance’ between the Tamil insurgents^
uncompromising campaign for a separate state on one side, and the cajoling
pressurising and persuasion by the Indian and Sri Lankan governments to agree to a
solunon within a united Sn Lanka, on the other side The TULF parliamentarians had
legitimacy in the eyes of the international community and India and thereby they
could exert an influence out of all proportion to their small numbers. The Tamil
insurgents especially the LTTE -  knew this and made it clear to the TULF leaders
at their lives were at stake and they must not ‘betray’ the campaign to create a
L“ k“  •  —  *  ■" « *  9.vent19 and
senior lnd,“ n * * *  * *  »  -  “  U " k“-T“ »
"The Times (London), 14 July 1989, ‘Gunmen kill two Tamil moderates in ColomhiV Mr a  a ■ u , 
and Mr V. Yogeswaran, two leaders of .he TULF were assassinated in Colombo on 13 j L  19^9 ‘S  r  a'"
............. or )°„V IZZ
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• also killed numerous other TULF and other Tamil 
whom they judged to be ‘traitors’.
community and political leaders
I
fb.1: Tamil Guerrilla Attacks. Indian Mediation & Sri l.anka
Government Eventually Forced to Concede. July 1983-1989: 
Political and Military Processes
The clearest and most effective method to enable the reader to understand and analyse this 
complex period is to present the material in a chronological framework. This is because the 
processes, events and policies of 1983 impacted on 1984; processes and policies of 1984 
impacted on 1985, the negotiations and military processes of 1985 impacted upon those of
1986 ... and so on and so forth. Simultaneously, the present author will periodically flag at
relevant junctures the dilemmas faced by the Sri Lanka government when formulating or 
implementing counterinsurgency policy.
Th.s chronological framework will be divided into two segments, one devoted to political
processes such as negotiations and mobilisations, and the second will be devoted to military
processes. The reader needs, however, keep in mind that these political and military
processes and events occurred sandwiched together, one closely following the other and
sometimes occurring simultaneously.20 It is useful to make this separation into these two
categories to facilitate the analysis of a very complex and complicated arena with multiple
actors. For the period from April 1987 onwards when a series of inextricably intertwined
political and military events led to the direct intervention of India, political and military 
processes have to be dealt-with as one complex phenomenon.
Political Processes, July 1983 to December 1984. The period after the July 1983
pogrom-riots witnessed a definite quantitative and qualitative increase in the insurrection. 
Thousands of Tamil youth joined the various guerrilla groups in the immediate aftermath of 
the pogrom-riots. Many of these youths underwent training in India and also in remote 
locations in the North and East of Sri Lanka. By April 1984 it was reliably reported that 
nearly 2,000 armed Tamil insurgents are ready for action as a result of training in India and
20
The empirical details of the military attacks are in Annexures 4 .1,4.2 and 4.3.
that 2,000 to 3,000 more are trained and awaiting arms”.21 Although in the
15
months immediately following the riots there were not many insurgent attacks, by late-1983
the guerrilla attacks began. From then onwards the military intensity of the Tamil secessionist
insurgency never declined ,o its pre-July 1983 level. The insurgent groups progressively
become stronger and their strategies and tactics bolder and more sophisticated. The
government too increased the size of the armed forces and condneted military operations of 
increasingly larger size.
Before the pogrom-riots the number of trained guerrillas was estimated at a total of
approximately 200 cadres. Within one year after the pogrom-riots it was estimated that the
number had mushroomed to about 5,000, and by 1986 the total number of trained cadres was 
estimated as 10,000.-2 All five major insurgent groups - LTTE, PLOT, TELO, EROS, and
EPRLF - became larger and stronger as a consequence of increased Tamil popular support, 
influx of new recruits, increased funds, increased supply of weapons, and support from India. ’
Concurrent to the mass political radicalisation of Tamil youth the pogrom-riot also catalysed an
explosive growth of many new Tamil guerrilla groups.23 The birth of these new groups was an
expression of the volatile political mobilisation which swept through the Tamil people. A
bewildering number of new organisations emerged and one writer mentions a “veritable alphabet
soup of initials”."4 Including the five main groups which existed from the mid-1980s onwards,
Marshall Singer mentions 35 groups while Tom Marks refers to a total of 42 groups at one stage
of the insurrection.25 Internecine fighting eventually destroyed all these new groups, leaving the 
original 5 insurgent groups.
The Pogrom-Riots Cause Very High Unrest in Tamil Nadu and Impact on the 
Indian Central Government. The pogrom-riots inflamed the people and politicians in
2!
22 New York Times, 29 April 1984, ‘Sri Lanka’s Crisis Hurts Indian Ties’.
23 ^ arks ' ^ :73- ‘"Peoples War" in Sri Lanka: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency’
borne or the new groups which emerged were: TEA (Tamil Eelam ArmvV TFI A c i , u
Army); TERO (Tamil Eelam Revolutionary Organisation)- TERPI A , ? n ^ T
(K *  Ton, of Tamil Eelam); S ' S S
(I lankai Free Tamil Army); TENA (Tamil Eelam National Army); TEC (Tamil Eelam Commandos!- TFFF (T I 
Eelam Eagles Front); RELO (Revolutionary Eelam Liberation Organisation)- TELC ITam Tp l’ TEf  a T 
Cobras). Some of these new groups were L *  money-making S S T S i e t o  2 S ^ a J £ T S  
plicate the successful mobilisation of the original five major insurgent grouns nth^re ,. P
capitalising on Ihe explosive increase in potential Tamil recruits, and yet othefs w^re break iwTvfac o r Tf 
older groups. None of these post-July 1983 groups were successful Most of y factions irom
particularly by the LTTE, and their cadres absorbed by the initial five groups The rem^n°Uf>S ,Were attacked> 
themselves due to various reasons and ceased to exist. *  **' * d,slnteSrated by
25 ^ arl?. I986i7n0’ l"Pe°P,es War" in Sb Lanka: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency’.
bee Singer 1986:14, ‘Report on the Pressures and Opportunities for a Peaceful Solution to the Fthnir rnnfr » • 
Sr, Lanka’. And Marks 1987:41. ‘Counter-Insurgency in Sri Lanka: Asia’s Dirty Little War’
Tamil Nadu immediately they happened.26 This in-turn impacted on Mrs Indira' § 
Gandhi s Congress Party dominated coalition government in Delhi.27 In early August 1983, a 
few days after the pogrom-riots, there occurred in Tamil Nadu the first of many dozens of 
mass agitation campaigns on behalf of Sri Lanka Tamils. Many of these demonstrations 
agitated for direct Indian military intervention in the North and East of the island. This first 
campaign was a 14-hour General Strike organised by the Tamil Nadu state government itself
and led by the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu M.G.Ramachandran, leader of the AIADMK2
party." All government activity, trade, education and travel came to a complete halt.29 In
early August a group of 5,000 Tamil Nadu ‘volunteers’ signed a pledge with their blood and
marched towards the Tamil Nadu coast with the intention of crossing the Palk Strait, landing
in Jaffna and fighting along with the Sri Lanka Tamil insurgent groups. While the Indian
central government prevented them from crossing over to Jaffna Peninsula, this very act was
an ominous foreshadow of events to come and also increased the anxiety of Sinhalese 
people.30
Mrs Indira Gandhi s Central Government in Delhi came under severe pressure by Tamil Nadu 
politicians to directly militarily intervene in Sri Lanka. This was not the first or last time this 
request was made. The lobbying for this measure continued over the subsequent years.31 In 
August 1983 Mrs Indira Gandhi’s Congress Party-led coalition government in Delhi needed 
the support of the Tamil Nadu politicians to maintain its power in the Indian parliament.32
“  0V£h 6ubsDequen' decades Tamil Nadu Chief Ministers and political parties in power in Tamil Nadu 
changed. M.G. Ramachandran died in December 1987, Mrs. Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh
yguards in October 1984, and Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by the LTTE in May 1991 The state
governments m Tamil Nadu and the central government in Delhi changed on many occasions but the political
continued unabated" atl° n ° f Tami' ^  P° 'iticians and its PeoPle behalf of Sri Lanka Tamils’
28 w eJ r S r“ ; / D12 AUpgUSt 1983’‘Gandhi under pressure over Indian Tamil hostility to Sri Lanka’
former film'Ictor R h " ^  i ^ ’ ' nd‘a ^  am° ngS‘ Ind' anS living overseas’ M G - Ramachandran was a former film actor with a huge popular support base in Tamil Nadu. AIADMK was the political party he led (All
India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, which means All India Dravidian Progress Federation)!
30 ^ le *imes (Lond(m), 3 August 1983, ‘General strike halts Tamil Nadu’.
u r l t l w ^ w 10^ 0^ '  12 AU§USt I983' ‘Gandhi under Pressure over Indian Tamil hostility to Sri Lanka' In all 
probability this march was just a symbolic gesture, a political stunt the likes of which Tamil Nadu politicians are
well known for. However, it did convey a powerful signal to the Sinhalese people and reminded them of the 
many dozens of invasions which had originated from India over the previous two millennia
sernre ? “ard,an' 15 Jan.uary l98,5’ ‘Why ,he Tamils are looki"g 10 Rajiv for their salvation: Sri Lankan 
separatists are convinced it is only a matter of time before India intervenes’.
anl &T h kr  Tlm? S <Lr d ° r>'do  AUgUS‘ l983' ‘Gandhi under pressure over Indian Tamil hostility to Sri Lanka' 
?"dt ?  G7 ^ 7 ’ 5 Ma* l987’. ‘Tamil 'ink* fead grows as Colombo hits ou, a. India'. I, is useful to Hag here 
that this vulnerability of any Prime Minister of India was (and is) is a continuously active systemic and weak
characteristic of the Indian central government. According to the Indian Constitution the head of the Executive 
of the Indian Central government is the Prime Minister. And he or she can govern India as long as the political
Sn Unka government and the counterinsurgency policies it could adopt or implement It was onlv after he 
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 (discussed in the next Chapter) that this situation changed. It changed
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India’s ‘two-track’ 
Government, and, 
territory.
policy: (1) diplomatic and political pressure on Sri Lanka 
(2)military training for Tamil insurgents on Indian
In mid-August 1983 President Jayewardene sent an emissary to Mrs. Gandhi to convey his 
concerns regarding Tamil insurgents using Tamil Nadu as a base and also obtaining military 
training. The Sn Lankan intelligence agencies had information that Tamil insurgents were 
being given sanctuary and training in Tamil Nadu.34 Mrs Gandh, blandly denied these claims. 
A few days later in the Indian Parliament Prime Minister Indira Gandhi stated that India did 
not support the demand to create an independent state for Tamils in Sri Lanka, made by both 
Sri Lanka Tamils and Tamils in Tamil Nadu.35 While this statement was literally accurate, it 
made no mention of what Mrs Gandhi had already begun to implement: namely, a ‘two- 
track policy of pressurising the Sri Lanka government via diplomatic means while 
simultaneously allowing Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran and the Tamil Nadu 
state government to give Tamil insurgents safe sanctuary and military training.
Mrs Gandhi also ordered India’s intelligence service RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) to 
organise military training for Tamil insurgents. Eventually RAW was training TELO, LTTE, 
PLOTE, EPRLF and EROS cadres.36 Military weapons were allowed to be stockpiled in 
Tamil Nadu and later smuggled into Jaffna as and when the insurgents chose to do so. The
LTTE
^  a ii* 1*1 L« v  I 1 \_7 1
the monetary aid he gave was utilised by the LTTE to purchase weapons from Singapore and
ferry 37
Mrs Gandhi’s plan was to use the Tamil insurgents as proxies to bring military pressure to 
bear upon Colombo as and when her government thought it necessary to do so.38 This type of 
two-track statecraft could ‘work’ provided the proxies obeyed Delhi. However, one of the
mswgeencJtCr ^  ^  India" C£mra' government adoPted a P°licy of total non-interference in the Tamil
34 Times (London), I I August 1983, ‘Sri Lanka updates riot death toll to 350’.
inrl^H T‘mesj London>' 12  August 1983,‘Gandhi under pressure over Indian Tamil hostility to Sri Lanka’ This
£ £ £ wounded cadres and ,he purchase of 800ds slolen in Sn Lanka 10— f- ds ^
36 V 'e Times (London), 13 August 1983, ‘India opposes partition of Sri Lanka’.
37 ‘" t  ^ 8-°r 2 enera! „ ar,kirat’ 2006: 22‘24’ intervention in Sri Lanka: The IPKF Experience Retold
38 T'" gh’ Maj° r Genera' 1Jarkirat, 2006: 21-22, Intervention in Sri Lanka: The IPKF Experience Retold.
This was a part of Delhi’s ‘two-track policy’ which was candidly admitted by Indian officials a few years
P  ® ’ and’ a'S° adm.‘“ ed ln, ,he Ind°-Lanka Accord of July 1987 (discussed later in this Chapter) See The 
IndG nT r 6, JUnv 98,6’. Jayawardene W|M exPlain Peace Plan: Proposals to end Sri Lankan conflict’ where
ndian officials acknowledge that Tamil insurgents were operating from Tamil Nadu See Sineh Mninr r  i
Hark,rat, 2006: 22-24, Intervention in Sri Lanka: The IPKF I p e r ln c e  R etoM ' for d e d  Ge"e™
coordinated the training and the Tamil insurgent groups given training. °W
LTTE , iwchafed against Delhi’s policy, and, later, went-
on lo fight (from Oct 1987-Seplember 1989) the Indian armed forces sent to Sri Lanka to
implement the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987. And went on to assassinate Mrs Gandhi’s 
sole surviving son Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991.
It can be argued that Mrs Gandhi and her strategic advisors could not have been expected to
anticipate all these in mid-1983. But it can be argued that the dangers posed to India’s own
security by militarily strengthening secessionist insurgents of a neighbouring country should
have been thought-out at greater depth.39 In any event Mrs Gandhi herself was assassinated on
31 October 1984 by Sikh secessionists who were members of her own bodyguard. Her son
Rajiv Ghandi became Prime Minister and he too continued with the ‘two-track’ strategy of his
mother’s administration, with the same expectation that the Tamil insurgents would behave
like good proxies and obey Delhi. Except for the LTTE all the other Tamil insurgent groups
did so. Although the Indian central government’s official position from August 1983 was to
deny that it was assisting Tamil insurgents, in 1986 its own policies made this public
knowledge.40 In the text of the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987 the Indian government
accepted that it had given such training and that in deference to the Accord’s clauses this 
policy would cease.41
Turing our attention back to insurrectionary actions in Sri Lanka, Tamil insurgent attacks in 
Sri Lanka increased in intensity throughout 1984.42 The Sri Lankan armed forces and police 
tried to counter the burgeoning insurgency as best as they knew how hut could not make any 
meaningful headway. Gradually the Tamil insurgents acquired the upper hand.43 At least some 
Tamil civilians would have been killed and property destroyed. This in turn politically 
impacted on Tamil Nadu and the Indian Central Government. In August 1984 Mr.
40 ^ peC,ally as lhls was what India was accusing Pakistan of doing in Kashmir.
The Times (London), 10 November 1986, ‘Indian state police act to s p i 1 non Tamil a
T“ " « —  —  '000 Tamil p S S i S S S ^ S S S  S S S S l
large amount of weapons were reported seized. The Guardian 10 November 1986 ‘Sri I .mUo' k
“  f  -  r ? - : • » " „ „  i s s k s s s
On 1 Mav \ W b Z l L '  m  ' 5*«?y ' 9^ ,6’ 'Possible exPulsio" of guerrillas from Indian state of Tamil Nadu
no, p o ss ib le e x p o , T „ „  8nom ,„ s  from Turn,I N ,d . b e e iT  5 % ^  “  £  Z S
Mr Chidambaram had said ibar ,r would havo been possible four rears a .o  bm no, in l i  a L  e f
Major General Harkirat, 2006, Intervention in Sri Lanka: The IPKF Experience Retold 2006’ 22 24 for d f \ 
informal,on of training given to Tamil insurgents. ’ 22' 24’ f° r de,ailed
See Annexure-1 to this Chapter, Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement to Establish Peace and Normalcy in Sri Lanka 
Annexure to the Agreement, and the two letters between President Jayewardene and Rajiv Gandhi 
43 See Annexure 4 .1, Tables 4A.4B and 4C. J
,Prr iL diSCUH Td e!SeWh? C in thlS Chapter‘ from late- 1983 and >984 onwards increasingly large amounts of
were under the control of the armed forces. See The Z Z S u i  ,I l l  H
l985CTamil n i r ar ^ 7 "  g° 7 nment trooPs and ,hc Tami' separatists'. The Times (London) 29 October 1985, Tamil guerrillas armed to teeth but out of step on political tactics’. October
Karunanidhi, President Tamil regional party, Dravida Munnetra
Kazhagam (DMK)44 called upon Tamils in Tamil Nadu to observe India’s Independence Day, 
15 August 1984, as a day of mourning for Sri Lankan Tamils killed by Sri Lankan security 
forces. He said “how can we celebrate Independence Day when out brothers and sisters are 
being killed in Sn Lanka?"'- On 13 August 1984 Members of the DMK shouted in India’s 
Parliament in Delhi Why is the Indian Government deaf to the death cries of Tamils in Sri 
Lanka and not intervening to save them from being slaughtered [emphases added]?”4* 
very significant that parliamentarians in Delhi of both the Opposition as well as the governing 
Congress Party unanimously condemned the killings of Tamils in Sri Lanka.
It is
Such pro-Sn Lanka Tamil political mobilisation in Tamil Nadu and Delhi inevitably impacted
on India s central government. As the fighting between the insurgents and the government
forces in Sn Lanka continued, the Indian central government ratcheted-up its pressure on the
Sri Lanka government. In December 1984 Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi made a very
strong critique of the Sri Lanka government. The Sri Lanka government was very displeased 
and stated that it:
d  I* • - _ ^ butod to the Indian Prime Minister, Mr
Rajiv Gandhi, on the latest escalation in the level of violence in Sri Lanka. Its language, tone
and substance.' the Sn Lanka Foreign Ministry said, can only encourage the terrorists and
their supporters, both in India and Sri Lanka, to pursue further their nefarious 
activities .[Emphases added]
These were among the initial signs of the Indian central government’s direct entry as a 
negotiator into the Sri Lankan conflict.
President Jayewardene's Reform Proposals, 24 July 1984. On 24 July 1984,
President Jayewardene presented a new set of peace proposals to the TULF (and by 
implication to the Tamil insurgents as well). One of the aspects of the new Proposals was a 
new 2nd Chamber to the Parliament of Sri Lanka. This 2nd Chamber would combine the 
regional characteristics of the US Senate and the limited powers of the House of Lords.48
“  The DMK was ‘he arch rival of lhe then Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran’s party the AIADMK In addition 
to agitating on behalf of Sr. Lanka Tamils, intra-Tamil Nadu political rivalries also entered the scene See
S I  E,hn>Ci,y ^  M0bt,‘m i0n: Polilical Citizens and
l ThJ r GT l an’ H  t UgUS1' 98^ ’ ‘Ang£r gr° WS in India at Sri Lanka suppression: Crackdown on Tamil groups 
y unty forces. Here the Tamil Nadu politicians were politicising the Sri Lankan Tamils’ secessionist 
movement and relating it to India’s independence from British colonial rule
b ^ ^ t S s ! ’4 AUglJSl,984’ ‘Anger gr° WS in ,ndia 31 Sri Lanka suppression: Crackdown on Tamil groups
1 V ?  Guardian> 14 Dec ,984> ‘Sri Lanka holds 725: Suspected guerrillas arrested’.
16 Guardian, 25 July 1984, ‘Sri Lanka week of mourning disrupted by Tamil militants’.
With these proposals President Jayewardene tried to break the stalemate between his
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government and the TULF and the Tamil insurgents. In the government’s proposals the ‘Unit 
of Devolution’ was the District.49 This was the ‘Uni, of Devolution’ that he and the Cabinet 
assessed the government could offer the Tamils -  especially in the context of the increased 
secessionist tendencies within Tamils. And, what he and the UNP leadership assessed that 
they could ‘sell’ to the Sinhala majority. But the TULF and the Tamil insurgent groups 
lobbied for was a ‘Unit of Devolution’ which was composed of the entire Northern and 
Eastern Provinces combined into one Regional Council, with one elected body and with one 
Chief Minister. But President Jayewardene persisted with his proposals and attempted to:
a o v ^ r ln tteadff0Ck the Tamils' insistence on 'regional councils and no less' and the
K S r S C S '  StnCt COUnCi,S and n° m0re' by redefinin8 the terms of the argument
As a further concession to the Tamils President Jayewardene said that a mechanism would be 
devised to allow contiguous Districts to coordinate on issues which affected more than one 
District. But President Jayewardene’s initiatives were unsuccessful. Three days after 
presenting them to the TULF, the TULF rejected the proposals as being insufficient.51
Efforts
December 1984. Let us now examine the Tamil insurgents’ military strategies and
tactics. For obvious reasons the insurgents did not publicly reveal their strategies. If they had 
done so that would have helped the government and the military. Therefore we have to
deduce the insurgents’ strategies by analysing the actions of the five major guerrilla groups 
militarily active at this time - EPRLF, EROS, LTTE, PLOTE and TELO.52
From August-1983 onwards insurgent attacks steadily increased. The primary objective of the 
Tamil insurgents’ was to weaken - and when and where possible, completely dismantle - the 
presence of all Sri Lanka government or State agencies and institutions in the Northern and
a re d is^ S S UCti0n' Chaf>teM a"d ChaPter-3 for seclions where the unresolved problem of ‘Unit of Devolution’
51 (i uard! an’ l l  !U!y !984’ ‘Sri Lanka week of mourn>ng disrupted by Tamil militants’.
The Guard,an, 28 July 1984, ‘Tamils reject offer of 'second chamber' solution: Sr, Lanka’. As will be seen this
ariSES T r T  ?V6r a .gain dunng the numerous political negotiations of the next four years But 
.romcaHy even after this demand was granted via the Indo-Lanka Accord, the LTTE re-ignited the insurrection
re stirred h ga,nS‘ ^  ^  ° Ct°ber 1987 °nWards tHI the IPKF departed in March 1990 And then
his was supposed to be a negotiating juncture, as far the LTTE was concerned it was not. For the LTTE it was 5 
Uict e on the way to a separate state. Agitating for the joining together of the North and the Eastwas a verv
52 Thi Dhrls TS |"'g neg0,iaU0ns and for misdirecting both (he Sri Lanka and Indian central governments
The phrase Tamil insurgents is used generically to refer to all of these grouos as ill of rh^m » •, /
"P » " We  » . . .  - l y  » e  lte .h id ,  p « im d “ S e1 n«
Eastern Provinces. The aim was to bring the
under their control.
largest possible number of Tamil people
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The initial targets of the insurgents were government owned banks and government civil
administration offices.5’ These were soft targets and easy to attack and brought funds to the
fast growing insurgent groups. These attacks also gave the insurgent cadres some tactical
experience. These attacks compelled the government to abandon most government offices and
this led to civil administration in significant areas of the Jaffna Peninsula and the Vanni
ceasing to exist. When this happened only police stations and armed forces camps remained 
as manifestations of the government’s presence.
The Banks which were targeted were the government-owned People’s Bank and the Bank of 
Ceylon. In the face of these robberies the government had two possible courses of action: one 
was to protect all Bank branches. This would have needed the deployment of large numbers 
of scarce police and/or army personnel. The second was to close down bank branches. The 
government chose the second option. In February and March 1984 twelve branches of the 
People’s Bank were closed.54 Gold and jewellery from People’s Bank branches were initially 
moved to army camps in the area and subsequently brought to the People’s Bank 
Headquarters in Colombo.55 By August 1984 the Bank of Ceylon and the People’s Bank 
ceased operations in the North.56 Consequent to the closure of state banks there was a dearth 
of cash in the North. Traders and businessmen faced difficulty in cashing cheques, carry on 
with business and stocking their stores and markets with provisions.57
Beginning in mid-1984 Tamil insurgent groups were strong and trained well enough and 
began attacks on police stations.58 This was in addition to ambushes using IEDs and 
landmines which killed many dozens of army and police personnel.59 Attacks against the 
railway system also began in 1984 and continued till 1987 when the rail link between Jaffna
InSUrgen' (Pnman'y G°Vernment Ba"ks> in the & Ease
55 w '[ S' Z dj l ]LFhbrUary, o o f ’DIn T 8 vulnerable t0 r«bberies: 12 People’s Bank branches to close’
and Jewehe'ry movedTnro Army camps’”  ‘°  ^  ^  in a"d Gold
56 The Ceylon Daily News, 11 August 1984, ‘North banks closed’.
The Island, 13 August 1984, ‘Sequel to closure of State banks: Jaffna may be paralysed by cash flow crisis’.
58
^ See Annexure 4.1, Table 4B: Insurgents Attacks on Police Stations, 1984.
See Annexure 4.1, Table 4C: Insurgents Landmine Attacks 1984 Thec<* TPnc n  ^  ^ , •
and Colombo was completely severed.60 Along with the other tactics such as the
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attacks on police stations and army camps, the landmine attacks served to corral the
government forces within their camps and bases and gradually severed the link between the 
government forces and the Tamil population.
Except for Armed Forces Camps Jaffna Peninsula Under Insurgent
Domination, September 1984. By September 1984 The Guardian reported that the
armed forces and police were effectively corralled within their camps. This had been achieved
by Tamil insurgents who had mined almost all the roads used by military convoys in the
Peninsula. As a result the Tamil insurgents were able to move freely in the peninsula and,
very significantly, the entire civilian population came under their control.61 Foreign
correspondents reported that normal life in the Peninsula had been completely disrupted. An
unofficial 24-hour curfew was being observed, schools were closed, shops were open for one
or two hours a day and the streets were deserted.62 From 1984 onwards the insurgents
demonstrated increasing tactical expertise in the use of many types of IEDs, claymore mines,
and electrically and pressure activated explosive devises. Neither the Sri Lankan army nor
police had ever experienced these types of attacks before and nor suffered casualties like this 
and their military effectiveness was severely degraded.
4.2: Year 1985
Political Processes 1985. In January 1985 the Indian coastguard seized a Sri Lanka
navy gunboat.63 While the dispute was quickly settled, it was a subtle warning of a hardening 
of the Indian government’s attitude towards Sri Lanka. Concurrently, Sri Lanka Tamils in 
Madras continued to lobby the Indian government to militarily intervene in Sri Lanka. “Tamil 
separatists exiled in Madras, are convinced that their intensified campaign is bringing the day 
of Indian military intervention nearer - and with it, partition of Sri Lanka”.64 In August 1985
6i ^ nnexure 4-2, Table 4J: Insurgent Attacks against the Colombo-Jaffna Railway link, 1984-1987
he Guardian. 4 September 1984, Tamil guerrillas control north: New offensive feared in Sri Lanka' The 
reporting by fore.gn correspondents was invaluable in areas where the insurgency was underway as local
“ ' d “POn ” h b» lh'  .nd Heked death if
2 The Guardian, 4 September 1984, ‘Tamil guerrillas control north: New offensive feared in Sri Lanka' The 
report,ng by foreign correspondents was invaluable in areas where the insurgency was underway as local
P v Z u r S s u c ! ,  areas'636 ^  “  UP°n W" h SUSpid°n by thc insu^ nts -k e d  death if
i s seize Sri Lankan gunboa,: sn Lankan presidem JayCWarde"e ^
separa,i^are Convinced hUiasr onlya^matterof,hme^b^oreandia°bkervenes'^aPV ** ^  “  La"ka"
Mr S.C. Chandrahasan predicted yesterday
to intervene to prevent a bloodbath and impose partition.”
that Mr Gandhi would eventually have
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The Sn Lanka government was aware of the assistance being given to Tamil insurgents by 
India. In his speech at the opening of Sri Lanka’s parliament on 20 February 1985 President 
Jayewardene accused India of fomenting and encouraging terrorism in Sri Lanka.
f  L,anka h3S ^  rePresentati°™ on several occasions to the 
Government o f India that there is evidence that terrorists operating in Sri Lanka are beine
movement 2 7 in  'Z T  Z  ^  We haVC a'S° ComPIained ‘hat the leaders of thisement live in India, and meet and conduct illegal activities in India [emphases added].66
By late-May 1985 the foreign ministries of the Indian and Sri Lanka governments had worked
together outside the glare of publicity and prepared the ground for a summit meeting between 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President Jayewardene.67
TULF
Summit Meeting between President Jayewardene and Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi, 2 June 1985. The first talks took place on 2 June 1985. India’s stance was that it 
would intervene to resolve the dispute only i f  President Jayewardene went beyond his
previous offer o f District based autonomy for the Tamils in Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka 
[emphases added].68 The
o — r ^  V./AI l i io ioii i ig  m a t  p u w c r
be devolved to a single entity which was composed of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. 
The Indian government kept on exerting pressure on President Jayewardene to concede to this 
demand. The Sri Lanka government, maintaining a clear political objective -  i.e. our Research 
Question no. 1 - kept insisting that it was prepared to devolve power to the level of the 
District and maintained its efforts to convince Rajiv Gandhi to support its position.
On the other hand the Gandhi government’s reading of the situation was classic 
counterinsurgency -  i.e. redress the grievance; then the insurgents would lose popular 
support; then they will begin to wither away; then offer amnesty to the mass of the cadres; if 
any hardliners (i.e. some in the top leadership) still kept on fighting then arrest them or
from Sb U ^ n  p 'r^ d r .’1 ' 985’ ‘JayeWarden£ '°  pr°P°Se ™J0r reform Tamils: Indians force concessions 
I n o M k rdJ m ' 21 FebrUary l985’ 'Jayewardene 8e,s touSh with '"din: Sri Lanka's President alleges Tamil
Jayewarfene^f Sri^Lanka\ ' 985’ ** ‘alkS ° n Tamil Cr,sis: Indla" P“  «° -ee l President
!  ThCr Uarl lan' ?  i UnC l985’ ‘Securit>' dominates India and Sri Lanka talks on Tamils’ It was reported that 
Rajiv Gandhi and President Jayewardene had begun with a 50-minute discussion ‘ eP0I'led lha
discussed the political and security aspects of the conflict between the unrest between the minorit^Tamds T d
Athulith l t u  Then thfM SeCUr" y adViSerS’ Mr Narasimha Rao (Indian Minister for Defence) and Mr Laldh 
Athulathmudali (Minister of National Security in Sri Lanka) had been called for a further one hour of talk!
destroy them with the military and police. Gandhi’s assumption was that if the
Northern and Eastern Provinces were fused together then the Tamil secessionist insurrection 
would reduce and eventually wither away.69
At the end of the Summit meeting a joint communique issued by the two governments stated 
that it had been agreed that “immediate steps should be taken to defuse the situation and 
create a proper climate for progress towards a political settlement which would be acceptable 
to all concerned within the framework o f the unity and integrity o f Sri Lanka [emphases
added]."70 This commitment to an undivided Sri Lanka was a stance that the Indian central 
government adopted and continued to maintain. India also took the initiative to organise direct 
negotiations between the Sri Lanka government and the Tamil insurgents and TULF.
Direct Negotiations between Sri Lanka government and Tamil 
insurgents groups -  the Thimpu Talks’, July and August 1985.
8-13 July 1985, 1st Round.
Soon after this summit meeting the Indian government began to prepare the ground for direct 
negotiations between the Sri Lanka government and the Tamil insurgent groups and the 
TULF. The first task was to obtain a ceasefire. This was necessary to allow the Tamils and 
President Jayewardene to prepare themselves for negotiations.71 This Indian effort was 
successful and on 18 June 1985 the five major insurgent groups and the Sri Lanka government 
agreed to a 3-month ceasefire, i.e. from 18 June to 18 September 1985.72
The two delegations met in Thimpu, Bhutan for six days from 8 to 13 July 1985. The 
government delegation was composed primarily of lawyers and was led by President 
Jayewardene’s brother, H.W. Jayewardene, QC. The Tamil delegation was led by TULF’s 
President and Secretary-General.73 The objectives of the talks were to discuss various
l ™ S.ST enCe W£!S c° ,Tect re«a;dlnS TEL0- EPRLF, EROS and PLOTE. But the LTTE chose to defy India 
and did not accept the Provincial Councils system. The LTTE did not allow the Provincial Councils system to
unction and, furthermore, fought a guerrilla campaign against the Indians, and, with a tactical alliance with 
7Po “ ‘d " Prer daf  comPelled the IPKF t0 leave Sri Lanka (see discussion later in this Chapter)
T a m te p T r i^ o n ^ c C  D" “  ^  ^  ^  ^  Lankan summit on
1' The* Z dif n' l  JT  ’ 'India Se£kS Tamil aSrcemcnt to Sri Lanka truce: Indian government attempts to persuade Madras-based rebel leaders to accept ceasefire’. ^
73 TJtf  Guardlan* 19 June 1985, Talks hope as Tamils agree to a ceasefire: Sri Lanka’.
FPR ipl° laI dfe,egati0n comPrised of representatives from the Tamil insurgents groups LTTE TELO
EPRLF and EROS. In a ceremonial and official sense it was led by TULF President M Sivasithamnn’ra - a
Efforts ^ Ge?erai’ A; Amirthalingam, see The Times (London), 6 July 1985, ‘All Tamil rebel groups for Bhutan- 
Efforts to solve Sri Lanka s ethnic problems’. But the actual strength of the delegation was with the Tamil
insurgents. This became very clear during the two rounds of talks. When the Sri Lanka government presented
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proposals on devolution. The Indian Government played a crucial role of
mediator but did not participate directly in the talks. But Indian officials were continuously
present behind the scene, cajoling, persuading, and talking with both sides and trying to push
them together to an Agreement.74 During the six days of discussions the Sri Lanka
government made several good will gestures towards the Tamils.75 These were significant 
conciliatory gestures.
The Sri Lanka government proposed greater devolution of powers with the District as the Unit
of Devolution. These District Councils would have wider powers than earlier proposals. But
the Tamil delegation refused to discuss any of the Sri Lankan government’s proposals.76 The
Tamil delegation rejected ah the Sri Lanka government’s proposals saying that they “did not
satisfy the hopes and aspirations of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka”.77 Here again one of the
constant thematic threads in the Sri Lanka's counterinsurgency manifested itself: the
government offered reforms that it assessed that it could offer while, concurrently,
maintaining the support of the majority Sinhala population,78 But the insurgent groups
rejec ted the reforms and wanted much more than the government assessed that it could give.
The Talks became deadlocked. Prime Minister Gandhi sent very senior Ministry of External
Affairs official and more Indian personnel to Bhutan to try and coax the two parties to break 
the deadlock.79
78
proposals for devolution of power, the Tamil insurgent groups rejected all discussion of all such substantive 
issues and instead focussed their attention on drawing up a ‘Liberation Charter’
r ThJ  {L°"don)\ 8 Ju,y ,985’ Colombo draws the line on devolution: Exploratory talks open between Sri 
Lanka and Tamil guerrilla organizations’.
5 It released 643 insurgent suspects who were under arrest at that time. The curfew in the five Districts of the
Northern Province which had been in effect from November 1984 was lifted. The Times (London) 11 July 1985 
Sri Lanka frees 643 suspects’.
6 Loganathan, K, Sri Lanka: Lost Opportunities. Past Attempts at Resolving the Ethnic Conflict 1996' 104
Loganathan was a member of the EPRLF delegation at Thimpu and was present during both - the first in July 
1985 and the second in August - series of talks. J
77 The ( inf s <LZndo">’ 13 Ju|y l985' ‘Delhi's env°y tries to end Sri Lanka-Tamil impasse: Romesh Bhandari 
senior Indian official goes to Bhutan’.
It is useful to reflect on these Thimpu talks as they give deep insight in to dilemmas of the Sri Lanka case as
well as insurgency & counterinsurgency in general. Would the 'the hopes and aspirations’ of the Tamil people’
have been satisfied with any reform suggested by the Sri Lankan government? If the 'the hopes and aspirations
of the Tam,I people meant a separate state, that was not a reform that the Sri Lankan government could agree to
The government would definitely not have been able to obtain the support of the Sinhala people for such a
measure. But the question arises would anything less than a separate state have sufficed? Tamil insurgents
should have taken this into account but insisted on pitching their demand at the maximum level On the other
hand the Sn Lankan government too could have offered greater devolution but seems to have assessed that what
it offered was the best it was prudent to give, at that time. If both sides compromised then an Agreement may
have been reached. But they did not. Consequently, there was a gap between the reforms that the government
what changes the Tamils would accept. This mean, that, sooner or later, the 'dialogue' of 
military conflict would come into play and the gap be closed or made redundant
J E  SSZ Sm iSiZS: 10 end *  L*nk- T™ 1 «— >« — * .
However, instead of discussing pragmatic devolution proposals which could be
practically implemented on the ground, the Tamil delegation placed before the Sri Lanka
delegation an extremely provocat.ve document which, if it had been accepted by Sri Lanka,
would have facilitated the creation of a separate Tamil state. The Tamils said that these were
the ‘four principals’ upon which they based their negotiations and requested Sri Lanka to 
accept these ‘principals’:
(1) Recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a distinct nationality; (2) Recognition of an 
identified Tamil homeland and the guarantee of its territorial integrity; (3) Based on the above
the' rfZT f fnhe !nahe"able r,8ht of self-determination of the Tamil nation; (4) Recognition of
the IsS d  Pra" Kther fandam8e0ntal democratic rights of all Tamils, who look upontne island as their country [emphases added].80 p
Item (4) was already being implemented by the Sr, Lanka government at that time and was
not a problem. The Sri Lanka delegation did not give an immediate reply -  obviously
President Jayewardene and the Cabinet had to deliberate these. Despite strenuous efforts by
Indian officials the talks remained deadlocked and they were adjourned for one month with 
both sides agreeing to meet again on 12 August.81
Soon after the end of the first round of talks at Thimpu, the insurgents demonstrated their 
influence over the Tamil people in Jaffna and the Eastern Province by holding a 3-day general 
strike which was completely successful.82 Concurrently, preparations for the 2nd round of 
talks scheduled to begin on 12 August continued behind the scenes in all three camps -  i.e. Sri
Lanka government, the Tamil groups and the Indian government. Some members of the Sri 
Lanka government were not hopeful of a negotiated settlement.
Pessimists in the [Sri Lanka] government, however, believe the guerrillas will be satisfied 
with nothing short of an independent state carved out of the Tamil-dominated northern and
!hn i7 Pr<m'lCeS- i he aSt talk’ the f,ve main guerrilla groups demanded that any deal
■ hould recognise the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a distinct nationality with a right to self- 
determination [emphases added].83 5
As events turned out, this was not a pessimistic assessment but a realistic one. In any event
prior to the 2nd Round of talks, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandh, exerted a great deal of pressure
on the insurgent groups. If not for this pressure the Tamil groups would have boycotted the
second round. Gandhi “threatened the guerrillas with arrest and the closure of their bases in 
80
an!)'I mnaf 7 a  L'• S,r‘ *Mnka: L°st Opportunities. Past Attempts a, Resolving the Ethnic Conflict 1996- 104-105 
and 116, fn.34 Joint Statement by the Tamil Delegation at Thimpu Talks on 13 July 1985
c o m l S ^ h S i o l e n ^ .  ' 985’ ‘Frag"e “  ^  *  risk 3S Tam" talks adJ—  Talks to end
The Times (London), 26 July 1985, ‘Guerrillas halt trains as part of Tamil protest* Sri I mkan 
problems;. This was during [he days on which (he 2"" Anniversary o I the pogrom-riots of July jpgj O-iiVh .
2 S T  ”  COl‘,mb'> * « i m » l ,  unde a '.d  0, ^ 00,W eV e.m e“  a
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The Sunday Times (London), 28 July 1985, ‘New hope of deal by Tamils- Sri Lank™ rnnflir-, iu ■ o, 
Although the Reporter characterises them as “pessimists” over the subsequent years they proved to be c o L t "  '
the Indian state of Tamil Nadu unless they agreed to attend the peace talks”.84
These were very strong and firm actions. However, at the same time both President
Jayewardene and Prime Minister Gandhi were opposed and criticised by constituencies in 
their own countries.85
In the meantime the Tamil insurgent leaders in Madras focussed on drafting a ‘Liberation 
Charter which enshrined the four principals presented at the first round of talks.86 Tamil 
insurgents who had borne the brunt of the fighting were not in favour of the Thimpu talks and 
a negotiated settlement within a united Sri Lanka. There were demonstrations in Jaffna 
against the talks. These demonstrations were ostensibly spontaneous but were in reality 
organised by the insurgent groups themselves.87 Considering the grip that the insurgent groups
had developed on the Jaffna civilian population over the previous years it is highly unlikely 
that these demonstrations were spontaneous.
Prime Minister Gandhi and his government were keenly interested in the success of the 
negotiations. He and his officials correctly assessed that complicated political forces were 
acting within the Tamil people and insurgent groups, the Sinhalese people and the Sri Lankan 
government which could negate the Thimpu negotiations.88 Prime Minister Gandhi was 
reported as “exerting pressure on President Jayewardene to produce credible proposals to put 
to the Tamils.”89 On the other hand Jayewardene was under continuous pressure by his 
Sinhala constituents. Jayewardene knew that his ability to govern Sri Lanka could be
84 The Sunday Times (London), 28 July 1985, ‘New hope of deal by Tamils: Sri Lankan conflict talks in Bhutan’.
In 1986 Rajiv Gandhi carried out this threat when, again, he was faced with non-cooperation by Tamil 
insurgents. Discussed later in this Chapter.
85 The political situation in both countries continued to be complex and full of potential pitfalls. In Sri Lanka the 
powerful Buddhist clergy warned Jayewardene not to decide anything without first consulting the people of Sri 
Lanka. In India Prime Minister Gandhi was booed in Madras when he delivered an anti-terrorism speech See 
The Sunday Times (London), 28 July 1985, ‘New hope of deal by Tamils: Sri Lankan conflict talks in Bhutan’.
87 The Guardian, 31 July 1985, ‘Tamils will present united front: Peace talks with Sri Lankan government'.
88 The Guardian: 31 Ju,y ,985’ ‘Tamils will present united front: Peace talks with Sri Lankan government’.
Rajiv Gandhi wanted to maintain the momentum of the search for a negotiated solution and requested
President Jayewardene to urgently formulate proposals which could be speedily implemented. See The Times 
(London), 6 August 1985, ‘Gandhi asks Sri Lanka to speed up Tamil plan: Indian Premier Rajiv Gandhi’s 
request’. The Indian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, D.N.Dixit, shuttled between Colombo and Delhi back and 
forth in early August 1985 conveying Mr Gandhi’s requests and President Jayewardene’s replies. A few days 
later the Indian Foreign Secretary arrived in Sri Lanka. See The Times (London), 9 August 1985, ‘Delhi envoy 
takes ideas to Colombo: Indian Foreign Secretary Romesh Bhandari visits Sri Lanka’.
The Times (London), 10 August 1985, ‘Tamil patience stretched as time runs out in Sri Lanka: Talks on future
of ethnic minority group’. What was a ‘credible option’? What was a ‘non-credible’? Who would/should decide*
the Indian government? The Tamil insurgents? The Sri Lanka government? The Indian government kept on
pressuring the Sri Lanka government to ‘compromise ... compromise ... concede more...concede more’ which
from the perspective of the Sri Lankan government and the Sinhala majority was tantamount to weakening the 
foundations of the Sri Lankan State.
seriously affected if large numbers of Sinhalese opposed his policies.90 B ut'50
Rajiv Gandhi -  facing electoral pressures of his own from Tamil Nadu politicians and Tamil
secessionist lobbyists who wanted direct Indian military intervention -  continued to exert
pressure on Jayewardene.91 This complex tussle continued throughout this period and was a
manifestation of the inherently difficult problems of implementing counterinsurgency against 
the Tamil insurrection in Sri Lanka
•  12-17 August 1985, 2nd Round
On 10 August, two days before the 2nd round of Thimpu talks were scheduled to begin, Tamil 
insurgents detonated an IED9' in Vavuniya town which killed 14 people including 5 police 
personnel. Later, unidentified men -  widely suspected as being police and armed forces 
personnel in civilian clothes - set fire to shops in the town. This was the most serious violation 
of the ceasefire up to that time.93 The timing of this attack had to have been deliberately 
chosen by Tamil insurgents to sabotage the 2nd round of Thimpu talks. And that is exactly 
what happened. Throughout the 2nd meeting the atmosphere was poisoned because the Sri 
Lankan government and the Tamil delegation exchanged accusations of ceasefire violations.
On the first day of the 2nd Round of talks the Sri Lanka government officially responded to the
•four principals’ presented by the Tamils during the first set of talks. The leader of the
delegation H.W. Jayewardene said that “acceptance of the militant’s demands would amount 
to granting a separate Tamil nation”.94 He went on to state:
“[...] if the first three principles are to be taken at their face value and given their accepted 
legal meaning, they are wholly unacceptable to the Government. They must be rejected for 
the reason that they constitute a negation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri 
Lanka, they are detrimental to a united Sri Lanka and are inimical to the interests of the 
several communities, ethnic and religious in our country” [emphases added].95
90
This is precisely what happened during 1987-1989 when the UNP government was faced with the 2nd 
insurrection launched by the JVP. This was when the Indian Peace Keeping Force (1PKF) was in Sri Lanka and 
Sinhala nationalism became greatly disturbed at the possibility that the Indians would not leave, or that they mav 
create a separate state (both of which the Indians could have chosen to do, if they so wished). The JVP enjoved a
° f, cross-Par‘y support from wide sections of the Sinhala electorate, Buddhist monks, 
Mudcnts, Trade Unionists and others who were not party members. Discussed later in this Chapter
The Tamil insurgents refused to present proposals of their own but insisted that the Sri Lankan government
present new proposals. Concurrently, they kept on politically agitating in Sri Lanka and in Tamil Nadu for a 
separate Tamil state.
92
Improvised Explosive Device.
93 The Times (London), 12 August 1985, ‘Policemen killed by bomb as Tamils break ceasefire: Communal strife 
in on Lanka .
eth^c t i \ \s \o !^ nd0n)' 13 AUgUSt ,985’ SH Lanka lUmS d°Wn TamiI Charter as devo,ution talks restart: Island's 
Loganathan, K, 1996: 105, ‘Sr/ Lanka: Lost Opportunities. Past Attempts at Resolving the Ethnic Conflict'.
After three days the talks became deadlocked. The Indian Foreign
Secretary, Mr. Bandan flew to Thimpu and attempted to re-start the discussions.96 The Indian
government continued with its efforts to save the talks.97 But the talks continued to be
deadlocked and finally by 23 August the Indian and Sri Lanka governments accepted that the 
2nd round of Thimpu talks had collapsed.98
With the end of the Thimpu talks the fear of renewed fighting was acutely felt by Tamils in
the North and East. Hundreds of Tamils were reported as fleeing to south India in fishing 
boats.99
At least one diplomat has admitted in private that a de facto  division of the island is slowly
coming about. The Sinhalese majority suspect that the 'boys', as the Tamil Tiger rebels are
universally known, have this as a policy. If more and more Sinhalese left the Northern, Eastern
and North Central provinces the Tamils could say they were in an overwhelming majority and 
increase demands for a separate state [emphases added].100
LankaIndian Government Further increases Pressure on Colombo: Sri
Government indicates that it will concede more to Tamil Demands, August
1985. With the breakdown of the Thimpu Talks and the approach of the end of the 3-month 
ceasefire -  18 September -  the Indian government further increased its pressure on the Sri 
Lanka government. In response the Sri Lanka Government indicated that it was ready to 
devolve executive and legislative powers to Provincial Councils which have been directly 
elected. This was the first time this concession was indicated after the ceasefire came into 
effect on 18 June 1985. “Although the detailed proposals are still secret, sources said the new 
formula goes further than any President Junius Jayewardene has been prepared to 
contemplate since autumn, 1983, to meet minimal Tamil demands [emphases added].”101 
This change was the result of pressure from India and the Sri Lanka government’s wish to 
maintain the ceasefire. As the reader can see, the Sri Lanka government is compelled to 
concede to Tamil demands, little by little. The unrelenting pressure from India and the 
insurgents’ guerrilla attacks left Jayewardene with little options.
In a new set of reforms discussed between the Sri Lanka and Indian Governments, Sri Lanka 
agreed to devolve legislative and executive powers to elected Provincial Councils in the North
“  The Times (London), 15 August 1985, ‘Bhutan talks: Ethnic problems in Sri Lanka’.
, lh. e Gu.aLnil‘m ' 20 August l985’ ‘D'P'omats battle to save Tamil peace negotiations: Sectarian violence in Sri
Lanka . The Guardian. 21 August 1985, ‘Time running out for Sri Lanka: Peace negotiations to resume between 
government and Tamil separatists in Bhutan.
99 The Times (London), 23 August 1985, Tamil negotiations with Sri Lankan team break down’
The Guardian 23August 1985, ‘Spectre of civil war looms in Sri Lanka: Bhutan peace talks between 
government and Tamil separatists adjourned’.
101 Tr,e Times (London)' 24 August 1985, 'Rising tide of refugees deepens ethnic divide in Sri Lanka’
The Guardian, 27 August 1985, ‘Colombo broadens offer as Gandhi guides Tamil talks: Indian premier’s 
attempt to secure peace in Sri Lanka’. F
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and East of the island (i.e. the ‘Unit of Devolution’ dispute). 102 The leader of 
the biggest party in each provincial legislature would be asked to form a cabinet. President 
Jayewardene also agreed that the Provincial Council’s jurisdiction would include law and 
order, land settlement, agriculture and education (i.e. the ‘Powers of Devolution’ dispute).103
While these concessions were being got from the Sri Lanka government, at the same time the 
Indian government had deep concerns about the LTTE:
Indian officials are less confident about the Liberation Tigers, the group responsible for most
of the recent guerrilla operations in Sri Lanka. I f  they so choose, the Tigers could wreck a 
settlement [emphases added].104
These apprehensions were completely accurate as the history of the conflict in the years ahead
were to reveal. It can be argued that India’s analysis of the LTTE did not go deep enough and
that India suffered a strategic intelligence failure in the comprehensiveness of its assessment 
of the LTTE.105
Returning to 1985, the Indian government simultaneously put pressure on the Tamil 
insurgents to compromise. On 27 August it expelled from India three of the most extreme 
Tamil secessionist ideologues who were living in Madras. But Rajiv Gandhi immediately 
faced widespread opposition in Tamil Nadu.106 Due to various infringements of the law the 
Indian government arrested another 3,500 protesters in Tamil Nadu. However, the complexity 
of the situation can be gauged by the fact that the ADMK was also in an electoral alliance 
with the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s Congress Party in the parliament in Delhi.'01
T  Thl  G“arf an' 3 1 Au§ust l985’ ‘Jayewardene to propose major reform for Tamils: Indians force concessions
from bn Lankan President’. This was a major concession by the Sri Lanka government on the ‘Unit of 
Devolution’ dispute.
103 ■ . .
,04 £1S was a major concession by the Sn Lanka government on the ‘Powers of Devolution’ dispute.
The Guardian 3 \ August 1985, ‘Jayewardene to propose major reform for Tamils: Indians force concessions 
trom Sn Lankan President’.
The LTTE perpetrated significant violations of the ceasefire; dragged its feet in all the efforts by the Indian
government to negotiate a solution during 1986 and early 1987; opposed the Indo-Lanka Accord and from 10
October 1987 tilMate-1989 onwards carried out military actions against the Indian government and killed 1000+
and wounded 3000+ of its soldiers. And, most serious of all, the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 -  an
act which no Indian intelligence agency or government department seems to have even contemplated RAW had
close ties with all the Tamil insurgent groups including the LTTE. The inaccuracy of RAW’s intelligence
assessment of the LTTE in terms of the harm that the LTTE could cause to India has to be classified as an 
intelligence failure.
A 3-d^  penod of opposition agitation was immediately launched throughout Tamil Nadu from 28 August 
onwards. The rapidity with which this opposition campaign was launched is a good indication of the support of
c T n L u L i la n k a ’5 “  AUgUSt ,985’ ^  f* * S *— • Tami. ange/rises: ££ZJZg
Agitation continued in Tamil Nadu throughout August and September 1985 and on most occasions the 
agitation was given official backing and led by the Tamil Nadu State government of the Anna Dravida Munnelra 
Kagazham (ADMK). In the third week of September, during a “24-hour official general strike was called to 
express the sympathy of the Tamils of Tamil Nadu with their cousins in Sri Lanka” a 57 year old Tamil man set 
himself on fire and killed himself (See The Times (London). 25 September 1985, ‘57 year-old man sets himself
Rajiv Gandhi also kept pressurising President Jayewardene.10* On 16 September 1985 the Sri
Lanka government unilaterally declared that it would extend the ceasefire beyond 18
September, the date on which the 3-month ceasefire was due to expire. On 17 September
Prime Minister Gandhi got representatives of the Tamil insurgents to meet him in Delhi and
successfully pressurised the insurgents to continue with the ceasefire.109 By 11 October the
Indian government was able to get the Tamil insurgents to accept a new ceasefire
agreement. On 12 October the Sri Lanka government immediately welcomed the decision
of the Tamil insurgents and stated that it too would honour the ceasefire that it had 
unilaterally declared on 16 September.111
Rajiv Gandhi made strenuous efforts to deal even-handedly with the Tamil insurgents on the 
one hand and the Sri Lanka government on the other. Some of the military training facilities 
for the Tamil insurgents were closed down but the deported Tamil secessionist ideologues 
were allowed to return to Tamil Nadu. Concurrently, at a press conference on 11 October 
Gandhi reiterated that he was searching for a negotiated solution “within the framework of a 
united Sri Lanka”.11- Gandhi and the central government of India periodically stated that the 
government of India did not want Sri Lanka partitioned. There was a significant amount of 
self-interest in this. In July 1986 a Sri Lanka Minister revealed that Rajiv Gandhi had told him 
that he would never encourage the partition of Sri Lanka because if that were to happen “he 
would have 15 Eelams on his hand” [emphases added].113 It was reported that Tamil 
insurgents groups in Madras had disappointedly concluded that India was “not going to follow 
the Bangladesh precedent and help them to [create] a separate state”.114
on fire in Madras’). Such incidents are indicative of the intensity of agitation in Tamil Nadu and also served 
increase the feelings of the masses of Tamil Nadu people.
The Guardian, 31 August 1985, ‘Jayewardene to propose major reform for Tamils: Indians force concessions 
from Sri Lankan President’.
109 The Guardian, 18 September 1985, ‘Gandhi meets rebels: Meeting between Indian Premier and Sri Lankan 
Tamil guerrilla leaders’.
110 The Times (London), 11 October 1985, ‘Tamil fighters agree to new truce: Guerrilla campaign ceasefire in 
north Sri Lanka’.
 ^The Times (London), 12 October 1985, ‘Sri Lanka welcomes decision of Tamil separatist guerrilla group’.
The Guardian, 12 October 1985, ‘Gandhi acts to cool Sri Lanka conflicts: India reportedly withdraws 
training facilities from Tamil separatist guerrillas’.
This statement of Gandhi’s was mentioned earlier in this Chapter. It is reiterated here due to its significance. 
The Sunday Times (London), 6 July 1986, ‘Sri Lanka makes new peace push: President Jayewardene proposes 
early election in effort to end Civil War’. This was revealed by Minister of National Security Lalith 
Athulathmudali.
114 The Guardian, 12 October 1985, ‘Gandhi acts to cool Sri Lanka conflicts: India reportedly withdraws 
training facilities from Tamil separatist guerrillas’. As the Indo-Lanka Agreement of 1987 was to illustrate this 
was correct. Four of the five main insurgent groups accepted India’s position. But the LTTE refused to give up.
Indian Government and Tamil Insurgent Talks, 7-9 November
1985. Rajiv Gandhi got the Tamil insurgents to meet him in Delhi for discussions 7 to 9
November 1985. The Sri Lanka government was not included in the process. Clearly, the
Indian central government had decided to take the lead role, drawing lessons from the
collapse of the Thimpu talks. The Indian Government wanted to quickly focus attention on
substantive issues included in the Sri Lanka government’s proposals. But the Tamil
insurgents initial move was to loudly denounce the Sri Lanka government for ceasefire
violations in the northern and eastern provinces. They presented a list of violations to the
Indian Foreign Secretary Mr. Bhandari who was leading the Indian team, After listening to
their complaints the Indian Government kept on reiterating the need to address the Sri Lanka 
government’s proposals.
But the insurgents would not respond positively. Their negotiating tactic became clear as
time passed. After their initial complaints of alleged ceasefire violations, they then said that
they wanted fresh proposals from the Sri Lanka government. The more moderate TULF (the
older politicians who had been elected to parliament in 1977) were prepared to submit
proposals which they had drafted but the insurgents would not.
The militants are unwilling to put forward any kind of proposals of their own for settlement 
of the crisis, preferring to demand another set from the [Sri Lanka] Government which 
would be more in line with their demands for a homeland of their own. However, the more 
moderate politicians of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) have drawn up a 20-page 
document of their own for discussion [emphases added].115
The Tamils were especially disagreeable to President Jayewardene’s reluctance to merge the 
Northern and Eastern Provinces."6 The Indian government made concerted efforts to break
the deadlock but could not make any progress and the talks were terminated on 9 November 
and the Tamil groups returned to Tamil Nadu.117
115 The Times (London), 8 November 1985, ‘Rebels say ceasefire broken: Talks to solve Sri Lanka's ethnic unrest 
resume’.
This, as discussed in the Introduction and already flagged on several occasions, was a crucial component of 
the Sri Lanka government’s position. Those two Provinces, together, constituted the territory of the separate state 
the Tamils wished to create. There was intense opposition to such a policy from within the government and from 
the Opposition parties and pressure groups in Sri Lanka. The insistence of the Tamils too should be noted As 
discussed in earlier Chapters, at least from 1973 the Tamils had concluded that such a fusion was essential if a 
separate Tamil stat were to be viable. So, the Tamils kept on insisting that the Sri Lanka government give-in on 
this issue. The Sri Lanka government, in turn, knowing the Tamils’ strategy kept at its strategy of not conceding 
this. However, with further deterioration of the Sri Lanka government's strength and the Indo-Lanka Accord 
this merging had to be accepted by the Jayewardene government in 1987. Discussed later in this Chapter
The Guardian, 9 November 1985, ‘Colombo peace moves collapse: Indian efforts to revive Sri Lankan Deace 
talks falter’.
155
Military Processes, 1985. Concurrent with all these efforts at a negotiated
deal, Tamil insurgents kept on attacking targets in the North and East Sri Lanka and also in
adjacent Districts. These attacks and the government forces' palpable inability to negate
them strengthened the Tamil insurgents' resolve to not compromise at the negotiating table.
And this was a continuous process throughout this period up to July 1987. By 1985 the armed
forces were concentrated in heavily fortified camps. The Tamil guerrillas had built bunkers
and strong points encircling them. The armed forces’ camps were under constant surveillance.
Unlike 1984, the Tamil insurgents attacked army and navy camps as well as the remaining
police stations. This was a marked escalation from 1984.11  ^While the Tamil insurgents could
not overrun these army and navy camps during this era, neither could the army venture out of
them at will. At the hint of the army attempting move out of its camps the guerrillas would
react with mortars, small arms, and heavy machine gun fire. An army patrol which did
manage to venture out was incessantly harassed till it returned back to its camp.
Consequently, the army remained cooped within its camps and had no direct contact with 
Tamil civilians.
IED and landmine attacks also intensified during 1985. These attacks had a serious impact on
the vehicular mobility of all the armed forces and police.120 The persistent attacks on police
stations compelled the government to abandon them. Then the sole government presence
became the army camps. Subsequently these army camps themselves were subjected to
attacks. During the periods of the initial attacks soldiers ventured out of the camps on foot
patrols and tried to dominate the surrounding areas. Gradually these patrols too became
impossible to conduct due to constant attack by ever vigilant insurgents who were deployed in
well-defended locations and buildings surrounding the camps. Then mobile patrols with
armoured cars and armoured personnel carriers had to be used. These mobile patrols radiated
out from these army camps, including the camp at Jaffna Fort. In due course these armoured
forays, too, had to be stopped as they became too dangerous for the crews and vehicles. They
were subjected to harassing fire, sniping and ambushes using IEDs. These occurred both
within built-up areas of Jaffna City as well as in the small towns and rural areas of the Jaffna
Peninsula. In this manner the government s connection with the Tamil people was severed as 
much as possible.
118 See Annexure 4.1.
See Annexure 4.1, Table 4D: Insurgents Attacks on Police Stations, Army & Navy Camps, 1985. 
See Annexure 4.1, Table 4E: Insurgents Landmine Attacks, 1985.
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4.3: Year 1986
Political Processes 1986. In early 1986 the Indian central government decided that it
had to pressurise the Sri Lanka government to grant devolution to the Tamils at least up to a 
quasi-Federal level. Sri Lanka was unwilling to go beyond the status of a Province in the 
North but the Tamils “want at least a [federal] state-like status, a pattern which India
follows.yy
India demands on 27 February 1986 that 
to the ethnic conflict within one month”
Lanka find
within one onth” (...or else). By late February 1986 the 
Indian government was frustrated by the lack of progress on negotiating an agreement 
between the Sri Lanka government and the Tamil insurgents. The option chosen by the Indian 
government was to make very strong and strident demands on the Sri Lanka government to 
concede even more to Tamil demands. In an unprecedented move, in February 1986 India 
demanded that Sri Lanka finds a political solution within one month. Indian Foreign Minister 
Mr. B.R. Bhagat was reported as saying that India “would not allow any further worsening of 
the conflict . The wording implied a threat to Sri Lanka but the Minister gave no indication 
of what India would do if President Jayewardene did not respond in one month. The Indian 
Minister said that India would raise human rights concerns against Sri Lanka at the UN 
Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva. Rajiv Gandhi’s government was under 
constant and relentless pressure from within parliament and from Tamil exiles. Sri Lankan 
Tamil exiles in India fervently lobbied Rajiv to militarily intervene in Sri Lanka.123 Rajiv 
Gandhi rejected this option but increased pressure on the Sri Lanka government to make even 
further concessions to Tamil demands. From the perspective of a foreign correspondent in 
Delhi, Rajiv Gandhi’s government “under pressure from Tamils in South India, the Indian 
Government seems intent on blaming the failure of its peacemaking efforts on Colombo.” 124
By mid-March due to pressure from India, the Sri Lankan government’s own desire to make 
headway on the issue, and the TULF’s own reasons, secret talks had began to take place
121
|22 The Times (London), 4 February 1986, ‘India stops minister's visit to Sri Lanka’.
ethmc^conXa’0" ’ ^  FebrUary ' 986, India 'SSUeS warning t0 Sri Lanka: Demand for political solution to Tamil 
121
The Times (London), 25 March 1986, ‘Tamil exiles ask Gandhi to intervene’. While Sri Lanka Tamils were
S '1!  ^  Indla j°  ™l-tanly intervene, on that very day itself, 28 February, all the Opposition members of
India s Parliament in Delhi again walked-out of the legislature in protest at the Gandhi government’s handling of 
tne an Lankan situation. 6
ethnic^conflict’0” ' ^  FebrUary l986’ 'India issues warning to Sri Lanka: Demand for political solution to Tamil
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between a Sri Lanka government Minister and a representative from the TULF. 
Both knew each other personally and both were Harvard educated lawyers.125 The talks took 
place with the support of the Indian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka. The talks made some 
progress and had touched upon the 3 main issues which divided the two parties: (i) the issue 
of linking the Northern and Eastern Province in a devolved governmental system; (ii) the 
issue of government-assisted land settlement, particularly in the Eastern Province; and (iii) the 
extent to which police powers would be devolved to the proposed Unit.
Sri La«ka Government’s Proposals of 25 April 1986. On 25 April 1986 the Sri
Lanka government came-up with yet another set of proposals. The Indian government
supported this initiative and wanted discussions to begin based on these proposals.126 Behind
the scene, the Indian government too had been involved in drafting the proposals.127 A high
powered Indian government delegation was scheduled to arrive in Colombo towards the end
of April. From Rajiv Gandhi’s perspective his increased pressure on Sri Lanka had resulted in
a significant development. But, Tamil insurgents were hostile to the new Sri Lanka 
government initiative.128
Insurgents Blow up Airliner and Telegraph Office, Colombo. While the new proposals 
were being examined and discussed in Delhi an insurgent group planted a bomb in a bus. 
Fortunately alert passengers informed the police and it exploded in the premises of the police
• 129
station. - By early May 1986 the Indian delegation had arrived in Sri Lanka and negotiations 
had begun. During this period Tamil insurgents carried out two very serious and provocative 
attacks in the Colombo area -  destroying an airliner and killing tourists and exploding an IED 
at a main telegraph office in Colombo.I3U Here we see a recurring thread in the insurrection -
The Times (London), 12 March 1986, ‘Secret talks bring hope of end to Sri Lanka turmoil’. These were
Minister for National Security Mr Lalith Athulathmudali and Dr Neelan Tiruchelvam, an ex-MP of the Tamil
United Liberation Front (TULF). Both went to the same elite Colombo school, Royal College, and both knew
each other well. Ironically both were later killed by the LTTE: Athulathmudali in April 1993 and Tiruchelvam in
July 1999. Incidentally, this Dr. Tiruchelvam is the same individual Dr. Nesiah says came to meet him with 
Professor A.J. Wilson in 1980 (see Chapter-3).
The Guardian, 26 April 1986, ‘Tamil talks backed: India supports Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict peace plan.
The Sunday Times (London), 6 July 1986, ‘Sri Lanka makes new peace push: President Jayewardene proposes 
early election in effort to end Civil War’. In fact during this 1984-1987 period it can be safely stated that there 
was very little of any Sri Lanka government negotiating initiative that was unknown to the Indian government.
Concurrently, the Indian government agents were also continuously monitoring Tamil insurgent groups in Tamil
Nadu.
128
Most Tamil insurgents, especially the LTTE, wanted nothing less than a separate state. If the Sri Lanka 
government came up with proposals which India could throw its weight behind, then the secessionists’ 
calculation was that they would be compelled to accept the proposals.
J30 The Guardian, 26 April 1986, Tamil talks backed: India supports Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict peace plan.
The first, on 3 May, was detonating an IED inside an Air Lanka airliner which killed 21 foreign tourists and 
injured 41 other passengers. Fortuitously the aircraft was still on the ground, otherwise hundreds of passengers 
and the entire crew would have died. See The Island, 4 May 1986, 'Air Lanka explosion kills 21 injures 41'
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i.e. when any new set of proposals appeared on which serious negotiations could
begin, Tamil insurgents carried-out provocative attacks or exploded bombs which in-turn
agitated the Sinhala electorate and compelled the Sri Lanka government to take stronger
security measures and/or harden its negotiating position.131 However, in spite of these attacks
President Jayewardene said on 15 June 1986 that he had further added to his proposals and 
that he would reveal the details at the negotiating table.
Indian officials hope that the clarifications will be enough to sell the peace package to the
TTnZ016 T('md, Umted Llbera,'on Front. Highly placed sources in Delhi say that if the 
y LF. aCAcepts the package, India will get very tough with the militant leaders, who have 
their headquarters in the southern Indian city of Madras. 'We will tell them to lay down their 
arms, or else, said one official [emphases added].132
On 24 June the Indian government gave its official backing to the Sri Lanka government’s
new proposals. This was a major development. The Indian government anticipated that this
would anger the Tamil insurgents who were committed to independent state and that they
would try to block the negotiations. The Indian government warned Tamil insurgents them 
that they would suffer consequences if they did so.
Indian officials, however, have given a warning that Tamil extremists, whose leaders are
based in the southern Indian city of Madras, should not try to block the peace process. 'If they
do,' an official said 'they could be jeopardising the hospitality they enjoy of living freely on 
Indian soil [emphases added]. 33'
President Jayewardene told representatives of 8 Opposition parties at a Conference in 
Colombo on 25 June that Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was pleased with the new 
proposals for devolution. He said that the unit of devolution would be the Provincial Council 
-  i.e. not the District which had been the government’s position till then - with an elected 
chief minister. The port of Trincomalee would be excluded from any Province’s area of
authority. A Political Parties' Conference (PPC) would be held daily from 15 to 18 July for 
the devolution proposals to be studied in detail.134
In spite of India s threats the hard-line segment of the Tamil insurgents’ gave their answer to 
these negotiations just a few hours before the Conference began on 25 June: they killed 16
The second was the explosion of a bomb on 7 May at the Central Telegraph Office (CTO) in Colombo which 
killed 11 and injured 114 persons The Island, 8 May 1986, 'Bomb blasts CTO: I I dead, I 14 hurt'.
For example, this happened just before the 2lul round of Thimpu talks and also happened in April 1987 when a 
massive bomb exploded in Colombo (discussed later in this Chapter).
.The Gordian, 16 June 1986, ‘Jayawardene will explain peace plan: Proposals to end Sri Lankan conflict’, 
mis, incidentally, was an acknowledgement that Tamil insurgents were located on Indian soil.
The Guardian, 25 June 1986, ‘India supports Sri Lankan plan to end Tamil conflict’. But these warnings did
not prevent the Tam" insurgents killing Sinhalese the very next day itself. It is the present author’s assessment
that the Indian intelligence services, Ministry of Defence and Prime Minister’s security division itself seriously
misjudged the threat that hard-line Tamil insurgents (primarily the LTTE) posed to India’s security and to Indian
politicians themselves. In spite of the above type of warning the hard-line insurgents wrecked the Indo-Lanka
Accord, fought the Indian forces in Sri Lanka (the IPKF) and killed 1,155 of them and also, worst of all killed 
Rajiv Gandhi in 1991.
134 The Times (London), 26 June 1986, ’Sri Lankan peace plan backed by Gandhi: Indian Premier reportedly 
approves island s proposal for devolution’. F y
159
civilians and injured 57 people in three separate landmine explosions in the
Northern and Eastern Provinces.1” The purpose of these landmine attacks was to derail the
talks and if possible also to trigger off retaliatory attacks against Tamil civilians by Sinhala 
civilians and Sri Lanka armed forces.
In thesenew proposals the Sri Lanka government had been compelled to, vet again, concede a
bit more on the joining together of the Northern and Eastern Provinces , i.e. the perennial 
‘Unit of Devolution’ issue.
One of the most difficult problems during any negotiations would be the question of linking
the north and the east, but the Government has made a concession in saying that 'suitable
institutionalised arrangements' could be made for the provinces to 'consult with each other and
act in coordination on matters of mutual interest and concern'. Tamil leaders are expected to
seek detailed clarification on this clause, which is seen as some kind of step towards unity 
[emphases added] . 136
But the hard-line Tamil insurgents were opposed to even these improved proposals. There 
was deadlock between them and Sri Lanka government. But President Jayewardene declared 
that he would go ahead with his devolution plan regardless of “the hard-line Tamil groups 
fighting for a separate state.” The Sri Lanka government expected the Indian government to 
persuade the moderate TULF to attend the Conference.138 In early July 1986 President 
Jayewardene concurrently made shrewd overtures to the main Sinhala opposition party, the 
SLFP.130 But the SLFP would not give its support to the President and when the Political 
Parties Conference (PPC) took place it boycotted the Conference.140
The TULF leaders responded positively to the Sri Lanka government’s invitation and arrived 
in Colombo but the insurgent groups did not attend. A bomb was thrown at the hotel in which 
the TULF delegation was scheduled to stay. But the TULF persevered and said that “we hope 
to discuss with the government issues relating to the units of devolution and a suitable linkage
135 The Times (London), 26 June 1986, ‘Sri Lankan peace plan backed by Gandhi: Indian Premier reportedly
approves island's proposal for devolution’. These killings were targeted at derailing the possibility of a 
negotiated solution.
136 The Guardian, 26 June 1986, ‘19 die as Colombo unveils peace plan: Sri Lanka’.
137 The Guardian, 27 June 1986, ‘Sri Lanka to push ahead with Tamil devolution plans’.
The Sunday Times (London), 6 July 1986, ‘Sri Lanka makes new peace push: President Jayewardene proposes 
early election in effort to end Civil War’.
The Sunday Times (London), 6 July 1986, ‘Sri Lanka makes new peace push: President Jayewardene proposes 
early election in effort to end Civil War . Mrs Bandaranaike had been agitating for early elections for many 
years. Jayewardene knew (as did most adult Sinhalese, Tamils and the Indian government) that opposition from 
the Sinhalese majority too could derail any negotiated solution. The President offered to bring forward to 1988 
the parliamentary elections which were scheduled to be held in 1989. In exchange President Jayewardene 
requested SLFP leader Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike to support his devolution proposals.
140 The Times (London), 21 July 1986, ‘Sri Lanka plan for devolution attacked’.
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of the north and east, among other matters”.141 But the Sri Lanka 
government continued to remain apprehensive of the consequences of such a merger:
The Sri Lankan government has so far refused to consider merging the two provinces because 
of fears that they would rapidly become an independent Tamil state. 142
This apprehension of the Sri Lanka government was shared by large numbers of the Sinhala 
electorate as well. Simultaneously, the Indian government kept on pressing the Sri Lankan 
government to give more concessions to the TULF. The then Indian Foreign Minister 
speaking in Madras appealed to President Jayewardene to concede more at the talks. The 
Foreign Minister said that when President Jayewardene had originally sent his draft to India 
he had hinted that he would make more concessions during the negotiations. The Indian 
Foreign said publicly that he hoped that President Jayewardene would “honour his word”.143 
This was indeed very intense pressure on President Jayewardene from India.
During this period Tamil insurgents continued with provocative attacks. They “blew up a bus 
killing 31 and injuring 67, most from the majority Sinhalese community”.144 Such attacks 
were clearly meant to derail the reform process and promote the hardline Tamil insurgents’ 
claim that only a separate state would suffice. “The recent increased violence suggests that 
the guerrillas are intent on wrecking Jayewardene's peace proposals, which are designed to 
devolve some power to the Tamils.” 145
SLFP accuses UNP Government of ‘betraying’ the Sinhalese. Concurrent to the
opposition from the Tamils, the President faced opposition from the SLFP from a directly 
opposite direction -  his Sinhala voters. The SLFP’s claim was that the government was 
conceding too much to Tamil demands and betraying the Sinhalese. The SLFP refused to 
attend the Conference and the Leader of the Opposition at that time, Anura Bandaranaike, 
Mrs Bandaranaike’s son, made a scathing attack on the government and stated that President 
Jayewardene’s proposals were tantamount to “virtually handing a separate state to the 
minority Tamils on a platter” [emphases added].146 This was blatantly untrue but was 
characteristic of the ‘out-bidding’ that both the SLFP and the UNP indulged-in, when in the
j4‘ The Guardian, 12 July 1986, ‘Tamil leaders not deterred by bomb: Talks to end Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict’.
142 The Sunday Times (London), 13 July 1986, Tamils cool to talks: Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict’.
143 The Guardian, 14 July 1986, Tamils reject Colombo deal: Sri Lankan peace talks’.
144 The Sunday Times (London), 27 July 1986, ‘Christ' helps in talks on Tamils: Local film star asked to help end 
Sri Lankan civil war’.
145 The Sunday Times (London), 27 July 1986, ‘Christ' helps in talks on Tamils: Local film star asked to help end 
Sri Lankan civil war’.
’ The Times (London), 21 July 1986, ‘Sri Lanka plan for devolution attacked’. Mr Anura Bandaranaike was the 
Leader of the Opposition at that time.
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Opposition. Anura Bandaranaike stated that the SLFP agreed that a political solution 
was needed but not at any cost”. He said that any solution had to have the support of the 
Sinhala people and the Tamil insurgents.147 This last condition was impossible to attain and 
all Sinhala, Tamil and Indian politicians knew this. During these months Mrs Bandaranaike 
and her son Anura campaigned throughout the Sinhalese Districts saying that the new 
proposals endangered the collective interests of the Sinhala people.148 Here was a 
manifestation of yet another systemic problem in the attempt to implement a 
counterinsurgency campaign in Sri Lanka, namely the main opposition party -  be it the SLFP 
or UNP - undercutting the policies of the party which happened to be in power.
President Jayewardene was acutely aware of the need to maintain the support of at least a 
simple majority of the Sinhala voters if his proposed reforms were to succeed. His desperation 
at this time can be gauged by the fact that he asked one of the most Opposition politicians -  
whom he had arrested and kept in remand custody for some time in 1980 -  to assist him to 
help negotiate a ceasefire with the Tamil insurgents. This politician was Sri Lanka’s most
popular and charismatic male film actor, Vijaya Kumaratunga, who was also the husband of
Mrs.Bandaranaike’s younger daughter, Chandrika.149 But the LTTE confirmed that their 
policy was to disrupt the peace discussions in Colombo and vowed to keep on fighting till 
they won an independent Tamil state.150
On 15 August President Jayewardene and the TULF began talks in Colombo.151 The talks 
made some headway but no conclusive agreement could be reached. The Indian government 
continued to pressurise the Sri Lanka government to concede more to the Tamil demands. It 
advocated the joining together of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, one of the main 
demands of the TULF and all the insurgent groups, and which the Sri Lanka government had 
resisted up to that time. As the talks progressed the Sri Lanka government proposed a 
boundaries commission which could re-draw the boundaries of the Northern and Eastern
147 The Times (London), 21 July 1986, ‘Sri Lanka plan for devolution attacked'.
148 The Times (London), 29 August 1986, ‘Sri Lanka peace talks face hostility from both sides'.
149 The Sunday Times (London), 27 July 1986, ‘Christ1 helps in talks on Tamils: Local film star asked to help end 
Sri Lankan civil war’. This was Vijaya Kumaranatunge (mistakenly and widely referred-to as Kumaratunga) 
who was married to Mrs. Bandaranaike’s younger daughter, Chandrika Bandaranaike. The reason for ‘Christ’ in 
the above article’s title is because he acted as Jesus Christ in a Sinhala film some years previously. Chandrika 
was elected as the Prime Minister and then the President of Sri Lanka in August and November 1994, 
respectively (mentioned in Chapter-5).
The Guardian, 7 August 1986, Tigers’ reject peace process: Tamil guerrilla group confirms it will keep 
fighting for independence in Sri Lanka.
15 The Times (London), 16 August 1986, ‘Tamils in peace talks: Sri Lanka’.
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Provinces. This was a potentially major development which could have resulted 
in a negotiated settlement.
The Indian Government of Mr Rajiv Gandhi has, with the assistance, or at least acquiescence, 
of the Western friends of Sri Lanka, been bringing pressure on the Jayewardene 
Government to improve its offer to the Tamils. The new agreement, hammered out in a series 
of meetings with the more moderate politicians of the Tamil United Liberation Front, is a 
distinct improvement on what has been suggested before [emphases added] . 153
It was vitally important that the insurgent groups, specially the LTTE, became a part of the 
negotiations. At this stage that the Indian government again came directly into the process and 
said that it would organise a meeting in India to which all the Tamil insurgent groups and the 
TULF would be required to attend. By this time Rajiv Gandhi was also meeting Tamil Nadu 
Chief Minister Mr. M.G. Ramachandran (‘MGR’, the Tamil Nadu film-actor turned 
politician) whose tacit consent was obtained.134 This was very significant as Mr. 
Ramachandran was looked-up to as a Tamil leader and had a large support base within the 
global Tamil Diaspora. Over the previous years, especially after July 1983, MGR had also 
given his support and sanctuary to Tamil insurgents in Tamil Nadu, especially the LTTE.155 In 
November 1986 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had persuaded him that the Sri Lanka 
government had been pressurised into making significant concessions and that the next step 
was to get the Tamil insurgent groups to participate in the negotiations.
On 3 November 1986 LTTE threatened that it would declare UDI on 1
January 1987. But on 3 November the LTTE still refused to accept the Indian 
government’s policy. It is possible that the LTTE sensed that the Sri Lanka government was 
prepared to make significant concessions which could lead to a negotiated solution without 
the partition of the island. From the LTTE’s perspective that was not what it wanted; it 
wanted a separate Tamil state. In any event the LTTE released a statement in Madras, Tamil 
Nadu, that it would make a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on 1 January 
1987.156 This threat by the LTTE was acutely embarrassing to the Indian government: the 
threat of UDI was made from Madras, Indian soil. If carried out it effectively meant the end of 
India’s efforts as a negotiator. It was also a public slap in the face of the Indian central 
government. It would also affect India’s credentials in the eyes of the international
152 The Times (London), 6 October 1986, ‘Delhi meeting to seek end of Tamil deadlock: Sri Lankan government 
and insurgents to meet in India to discuss ethnic conflict’.
153 The Times (London), 10 November 1986, ‘Indian state police act to seize 1,000 Tamils and arms in dawn 
raids’.
154 The Times (London), 6 October 1986, ‘Delhi meeting to seek end of Tamil deadlock: Sri Lankan government 
and insurgents to meet in India to discuss ethnic conflict’.
155 Subramanian, Narendra, 1999: 303, Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization: Political Parties, Citizens and 
Democracy in South India.
156 The Times (London), 3 November 1986, ‘Tamil Tigers leader is expected to quit India’.
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community. The LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran was also reported as getting 
prepared to travel back to Sri Lanka because he anticipated being arrested by India and a 
crack-down on all the insurgent groups by the Indian government.158 On 4 November 1986 
the five main Tamil insurgent groups formally met Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Mr. 
Ramachandran ( MGR ) and formally rejected the Sri Lanka government’s proposals.159
Indian Government Arrests (and releases) 3,000 Tamil Insurgents and
Confiscates weapons, November 1986. Rajiv Gandhi was extremely exasperated at 
the insurgents outright rejection of the compromises offered by the Sri Lankan government. 
Mr. Ramachandran too was reported as being annoyed with the insurgents. Several weeks 
later Mr. Gandhi publicly criticised the LTTE for its lack of cooperation.
India, for its part, appears profoundly irritated by the Tamil Tigers' outright rejection of the 
compromise, even as a basis for further discussion. Mr Gandhi himself directly contradicted 
them in public, saying the proposals were good. Even Mr M. G. Ramachandran, Chief 
Minister of the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu, who has been sympathetic to the Sri Lankan 
Tamils, showed signs of impatience [emphases added] .160
In the face of the non-cooperation by the insurgent groups, especially the LTTE, the Indian
central government and Tamil Nadu state governments decided to take resolute punitive
actions to convey the power that the Indian’s had over the Tamil insurgents who were on
Indian soil. On 10 November many hundreds of squads of Tamil Nadu state police carried out
hundreds of raids throughout Tamil Nadu and arrested about 3,000 Tamil insurgents and 100
of their leaders.161 The arrested cadres were identified, photographed and then released. Large
amounts of weapons were also taken into custody but these were not given back. The
weapons included anti-aircraft missiles, assault rifles, rocket-launchers and grenades.162
The leaders of the insurgents were placed under informal house arrest and instructed by police 
to not to leave their residences. Armed police were stationed at their gates.163 LTTE leader 
Prabhakaran, the LTTE’s chief theoretician Anton Balasingham, EROS leader V. Balakumar
157 ,
Because if such a UDI was carried out it would have amounted to an insurgent group, operating from Indian 
territory, trying to officially secede from a neighbouring country. And the Indian central government either 
standing by (and thereby seemingly giving its tacit approval) or being unable impose its will on the insurgent 
group. Both actions did not show India in a good light. In any event the Indian central government was very 
much against a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka.
158 The Times (London), 3 November 1986, ‘Tamil Tigers leader is expected to quit India’.
159 The Times (London), 4 November 1986, ‘World Summary-Tamils say no: Sri Lanka'.
160 The Guardian, 19 November 1986, ‘Sri Lanka delight at Gandhi's deal: Indian Premier's solution to Sri 
Lankan ethnic conflict welcomed’.
161 The Guardian, 10 November 1986, ‘Sri Lanka's rebel leaders held in India’.
162 The Guardian, 10 November 1986, ‘Sri Lanka's rebel leaders held in India’.
163 The Guardian, 10 November 1986, ‘Sri Lanka's rebel leaders held in India’.
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and A. Selvam of TELO were among those under house arrest.164 Balasingham
stated that among arms seized were surface-to-air missiles165 and many heavy weapons
which were awaiting shipment to the shores of Sri Lanka. The long-range 50mm guns fitted to
our boats have been taken”.166 He said that this meant that the LTTE’s capacity to protect
itself at sea was affected. This action of the Indian government was more a show of force by
the Indian government as all those arrested were released. If they were kept under arrest then
that would have been a great help to the Sri Lanka government. In any event the seized 
weapons were not given back to the insurgents.167
During July 1983- July 1987 whether India fully realised the dangers Tamil insurgents posed 
to its own security and to the security o f its political leaders is doubtful m  But the ease with 
which India had allowed such large numbers of heavily armed insurgents to operate from 
Tamil Nadu in the manner in which they did needs to be noted.169 Even this 1986 November’s 
token arrest of 3,000 insurgents and confiscation of weapons was not a serious crack-down. It
The Times (London), 10 November 1986, ‘Indian state police act to seize 1,000 Tamils and arms in dawn 
raids , and The Guardian, 10 November 1986, ‘Sri Lanka's rebel leaders held in India’. EROS was the Eelam 
Revolutionary Organisation of Students and TELO was the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation.
The IISS had mentioned in March 1986 that the LTTE possessed SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles (see The Ceylon
Daily News, 22 March 1986, ‘Militants armed with surface to air missiles, says IISS report’). If the IISS
(International Institute for Strategic Studies, London) knew about the missiles in March 1986, the US and EU
governments and the Indian government too would have known this. The fact that Mr. Balasingham of the LTTE
confirmed this is significant. Mentioning this may have been a mistake on his part as such weapons had not yet
been used against the Sn Lanka Air Force. Publicly confirming this information would have increased the
concern of the USA and EU countries and their air travelling public as there was concern about such weapons 
being used against civilian airliners.
The Times (London), 10 November 1986, ‘Indian state police act to seize 1,000 Tamils and arms in dawn
raids’. (Author’s Note: although Balasingham is reported as mentioning “50mm guns”, it is highly likely that this
is a mistake by either Mr Balasingham or the newspaper reporter. Guns of 50mm calibre are quite large and have
a heavy recoil and can be mounted only on large sized vessels with suitably strong structures to withstand the
recoil when such guns are fired. At that time the LTTE did not have such vessels. The weapons actually taken
into custody were probably 0.50-inch calibre heavy machine guns. Among insurgent cadres and the Sri Lanka
armed forces too (which had such 0.50-inch calibre heavy machine guns) the colloquial way of referring to them
was “five-zero’s”, “five-zero guns” or “fifty calibre guns”. The word ‘fifty’ may have confused either Mr
Balasingham or the reporter. Mr. Balasingham was a middle-aged man in poor health who had never taken part
in any LTTE guerrilla attack. He was completely proficient in English, was a UK citizen and the theoretician and 
spokesman of the LTTE.)
1 7 This action had an aspect which is relevant to India’s own ‘state security’. Over the years the identity and
whereabouts of Tamil insurgents would have been kept under close surveillance by India’s different police
organisations -  both central government police and Tamil Nadu state police -  and also India’s intelligence
organisations, the most well known being RAW (Research and Analysis Wing). Over the years there have been
numerous Indian newspaper reports on this. As was known at that time -  and admitted by India in the text of the
Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987 -  Tamil insurgents had been given military training on Indian soil for many years.
Records of the insurgents would have been kept by the Indian government agencies which were involved in 
these activities.
168 After the complicated exit of the IPKF from Sri Lanka in 1990 and the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 
there was a complete change in the Indian central government’s policy to the Tamil insurgency. It adopted a 
strict ‘hands o f f  approach to the Tamil insurgency. But by that time significant damage had been done to the 
Indian national interest in the sense that India’s Congress party’s leader -  and grandson of Jawaharlal Nehru -  
had been assassinated by the LTTE, and damage done to India’s international image.
It needs to be noted that India did this while simultaneously complaining at numerous international meetings 
and Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press briefings, that Pakistan was assisting Islamic insurgents in Kashmir.
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was a ploy to pressurise Tamil insurgents, especially the LTTE, to fall in-line with 
Rajiv Gandhi’s policies.
Initial (false) signals by the LTTE that it was ready to cooperate. From 10
November onwards Indian officials maintained pressure on the Tamil insurgents to participate 
in the negotiations. On 16 November 1986 the summit meeting of the South Asian 
Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) began in Bangalore, India. On the side-lines
of the Conference President Jayewardene and Prime Minister Gandhi met separately for talks 
on the Tamil insurgency and Sri Lanka’s new proposals:
Mr Gandhi played a subtle game of carrot and stick at Bangalore. To balance the crackdown, 
he sent an Indian airforce plane to fly three top leaders of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam [to Bangalore] for consultations during the talks. This virtually gave them the 
recognition they craved as the chief spokesmen for Sri Lanka's Tamils [emphases added] . 170
During the discussions the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, ‘MGR’ also joined Gandhi and 
Jayewardene and brought the information that the LTTE had agreed to participate in the 
negotiations if some kind of linkage between the Northern and Eastern Provinces was 
granted.171 The concept put forward by President Jayewardene was that the boundaries of the 
Eastern Province could be re-demarcated and the those areas with Tamil majority population 
(i.e. Batticaloa District) be linked to the Northern Province but the Districts with significant 
Sinhala and Muslim populations (i.e. Trincomalee and Ampara) be treated separately.
But the November 1986 Bangalore negotiations failed. Although the LTTE stated 172 that it 
would abandon its demand for an independent state, it insisted on the merger of the Northern 
and Eastern Provinces.173 But for President Jayewardene and the Sri Lanka government team 
this was not an option due to concerns about future secession, possible encroachments by 
India into Sri Lanka and also the opposition from the majority of the Sinhala electorate.
170 The Guardian, 22 November 1986, ‘Tamils stand firm against push for peace: New efforts to end Sri Lanka's 
ethnic violence'. Mr Gandhi had the enormous resources of the Indian state at his disposal. Sending an aircraft to 
ferry LTTE leader Prabhakaran was an expression of the power of the Office he held and he may have thought 
that he had impressed the LTTE leader.. But it is doubtful that Gandhi had a correct assessment of Prabhakaran. 
Less than a year later, 10 October 1987 onwards, the LTTE and the IPKF were locked in battles in Sri Lanka’s 
North and East. Eventually the IPKF suffered 1000+ killed and 3000+ wounded in action. And, in May 1991, 
4 '/2 years after this meeting in Bangalore Gandhi himself was assassinated by an LTTE female suicide bomber 
This assassination itself must have needed at least one year’s preparation.
|7' The Times (London), 17 November 1986, ‘Step nearer to ending Sri Lanka dispute as Tamils join talks’.
1 The LTTE’s statement in Bangalore was violated by it in the years ahead. It fought for a separate state with
the Indian armed forces during 1987-1990 and with the Sri Lanka government up to 1994 (the end date of this
Thesis). And it continued with its effort from 1995 to May 2009 (this period falls outside the perimeters of this 
Thesis).
173 The Guardian, 22 November 1986, ‘Tamils stand firm against push for peace: New efforts to end Sri Lanka's 
ethnic violence’.
166
[...] a merger [of the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka], even as 
part of Sn Lanka, is unthinkable to the great majority of Sinhalese. It is still seen as the thin 
end oj the wedge of Tamil separatism and, eventually, domination by India. Despite his 
large majority in Parliament and his personal popularity, Mr Jayawardene could not have sold 
it to his own community, even if he had wanted to [emphases added] . 174
Military Processes, 1986
By 1986 the insurrection further increased in intensity when compared to 1985. There were
attacks on army camps and police stations in every month of the year.175 This illustrated the
insurgent’s capacity for sustaining such guerrilla attacks on a continuous basis. By 1986 the
Tamil insurgents had become tactically very skilful in the use of command detonated IEDs and
landmines. These attacks were often combined with attacks on the survivors with small arms and
grenades. The tactical mobility and operations of police and army patrols were severely affected 
by these attacks.176
A close analysis of above insurgent tactics enables the deduction of Tamil insurgent strategy.
First, in 1985-1986 police stations were consistently attacked. Priority was given to the police
stations in Jaffna Peninsula. After the government was compelled to withdraw these police
stations the insurgents turned their attention on the smaller army camps. These, in turn, had to be
abandoned. And by April 1986 the Jaffna Peninsula was almost totally controlled by the Tamil 
insurgents.
The Jaffna peninsula is almost totally controlled by the militants, who mingle freely with the
local population. Many were bom and brought up in the neighbourhood. They walk around
openly carrying sub-machineguns, collect taxes, and even direct the traffic. The troops,
unable to operate in such a hostile environment, are largely confined to barracks. Outside
barracks, they travel in heavily armoured convoys and are vulnerable to sniper and landmine 
attacks [emphases added] . 177
h is these military victories on the ground, in the North and East which contributed to the 
hardline Tamil insurgents' determination to oppose both the Sri Lanka government and the 
Indian government, and not agree to a negotiated settlement.
174 The Guardian, 22 November 1986, ‘Tamils stand firm against push for peace: New efforts to end Sri Lanka's 
ethnic violence’.
175 See Annexure 4.1, Table 4F: Insurgents Attacks against Police, Army, Navy and Air Force Camps Stations & 
Establishments, 1986.
176 See Annexure 4.1, Table 4G: Insurgents Landmine Attacks, 1986.
177 The Guardian, 1 April 1986, ‘Colombo fears rebel offensive: Tamil separatists prepare attack against Sri 
Lankan troops’.
Militarily, the government forces were largely
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on a defensive posture. One government
army
personnel (see Maps 4.1 and 4.2). Patrols would radiate outwards from these camps, searching 
for insurgents. Initially these patrols were on foot, and then later, in areas such as the Jaffna 
Peninsula these patrols were in armoured vehicles. The army did not have a large number of
armoured veh 
was available.
Very little detailed information is available in the public realm about military operations during
army
officers reveals that the vast majority of the operations were platoon or company sized patrols or 
jungle bashing treks into the forest in search of insurgents. Sometimes insurgents were located 
and fire fights occurred between the two groups. Sometimes the army and police patrols were 
ambushed by insurgents. In vast majority of cases there was no contact with insurgents.
4.1: Military and Police Camps, Northern Province plus Trincomalee District, circa
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(Source: Map in 'Militarstiitzpunkie in Sri Lanka\  SUdasien-Info, Vol.7, Nr.3-4/87, published by Sudasienburo 
Bonn, Germany. Redrawn by author using GIS software.)
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Maps 4.1 and 4.2 (see above and below) are based on a very rare map which appeared in
Sudasien-Info, a little known Journal of a German Non Governmental Organisation named 
Siidasienburo.
Map 4.2: Military & Police Camps, Eastern Province minus Trincomalee District, circa 
1986
\ 31
US
Kathir&veli
V akarai 
Mankeni 
Punanai
V akanen
V ad aim  iia 
Kalkudhah
V alaichchenai 
Kumbu mrmilai
M oroc cod anc hena i
Eravur
Karadiyanaiu
Urani
Putur
Batticaloa
V avunathivu 
Kallady 
Pulhimalai 
Malia Oya 
36th Colony
V ellaveli 
Kalavanchikudi 
Chavalkudai 
Uliana (Police)
C e ntral C amp 
Kalmunai
S amanturai
t'ii
114
w
\
as
r— t
\
108 Kondavattavan
109 Dam an a
110 Digavapi
111 Akkaraipattu (Police)
112 Akkaraipattu
113 Neethai
114 Timkkovil
115 S an gam ankandy
116 Koman
117 N evngala
118 Pottavil
123 Tnkonamadu
124 Roodaw ava
125 S ing apu ra
126 Minneriya
127 Karadkolam
128 Polonnamwa
129 W elikanda
I oa
)
\ )
?
7
(
l
f— •
33
39
9 1
9?
94
/ \  l
ID A
103
107
i
/
M i
11 s11
m 3
Map in ‘Militarstiitzpunkte in Sri Lanka , Sudasien-Info, Vol.7, Nr.3-4/87, published by Siidasienburo,
had tNo similar maps were allowed to be published in Sri Lankan newspapers. This map 
prepared by a German journalist who travelled extensively in the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces in 1984-1985. These two maps pertain to all army, navy, air force and police 
establishments in the North and East that he was able to locate. While these maps pertain to 
1986, by that time many of these camps and police stations may have been closed down and may 
not have been in existence. It was precisely this wide network of police stations and army camps 
that the Tamil guerrillas attacked and consequently compelled the government to shrink its area 
of control. In spite of these (possible) inaccuracies these maps are useful for us to obtain an 
overview of government strategy at that time.
As insurgent attacks on police stations and military camps, ambushes, and landmine
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attacks became numerous, the government went from one crisis to another. Troops tended to 
attack Tamil civilians who happened to live or work in the vicinity of an ambush. Provoking 
excesses by government forces is a time-tested principle in protracted guerrilla warfare. This was 
well understood by Tamil guerrillas who put their knowledge to deadly use.
The government merely carried out standard ‘search and destroy' military operations intended to 
destroy as many insurgents as they could -  i.e. the destruction of subversives. But, there was no 
programme by the government to counter-act the processes of subversion that were underway 
conducted by Tamil insurgent groups within the Tamil people.
4.4: Year-1987
By late-1986 and early-1987 it was very clear that the military situation in Jaffna Peninsula and
large parts of the Vanni had turned against the army. The army was corralled within their camps 
and could move out only in very strong columns with armoured cars. Obviously, in such a 
situation there could be no normal contact with the civilian population. The insurgent tactics had
succeeded in separating the government from the Tamil people, the exact opposite o f  what 
should have happened in a successful counterinsurgency.'78 Army camps were the targets as 
all the police stations had ceased to exist by this time.179 The attacks stopped in mid-July 1987 
because of the ceasefire which came into effect with the signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord on 29
July 1987. During early 1987 the insurgent’s IED and landmine attacks were as proficient as
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ever. They too ceased consequent to the arrival of the Indians.181
In the first half of 1987 the insurrection continued unabated. The Tamil insurgents -  specially 
the LTTE -  were unyielding on the demand that they wanted the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces combined together and would not accept any other proposal put forward by the Sri
Lanka government. The Indian government kept on lobbying with the LTTE and the Sri 
Lanka government but no compromise could be reached.
178 See Chapter.6, Consolidated Conclusions.
179 See Annexure 4.1, Table 4H: Insurgents Attacks on Army Camps, 1987.
180 See Annexure 4.1, Table 41: Insurgents Landmine Attacks, 1987.
181 Landmine and IED attacks began again in October 1987 with one attack in Vakarai (Batticaloa District) and 
Kumpurupiddi (Trincomalee District). These two attacks were against Sri Lankan armed forces. By this time the 
LTTE had begun to re-ignite the insurrection and the ceasefire negotiated was falling apart. By early October the 
LTTE had begun to attack and kill large numbers of Sinhala civilians in the East and also attack Sri Lanka 
forces. The Indian government tried to re-establish the ceasefire but failed. On the orders of the Indian government 
the IPKF began full-scale military operations against the LTTE on 10 October 1987.
There is a great deal of circumstantial evidence that this demand was a strategic gambit on the LTTE’s part 
and that it remained committed to a separate state and nothing less. This can be inferred by the fact that under 
the provisions of the Indo-Lanka Accord (signed on 29 July 1987) and the 13th Amendment to Sri Lanka’s
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IED Explosion in Colombo's main bus terminal, 21 April 1987 - the “Game
Changer”  During the evening rush hour of 21 April 1987 a large IED exploded in the
vicinity of Colombo’s main bus terminus in the Pettah area of the City. The explosion took 
place when thousands of office workers, students and self-employed workers were milling 
about in the area. All the victims were civilians - officially 113 were killed and 282 injured. 
This IED explosion can be identified as a ‘Game Changer’ as it resulted in the Sri Lanka 
government taking decisions which inadvertently precipitated direct intervention by India.183 
One initial report stated that at least 100 people had been killed, scores injured, 15 passenger 
vehicles and taxis and 20 shops destroyed.184 Another gave graphic eyewitness details:
“Seven light, privately owned buses and three heavy Transport Board single-deckers, all of 
which were either full or being boarded by home-going workers, were virtually destroyed in 
the blast. \...]The bodies o f the dead lay in bloody heaps among the glass and twisted metal 
o f the ruined buses. [...]More than 200 injured were treated at the Colombo General Hospital 
which eventually had to close its doors to further admissions. Jayewardenapura Hospital, a 
few miles away, also treated more than 200 casualties. First estimates by the authorities were 
that more than a hundred people had been killed. But at the hospitals they soon stopped 
counting the dead. The mortuary quickly overflowed and dead bodies, men and women, were 
casually heaped in a garage and covered with straw mats [...] Scenes at the hospital were like
something out o f a nineteenth-century war. Patients dripping blood were rushed along 
hospital corridors, often two to a trolley [emphases added].”185
The casualty details known at that time were formally presented to Parliament on 23 April as
106 dead, 282 wounded of whom 212 were still in hospital.186 Eventually the number of dead 
came to 113.187
The statistics, though horrific, do not hint at the suffering glimpsed by foreign 
correspondents yesterday during a tour laid on by the National Security Ministry. At the 
Colombo General Hospital, scarred and disabled victims still lie moaning in a ward which, 
doctors said, was awash with blood on Tuesday night. Immediately outside there is a tin- 
roofed car shed where 38 bodies and bits of bodies were stacked that night. Around the comer, 
the city morgue is even more horrific, with scores o f relatives patiently waiting to identify 
and claim the charred and mutilated corpses [emphases added].188
Constitution (Certified on 14 November 1987) the Northern and Eastern Provinces were combined together. But 
the LTTE was still not satisfied and recommenced the insurrection -  in this case fighting the IPKF -  from 
October 1987 onwards. This is a very important issue and we will return to it later in this Chapter.
In retaliation to this IED, the Sri Lanka Government launched a large conventional-type military operation in 
Jaffna Peninsula in May 1987, codenamed Operation Liberation. This Operation was strongly condemned by 
Tamil Nadu politicians who claimed that thousands of Tamil civilians were dying. Rajiv Gandhi too made 
excessive and totally inaccurate claims that ‘carpet bombing’ was taking place in Jaffna and called for the 
military operation to be stopped. The government of Sri Lanka eventually stopped the Operation but by that time 
the Indian government had set in motion a series of actions (described below) which eventually resulted in the 
Indo-Lanka Accord being signed on 29 July 1987 and Indian military forces arriving in Sri Lanka .
Ig5 The Island' 22 April 1987, * 15 vehicles mangled: 20 shops gutted: Thousands flee carnage’.
The Times (London), 22 April 1987, Sri Lanka's violent divisions explode in the heart of Colombo- Over 100
die in massacre at bus station’.186
lg7 The Guardian, 24 April 1987, ‘Sri Lanka waits in fear as government promises revenge’.
The Guardian, 30 April 1987, ‘Sri Lanka steps up the war of words’.
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The Guardian, 24 April 1987, ‘Sri Lanka waits in fear as government promises revenge’.
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This bomb explosion generated a great deal of anger amongst the thousands of Sinhala people 
gathered in the area and throughout the country. The government quickly activated a pre-
planned police and armed forces’ internal security operation which had been designed 
specifically to deal with possible unrest and rioting in Colombo. Criminals were rounded up 
and vehicle and population control security check points were activated throughout 
Colombo.189 A curfew was declared and police and army patrolled the streets of the City and 
no rioting was allowed to occur.190 The lessons of the July 1983 riots had been learnt by the 
government, police and army and no disorder was allowed to occur. The 21-hour curfew was 
relaxed only between 5am to 9am to allow citizens to purchase essential daily provisions.191 
The Opposition s leader Mrs Sirima Bandaranaike (a former prime minister, 1960-65 and
1970-77) immediately tightened political pressure on President Jayewardene and stated that 
the “government was failing to protect the Sinhalese people through lack of vigilance and
care. 99 192
The deaths and destruction of the bomb created strong political pressures on the government
to act very harshly against the Tamil insurgents: “The Government is under heavy pressure
from the Sinhalese majority to retaliate without mercy for the Colombo bomb massacre on
Tuesday.”193 Soon after the explosion the government ordered the Sri Lanka Air Force
(SLAF) to attack identified Tamil insurgent camps in Jaffna. The SLAF had six Siai-
Marchetti, single piston engined aircraft, which were normally used as advanced trainers but
could also be fitted with unguided rockets. And also a total of 17 Bell 212 and 412
helicopters.1M The attacks by these aircraft were largely symbolic as they were the only way
the government could immediately strike at Tamil insurgent targets in Jaffna, and announce to
the Sinhala people that this was being done. The political pressures on the government were
succinctly expressed by a Sri Lankan diplomat:
Sri Lanka diplomats bluntly dismissed an immediate possibility of peace moves. ‘My personal 
feeling is that our Government will have to go on an all-out offensive or else there will be 
tremendous problems’ one said. The Sri Lankan opposition, led by Mrs Bandaranaike and
Buddhist clergy, would be looking for signs of weakness or compromise, as would the 
Sinhalese majority, he said.195
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The Island, 22 April 1987, ‘Operation Thunderbolt’. This was a pre-planned operation for internal security 
and maintaining Law & Order in Colombo City, code-named ‘Thunderbolt’.
The Guardian, 22 April 1987, ‘Colombo bus station bomb claims 150: Government blames Tamils for rush- 
hour blast’. The Guardian's correspondent too was in the area and filed a harrowing and detailed account.
The Guardian, 24 April 1987, ‘Sri Lanka waits in fear as government promises revenge’.
192 The Guardian, 22 April 1987, ‘Colombo bus station bomb claims 150: Government blames Tamils for rush- 
hour blast’.
193
The Guardian, 24 April 1987, ‘Sri Lanka waits in fear as government promises revenge’.
4 The Times (London), 1 June 1987, ‘Slow struggle on Jaffna peninsula’.
The Guardian, 22 April 1987, ‘Colombo bomb blasts peace moves’.
It was also assessed that the IED blast would impact negatively on India’s
attempt to find a negotiated settlement. 196 And the events of the succeeding months proved
this to be correct. This bomb explosion illustrated many aspects of the actual difficulties of
implementing counterinsurgency: it illustrated (a) the ‘utility’ of terrorist acts by quite small
numbers of insurgents, at crucial junctures, to derail or prevent the possibility of any political
reforms, (b) the impact that relatively small insurgent organisations can have on large
organisations such as the Indian government and the Sri Lanka government; (c) the ability for
insurgents to derail implicitly IDAD type counterinsurgency processes -  which was what the
Indian and Sri Lanka governments were trying to do -  with very little cost in personnel or 
weaponry.
The Sri Lanka Government decides to take very strong Action against the
Insurgents, late-April 1987. The UNP’s parliamentary group met in parliament on 23
April and passed a unanimous resolution which “urged the security forces to continue 'without 
interruption’ the annihilation of terrorism and terrorists.”197 The government declared that the 
complete destruction of all terrorists camps in the North was its objective. The naive rhetoric 
used by the UNP parliamentarians was impolitic, extreme and detrimental to Sri Lanka’s 
strategic interests. One MP drew a comparison with the ending of the war with Japan and the 
role played by dropping atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. “We shall have to take a 
lot o f  decisions that will not be helpful to civilians. Jaffna might become a Hiroshima 
[emphasis added].”198 This was a deliberate reference to the dropping of bombs by aircraft 
and that many Tamil civilians would face death in the near future. This type o f rhetoric was 
completely detrimental to the Sri Lanka government's and the Sinhala peoples' image in 
Tamil Nadu and in Delhi. It is unlikely that President Jayewardene or any of his senior 
colleagues authorised these types of statements. But nevertheless he did not disassociate his 
government from these backbench MP’s rhetoric.199 Although these statements were mainly 
aimed at assuaging Sinhala voters, the Tamil Nadu and the Delhi press picked up these stories 
and gave them wide publicity in India. This in-turn generated political pressures on Rajiv 
Gandhi to adopt very hard policies towards Sri Lanka (as the Sri Lanka government was
l% The Guardian, 22 April 1987, ‘Colombo bomb blasts peace moves’. This was to prove a correct assessment.
197 The Times (London), 24 April 1987, ‘Colombo pledge to crush Tamil rebels’.
198 The Times (London), 24 April 1987, ‘Colombo pledge to crush Tamil rebels’.
199 The point that needs to be flagged here is that the Sri Lanka government and State was (and still is) a 
relatively unsophisticated moderately competent system, and cannot be compared with most European states and 
the USA. It was (and still is) deficient in institutions and personnel to ‘manage’ information and also strategic 
decision making. It is entirely possible that nobody in his Staff brought such impolitic statements to The 
President’s attention. The period after the IED explosion was probably full of NSC (National Security Council) 
meetings where the details of the imminent large military operation into Jaffna were being finalised. And 
numerous other matters that the President had to monitor such as the possibility of Sinhala riots against Tamils, 
what to do about the large number of the dead, trying to garner international support for Sri Lanka and such like/
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forced to leain in 3 months time). Later Rajiv Gandhi made totally inaccurate
claims of ‘carpet bombing’ by the Sri Lanka Air Force, knowing full-well that the Sri Lanka
Air Force had only 5 or 6 single engined two seat trainers which could carry a few puny 
bombs.200
There was a lack of understanding amongst the ordinary UNP Members of Parliament (MPs) 
of the regional military power dynamics in South Asia. One was reported as saying that 
There was a time when we did not attack Jaffna because we did not have the strength and the 
sophisticated weapons.”-01 While it was correct that the Sri Lankan armed forces had 
increased in personnel and had been able to obtain some new artillery weapons and such like, 
the possibility of the Indian armed forces entering the arena on the side of the secessionists 
and the ease with which India could partition Sri Lanka does not seem to have been 
understood by these MPs. Even more serious than the average UNP MP’s lack of 
understanding was that President Jayewardene, Prime Minister Premadasa and senior 
Ministers such as Harvard Educated Lalith Athulathmudali the Minister for National Security 
the misjudged the possible repercussions from India, against Sri Lanka’s hash new policies.
On 28 April President Jayewardene increased by several magnitude the inter-state rhetorical 
criticisms between Sri Lanka and India. Jayewardene harshly criticised Tamil Nadu 
politicians and Indian intelligence services for aiding Tamil insurgents. He especially singled 
out Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran by name. Jayewardene carefully 
sidestepped criticising Rajiv Gandhi. This could have been with the possible intention of 
differentiating between Tamil Nadu politics and the Indian central government’s policies and 
wanting to keep the Sri Lanka government’s communication links with the Indian central 
government as firm as possible, while concurrently criticising Tamil Nadu.
[President Jayewardene] described the main terrorist group, the Tamil Tigers, as the ‘private 
army’ o f Mr M. G. Ramachandran, the Chief Minister o f the south Indian state o f Tamil 
Nadu. 7  am saying that deliberately, knowing you will publish it, knowing India will see it 
knowing the world will see it. I will go into the box to defend you if you are charged,' he told 
foreign journalists [in Colombo], The 81-year-old President spoke bitterly about the role of 
India in arming and encouraging the Tamil rebels, whose campaign for a separate 
homeland in the north and east o f the island has cost more than 5,000 lives in four years 
He absolved his friend, the Indian Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, but accused intelligence
200
The Guardian, 30 May 1987, ‘Tamils 'lose control of supply route in Jaffna': Government says it has retaken 
north-east of rebel peninsula . These Siai-Marchettis’ were in the same category as the Bristol ‘Bulldog’ basic 
trainer used by the RAF (Royal Air Force) in the past. Gandhi was a former airline pilot. He had to have been 
briefed by Indian intelligence about the Sri Lanka Air Force. In all probability there was probably nothing 
significant that India did not know about the Order of Battle of all of Sri Lanka’s 3 armed forces and police 
The Times (London), 24 April 1987, ‘Colombo pledge to crush Tamil rebels.’
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services in New Delhi, as well as politicians in Tamil Nadu, of abetting the 
terrorists [emphases added].
In any event. President Jayewardene said, that there would be no further negotiations with the
Tamil insurgents until their armed actions ceased and the Indian government guaranteed that 
the insurgents would negotiate without preconditions.203
In late April 1987, the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister acted with further disregard to Sri Lanka’s 
wishes. He decided to give the Tamil people of Sri Lanka the equivalent of US $ 3.2 million 
‘humanitarian aid’.' The Sri Lanka government objected vehemently to this act and said 
that the planned food and medical aid was not needed. It was an interference in the internal 
affairs o f  a sovereign state [emphases added].” The Sri Lanka government stated that it was 
not humanitarian and because it was selective, and therefore a racist act.205 The allegation of 
the violation of the Sri Lankan State s sovereignty by Tamil Nadu is significant as it flagged 
the entry into the discourse of the possibility of future such acts -  either by Tamil Nadu or the 
Indian Central Government - which would violate Sri Lanka’s sovereignty. A few days later 
the Sri Lanka government revealed that it had information that the Tamil Nadu government 
had given back to the Tamil insurgents the communications equipment, arms, and 
ammunition which had been impounded by the Tamil Nadu police in November 1986.206
The Tamil Nadu Chief Minister continued to make provocative statements in support of the 
Tamil insurgents^ Strictly speaking these fell within the ambit of India’s foreign policy and 
were the prerogative of the Central government in Delhi. But the Central government in Delhi 
was compelled to ignore these as the support of Mr. Ramachandran’s party was needed to 
maintain the stability of the coalition government in Delhi. Prime Minister Gandhi -  like the
Prime Ministers before and after him - was dependent on the support of regional politicians 
like the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister.208
202 The Guardian, 29 April 1987, ‘Indian help for Tigers savaged: Terror group 'the private army' of Tamil Nadu 
chief minister’.
203 The Guardian, 29 April 1987, ‘Indian help for Tigers savaged: Terror group 'the private army' of Tamil Nadu 
chief minister’.
204 The Guardian, 30 April 1987, ‘Sri Lanka steps up the war of words’.
205 The Guardian, 30 April 1987, ‘Sri Lanka steps up the war of words’.
206 The Guardian, 5 May 1987, ‘Tamil links feud grows as Colombo hits out at India’.
207 The Guardian, 5 May 1987, ‘Tamil links feud grows as Colombo hits out at India’.
208 The Guardian, 5 May 1987, ‘Tamil links feud grows as Colombo hits out at India’. It is useful to Hag here, 
yet again, this systemic weakness of any Prime Minister of India. This political fact impacted on Sri Lanka 
government and complicated its ability to develop and implement any counterinsurgency campaign. This is an 
instance of the specific difficulties faced by the Sri Lankan government in coping with the Tamil insurrection 
and where standard counterinsurgency doctrine has to be supplemented with ‘context specific’ policies.
Sri Lanka Government makes preparations for a large scale
Military Operation in Jaffna Peninsula. By mid-May 1987 the Sri Lanka government 
was in the midst of building-up troops and stocks of arms, ammunition, armoured cars and 
other supplies for a large-scale military operation in Jaffna Peninsula. The international media 
picked up the signs of large movements of weapons and troops to the peninsula.209 Sri Lanka 
Air Force helicopters were dropped leaflets for civilians to move away from the vicinity of 
insurgent bases and camps.210 Undoubtedly the Indian government too would have been 
aware of these preparations. From 21 May 1987 onwards the army made probing attacks from 
its bases in Palali, Jaffna Fort and other locations. Many Tamil sources reported to the media 
that the offensive had begun. But, as subsequent events revealed this was not the case. 
These actions by the army were small forays which probed the strength of the insurgents’ 
defences which surrounded the army’s bases in the peninsula. In the meantime the armed 
forces kept on building up its personnel, weapons and ammunition stocks in Jaffna
For more than a week, heavy reinforcements of men and material have been shipped up to
Jaffna from the south. No official comment has been made on reports o f an additional 2,000
men, bringing the total in the peninsula to 6,000. At least three ships, heavily laden with
armoured vehicles, arms and ammunition, have been unloading in the port of Kankesanturai 
on the peninsula's northern coast.212
Sri Lanka Government launches Conventional Type Military Operation in
Jaffna, 26 May 1987 (The Inadvertent Catalyst for direct Indian 
intervention).
On 26 May 1987 army commandos were landed by Sri Lanka Navy crafts on the beach at 
Vadamarachchi on the North-Eastern topmost coastline of Jaffna Peninsula.213 This was the 
beginning of Operation Liberation, the code-name given by the Sri Lanka government to this
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large scale operation. ’ The government’s radio station SLBC announced that civilians had 
been given 2-hours to move to designated Hindu Kovils, Churches and schools identified by
215 o
name. Subsequent to this a 48-hour curfew came into effect.216 Helicopters were used to 
drop leaflets with the same information.217
209The Guardian, 22 May 1987, Tamil civilians bear brunt of pounding’.
'° The Guardian, 18 May 1987, ‘Colombo may be poised to strike at Jaffna Tamils: India concerned about 
heavy shipments of arms and troops’.
211 The Times (London), 21 May 1987, ‘Tamils say offensive has begun’.
The Guardian, 22 May 1987, ‘Tamil civilians bear brunt of pounding’.
213 Sri Lanka Navy, 2013:37, Sri Lanka Navy: Diamond of the Silent Blue.” Steering True 1950 to 2010”.
4 This Operation was launched into the Vadamarachchi area of Jaffna peninsula. Hence it is colloquially known 
as the ‘Vadamarachchi Operation’ in Sri Lanka, in both the English and Sinhala press.
Ceylon Daily News, 27 May 1987, ‘Operation Liberation’ to restore law and order underway: Curfew in 
Jaffna, troops move in’. SLBC -  Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation.
216 The Times (London), 27 May 1987, ‘Battle begins for Tamil stronghold’.
Ceylon Daily News, 27 May 1987, ‘Operation Liberation’ to restore law and order underway: Curfew in
Jaffna, troops move in’. Sun, 27 May 1987, ’48 hour curfew in Jaffna: Govt, launches military offensive in 
Jaffna’.
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The army used 3 Brigades for this Operation. One Brigade was used in a defensive role to
hold on to the existing camps and bases in the Peninsula while the other two were used in an
offensive role. Two brigades moved eastwards from Palali base towards Point Pedro.
Troops from other camps in the Peninsula moved out of their camps and fought with the
insurgents around these locations.219 These were diversionary moves to occupy the attention 
of the insurgents.220
Ittdmn Central Government Uses very high Diplomatic Pressure and Calls for
a Stop to Operation Liberation. On 27 May the Indian Central government released a 
statement which strongly criticised the military offensive in Jaffna Peninsula.
The massive assault launched by the Sri Lankan security forces against the entire civilian 
population o f  Ja ffna , in spite of earlier official announcements that Sri Lanka will continue 
actively to pursue the part of negotiation, signifies the increasing influence o f external elements 
inim ical to security, stability and peace in the region [emphases added] .221
The Operation was not against the ‘entire civilian population of Jaffna’ as Rajiv Gandhi said.
Foreign correspondents who later visited the Jaffna testified to this.222 The Indian government
also alleged the entry of external forces’ into the conflict.223 Furthermore, in this statement
the Indian government also introduced the “security, stability and peace in the region” into
the diplomatic contest of words which had now begun between the Sri Lankan and Indian
governments. As the predominant regional power’ of South Asia, ‘peace of the entire South
Asian region’ was a ‘responsibility’ which the Indian central government had appropriated for 
itself.224
218
219 Sri Lanka Army, 1999: 398, Sri Lanka Army: 50 Years On, 1949-1999.
220 Sun■ 27 May l987’ ’48 hour curfew in Jaffna: Govt, launches military offensive in Jaffna’.
The Times (London), 29 May 1987, ‘Counter-claims confuse pattern of Sri Lankan advance against Tamils’ 
This is confirmed by the army’s official history published in 1999. See Sri Lanka Army, 1999: 398, Sri Lanka 
Army: 50 Years On, 1949-1999. By 29 May the army’s pattern of movements was becoming clear The two 
Brigade columns were moving eastwards from Palali Base towards Valvedditturai. The aim being to box the 
insurgents in the North-East corner of the Peninsula. Other columns moved northwards from Elephant Pass Base
and also from the army camp in the Jaffna Fort which was on the western border of Jaffna City. These were 
diversionary moves to occupy the attention of the insurgents in those areas.
221
J22 The Times (London). 28 May 1987, 'Government denies 100 civilians died in air raids on Tamil positions'
223 The Times (London)’ 1 June 1987, ‘Slow struggle on Jaffna peninsula’.
3 The allegation of the entry of ‘external elements’ in to the Sri Lankan conflict was not explained by the Indian
government. Did it mean the USA? Or Pakistan? In any event here again was revealed a difficulty of
implementing a COIN campaign in an actual context such as which the Sri Lanka government faced in 1987
when compared with a theoretical COIN approach. The theoretical concepts and approaches of COIN have their
merits -  they are the basic template on which a counterinsurgency campaign can / should be built -  but specific
governments find themselves caught within a ‘lattice’ of specific internal and external political circumstances
many of which are completely out of their control. This impacts on the ability to implement a counterinsurgency 
campaign. h y
4 Incidentally, while India was giving sanctuary and support to Tamil insurgents, at the same time it was loudly
complaining about Pakistan sponsored cross-border Muslim militant attacks in Kashmir. Such are the policies 
that States sometimes implement.
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The very next day, 28 May 1987, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi himself raised the criticism of 
Sri Lanka’s policy to an unprecedented level when he said
The cold-blooded slaughter o f  thousands of Sri Lankan citizens by their own government 
cannot promote a solution [emphases added].225
Rajiv Gandhi went on further to say that by the “merciless bombing of a defenceless people” 
Si i Lanka was placing its own territorial integrity and unity in danger. This was clearly an 
oblique threat of direct Indian intervention. Significantly, it was reported that this statement 
was made soon after Rajiv Gandhi met Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran.226
After Prime Minister Gandhi’s statement the Sri Lanka government immediately contested
these claims and said that these were based entirely on propaganda. Then the government very
quickly organised a visit to Jaffna by a group of foreign correspondents, diplomats and 
foreign military attaches.
The visit to the northern battle front was arranged by the Sri Lankan armed forces to 
demonstrate to a group of diplomats, foreign military attaches and journalists the falseness of 
the claim by Mr Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, that thousands of innocent Tamil 
civilians had died as a result of ‘carpet-bombing’ attacks by the Air Force. The Indian military 
attache declined the invitation, being unwilling to be a party to a ‘propaganda operation’.227
The foreign correspondents clearly stated that there was no evidence of ‘carpet bombing’. 
One wrote: “it was clear that the [Jaffna] town had not been 'carpet-bombed'. It is unlikely 
that the Sri Lankan Air Force is capable of such a thing. It possesses no bombers. The only 
attack planes it has are six Italian-made Siai Marchettis, which have been adapted to carry
9)228 r p
rockets.” That the Sri Lanka Air Force had no capability to ‘carpet bomb’ was corroborated 
by another foreign correspondent who wrote “The main air strike consists of five or six 
marchetti trainers. They are single-engined, propeller-driven light aircraft” 229
Factually this was correct and the IAF (Indian Air force), Indian MoD, Indian intelligence 
Agencies and Rajiv Gandhi himself (a former airline pilot) would have know this. And so too 
the USA, Britain, France, China, Pakistan and most countries with intelligence services. But 
the Indian government still went ahead and made these statements because the message it
225 ...The Guardian, 30 May 1987, ‘Tamils ’lose control of supply route in Jaffna': Government says it has retaken 
north-east of rebel peninsula’.
226 The Guardian, 30 May 1987, ‘Tamils 'lose control of supply route in Jaffna': Government says it has retaken 
north-east of rebel peninsula’.
The Times (London), 1 June 1987, ‘Slow struggle on Jaffna peninsula’.
228 The Times (London), 1 June 1987, ‘Slow struggle on Jaffna peninsula’.
The Guardian, 30 May 1987, ‘Tamils 'lose control of supply route in Jaffna': Government says it has retaken 
north-east of rebel peninsula’. The Siai-Marchettis’ were in the same category as the Bristol ‘Bulldog’ basic 
trainer used by the RAF (Royal Air Force) in the past.
wanted to convey to the Sri Lanka
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government was not about the capability
o f the Sri Lanka Air Force’s aircraft nor even whether ‘carpet-bombing’ had taken place. The 
message it wanted to convey was that it was greatly displeased with the Sri Lanka 
government s military operation in the Jaffna peninsula and wanted that operation stopped.
Sri Lanka Government Misjudges Indian Policy: A Failure of Intelligence
Analysis. But President Jayewardene and his Cabinet did not get this message. The rapidity
with which the fact-finding tour (mentioned above) to Jaffna was organised is a clear
indication that the Sri Lanka government had registered the fact that the Indian central
government had ratcheted upwards the diplomatic pressure by several magnitudes. But the Sri
Lanka government did not appreciate that the danger of Indian military intervention was a real
and imminent one. This, in the author’s assessment, was a failure o f Intelligence analysis by 
President Jayewardene and his Cabinet,230
And so the Sri Lanka government kept-on going with ‘Operation Liberation’, oblivious to the
dangers building-up in Delhi. On 30 May the government triumphantly reported that it had
destroyed 32 fortified bunkers in Valvedditturai, Jaffna.231 Twenty civilians were also
reported to have been killed in crossfire with insurgents and by insurgent booby traps meant
for the armed forces (of course the Indian government’s view would be that whether these
booby traps were meant for the Sri Lanka armed forces or not, none of these civilians would
have died if the Sri Lanka government stopped the military operation). The government also
reported that up to 30 May 1987, 27 of its troops had been killed and 150 injured mostly by 
booby traps.232
Prelude to Direct Indian Intervention. On I June 1987 the Indian Government
communicated to the Sri Lanka government that it would send a convoy of 20 Indian Red 
Cross chartered boats to Jaffna peninsula with ‘food aid’ for Jaffna civilians. The boats would
230
If President Jayewardene and his Cabinet were fully aware of the consequences that could arise in the future
if the military operation in Jaffna was continued or increased, and were prepared for whatever India would do
and prepared to take the accompanying risks, then this cannot be classified as a ‘failure of Intelligence analysis’
It would be classified as a government deliberately choosing a high risk policy. But, when the Sri Lanka
government’s surprise and dismay after the Indian government’s air drop of supplies on 4 June 1987 is
considered, then it is clear that the Sri Lanka government had not been prepared for the actions that India took
The government had a great deal of intelligence and information (a great deal of it was in the press and the
public realm) about the actions that the Indian government could take. But the Sri Lanka government either (a)
chose to ignore these, or (b) could not analyse and understand the signals coming from Delhi. Consequently, the
Sri Lanka government’s decisions to persist with Operation Liberation needs to be classified as a policy under- 
girded by ‘failures of Intelligence analyses’.
31 Ceylon Daily News, 30 May 1987, ‘Operation Liberation smashes 32 bunkers: Security forces win whip hand
a t v v r ”* DaUy NeWS' 30 May l987’ 0peration Liberation smashes 32 bunkers: Security forces win whip hand
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be unarmed and flying the Red Cross flag. The Indian High Commissioner in
Colombo communicated this message to the Sri Lanka Government and requested that the 
convoy be given access to the Jaffna Peninsula.233 This was India’s Is' Gambit.234
The Sri Lanka government tried various tactics to buy time.235 The government replied to
India in carefully measured language and while denying that Jaffna Tamils were in any real
need the government stated that it would accept the food aid “in the spirit of good neighbourly
relations . Sri Lanka also said that the two governments would need to discuss “the
modalities” of the delivery process.236 But the Indian government was not inclined to any
discussions and ended its message with an abrupt instruction: “The concurrence of the
Government of Sri Lanka may kindly be conveyed urgently so that relief can reach the long-
suffering citizens of Jaffna without further delay”.237 Sri Lanka government was instructed to
obey and not given any choice in the matter. In the meantime the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister 
called for immediate military intervention in Sri Lanka.238
It was reported that armed Indian Coast Guard vessels were on alert and positioned just 
outside Sri Lanka’s territorial water margin, and would engage the Sri Lanka Navy patrol 
boats if they attempted to stop the relief shipment. The coastguard vessels were more 
powerful than the Sri Lanka Navy’s patrol boats and Indian Navy Frigates were reported 
heading for the same area of the sea.239 Although the consignment of supplies were ostensibly 
to aid the civilian population, foreign correspondents assessed the true objective as follows:
[. .] the move showed that India is prepared to breach Sri Lankan sovereignty and  
intervene, with military force  i f  necessary, to stop the bloodshed. Pressure has been growing
in India, especially ,n the southern state of Tamil N adu , for the Government to flex its 
muscles as the regional superpower [emphases added].240
Sri Lanka Government Alerts its Armed Forces to Defend the Sovereignty of the 
Country. Calls for Support from friendly States in South Asia and the West.
234 V f  T,mes. {f f nd°n>• 2 June 1987, ‘India angers Colombo with plan for Tamil aid convoy’
The word ‘Gambit’ is used to Hag Indian strategy and tactics at this juncture. When the boat convov was 
being suggested and debated in the press, the entirety of India’s tactics were not in the public domain But in 
retrospect when the rapidity with which the Indian government implemented its 2nd action -  the supply drop bv
" T A T u  r raf‘ (diSCUSSed below)’ 11 is 'hat the Indian government had m have S v  antu. ipated that the boat convoy would be stopped and already prepared the IAF aircraft.
The Guardian (London), 2 June 1987, ‘Indian gunboats on alert’
The government hf.ed with immediate effect a 5-month long fuel embargo of the Peninsula targeted at stopping
236 ™ ° msurge”ls but wb,cb also had concurrently inconvenienced Jaffna civilians P §
237 V f  ^ mes <Lon^or‘)’ 2 June 1987, ‘India angers Colombo with plan for Tamil aid convoy’
23g The Guardian (London), 2 June 1987, ‘Indian gunboats on alert’ '
239 l h. e Gr Uard!an-,? Ju n ,e  l987’ ‘ T h e  nee‘ S°“  'n: Why India has lost patience with Sri Lanka’.
240 ^ uarc l^an (London), 2 June 1987, ‘Indian gunboats on alert’.
The Guardian (London), 2 June 1987, ‘Indian gunboats on alert’.
With tensions rising between Sri Lanka and India due to the Indian government’s 
stated policy of sending a convoy to Jaffna peninsula without the permission of the Sri Lanka 
government, the government of Sri Lanka took the unprecedented step of calling upon the Sri 
Lankan armed forces to defend the country’s sovereignty against a potential external threat. 
As boats in Tamil Nadu were being loaded with supplies on 2 June 2987, on the same day the 
Sri Lanka Cabinet and Parliament were hastily convened for emergency sessions. After the 
Cabinet meeting under the chairmanship of President Jayewardene, Prime Minister Premadasa 
informed parliament that President Jayewardene had alerted the armed forces to defend the
country and its territorial waters.241 President Jayewardene was also reported as having 
telephoned and requested support from President Ronald Reagan, British Prime Minister Mrs 
Thatcher, Pakistan President General Zia ul-Haq and Bangladesh President Ershad.242
31 Buddhist Monks Killed by Tamil Insui 
1987: A Ploy to Induce Indian Invasion?
On 2 June 1987 Tamil insurgents waylaid a bus transporting Buddhist monks near 
Arantalawa, Ampara District, Eastern Province. They were on their way to a religious
ceremony in Kandy City. 31 Buddhist monks and several normal civilians, all Sinhalese, and 
were hacked and shot to death.243
The targets and timing of this act -  Buddhist monks, most below the age of 14 -  need careful 
examination. Why were army and police targets not chosen? The main fighting at that time 
was in Jaffna. Attacking army or police camps in the Eastern Province would have made 
sense as such attacks could have compelled the government to send reinforcements to the 
East. Why were these particular soft targets -  Buddhist monks - chosen? The monks were a 
very soft target. The Bus did not have a single policeman or soldier as guard. There were 
hundreds of other ‘soft targets’, e.g. many dozens of Sinhala villages in the Eastern Province. 
And why the killings at this time? This attack occurred five days after Prime Minister 
Gandhi s very strong criticism on 28 May of the Sri Lanka government’s military operation in 
Jaffna and one day after Gandhi declared that a Red Cross convoy would be sent to Jaffna.
Tlie Times (London), 3 June 1987, ‘32 die in new Sri Lanka massacre - Fears rise of clash off Jaffna’. 
The limes (London), 3 June 1987, ‘32 die in new Sri Lanka massacre - Fears rise of clash off Jaffna'.
241
242
3 See Daily Mirror, 24 March 2013, ‘Memorial museum for Arantalawa massacre’. A museum to memorialise 
this massacre was opened at the site of the killings in March 2013. However, in June 1987 information about 
e killings were censored by the Sri Lankan government as much as it could. This was due to the
censtotodTe'rT  a"t" Tar"!1 r,° tinf  c° “ld oc;cur- No such rioli"g occurred. The international press could not be 
Jaffna ^  (London), 3 June 1987, ‘32 die in new Sri Lanka massacre - Fears rise of clash off
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From the above circumstantial factors it is possible to make an informed deduction
that this massacre was aimed at -  if possible - triggering off anti-Tamil riots by Sinhalese.
Fortunately for Sri Lanka, there were no riots against any Tamils.244 While no Tamil insurgent
group accepted responsibility for the killing of the monks and no direct evidence exists for the
above deduction, this is a deduction that deserves to be kept in mind when assessing these 
events of these crucial weeks of June and July 1987.
If anti' Tarni1 rioting had occurred then Tamil secessionist in Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu and
the Tamil Nadu political establishment including Chief Minster Ramachandran himself would
have had a strong argument to demand from Delhi the direct and immediate military invasion
of the North and East of Sri Lanka to ‘save Tamils from being killed’. If widespread anti-
Tamil riots occurred in June 1987, there was a very strong likelihood that Rajiv Gandhi would
have felt compelled to invade and partition the island. As mentioned earlier there were Sri
Lankan Tamil political refugees living in Tamil Nadu and also Tamil Nadu politicians
themselves who consistently lobbied for many years for India to militarily intervene and
create a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka in the way India assisted in the creation of 
Bangladesh.245
with Restraint
Lanka
On 2 June Sri Lanka Foreign Ministry handed over a message to India’s High Commissioner
in Colombo. It reiterated that Sri Lanka had not accepted the aid offered and would continue
to reject this aid until the two governments’ discussed and arrived at an agreement on the
manner in which this aid would be supplied. The message further stated that “if  India took
any unilateral action, it would be ‘considered a violation of the independence, sovereignty, 
and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka’ [emphases added].”24' In reaction Delhi’s position was:
The Indian Government left no doubt when it announced the aid mission on Monday [1 June 
1987] that it would brook no interference from  the Sri Lankan fo rces . New Delhi said the 
relief supplies would be landed whether Colombo liked it or not [emphases added] 247
244 If widespread anti-Tamil rioting had occurred after the killing of the monks then Prime Minister Gandhi
would have had enormous pressure brought upon him to militarily intervene in Sri Lanka In the event such
noting did not take place and this massacre did not initiate the macro political and military consequences it could 
nave precipitated. 1
245 The Guardian, 15 January 1985, ‘Why the Tamils are looking to Rajiv for their salvation Sri Lankan 
separatists are convinced it is only a matter of time before India intervenes’.
TheGucirdian, 3Junz 1987, ‘Sn Lanka orders army to defend sovereignty: Conflict looms as India prepares 
relief shipment to Jaffna civilians’. p p
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“ rH° f thC Indian Red Cr°SS mission in ^orge of this mission, however was in a
,hai - « *  - — -  of the s ; l i
r :::r:d -s* if -«— *»« ^ «i: ~  Undkan cj.zzz
: : : : : : :  „ .  h l 8 h  a n d  h a d
Z T  h m0ni,0^e<, *  ‘he in,ema,i0nal Th^  « »  »"cen,ed .ha, war
mica ly settle ,he,r ^agreem ents regarding ,he reiief ship™ ,,. The US State Department
'” W"S "“ PeCia“y C m d  °b° “‘ " «  P ° » W >  of wafer,„  „„ b
r u  T  added) ?he B" ,iSh ~  «  - s a g e s  to L  Foreign 
Ministries Coiombo and Delhi and also messages via the High Commissioners' of boih
conntrtes London. A UK Foreign Offiee spokesman stated tha, „  sreMly
at the possibility o f a military confrontation.^mphases
• * ------- -----j  • x c i i \ i a i a n  c lIS lI
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ispute. In an , event, the convoy of Red Ctoss boats sailed from Tamil Nadu to Jaffna on
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4,5: The Indian Air Force Vinlates Sr. I 0..1. 0 Airs
affna Peninsula une 1987
ace and Dro
On 4 June 1987 the Indian government notified the Sri Lanka government that Indian Air Force
(IAF)
” pcmii^uia. inis notification
was clearly ,  signal from the Indian Government tha, i, could militarily intervene in Sri Lank,
Unhke the Red Cross boats the IAF aircraft were enttrely under the authority of die Indian
central government. Accordingly, a, about 5pm on A June 1987 five Antonov AN-32 transpori
amrtaft escoried b , four Mirage 2000 je, lighten, of the IAF Hew over Jaffna peninsula and
m The Gimrdmn, 3 June 1987, ‘Sri Lanka orders army to defend sovereignty rnnfli,, ,
24<]leShipment to Jaffna civilians’. ^ y‘ onllict looms as India prepares
2 l h.e (London), 3 June 1987, ‘32 die in new Sri Lanka massacre - Fears rise of clash off I f f  •
relief shipment to Jaffna civilians’. gnty' Confl,ct ,00ms as In^ia prepares
252 1hu %Uard!an' 4 June ,987’ ‘Delhi vows to stand by Jaffna Tamils’.
253 Guardian, 4 June 1987, ‘Delhi vows to stand by Jaffna Tamils’.
16 Gua,dian, 4 June 1987, ‘Delhi vows to stand by Jaffna Tamils’.
dropped 25 to 30 packages by parachutes.254 The Sri Lankan forces were ordered not
to fire on the Indian aircraft and no defensive firing took place. The Sri Lanka government
strongly protested at this violation.255 In a diplomatic note to India the Sri Lanka government 
said:
preveltinfthis Z t a l e  W °"n Uldependence We »<> "Hilary or other means of preventing this outrage. We will take up in the appropriate forums this unwarranted assault
on our sovereignty and territorial integrity [emphases added].256
There was widespread outrage among the people in the southern parts of the country at this act 
by India. Several countries in South Asia, namely Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal also 
criticised the Indian action.257 After all, except for Pakistan, all the other countries of South 
Asia can be invaded by India at any time. Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister Premadasa was 
addressing a World Environment Day Conference in Colombo on 4 June when he was informed 
of the Indian parachute drop. He spoke strongly against the Indian act -  completely off the script 
and off the subject of the Conference - with great emotion to the international gathering:
What greater pollution is there than this? They've broken all the rules of the South Asian 
[emphSTs”added]^”fl CooPera,ion- the Non-Aligned Movement and the United Nations
On 6 June 1987 a government spokesperson stated that with the capture of the Vadamarachchi 
area of the Jaffna Peninsula Phase-1 of Operation Liberation had been completed. The 
international media’s assessment was that the air drop had achieved its real objective -  it 
delivered a warning to the Sri Lanka government to not implement Phase-2 of Operation
Liberation:
[T]he clear message conveyed by India's air drop was this: "If we can drop relief supplies 
7, T 1 f  °P a! lythlng' so do >lot S° on to phase two [of your military Operation in Jaffna] ”
^ d e d 'p ™  S°UrCeS S3id 11115 h3S b6en reCeiVed [by thC Sn Lanka 8overnmeml [emphases
On 10 June the Sri Lanka government announced that it had suspended Operation Liberation
and that it was ready for peace talks.260
Lanka
Times (London) made incisive critiques of the India’s violation of Sri Lanka’s sovereignty. It
r  f.n La,nka l999: 399' Sri Lanka Army: 50 Years On. 1949-1999. The Times (London) 5 June 1987
Indian planes drop relief supplies over rebel-held Jaffna’
“ io° "* mk' d °r — i— .  - »
257 The Times (London), 5 June 1987, ‘Indian planes drop relief supplies over rebel-held Jaffna’.
258 Gordian, 11 June 1987, ‘Sri Lankans halt Jaffna push in preparation for peace talks’.
259 Gwrdicm, 6 June 1987, ‘Air drop delivers message of warning’.
2(.o ^  Guardian, 6 June 1987, ‘Air drop delivers message of warning’.
The Guardian, 11 June 1987, ‘Sri Lankans halt Jallna push in preparation for peace talks’
said that India should not be allowed “to escape international condemnation of its
action”. The Times (London) pointed out that from 6 June onwards Delhi went out of its way
to be conciliatory towards Colombo while underscoring its desire for “friendly, cordial and 
good-neighbourly” relations with Sri Lanka.
The Times (London) notes that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi could afford to do this because
by using Indian military capabilities he had been able to display his ability to act with a firm
resolve. This had won the support of his parliamentary opposition and the support of the
Indian people too. On 8 June 1987 Gandhi began his party’s election campaign in the state
elections in Haryana State, in north India, and his Sri Lanka policies “can have done his cause
no harm at all". The Times’ went on to make trenchant critiques which deserve to be quoted 
in full:
But that cannot justify his action. For India to infringe Sri Lanka's air space was to bully its 
my neighbour, not treat it as a friend. To draw an unlikely parallel, it was as if the United 
States lias showered food on West Belfast while the British army was conducting an 
operation against the IRA. How far Sri Lanka’s Tamils needed supplied is a question open to 
debate. It is hard to believe that they need them quite so badly. There is certainly no evidence 
to suggest it. [...] If Delhi wished somehow to help them, it could have done so more 
effectively by working with the Colombo government, not against it. The latest talks in 
Delhi, at which further aid was discussed, suggest that co-operation between the two is 
possible. [...] By its precipitate action India has alarmed not just the Sri Lankans but all 
other five nations o f the sub-continent. India has more than three times the combined 
population of the others and dwarfs them militarily and economically. [...] just now Sri Lanka 
needs help against the unscrupulous enemy within. If Delhi uses that situation to make 
political capital for itself, it is falling far short of what any country might expect from a more 
powerful friend and neighbour [emphases added].261
In any event the violation took place. And on 29 July 1987 Sri Lanka and India signed the 
Indo-Lanka Agreement.
4.6: The Indo-Lanka Accord
India’s direct intervention in Sri Lanka can be said to have begun with the signing of the Indo- 
Lanka Accord on 29 July 1987 and the arrival of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to 
Sri Lanka, which began on that day itself. The intervention ceased with the withdrawal of the 
last units of the IPKF from Sri Lanka in March 1990. During the period July 1987 to June 
1990 the Sri Lankan armed forces were not involved in any offensive military operations in 
the North and East. As such the events of this period fall outside the ambit of this Thesis 
Therefore only a brief mention of the main Clauses of the Indo-Lanka Accord and its 
accompanying documents are relevant to us. And then, in Part II of this Chapter, the ceasefire
261 The Times (London), 9 June 1987, ‘Leading Article: An Offensive Act By India’.
President Premadasa negotiated with the LTTE and how he and the LTTE
successfully collaborated -  for their own tactical reasons -  to get the Indian forces to leave Sri
Lanka. It was only with the re-ignition of the insurrection by the LTTE in June 1990 that the
Sri Lanka government was again involved in military conflict with the LTTE, the subject of 
the next Chapter.
Analysis o f Some Crucial Clauses of the Indo-Lanka Accord. The full and official 
title of the Indo-Lanka Accord is 7ndo-Sri Lanka Agreement to Establish Peace and 
Normalcy in Sri Lanka’. In addition to the Agreement there was one Annexure, and an 
exchange of two Letters between President Jayewardene and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. 
The Annexure and the letter from Rajiv Gandhi include a great deal of important geopolitical 
concessions wrested by India from Sri Lanka (please refer Annexure 4.4 for the complete 
texts of all the above documents and the complete context of the excerpts below).
V ef ° 8ni«°" of “areas ° f  historical habitation” and thereby an indirect recognition 
of a ‘Tamil Homeland’
“ 1.4;alsorecognising that the Northern and the Eastern provinces have been areas 
of historical habitation o f Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have at all times 
hitherto lived together in this territory with other ethnic groups;”
While the phrase ‘Tamil Homeland’ was not used in the Accord, “areas of historical 
habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples” was included. This is a close equivalent.
• The Northern & Eastern Provinces were to be joined together. Later a Referendum
was supposed to be held as to whether the Eastern Province wished to seDarate 
from the North.
2.2 During the period, which shall be considered an interim period (i.e. from the date
of the elections to the provincial council, as specified in para 2.8 to the date of the
Referendum as specified in para 2.3), the Northern and Eastern provinces as now
constituted, will form one administrative unit, having one elected Provincial
Council. Such a unit will have one Governor, one Chief Minister and one Board o f 
M i n i s t e r s J
As can be seen from the above, after 4 years of trying to prevent it from happening, the Sri Lanka
government was finally forced to accept the joining together of the Northern and Eastern
Provinces. Although this was supposed to be for an ‘interim period’, it would remain the status 
quo till the Referendum was held.
• However, the Referendum could be postponed indefinitely by the President of Sri 
Lanka (which is precisely what happened. This Referendum was never held)
“The President may, 
referendum.”
at his discietion, decide to postpone such
™ S HR* r „ dl'm "eVer hdd Presid'"' '■ * » “ * *  kep. postponing i, every year till he
exrte Offiee January l989. This practice WM comi„ued by ^  (Jan , 989
ay 1993), and President Wijetunge (May 1993-November 1994).
'  a ^ p S T 8" "  ^  ™  '» *>= - p e e ,  the ceasefire,
"19_The emergency will be lifted in the eastern and Northern provinces b , 15 August 
1987. A cessation of hostilities will come into effect all over the Island with.n 4S 
ours of signing of this Agreement. All arms presently held by militant groups will he
bythe Government o^S tiiU nka™  pr° Cedure to auth™ties to be designated
The ceasefire was initially respected by all insurgent groups. Some weapons were surrendered.
gradually the LTTE
LTTE and the IPKF
What the Sri Lanka Armed Forces were expected to do:
ConfSequent to the cessation of hostilities and the surrender of arms by militant groups,
[S L k ;‘J “rmy and other securi‘y Personnel will be confined to barracks in 
camps as on 25 May 1987. The process o f surrendering arms and the confining o f
thelr Z n PterS° Z  ^  '°  barracks ^  be C0™P'eted within 72 hours o fthe cessation o f hostilities coming into e f f e c t ^
The Sri Lanka armed forces did adhere to the above within 72 hours. They returned to their
camps as of 25 May 1987, and stayed in such locations. But only a token amount of weapons 
were surrendered by the Tamil insurgents, especially the LTTE.
What the Indian Government pledged to do
“2 16 These proposals are also conditional to the Government of India taking the
following actions if any militant groups operating in Sri Lanka do not accept this 
framework of proposals for a settlement, namely;
(a) India will take all necessary steps to ensure that Indian territory is not
used fo r  activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and security o f Sri 
L a n k a J
This was a tacit acknowledgement by the Indian government that Indian territory had been 
used by Tamil insurgents.
of India. As mentioned at theAssertion o f Geopolitical Objectives
beginning of this Chapter there is evidence that the Indian centra, g„vemm7n, had cenain
geopolittcal security concerns which had nothing to do with the Tamil sccessionisi
insuirection. The Tnncomalee harbour's future and the (alleged) intelligence gathering
activities of other countries from Sri Lankan soil were among India's concerns. These
concerns officially manifested themselves in the text of the letter from Prime Minister Gandhi 
to President Jayewardene:
cen t™  as'follows ;had ”  *  °f °Uf diSCUSsionS ^ reed —  of India:
relevant nency t "*1 myself Wl11 reach an early understanding about the 
relevance and employment of foreign military and intelligence personnel with
ensuring that such presences will not prejudice Indo-Sri Lankan relations.
(ii) Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made available for 
military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India’s interests.
(hi) The work of restoring and operating the Trincomalee oil tank farm will be
undertaken as a joint venture between India and Sri Lanka [emphases in bold and 
underlining added].
a
In 2(i) India wanted Sn Lanka to give assurances regarding the presence of military personnel
from other countries whose assistance Sri Lanka had requested. It is somewhat ironical that
this was being demanded after allowing thousands of Tamil insurgents to use India as a
sanctuary for the previous 4 years. Item 2(ii) is phrased in such broad and all-encompassing
terms that it gave India the basis to veto the use of any port or harbour in Sri Lanka. Through
clause 2(iii) Sri Lanka was compelled to develop the facilities at Trincomalee only with India.
These were serious violations of Sri Lanka’s sovereign rights to develop its resources to its
own benefit. But Sri Lanka was compelled to accede to these demands as it found itself
isolated and under India’s thumb. The following is another confirmation of India’s
geopolitical objectives. It is an excerpt from a briefing given in early 1988 by the then head of
the Indian Army to the senior officers of the IPKF. This text became a public document only
with its publication in 2006, nineteen years after the Indo-Lanka Accord was signed. It
appeared in book by the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Indian Peace Keeping 
Force (IPKF), Major General Harkirat Singh.
COAS [Chief of Army Staff] in his briefing said that the Indian Army has not been employed 
in Sri Lanka for the protection of any one community or to fight Sri Lanka’s war with the 
LTTE but has been deployed for safeguarding the Indian national interest. [The] Sri Lankan 
Government had openly invited other countries to assist and in the bargain was prepared to 
give base facilities, which would have threatened Indian security at some time. Therefore
262
See Annexure 4.4, the ‘Exchange of Letters’ are a part of the set of documents which accompanied the Indo- 
Lanka Accord.
were^pressur!zee/1o'a -T "! ,°Ut °f hf nd’ [the] Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE
sTaTd S E a s i^ io n  15 and 1C°nditionS’ which were slightly diluted to their publishediana. L i  I b aspirations were pnmanlv kent in minH f p m n h o o j c  263 p
II
The Tactical Rapprochement Between the LTTE and 
President Premadasa, April 1989 onwards
By mid-1988 the Sri Lanka government was in the midst of an immense political crisis. Two 
separate insurrections were simultaneously under way in the country: the Tamil insurrection in 
the North and East where the LTTE was fighting the IPKF and, when the opportunity arose, 
attacking Sri Lankan armed forces targets as well. And the second was the JVP insurrection 
which began in July 1987 with the arrival of Indian troops on Sri Lankan soil. The JVP’s main 
slogan was a Sinhala Nationalist one -  its charge was that the ‘traitorous’ UNP government had 
brought Indian troops to Sri Lanka and that these troops would permanently stay in Sri Lanka. 
The JVP s aim was to turn the Sinhala people against the UNP government.
By mid-1988 the IPKF’s campaign against the LTTE had also reached stalemate. The LTTE was 
ensconced in the jungles of the Northern and Eastern provinces and carrying out quite effective 
guerrilla warfare against the IPKF. The IPKF was now at the receiving end of what the Sn 
Lankan armed forces had been from August 1983 to July 1987. This guerrilla warfare could go 
on for years, and, potentially decades. Theoretically, the Indian government could continue this 
indefinitely -  it had the financial resources and millions of army, para-military, police, navy and 
air force personnel in India whom it could deploy to Sri Lanka on a rotational basis. The total 
number of Indian personnel would obviously vary over time and the Indian government kept the 
details secret. Two Indian defence analysts arrived at quite similar figures: Rikhye264 estimated 
102,000 to 105,000 in March 1989 and Singhe265 estimated 100,000 “at its peak”.
But could Sri Lanka could not wait for years. When the two factors - viz. the IPKF unable to 
subdue the LTTE in the near future, and, the IPKF’s presence providing the main fuel for the 
JVP insurrection -  were assessed it became clear to both Mr. Premadasa and Mrs. Bandaranaike
263 Singh, Major General Harkirat, 2006: 161, Intervention in Sri Lanka: The IPKF Experience Retold. See 
Annexure 4.5 for the entire text of the Briefing paper.
| Rikhye, Ravi, 1989: 606, ‘How Many Troops in Sri Lanka?’
265 Singh, Pushpindar, 1990/91: 26, ‘Peacekeepers in Sri Lanka’.
that the exit of the IPKF from Sri Lankan was the essential factor for the stability of the' ^  
Sri Lankan regime.266
Presidential Elections (1988) and Parliamentary Elections (1989). According to the
Sn Lankan Constitution and electoral calendar, Presidential Elections had to be held in Sri Lanka 
by December 1988. The central component of the Campaign promises of the both the UNP’s 
Candidate (Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa) and the SLFP (Mrs Sirima Bandaranaike) 
was that the IPKF would have to leave Sri Lanka as soon as possible. Mrs Bandaranaike pledged 
to abrogate the Indo-Lanka Accord. Prime Minister Premadasa’s position was that he would 
replace the Indo-Lanka Accord with a ‘Friendship Treaty’ with India and de-link the Northern 
and Eastern Provinces).-67 The Presidential Elections were held on 19 December 1988.268
Prime Minister Premadasa won the Presidential elections. He won outright with 50.4% of
votes cast.269 Mrs Bandaranaike obtained 44.9% of the votes.270 Contrary to dismal
expectations of the 9.4 million eligible voters, 55.3 % voted.271 Nonetheless 14 voters were
gunned down or blown-up when they tried to vote.272 Immediately after his triumph was
announced Mr Premadasa praised the electorate for defying threats by extremists in both 
majority Sinhalese and minority Tamil areas.
Premadasa wanted to begin his term of Office in a new year and was sworn-in on 2 January 
1989. He made a fervent appeal for unity and reached out to both the JVP and LTTE.
Mr Ranasinghe Premadasa, sworn in yesterday [2 January 1989] as Sri Lanka’s new President, 
appealed to both Sinhalese and Tamil extremists to join him in a fresh dialogue. [...] 
President Premadasa said he was willing to go anywhere and to talk to anyone in order to 
make the extremists join the democratic process. (...] in a gesture of conciliation intended to 
bring the militants back to the negotiating table he has already announced that the six- year- 
old state of emergency will lapse on January 15. The move will bring freedom to 2,000
266
Under the then prevailing conditions the IPKF could remain in Sri Lanka for and indefinite period. But, the 
presence of the IPKF was the major factor to the intensity of the JVP insurrection due to the considerable 
popular support from a widespread cross-section of Sinhala people who were concerned that the Indian military 
would become a permanent presence in Sri Lanka. By late-1988 the JVP insurrection had grown to a level where 
the survival of the government and state power were seriously threatened. The exit of the IPKF was seen by both 
presidential candidates as the pre-condition to undermine the JVP’s support base.
67 The Times (London), 19 December 1988, The Presidential Candidates and their main policies; Sri Lanka 
election'. De-Linking the North and the East was assessed as an issue of deep strategic significance to the unity of 
the Sri Lanka State by most Sinhala political and military leaders.
268 The Guardian, 19 December 1988, ‘Sri Lankan presidential poll caps year of ethnic disintegration'.
According to the Guardian’s assessment these elections were “the most critical test of democracy in the 40-year 
life of a bitterly divided country.”
269 The Times (London), 21 December 1988, ‘Jubilant Premadasa vows to end spiral of political violence: Sri 
Lanka election’.
270 The Guardian, 21 December 1988, ‘PM clear winner in Sri Lanka poll’.
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political detainees held under « *90
the presence of Indian peace-keeoinP tmnn .me.rgen^y regulations. [...] Speaking about
the President insisted that ‘we must not create^?6 t‘S and’S Northern and Eastern provinces, 
He said that the country’s affairs must hr Mtuatlons that Provoke or inv>te intervention.’ 
foreign intervention unnecessary ‘XVhatrvr C°"ducted ln a man»er which would make 
Lankan territory ’, he said [emphases a d d e d ] ,^  "0t surrender one inch ° f  Sri
But neither the JVP or LTTE responded positively to the President’s overtures. The next
important pohttcal event on the calendar were the Parliamentary Elections. These were
scheduled to be held on 15 February 1989. The JVP continued with its insurrection and 
threatened to kill those who participated in the elections.274
The UNP won the Parliamentary election, a, well. Ou, of ,he 225 seats in parliament the UNP
won 125. The voter turn-out was 63.6%, which was higher lhan a, the Presidential elections
two months earlier™  During this election loo the JVP targeted and killed voters and the day 
was called “the bloodiest election day in the island's history”.276
Now President Premadasa was strongly positioned politically. He was the elected Executive 
President and in the Parliament too the UNP had the majority. On 1 April 1989 President 
Premadasa made a characteristically bold initiative. He again made overtures to the JVP and
LTTE
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new parliament if they gave-up violence. “The extraordinary proposal was made by President 
Ranasinghe Premadasa in a weekend speech [1 April 1989] to a youth rally [...] in the east of
LTTE 277
But, two weeks later, on 15 April the LTTE sent a message to the President that it was
LTTE
LTTE
London for the LTTE to appoint a person to discuss arrangements for talks.278 Many
LTTE
Guardian was extremely perceptive when he said that “[t]he Tigers' official reason is that they 
want to end the violence. But the primary motive would appear to be a desire to get rid of the 
Indians."'7 J President Premadasa and government and military analysts would not have been
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unaware of this. But the President too
as possible so as to remove the JVP’s reason for its insurrection.
wanted to get rid of the Indian’s as early
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Relations between the Tigers and the government have never been better. The peace talks, 
which began on May 11, have proceeded without any disagreement.” 280
Presided Premadasa demanded on 1 June 1989 that the IPKF leave the 
island by the end of July 1989
IPKF
to leave Sri Lanka by end-July 1989.281 This would be the 2"d Anniversary of the Indo Lanka
IPKF
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prior consultations had taken place prior to this public statement. President Premadasa went
onto say that he would be making this request from Gandhi in the next few days.282 From the
perspective of diplomatic relations between two States the standard procedure would have
been to first inform Prime Minister Gandhi and give him some prior notice and then make this 
public announcement.
In the present author’s assessment it was not that President Premadasa was unaware of these 
protocols. But rather this was a part of a deliberate strategy by President Premadasa. 
Premadasa chose to do things in this manner because, first, it pre-empted any objections, 
prevarications and back-room pressure by India. Second, it was a clear initiative by him, the 
President of Sri Lanka and seen as such by the Sinhala electorate. Third, it was an election 
promise he had made prior to the Presidential Elections of December 1988, and he wanted to 
be seen by the Sinhala people as carrying out his election promise. Fourth, by making this 
demand from the Indian government Premadasa appropriated the JVP’s main demand. On the
other hand Indian officials were very unhappy that Premadasa had made this announcement 
without consulting Delhi.2X1
Lankan
LTTE, 28 June 1989. In the meantime the ‘peace talks’ with the LTTE were proceeding
rapidly. And on 28 June 1989 the Sri Lanka government made a momentous announcement. It 
said that it had arrived at a ceasefire agreement with the LTTE. The LTTE announced that the 
‘tacit’ ceasefire which had begun in April 1989 when they agreed to talk with the Sri Lanka
280
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The Guardian, 29 June 1989, ‘Tamil Tigers agree to lay down arms in Sri Lanka’. 
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government would now become a complete
ceasefire agreement.284 The ceasefire
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the country when it invited the Indians in.285 ' ™  f S the g°vemment betrayed
II is significant to note lhat “the Tigers have said nothing about abandoning their objective of 
a separate stale of Tamil Eelam In the North and East." »  Bu, President Premadasa did not
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commitment. In the present author's assessment this was the correct tactical position for the 
President to adopt. Especially as the President’s and the Sri Lanka government’s primal^
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The two sides are united in wanting the Indians to leave. The Tigers have suffered grievous 
losses at the hands of the Indians, while the government is suffering a crippling backlash of 
strikes, sabotage and assassinations by extreme nationalists opposed to the Indian presence 287
President Premadasa Transfers Weapons and Ammunition to the LTTE, July 
1989. (A Misjudged ad hoc Counterinsurgency strategy). During the initial
meetings with the government after 15 April 1989 the LTTE seems to have requested
weapons, ammunition and funds from President Premadasa to be used in fighting the IPKF
Towards the end of April 1989 President Premadasa authorised the secret transfer of small
arms (such as AK-47s), ammunition and money to the LTTE.288 Although President
Premadasa wanted to keep this matter secret, on 3 July 1989 a British newspaper broke the 
story.
There are reports that the Tigers are now receiving money and arms from the Sri Lankan
Government to carry on their fight against India. This is a bizarre turnaround. Two years
ago, the Tigers were being funded, armed and protected by India to fight the Sri Lankan army
The Indian Peacekeeping Force then arrived in July 1987 to separate and pacify the two sides
as the Sri Lankan forces launched a major offensive against the guerrillas (emphases 
added].
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Government of Sri Lanka, 1997: 13 and 15 [Abbreviated Title: Report on Assassination of Major General 
Denzil Kobbekaduwa] Sessional Paper No. IX-1997. See Bibliography for complete Title.
The Guardian, 3 July 1989, ‘Tamil Tigers face Indian offensive’.
193
LTTE
» O  ™ * *  ^  ® ^ ^  ^  vy   • i  / (C
G « « r,W s  article was published on 3 July 1989. The time period between 28 June and 3 July 
1989 (including both days ) is 6 days. This is far too short a period for this secret operation to 
have been conceived, the weapons collected, transported by trucks, etc, to have taken place.
Which
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LTTE regarding this matter had to have taken place prior to the formal ceasefire, and (b) the
transfer of weapons and ammunition had to have begun even before the formal ceasefire
agreement was signed on 28 June 1989. The leadership for this strategy was entirely President
Premadasa’s, and he took huge risks by doing this. But it was his assessment that he would be 
able to manage these risks.
In later years right up to his death in 1993 President Premadasa was compelled to suffer
LTTE
important issue as (i) it reveals how a President (or any Director of Operations) could 
implement ad hoc counterinsurgency strategies which can go terribly wrong and worsen an 
insurgency; (ii) in the years ahead it was used by the Opposition to undermine Premadasa and 
affected his presidency to an inordinate extent; (iii) it was widely misunderstood by the 
Sinhala people as a ‘traitorous’ act when in fact it was an imprudent and injudicious exercise 
of counterinsurgency statecraft. Let us examine and analyse the facts.
In 1994 a Special Presidential Commission of Inquiry was instituted to inquire into the death
of Major General Denzil Kobbekaduwa. It completed its work in September 1997.290 This
Commission revealed beyond any doubt that the transfer of weapons had taken place. A great
deal of information from diverse sources including from army officers, civilian officials and
Other Ranks who implemented the order was revealed during the investigation and became
public knowledges Witnesses revealed that the then Secretary of the MoD, General (Rtd)
Attygalle and Deputy Minister of Defence Ranjan Wijeratne had tried to dissuade the
President, and had also solicited the support of the Secretary to the President K.H.J. 
Wijeydasa.292
290
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The Secretary to the President K.H J Wijeydasa
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had presented the
apprehensions of the defence officials and Minister Wijeratne to President Premadasa. The 
President had replied and sa.d that he was working to a strategy and a plan and mentioned 
four arguments to support his decision.293 It is relevant to flag at this point that this was 
President Premadasa’s practical counterinsurgency statecraft in action. And if it had worked,
it would have been a great triumph for him.294
President Premadasa explained that he had four reasons for implementing this policy: First, 
that the Chief Minister of the North-East Provincial Council (NEPC), Mr. Varatharaja 
Perumal, was recruiting Tamil youth and establishing a militia called the Tamil National 
Army (TNA). And that this was being doing with the assistance of the IPKF. Second, that he, 
President Premadasa had the authority and the right to make this decision. Third, that the 
LTTE would wipe-out the Tamil National Army. Fourth was that he did not want Sri Lankan 
armed forces [i.e. Sinhala soldiers] to crush this Tamil militia [i.e. composed of Sri Lanka
LTTE
task.
Let us analyse each of the President’s four arguments. In relation to the first argument
President Premadasa was accurate.'b The second argument is also accurate. The President
was the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and police, the Head of State and the Head
of Government. The third argument too proved to be a correct assessment by the President in
July 1989 as events in late-1989 and early 1990 showed. By December 1989 the LTTE was
successfully destroying the hastily trained TNA militia or getting them to surrender.296 By
January 1990, the TNA militia were deserting in their hundreds:
In a final mockery of India’s involvement in Sri Lanka, hundreds o f captured Tamil 
boy soldiers, some only 14, are being returned to their parents by the Sri Lankan 
Army and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The boys have fought the highly 
experienced Tigers for less than a month. Most were forcibly recruited into an 
Indian-backed group, the Tamil National Army, to fight the Tigers, and most
293
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The President held the highest and Constitutionally the most powerful Office in the country. He was Head of 
State and the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces. He knew that in the final analysis the responsibility 
was his. He did not have the luxury of sitting back and doing nothing. In the extremely difficult political 
situation that he found his government in - i.e. two separate insurgencies occurring in separate parts of the 
country and the presence of Indian troops - the President was compelled to think and take a series of measures. 
No doubt he would have discussed these strategies with close advisors and colleagues. But the final decisions 
had to be taken by him.
295 "The Guardian, 2 October 1989, ‘Northern Sri Lanka waits for Tigers to pounce: Tamil leaders in the island's 
war zones who are dreading the time when their Indian patrons depart’. The Guardian, 22 November 1989. 
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The President’s fourthBy mid-March 1990 the LTTE moved unopposed into Trincomalee "  ............ .............. .
argument too is was what eventually occurred The Sri Lankan Armed forces were no, 
mvolvedm any o p e r a t e  against the TNA militia and i, was d.sarmed and dismantled b , the
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the LTTE and thereby wean it away from the insurrection. The LTTE skilfully 
deceived the President to think along these lines -  whieh is a perfectly acceptable tactic in
_   ..l* T P •warfare
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enemy to continue to do so ”  President Premadasa grossly misjudged the situation. Prior to any
such transfer of weapons and ammunition he should have negotiated and arrived at a confirmed
He did neither. By
LTTE
getting personally involved in the negotiations the President put at risk his political reputation 
and also exposed himself personally to the possibility of a massive backlash from the Sinhala
i 'xm
electorate.
The IPKF and l TTE Agree to a Ceasefire on 20 September 1989, and leave
V  M V  I  M  ___________________ ^  / "  « / #  1  -mLanka on 26 March
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staying any longer in Sri Lanka. Consequently an agreement was signed between the Indian 
and Sri Lanka governments on 18 September and the IPKF declared a unilateral ceasefire on
298 Tlle Times (London)- 3 January 1990, ‘Indian ignominy as Tamil boy soldiers go home- Sri Lanka’
299 The Independent, 15 March 1990, ‘Tamils advance’.
The present author has not yet been able to locate any source which explicitly explains the President's reasons 
tor this fourth argument. However, the present author advances the following deductions- (I) The President 
wanted the LTTE (composed of Tamils) to disarm or fight the TNA militia (composed of Tamils) If the 
predominantly Sinhalese army had operated against the TNA militia it would have been Sinhala soldiers versus 
Tamil militia. This may have stiffened the resolve of the TNA militia to resist and fight. (2) Worse this mav 
have resulted in IPKF troops fighting alongside the TNA militia. That could have led to unnecessary and 
dangerous consequences. (3) The LTTE cadres ‘knew’ the nature and quality of the youth they were fighting 
3(§a*nSt an(  ^a S^0 ^new tbe terra*n- (4) No lives of Sinhala soldiers would be lost.
3oi ThlS IS a deduction by the present author based on an analysis of the actions of the LTTE and the president.
If he had done so, then he could have told the Sinhala people that he was betrayed by the LTTE. Which he 
was. But what ultimately occurred was that large numbers of Sinhala people -  assiduously encouraged by his 
enemies in the UNP and the Opposition SLFP and JVP - began to suspect him of being a traitor.
The President did not seem to have had have an exit plan or even a damage limitation plan if the LTTE 
reneged on its promises. And he had just witnessed how the LTTE had reneged on Rajiv Gandhi and the Indian 
government. These were errors of statecraft of very serious consequence to his political reputation and were to 
have far-reaching repercussions on his political career. These repercussions bedevilled Prcmadasa’s tenure as 
President in the years 1990-1993 (as discussed in the next Chapter).
20 September 1989. The LTTE said that it
would reciprocate.303 India’s general
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elections were due in November 1989 and Mr. Gandhi and his Congress Party had a serious 
electoral contest on their hands. And, as it transpired, Rajiv Gandhi lost the Elections and 
V.P.Singh became India’s Prime Minister on 2 December 1989.304 The very last batch of
H ■ M V A % AIPKF 
March.305
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When that happened Rajiv Gandhi was no longer the Prime Minister of India.
The next phase of the insurrection began after the pogrom-riots of July 1983. The pogrom-
nots immensely worsened the government’s position and substantially benefited the
insurrectionary groups. The pogrom-cum-riots of July 1983 raises questions of a deeply
fundamental character about President Jayewardene’s and the Cabinet’s policy (profoundly
deficient) understanding of the Tamil insurrection they were facing, and what 
counterinsurgency policies would be appropriate.
When we assess the government’s policies from July 1983 to March 1990, it can be clearly 
seen that from late-1983 onwards the government was faced with a huge increase in the Tamil 
insurgency s vigour and guerrilla capabilities. These were entirely new experiences for the Sri 
Lankan armed forces and police which had never faced such guerrilla warfare spread 
throughout a territory as large as such as the Northern and Eastern provinces and over such an 
extended period of time. And Colombo was a target of bomb attacks. Militarily, from late- 
1983 onwards the government was primarily on the defensive and reacting to the strategies 
and tactics of the Tamil insurgents. The insurgents chose the targets and time of attack. By 
1985-86 the government could barely cope with the insurgent’s military onslaughts.
Even when the army ‘Cleared’ insurgents from any area, the ‘Holding’ phase was always 
precarious and the ‘Build’ phase was never reached. The army’s primary approach was to 
make forays out of its bases and large camps and try and kill as many insurgents as possible. 
For some period of time a particular area would witness an absence of insurgents but the army 
was unable to ‘hold’ that area indefinitely to allow the next 2 phases of a counterinsurgency 
campaign to begin.
303 The Times (London), 21 September 1989, ‘Tamil Tigers in ceasefire deal’.
The Times (London), 4 December 1989, ‘Singh picks flamboyant Lai as deputy; Indian election’. 
305 The Guardian, 26 March 1990, ‘Bananarama serenades Delhi's departing troops’.
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1. Did the Sri Lanka government have Political Purposes?
Yes, the Sri Lanka government did have a set of Political Objectives. And these political
purposes played the determining role in the overall direction of government policy. These 
objectives were:
That a separate Tamil state was not to be allowed to be formed in Sri Lanka. This was 
a non-negotiable objective.
• That the government was prepared to devolve power to Tamils living in the Northern 
and Eastern Provinces with the District as the ‘Unit of Devolution’. The government 
wanted to proceed slowly and carefully in the devolution of power, cognisant of the 
fact that these Districts were the very same Districts from which Tamil secessionists 
wanted to create a separate state. TULF parliamentarians and Tamil insurgents 
consistently and inflexibly demanded that they wanted the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces joined together into one ‘Unit of Devolution’. When the UNP government 
offered the District Development Councils (DDCs) this offer was rejected.
• That the Sri Lanka government was completely opposed to merging of the Northern 
and Eastern Provinces into one territory called the ‘North-East’ or ‘North-East 
Province’ because it assessed that this was a serious threat to its territorial unity. This 
was the assessment of all political leaders who stood for an undivided Sri Lankan 
State.
• That the Sri Lanka government did not accept that the Northern and Eastern Provinces 
of Sri Lanka were the ‘traditional homeland’ of the Tamil people.
The above being said, however, the Sri Lanka government did not have an overall 
counterinsurgency campaign plan where -  while achieving the above objectives -  it could 
address the reasonable grievances of the Tamil people and defeat the Tamil insurgents. This 
proved to be a far too difficult a task for the Sri Lanka government because: (a) the Tamil 
insurrection grew immensely after the pogrom-riots, (b) the insurgents were assisted by the 
Tamil Nadu and Indian central governments, and (c) the Indian central government insisted 
on becoming an active participant in the search for a solution.
2. Did the Sri Lanka government give security to the Tamil population?
No. Very quickly after the pogrom-riots, i.e. by mid-1984, large areas of the Northern 
Province came under the control of Tamil insurgents. These Tamils were not governed by the 
Sri Lanka government. These Tamils looked to the Tamil insurgents for security.
Tamils who lived under Sri Lanka government controlled areas -  such as Colombo and also 
areas in the East -  were subject to suspicion and surveillance.
3. Did the Sri Lanka government neutralize the Tamil insurgents?
No. While there were fire-fights and ambushes and counter-ambushes, overall it was the 
Tamil insurgents who were on the tactical offensive and who took the initiative. The
insurgents .mplemented very skilful mobile guerrilla tactics which the Sn Lanka 
army found very difficult to cope with. The police stations were systematically attacked and 
all of them in the Northern Province and some in the Eastern Province too had to be 
abandoned. Gradually the government forces began to get isolated to their camps.
4. Did the Sri Lanka government gain and maintain popular support of the 
lamil people?
No. By this time the majority of Tamils in the Northern Province and a significant number in
the Eastern Province were living in areas under Tamil insurgent control. They did not support 
the government.
5. Did the Sri Lanka government separate the Tamil insurgents from their 
support base?
No. It s the opposite which happened, i.e. the Tamil insurgents separated the government
from the Tamil people, especially those Tamils living in the Northern Province. By late-1986
and early-1987 it was very clear that the military situation in Jaffna Peninsula and large parts
of the Vanni had turned against the army. The army was corralled within their camps and
could move out only in very strong columns with armoured cars. Obviously, in such a
situation there could be no normal contact with the civilian population. The insurgent tactics
had succeeded in separating the government from the Tamil people, the exact opposite o f
what should have happened in a successful counterinsurgency. A similar situation prevailed
in the Eastern Province too wherever government forces merely held onto their camps and 
some of the main roads.
6. What were the relationships the Sri Lanka government’s 
counterinsurgency operations had with the Law?
The Emergency regulations activated in June 1983 continued to as before. As the Tamil 
insurrection escalated, legal provisions became increasingly harsher. Concurrently, extra-
judicial killings also began.
7. Did the Tamil Nadu and the Indian central government impact upon the 
Sri Lanka government’s efforts to counter the Tamil secessionist 
insurrection?
Yes, exceedingly so. To the extent of violating Sri Lanka’s sovereignty, and, forcing a 
change in Sri Lanka’s Constitution . During this phase Sri Lanka came under very great
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pressure from the Indian Central government. The Indian central government implemented 
‘two-track’ policy where it applied diplomatic pressure on Sri Lanka while concurrentl 
trained and built-up the military capabilities of Tamil insurgents. The Tamil Nadu stat 
government and its people assisted the Tamil insurgents in numerous ways. Under intens, 
pressure from India the Sri Lanka government had to concede to a Provincial Council systen
July 1987 which joined together the Northern and Eastern Provinces. This created th, 
North-East Provincial Council (NEPC).
(But, the LTTE revealed through its actions that it wanted nothing less than a separate state. 
The LTTE began fighting the IPKF and also attacked and killed NEPC personnel, all of 
whom were Tamils who had agreed to a negotiated solution within a united Sri Lanka. 
Consequently the NEPC functioned for a short time and was then dissolved. And then, till the 
end of 1994 -  the end-date of this Thesis -  the insurgency raged in the North and the East and 
there was no possibility of implementing the Provincial Council system in the North-East.)
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Chapter. 5
The Tamil Secessionist Insurrection, 1990-1994:
Presidents Premadasa, Wijetunga & UNP
Government's Policies
Introduction
This Chapter is devoted to an examination and analysis of the UNP government’s policies 
from June 1990 when the LTTE re-ignited the insurrection to August-November 1994 when 
the UNP lost both parliamentary and presidential elections. These were the final AVi years of 
the UNP s 17 years in power. Compared to the 7 year period covered in the earlier Chapter 
these 4Vi years were simple : the LTTE continued with the insurrection and had considerable 
military successes. The Sri Lankan armed forces too had some successes but on balance they 
were in a worse position in 1994 when compared with the LTTE.
This 4Vi year period had nothing comparable to the frantic political negotiations of the August 
1984 to July 1987 period. There was no interference from India and no insistent pressure on 
the Sri Lanka government to ‘concede’ to Tamil demands. India adopted a “hands-off’ policy 
after the humiliating manner in which the IPKF had to exit from Sri Lanka by March 1990. 
After the LTTE killed Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 this “hands o ff’ policy became very accentuated. 
But even by that time significant damage had been done to the Indian national interest in the 
sense that the Congress Party’s leader -  and only remaining son of Indira Gandhi and 
grandson of Jawaharlal Nehru -  had been assassinated by the LTTE. Considerable damage 
had been done to India’s international image. In Tamil Nadu too there was a sharp dip in 
support for the Tamil insurgents due to the internecine killings and the killing of Rajiv 
Gandhi.1
As a matter of fact there were no ‘Tamil demands’ as such because the Tamil insurrection was 
by now prosecuted only by the LTTE. This was the case from October 1987 when fighting 
broke-out between the IPKF and the LTTE. All the other insurgent groups -  TELO, EPRLF, 
PLOTE and EROS -  became tiny caucuses of a few dozen die-hards. All of them were
1 See Subramanian, Narendra, 1999: 303-304, Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization: Political Parties, Citizens 
and Democracy in South India.
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After the IPKF left Sri Lanka in March 1990 the ceasefire between the LTTE and the Sri
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1990. This was a very serious political set-back for President Premadasa as his high profile 
personal effort had clearly failed.
th  ? k g0Vemment was ciear|y see" time to have been treacherously deceived 
There had been a truce with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam for more than a year while
negotiations to provide Sri Lanka's Tamil minority with greater autonomy went ahead. Most
diplomats in Colombo felt that the government of President Premadasa was making generous
concessions to try to reach a peaceful solution to end Sri Lanka’s seven-year civil war (iThe
Tigers could have got everything they wanted at the negotiating table” a Western diplomat in
Colombo said in puzzlement after the attacks [emphases added].3
LTTE
The Western Diplomat was correct. The merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces which 
had been such a persistent issue of disagreement during 1983-1987 was no longer an issue as 
it had already been conceded -  in the face of bitter opposition by some Sinhalese - via the 
Indo-Lanka Accord and the 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution. Numerous other 
powers too had also been conceded via the 13th Amendment. The 
established a Provincial administration -  the North East Provincial Council (NEPC) - and 
lawfully administered the entire Northern and Eastern Provinces as one Unit of Devolution. 
But the creation of a separate state had not occurred. From the LTTE’s actions it can be 
deduced that that was the ultimate goal and anything short of that goal was unacceptable. 
Once that central component of the LTTE’s strategy is understood the basis for puzzlement 
ceases to exist.
Rumours that the Sri Lanka government had transferred weapons and ammunition to the LTTE were in 
circulation within the Sinhala electorate. As mentioned in the earlier Chapter the story about this transfer had 
already been revealed by The Guardian in July 1989 itself. The Sri Lankan press avoided this story due to its 
inflammatory potential and apprehensions regarding their own security. In any event in May-June 1990 this 
matter was not (yet) a controversial issue as the government-LTTE ceasefire still prevailed.
3 The Times (London), 5 July 1990, ‘Tigers promised fight to finish'.
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President Premadasa was seriously interested in arriving at a negotiated
settlement with the LTTE in 1989. In the Sr, Lankan political system the President had
unrivalled power and is the ultimate decision maker. By getting personally involved
Premadasa sent an unequivocal signal that he was serious about negotiations with the LTTE,
and that decisions could be made and implemented very fast if the LTTE were serious.
President Premadasa was a very experienced Sinhala politician who had been involved in
thousands of negotiations and political manoeuvres during his career as a Municipal
Councillor, Member of Parliament, Cabinet Minister, Prime Minister and finally President.
President Premadasa was confident that he could negotiate a ‘deal’ with the LTTE. From
sometime from June 1989 onwards President Premadasa himself took direct control of the 
negotiations with the LTTE.
No officials attended those talks. Premadasa said that the LTTE had now pledged to join the 
democratic process, they had registered themselves as a political party; he said that he could 
trust them. When asked if they will not betray that trust he said NO.4
In this belief President Premadasa was seriously, and fatally, in error. The LTTE was not 
ready to compromise on a solution short of a separate State. During the negotiations with him 
the LTTE had never given a definite commitment that it was prepared to settle for a solution 
within a united Sri Lankan state. But Premadasa did not, or could not, understand this. He 
misread the LTTE's commitment to secession: he did not fully comprehend the LTTE’s 
sophisticated strategies and tactics during 1984 -  July 1987 when, while combining guerrilla 
warfare in Sri Lanka it insisted on demands which, in fact, were irrelevant to the LTTE. The 
LTTE insisted to Rajiv Gandhi's government from 1984 onwards that the merging o f the 
Northern and Eastern Provinces was an essential factor for a negotiated settlement. When the 
Indian government finally coerced the Sri Lanka government to make this vital concession via 
the Indo-Lanka Accord, without cooperating with the Indian government to make the 
Provincial Council work, the LTTE renewed the insurrection this time fighting the IPKF. This 
was the LTTE’s modus operandi and it should have been fully understood by the President.
During 1990-1994 the secessionist insurrection further escalated in intensity when compared 
with the entire period preceding it. A large number of military operations were conducted by 
the government and this period also witnessed the highest intensity of fighting seen up to that 
time. The number of armed forces and police casualties -  a concrete empirical indicator of the 
intensity of military conflict -  far exceeded the numbers of the entire preceding periods. As 
can be seen from Table 5.1 the army’s casualties were the highest.
4 Government of Sri Lanka, 1997: 15, Report on Assassination o f Major General Denzil Kobbekaduwa,
Sessional Paper No. IX-1997. See Bibliography for complete Title.
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Armed
Navy
Air
Force
Killed-in-Action
From 10 
June 1990 
to 16 Nov 
1994
4,230
228
118
From 1977 to 
10 June 1990 
(entire 
previous 
period)
1,017
% increase 
compared to 
1977-June 
1990
316%
470%
141%
Wounded-in-Action
From 10 June 
1990 to 16 Nov 
1994
2,121
From 1977 to 
10 June 1990
(entire
previous
period)
% increase 
compared to 
1977-June 
1990
429%
587%
688%
Police 714 400 78.5 % -16%
Total 5,290 2,297
(Source: ‘Official Roll of Honour-1977 to 2003’)
The subjects of this Chapter are best dealt with in two parts as it facilitates the understanding 
of the 1990-1994 period. Part.I deals with two systemic trends which exerted their effect 
during these years; of these the first two were major trends while the third was a very minor 
trend. First, the LTTE's targeted assassination of key civilian and military leaders of the 
government and therefore the veiy serious discontinuity o f leadership and strategy o f the 
government. The second trend was the UNP civilian government's abdication - while 
maintaining a cursory overview - of military strategy formulation and military operations to 
the army to a degree not seen before (or since) in Sri Lanka. These two strands were 
inextricably interwoven with each other and occurred synchronously; sometimes in close 
correlation with one another while at other times as a direct causal relationship with the other. 
Part. II is devoted, in chronological order, to a description and analysis of the military 
operations of these 4‘/2 years. Government policy during these 4*/2 years consisted almost 
exclusively of defensive and offensive military operations to cope with LTTE attacks.
assassinations
leaders and the Strategic Consequences
During 1990-1994 there occurred a series of assassinations and deaths of political and military 
leaders which were unprecedented up to that time. These deaths created serious 
discontinuities in political and military leadership and had a deleterious impact on the
government’s policymaking mechanisms
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LTTE
This
Of the Indian National Congress Party in Tamil Nadu, India, on 21 May 1991............
assassination had a great negative impact on the Indian Government, the Congress Party of
India, Indian civil and military officials, and large segments of ordinary Indian people
throughout India. The modus operandi pointed to the LTTE but the LTTE denied any 
involvement in the assassination.18 In 2006, 15 years later, the 
assassinating Rajiv Gandhi.19
LTTE
16 Guardian, 4 March 1991, ‘Tigers blamed for murder of security hawk’.
The Independent, 28 September 1991, ‘Sri Lankan government calls off Tiger offensive’. “The Sri 1 -uA-
government, facing a no-confidence vote in parliament, yesterday suspended all offensive operations against the 
Tamil Tiger separatist guerrillas in the north of the country, military sources said.” F g h
18 Times (London), 22 May 1991, ‘Rajiv Gandhi assassinated in bomb blast’.
,9 ^ le Guardian, 23 May 1991, ‘India After Rajiv: Tigers deny role in the attack’.
The Independent, 28 June 2006, ‘Tamil Tigers apologise for suicide bomber's murder of Rajiv Gandhi’.
In the years and decades after May 1991 the
negative impact of this assassination
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During this era Kobbekaduwa was hugely popular in the army and amongst the Sinhala 
people.'2 A great many military operations were carried out in the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces from June 1990 onwards (discussed later in this Chapter). In the course of these 
operations two senior field officers of the army became household names in Sri Lanka: Major 
General Denzil Kobbekaduwa and Brigadier Vijaya Wimalaratne. Even prior to this time both 
Kobbekaduwa and Wimalaratne were well known in the army and amongst the Sinhala 
public. They had been at the forefront of operations in Jaffna during the 1984-1987. Of these 
two Kobbekaduwa had a very charismatic personality and was by far the most popular 
amongst the Sinhala public. In the army too he was greatly loved and respected by the other 
ranks, young officers and most senior officers. The care and concern for the welfare of troops 
in the field that Kobbekaduwa had shown on numerous occasions was well known in the 
army. Some senior officers of an equivalent seniority to Kobbekaduwa, however, were hostile 
to him. This was primarily due to the inevitable competition for prestigious appointments 
amongst senior officers of similar rank, and also the inevitable competition to become the
Such changes and issues fall outside the time period dealt-with in this Thesis and therefore will not be 
discussed in this Thesis.
22 The Independent, 10 August 1992, Tamil Tiger mine kills top army commanders’.
He enjoyed the rare privilege of having had his entire military training in Britain. He obtained his officer cadet 
training at Sandhurst after which he did two young officers’ courses in the UK. He also did his Staff College 
course at Camberley and his higher defence training at RCDS (Royal College of Defence Studies) See Sri Lanka 
Armoured Corps, 2005: 322 and The Wish Stream, Vol.15, No.l, 1960, p.65.
Commander of the Army. Kobbekaduwa was one of the very few Sri Lankan
army officers who had his most important stints of military education -  i.e. as a Cadet, Staff 
College and Higher Defence College -  entirely in Britain.23
From late-1991 onwards it was publicly discussed in newspaper feature columns, at public 
meetings and in conversations that he should enter politics and ‘save’ the country from the 
LTTE scourge. Large road banners and wall posters were put-up by anonymous groups 
which appealed to Kobbekaduwa to contest the Presidency and lead the country to safety.23
In 1990-1992 Kobbekaduwa was probably the most popular Sinhala person in Sri Lanka.26 
President Premadasa’s political reputation was seriously damaged by the LTTE reneging on 
the promises made to the President during the earlier negotiating period. Kobbekaduwa was 
well aware of the danger posed to his military career by the unsolicited popularity he was
27
accruing. The appearance of pro-Kobbekaduwa banners and posters created unease within 
government circles.
During the 2 years and 2 months from June 1990 to August 1992, the pace of military 
operations -  reinforcement, withdrawals, ‘search & destroy’ - in both the North and East was 
unprecedented when compared with the preceding phases of the insurrection. After Minister 
Wijeratne’s death the tendency for the Sri Lanka Army to be in the forefront of the 
formulation of military strategy and planning became even further accentuated. General 
Kobbekaduwa’s name was often in the press. He was in the lead in the large multi-pronged 
operation to re-capture the populated areas of the East via Operation Sledge Hammer right 
from the inception of fighting on 10 June 1990 onwards. Subsequently, Kobbekaduwa was the
53 See The Times (London), 15 August 1992, ‘Maj-Gen Denzil Kobbekaduwa’. Kobbekaduwa had his Officer 
Cadet training at the Royal Military Academy (RMA), Sandhurst; his Staff College training at Camberley; and 
his highest level of training at the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS).
24 A fact of very great political significance was that Kobbekaduwa had close family connections to the main 
opposition party, the SLFP, through his Kobbekaduwa family network. The prestigious and influential 
Kobbekaduwa family was well known in Sri Lankan politics as a pro-SLFP family. Kobbekaduwa was also 
married to one of SLFP leader Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike’s nieces. Kobbekaduwa was well aware of his 
vulnerability within a UNP government. He attempted to be scrupulously a-political in his conduct within the 
army, in public, and in press interviews. However, accolades were heaped on him by newspapers supportive of
the Opposition SLFP.
25 Banners and posters were seen by the present author in suburbs of Colombo, late-1991 to August 1992.
26 This assessment is based on numerous discussions with a wide range of informants during this time, and, the 
press coverage given to the General. This assessment is not based on a scientific survey. Scientific surveys on 
such a topic were impossible to implement at that time to, among other factors, security dangers posed to the
implementers of such a survey.
27 Interview with the Genera’s wife, Mrs Lali Kobbekaduwa, June 2005, Colombo. When Kobbekaduwa 
received information of the appearance of banners and posters supporting him, he would arrange -  if he was in 
Colombo - for groups of soldiers to be sent in the night to such locations to cut down the banners and scrape 
away the wall posters. If Kobbekaduwa was in the Northern Province, however, he would not get such 
information in a timely fashion nor find it easy to muster the personnel to dismantle the banners and posters.
GOC (General Officer Commanding) the amphibious task force which saved the 
Elephant Pass army camp in July-August 1991 from being overrun by the LTTE (discussed 
later in this Chapter). Up to that time the army had experienced a string of withdrawals and 
defeats in the Northern Province. This operation was named Operation Balawegaya-J and was 
a significant victory for the army. Newspapers carried stories on this operation and it was 
widely popular in the eyes of the Sinhala electorate and boosted the morale of the armed 
forces, police and the Sinhala public. Kobbekaduwa was a hero in the eyes of the Sinhala 
masses. It can be accurately stated that no other military officer up to that time had achieved 
such a level of popular acclaim in postcolonial Sri Lanka.
Concurrent with the above President Premadasa personally and the UNP government in 
general became increasingly unpopular amongst the Sinhala electorate.28 By 1992 the UNP 
had been in government for a total of 15 years (President Jayewardene from 1977 to Jan 1989 
and President Premadasa from January 1989 onwards). Up till this time no single Sri Lankan 
political party had governed postcolonial Sri Lanka for such a long period. There was the 
natural tendency, as in all democracies, for governing parties to become unpopular due to 
matters such as the rising cost of living and this had begun to occur to the UNP. However, 
significantly the Sinhala electorate was also becoming increasingly worried about the LTTE’s 
successful attacks on the armed forces and police, the high casualties being experienced by 
the army and the police and the UNP government's inability to make meaningful progress 
against the LTTE.
After the LTTE re-ignited the insurrection in June 1990 it was on the offensive on many 
fronts. This compelled the abandonment of a number of army camps in the North, the 
withdrawal of their personnel to larger bases and the deaths of many hundreds of army and 
police personnel. For example, from 10 June 1990 to 31 December 1990, the police casualties 
were 457 killed and 12 disabled in action, and the total army casualties were 732 killed and 415 
disabled in action.29
It was in this context that President Premadasa’s period of negotiations with the LTTE came 
under renewed suspicious scrutiny by the Sinhala public, a suspicion which was deliberately 
fanned by Opposition parties and pressure groups hostile to President Premadasa. Large 
sections of the Sinhala electorate began to look at President Premadasa with suspicion. This 
was actively encouraged by the Opposition SLFP and other opposition political parties.
This is indirectly borne-out by the fact that in 1994 the UNP lost both Parliamentary and Presidential 
Elections. Discussed later in this Chapter.
29 ‘Official Roll of Honour-1977 to 2003’, 2005: spreadsheet.
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Gradually a body of opinion emerged within a section of the Sinhala peoples that 
Premadasa had been a ‘collaborator’ with the LTTE in 1989 and that he was still in 
collaboration with the LTTE in 1990-1992. To those with this extremist viewpoint Premadasa 
was a traitor’ to the Sinhala people. The risk that Premadasa had taken in 1989 to personally 
become the government’s chief negotiator now came to haunt him with renewed vigour.
When the LTTE reneged on its commitments and re-ignited the insurrection, the President’s 
standing in the eyes of the Sinhala people became tarnished.
Additionally, and in a sense most importantly of all, was the information that in 1989 
Premadasa had authorised the secret transfer of some small arms (such as AK-47s), 
ammunition and money to the LTTE.30 Information that President Premadasa had authorised 
this transfer gradually leaked into the public realm.31 By 1991-1992 this information was 
quite well known amongst the Sinhala electorate. This was assiduously encouraged by the 
Opposition. For most Sinhalese people who were hostile to Premadasa this was 
incontrovertible proof that he was a ‘traitor’ to the Sinhala people. Even UNP supporters loyal 
to President Premadasa found this fact difficult to understand.32
It was in this volatile political context that on 8 August 1992 General Kobbekaduwa and 
Brigadier Wimalaratne were caught in an explosion in Jaffna. They were on a reconnaissance 
trip in a Land-Rover on an island off Jaffna Peninsula. Wimalaratne and many others died on 
the spot while the very critically injured Kobbekaduwa was rushed to Colombo by helicopter 
and fixed wing aircraft and desperate efforts made to save him. Eventually he was pronounced 
dead. The death of Kobbekaduwa dealt an immense body-blow to the morale of the Army and 
the Sinhala people. Army personnel were deeply affected by the two officer’s deaths and there 
was a distinct demoralising effect on the army . However, other officers took over the duties 
of those killed and the army dourly carried-on with its duties. Mini anti-government riots 
occurred at both Officers’ military funerals which were held at the Kanatte cemetery in 
Colombo. Some busses were burnt and a considerable amount of disorder took place.34
As already discussed in Chapter-4.
31 Wickremasinghe, Nira, 2006:292, Sri Lanka in the modern age: a history of contested identities.
32 As discussed in Chapter-4 there is no doubt that President Premadasa had authorised this transfer. He did this 
as a part of his statecraft, without fully realising the risky consequences which could arise in the future. When 
the LTTE re-ignited the insurrection and armed forces and police personnel began to be killed in hitherto 
unprecedented numbers. The Opposition spread the story that it was with the weapons and ammunition that 
President Premadasa had transferred that the soldiers were now being killed. The irony is that it was entirely 
possible that some of the ammunition used against Sri Lankan army soldiers were from the stock transferred in 
1989. But that was not the result of a deliberate act of treason by the President but the unforeseen consequences 
of risky statecraft.
33 Interview with former army Commander Lt.General (Red) G.H. De Silva, August 2006, Colombo.
34 The Guardian, 13August 1992, ‘Mourners Rampage’.
The government appointed an official commission to investigate the explosion 
and the commission arrived at the conclusion that an LTTE IED (improvised explosive 
devise) had caused the explosion. Wide segments of the Sinhala population, however, 
dismissed these conclusions. In any event the death of these two officers served to cast a 
cloud over Premadasa personally and also served to diminish his authority.
In 1994, the new SLFP-led coalition government came to power. President Chandrika B. 
Kumaratunga appointed a Presidential Commission to investigate the death of Major General 
Kobbekaduwa and others.” In 1997 this Commission published its findings and one of its 
main conclusions was that it had found “evidence beyond all reasonable doubt that there was 
an IED on board the vehicle [in which the Major General and others were travelling]” and that 
President Premadasa was responsible for a conspiracy which led to the death of 
Kobbekaduwa.36
Vice Admiral Clancy Fernando. The next death was that of Navy Commander Vice 
Admiral Clancy Fernando on 16 November 1992. This was a targeted assassination. This 
attack took place when Fernando was being driven in the morning to Navy HQ in Colombo. 
As the Admiral’s staff car with his security detail was proceeding along one of Colombo’s 
main roads a motorcyclist drove up and crashed into the moving car and detonated 
explosives.37 All the occupants in the car were killed on the spot.38
The LTTE never admitted that it was responsible but the modus operandi was unmistakable.39 
This was the targeted assassination which caused the least strategic damage to the Sri Lanka 
government. That was because the navy took the death in its stride and a new Commander of 
the Navy was appointed on the same day itself and the navy dourly carried-on as usual.40 
Fernando was not politically connected as was Kobbekaduwa. Fernando’s death was
Government of Sri Lanka 1997. Sessional Paper IX-1997, The Report of the Special Presidential Commission 
of Inquiry Probing into The Assassination of Lieutenant General Denzil Kobbekaduwa and Nine Others and 
Causing Serious Injury to Another at Arali, Kayts on 08 August 1992.
36 See Government of Sri Lanka 1997: 170-171. Sessional Paper IX-1997, The Report o f the Special Presidential 
Commission o f Inquiry Probing into The Assassination of Lieutenant General Denzil Kobbekaduwa and Nine 
Others and Causing Serious Injury to Another at Araly, Kayts on OS August 1992. There are serious problems 
with this enquiry. It was done by a SLFP-led coalition government after the UNP had lost power in 1994; none 
of the main witnesses were alive -  eg. President Premadasa, Lalith Athulathmudali; and there were significant 
issues related to the investigative process. These cannot be discussed any further in this Thesis.
37 The Island, 17 November 1992, ‘Suicide bomber on motor bike with explosives rams Navy Commander: 
Navy Commander killed in bomb explosion'.
38 The Times (London), 17 November 1992, ‘Sri Lanka navy chief murdered’.
39 The Independent, 17 November 1992, ‘Bomber kills Sri Lankan navy chief’.
40 Sri Lanka Navy, 2013: 505 (Annexure page. VII), Sri Lanka Navy: Diamond of the Silent Blue. “Steering True 
1950 to 2010".
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politically significant because it caused yet another shock to the Sinhala public.
From the modus operandi the Sinhala public, government and all armed forces concluded that
the Admiral had been killed by the LTTE. This death further increased the fear and insecurity
of the Smhala people because for the first time a serving commander of one of the armed
forces had been killed by the LTTE." This was read by the Sinhala people as an indicator of
the LTTE s military prowess, and conversely, yet another pointer to weakness of the 
government.
President R.Premadasa. The next targeted assassination was that of President 
Premadasa himself on 1 May 1993. By April 1993 President Premadasa’s popularity was at a 
very low ebb. An attempt had been made in August 1991 to impeach him. This effort was 
defeated in October 1991. The two senior most members of his own UNP party -  Lalith 
Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake, both of whom were later expelled from the UNP by 
him — had led the impeachment effort. Premadasa was able to outmanoeuvre his opponents in 
parliament and did not face an Impeachment Vote. But his stature as President was further 
diminished. One of the charges made against Premadasa in the impeachment motion was that 
he had transferred arms and funds to the LTTE. As fighting between the LTTE and 
government forces continued throughout 1990-1993, armed forces casualties were in the 
newspapers almost on a daily basis. The Opposition SLFP and disgruntled UNP politicians
were wont to say that the dead soldiers had been shot by ammunition and weapons transferred 
by President Premadasa in 1989-1990. This kind of rumour negatively impacted upon 
President Premadasa’s reputation and stature.
In the last week of April 1993 Lalith Athulathmudali -  an ex-UNP leader who was one of the 
leaders of the attempt to impeach Premadasa - was shot and assassinated at a public meeting 
in Colombo. His alleged assassin was shot and killed by police personnel who chased after 
him. After initial investigations the government stated that the assassin was an LTTE cadre. 
The Opposition, on the other hand, claimed that Premadasa was responsible for the
A  * )
assassination. ~ Posters and slogans appeared on walls and a massive public campaign built- 
up against Premadasa. The President was compelled to go on State television and vehemently 
deny these allegations. However, the opposition kept-up its campaign against the President. 
The 1st of May is a holiday in Sri Lanka, and all the political parties have parades and public 
meetings commemorating workers’ rights. The UNP too organised its own procession.
41 This was the first and the last time that a Commander of any of the three armed forces were killed by the 
LTTE.
42 The Guardian, 26 April 1993, ‘Sri Lankan death mystery grows’.
President Premadasa joined the UNP procession when it was passing through 
his old parliamentary electoral aiea in central Colombo. He stepped out from his armoured 
vehicle and began to walk with the people in the UNP procession. A few minutes later a bomb 
explosion occurred in his vicinity and he, along with many of his bodyguards and UNP 
supporters were killed43 At least 17 were killed and 60 persons wounded.44
President Premadasa took this risky action in an effort to recoup the popularity he had been
losing over the previous months. Premadasa was an experienced populist parliamentarian with
over 30 years experience in the electoral hustle and bustle of Sri Lankan politics. He had a
strong popular base amongst many Sinhala voters in Colombo and throughout the country. 
Premadasa had an instinctive capacity for popular mobilisation.
Although he was under strict guard under normal conditions and avoided taking risks in 
public, on this occasion he violated the prudent counsel given by his security officers in his 
endeavour to be with ‘his’ people and be seen as ‘a man of the people’. Premadasa was under 
political siege on many fronts. Being seen amongst thousands of his supporters was one way 
to begin repairing his battered public image. Later that day parliament appointed Prime 
Minister D.B. Wijetunga as the new President as per the Constitution.45 
Within a period of 7 days - from Lalith Athulathmudali’s assassination on 26 April to the 
President’s assassination on 1 May -  the UNP and the country as a whole lost two very
capable and experienced political leaders. As Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam, TULF politician and 
scholar stated:
The last 10 days have completely destabilised the whole s y s t e m said Neelan Tiruchelvam, a 
lawyer and noted political commentator. “Two of the most dynamic, single-minded and 
determined politicians have been taken out. It was a dual body blow to the system, and it will 
take one generation to recover . . .  It is a very sad time for Sri Lanka [emphases added].46
There is a great deal of accuracy in the above observation. It is correct that the Sri Lankan 
State did not implode, did not decay. The institutions of the government and the State 
replaced the assassinated leaders with others and plodded along. But the UNP as a party went
43 The Sunday Times (London), 2 May 1993, Tamil Tigers blamed as bomb kills president'.
44 The Sunday Observer, 2 May 1993, ‘Personal body guards among at least 17 people blown to pieces in bomb 
blast: President assassinated'.
45 The Independent, 4 May 1993, ‘Sri Lanka leader catapulted to top'.
46 The Independent, 5 May 1993, ‘Sri Lanka mourns and fears for future’. Dr Neelan Tiruchelvam is the same 
TULF leader who negotiated with then Minister Athulathmudali in 1986 (discussed in the previous Chapter). Dr 
Tiruchelvam was himself assassinated by an LTTE suicide bomber in Colombo on 29 July 1999. He was 
involved in negotiations on Constitutional Reforms which would address some of the demands of the Tamils 
with the then government. This would have been within a united Sri Lankan State and that was considered a 
traitorous act by the LTTE. This assassination was one more indicator -  amongst thousands of attacks, targeted 
killings and reneging on negotiations -  which revealed that the LTTE was totally committed to the creation of a 
separate state.
into a serious crisis, other leaders in the party became fearful and, most 
important of all, the general public -  although outwardly people tried to put on a brave face -  
were very pessimistic of whether a separate state could be resisted. Without Premadasa’s 
forceful leadership the UNP became rudder-less. Suffering from the atrophy of having been in 
power for 16 years the UNP government was thence onwards essentially a ‘lame duck’ 
administration. While military operations were carried out, new army officers were routinely 
appointed as Division and Brigade Commanders and many ‘search and destroy’ operations 
were carried out very little -  if any -  substantive progress was made in countering the 
secessionist insurgency. A little more than a year later the UNP was defeated at both the 
parliamentary elections (in August 1994) and Presidential Elections (in November 1994) by 
an SLFP-led coalition led by Mrs. Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga.
Cumulative Consequences of these Assassinations. The political and military
policies of the government during 1990-1994 were compelled to ‘muddle through’ the deaths 
of the important Sri Lankan political and military leaders mentioned above. Continuity of 
policy was not possible to maintain when key leaders were eliminated at regular intervals. 
Wijeratne’s assassination was a body-blow to President Premadasa’s government as it 
eliminated the one individual in his cabinet who, at that time, could give effective leadership 
to the armed forces, had the confidence of the armed forces, and knew what had to be done. 
The other two senior leaders in the Cabinet were Ministers Lalith Athulathmudali and Gamini 
Dissanayake who were both contenders for presidential office and were involved in a 
leadership struggle with President Premadasa. After these two Ministers led an unsuccessful 
move to Impeach the President in August 1991, Premadasa expelled them from the UNP. In 
the present author’s assessment Wijeratne’s death was the most damaging to the Sri Lankan 
State. After Ranjan Wijeratne’s death it was Ranil Wickremasinghe -  a comparatively junior 
Minister who came from a traditional UNP family - that Premadasa appointed as the Minister 
to liase with the Defence establishment. Consequently the tendency for senior army officers to 
formulate military strategy became further accentuated.
The death of General Kobbekaduwa had consequences which were complex and far- 
reaching47. His death eliminated a very charismatic field commander and there was
All of these complex issues, some of them in the realm of civil-military relations in Sri Lanka, cannot be dealt 
with in this Thesis. However, the following need to be mentioned: (i) Kobbekaduwa was one of the senior 
officers in the army who could have become army commander either after the retirement of Lt.General 
Wanasinghe (1988-1991) or Lt.General Waidyaratne (1991-1993). (ii) Kobbekaduwa’s inadvertent ‘connections’
-  through birth and marriage, both of which he had no personal control over - to the Opposition SLFP were a 
thorny issue for Premadasa and the UNP government. Kobbekaduwa’s unprecedented popularity among the 
Sinhala electorate due to his association with the military successes of that added to the UNP government’s
widespread demoralisation within the army. Large scale attacks such as the LTTE’s
attack on Pooneryn Base in November 1993 (discussed later in this Chapter) increased this
demoralisation. While many operations were carried out during these years the cumulative
gams were minimal. When President Premadasa was assassinated the Sri Lankan state was 
shaken to its foundations.
Death, which has claimed many thousands of victims in Sri Lanka's long-running civil war, has in
the last two years been stalking some very senior military and political leaders. In March 1991
the defence minister, Ranjan Wijeratne, was killed by a powerful bomb in Colombo. In August
last year [1992] General Denzil Kobbekaduwa, in charge of the war against the Tamils in the
north, was killed by a landmine. In November [1992] Vice-Admiral Clancy Fernando , the
commander o f the navy, was killed by a motorcycle bomber. And just a week before Premadasa's
death his main rival, Lalith A thulathm udali, was shot dead at a political rally.[...] by the time o f
Premadasa's assassination many Sri Lankans felt that the very basis o f  the state was being 
shaken  [emphases added].48
The deaths of these political and military leaders had strategic consequences. These deaths 
were spread-out through these years. The first took place in 1991, the next two in 1992 and 
the last in 1993. These deaths created serious discontinuities in political and military 
leadership and had a strategically significant negative impact on the government’s 
policymaking capacity. Sri Lanka’s political and defence establishments were relatively small 
in 1990-1994. They could not easily generate alternative leaders to replace those who were 
lost. The Independent’s correspondent is accurate when he wrote that “by the time of 
Premadasa's assassination many Sri Lankans felt that the very basis of the state was being 
shaken.”49
The death of Premadasa led to a fundamental realignment of political forces and political 
affiliations within Sri Lanka. With his death, the most formidable challenge to the 
Opposition’s electoral chances in the elections scheduled for 1994 had ceased to exist. UNP 
politicians and supporters also became demoralised and the UNP government became a 
‘lame-duck’ administration. The electorate was weary with the UNP -  which by 1993 had 
been in power for 16 years -  and wanted a change. And that is precisely what happened in 
1994 when the UNP lost both parliamentary and presidential elections.
dilemma as there was high expectation within a large proportion in the army and the Sinhala people that 
Kobbekaduwa would soon be appointed army commander, (iii) Simultaneously, the UNP government was faced 
with the fact that Kobbekaduwa was probably the most popular Sinhala person -  military or civilian -  then living 
in Sri Lanka. The government. Opposition, the Sinhala electorate and all armed forces and police personnel 
knew that Kobbekaduwa’s popularity could easily be turned into a political asset at the next Presidential 
Elections.
48 The Independent, 5 May 1993, ‘Sri Lanka mourns and fears for future’.
49 The Independent, 5 May 1993, ‘Sri Lanka mourns and fears for future’.
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f ;2 The UNP Government’s Abdication of Military Strategy 
Conceptualisation to the Army
One of the distinct characteristics of the 1990-1994 period was the greater than usual role of 
army commanders and other senior army officers at AHQ being involved in the formulation 
of military strategy.50 The normal procedure in Sri Lanka is for the Commander of the Army 
and other senior officers to give policy advice to the government -  mostly during NSC 
meetings but also at other MoD meetings -  and for the civilian leaders to make the decisions. 
But during the 1990-1994 period the army’s senior officers were given a degree of ‘leeway’ to 
design and implement overall military strategy that was much larger than in any previous 
periods of the Tamil insurgency. This should not be understood as the army doing major 
operations without informing the government. What happened was that the army would 
design military strategies and make presentations to the government. Once the government 
gave its imprimatur the army would go ahead and implement that policy.
When, in June 1990, the LTTE re-ignited the insurrection with a series of attacks on police 
stations in the east and attacks on armed forces camps in the north, President Premadasa’s 
government was thrown into a serious quandary. He had been personally involved in 
negotiations with the LTTE and staked a substantial amount of his personal political capital in 
the negotiations. And the negotiations had completely failed. With its attacks in June 1990 
and afterwards the LTTE demonstrated that it was strong and skilful. LTTE quickly brought 
large areas of the East under their control, including large cities like Trincomalee, Batticaloa 
and Ampara. In these cities and elsewhere only armed forces bases and police stations 
remained under government control. In the North the LTTE kept up a relentless pressure on 
the army bases, many of which had to be abandoned and the personnel withdrawn.
It was in this context that senior army officers at AHQ in Colombo and in the field in the 
North and East came to the forefront of military strategy conceptualisation and planning to a 
degree unseen in earlier or in subsequent phases of the counterinsurgency. The amount of 
influence varied over time, and also varied in relation to the officers who were prominent at
M) Interviews with many retired senior army officers, including senior officers who were in service at that time. 
Corroborated with newspaper articles of that time. This situation was changed completely by the new 
government which came to power in 1994 (dealt-with in next Chapter) when the civilian political leaders took a 
firm leadership in the strategy formulation process.
any given period. However, the period 1990 to 1994 undoubtedly witnessed a degree2 ' 7 
of abdication of the civilian government’s role that was unusual for Sri Lanka.
President Premadasa’s approach was to allow the ‘military professionals’ to handle the 
‘military side' of government policy and for him and his cabinet to try and achieve the 
‘development side’ if his government’s policies. In 1991- early 1993 nascent development 
initiatives were launched by a few army Brigades in the Vavuniya area. These were efforts 
inspired by the US Army’s IDAD concepts. These were the result of initiatives taken by 
(then) Brigadier D. Kalupahana who was familiar with FM 100-20 and the British army’s 
counterinsurgency doctrine and other officers that he had trained.51 This began as an 
individual initiatives and was supported by President Premadasa. Kalupahana was called to 
Colombo by Premadasa and requested to brief a range of Cabinet Ministers, civilian 
bureaucrats and army officers. But President Premadasa was killed before this approach could 
have been given a chance to become a government-wide policy adopted by the entire army 
and the civil administration. After Premadasa’s death this whole initiative got shunted aside
and forgotten, the officers were routinely transferred to other localities and in the face of the 
military attacks by the LTTE.
After Ranjan Wijeratne’s death Ranil Wickremasinghe was informally appointed by the 
President to liase with the military establishment. These internal and informal arrangements 
within the innermost reaches of the government were not, and are not, openly discussed in Sri 
Lanka. These matters had to be painstakingly deducted and reconstructed by the present 
author through different bits of information obtained from close readings of newspapers and 
interviews with military officers made over the subsequent years.52 The modus operandi 
adopted in these years was for Army HQ to make presentations to the NSC on major 
operations planned for the future. Once the government’s civilian leaders gave the ‘nod’ -  
which was almost always a foregone conclusion as the civilian politicians’ view at that time 
was that the army should be allowed to ‘get on with the job’ -  then these operations were
* 53implemented. The many small scale ‘search and destroy’ operations launched in the East
51 Interviews with Major General (Rtd) Devinda Kalupahana, February and March 2008, Colombo. Kalupahana, 
then a Brigadier, had studied British and US counterinsurgency manuals from his days as a young officer. 
Kalupahana, with the cooperation of other junior officers that he had trained implemented an IDAD-type 
campaign in the area of Vavuniya that was his responsibility as a Brigade Commander. Later, from 1994-1995 
Brigadier Kalupahana was the Director of Operations (DOps) at Army Headquarters, Colombo. As DOps he 
tried to gel a coherent IDAD-type system functioning within the entire army but the army’s institutional inertia 
resulted in the process moving far too slowly and it eventually ceased with his retirement.
52 Interviews with former Army Commander (1 Jan 1994 to 30 April 1996) Lt.General (Retd) G.H. De Silva, 
July 2008, Colombo.
53 Information obtained through interviews with Major General (Rtd) Devinda Kalupahana and former army 
commander Lt.General (Retd) G.H. De Silva, July 2008.
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and in the North were mostly launched by AHQ under its own authority and
sometimes by division commanders. The government was briefed of the large scale operations
(such as the ‘encirclement of Jaffna peninsula’ discussed later in this Chapter). In effect the
army was delegated the task of subduing the LTTE and the means by which the army chose to 
do so was left to the army to conceptualise.
On 16 December 1992, there was a rare windfall of information for researchers like the
present author. In parliament, while answering criticisms made by the Opposition on defence
matters, the then Leader of the House Ranil Wickremasinghe made a wide ranging speech on
government military policy and defence matters. During the course of his speech he
inadvertently revealed the civilian government’s ‘hands-off’ approach to military strategy and
army s prominent and decisive role in military strategy formulation. Mr. Wickremasinghe’s
speech touched on a wide range of issues raging from the total number in the armed forces,
new equipment and weapons, medical facilities, uniforms and even the issue of duty free
cigarettes to troops. The speech revealed the role played by the army in determining the
highest-level military policies then being implemented in the insurgent areas, and the type of
relationship which existed between the army and the civilian government at that time. To 
quote in full:
“And kindly remember what the army and the armed forces have achieved in the last
2 years. They fi.e. the army] have been able to establish the administration in the
whole o f the Eastern Province. There are certain LTTE groups operating in the
jungles in the East. They are able to come and attack villages, sometimes disrupt
communication. But the administration goes on. They have not been able to dislodge
the army or police from the East, and the East is being administered by the 
Government.
The LTTE groups that attack the armed forces or the civilians are ones who hide in the 
jungles. The armed forces have decided that they could confine them [the LTTE] to 
the jungles, meet some of the threats, strengthen the security around the border 
villages more and then concentrate on the North. In fact last year [i.e. 1991] their [i.e. 
the army’s] strategy was to consolidate themselves in the East, to clear up some of 
the areas - there are about 6 areas in which the LTTE is hiding in the jungle areas - and 
when they were in the process of doing this campaign and finishing it up, the LTTE 
attacked at Elephant Pass. So the army changed their strategy, they landed at 
Vettilaikerni and went into Jaffna and in the next year [i.e. 1992] they have put a ring 
around Jaffna. [ . . .]
They [i.e. the Army] have secured the populated areas of Vavuniya, Mannar area and 
Mullaittivu. But they [i.e. the army] have decided to leave the jungle area open and 
then they put a ring around the whole of the Jaffna Peninsula confining the LTTE 
into that area [...] if you look at this map which was prepared by the armed forces, 
not by me, but given to me, it shows the position [...] There is administration going
Sri Lanka Parliament, Hansards, 16 December 1992: Cols. 3234-3242.
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HerfWinH' ^ IC'r ^ 'C' tllc army’s] policy is this. There are two large areas
.  I 0" maP) th£ LTTE °perateS’ the Jung 'e a™ , bu‘ also are not in
ntrol ancl in this area the LTTE does have control. They [i.e. the army] have got to
ecide their strategy next. In the meantime the LTTE has also decided on their
measures to counter the armed forces. [...] In fairness to the armed forces
mmnn er, eneral Wanasinghe, JOC, I must read out a directive because many
comments were made during the Committee Stage of the Defence Ministry. I would
1 6 t(? te you the operational directive issued by him for the period up to July 1993 
says t at t le concept o f the operation (sic) is to destroy the enemy’s manpower and
resources. [...] I must also say that the JOC, the three Service Commanders, the IGP, 
the Secretary Defence and the State Secretary are all engaged in conducting the 
operation (sic). We may sometimes not agree with their strategy. In war you always
f ln ifferent viewpoints, but it is not for us to go and undermine or demoralize or to 
attack them or for that matter to demoralize the troops [emphases added]”55
As can be seen, in this statement the Leader of the House and the government’s chief
spokesman Wickremasinghe placed the entire responsibility of the military strategy then
underway, including the encirclement of Jaffna Peninsula’, on the shoulders of the army. On
one occasion he even uses the word ‘policy’. At various points of his speech Wickremasinghe
said that it was the army which had “changed its strategy”; that it was the army’s “policy” to
implement certain measures; that the army has to “decide their strategy next” ...and so on and
so forth. Towards the end of the above speech Wickremasinghe used ‘we’ to refer to the
civilian leaders of the government, and ‘they’ and ‘their’ to mean the army. He thereby
created a ‘we’/ ‘they’ dichotomy which separated the civilian leadership from the military
strategy then being implemented. He went to the extent of stating that:
“We [i.e. meaning the government and also parliamentarians in general] may 
sometimes not agree with the Army’s strategy. In war you always find different
• • • »  )  n
viewpoints.
Thus, here we have a situation where the civilian government stated in parliament that it may 
"sometimes not agree” with its own Army’s military strategy because in warfare there are 
always different viewpoints. And that the correct posture for the government (and Opposition 
parliamentarians too) was to unquestioningly support the army and not criticise it as that 
would demoralise the soldiers. The above clearly violates civilian control of the military 
which is supposed to exist in a democracy and illustrates the UNP’s inability to cope with the 
insurrection. And so it handed over the entire responsibility to the army.
55 Sri Lanka Parliament, Hansards, 16 December 1992: Col. 3239-3240.
56 Sri Lanka Parliament, Hansards, 16 December 1992: Col. 3240.
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II
Government Military Operations, 1990-1994
Dunng 1990-1994 the LTTE showed strategic and tactical capabilities far greater than the earlier 
1984-1987 phase when it fought the Sri Lanka army, or the 1987-1990 phase when it fought the 
IPKF. For example, in those earlier phases not a single army camp was overwhelmed by the 
LTTE. Dunng the penod 1990-1994, however, the situation changed significantly to the 
detriment of the government. This increase in the LTTE’s ability to confront government forces 
was the result of the LTTE’s progressively increasing military capabilities. In certain areas of the 
Northern Province the LTTE was able to move from ‘strategic parity’ to ‘strategic offensive’.
5.3: The Army Responds to the LTTE’s Initial Onslaught in the 
East and the North
In the Northern and Eastern Provinces the LTTE had - beginning in the months prior to the exit
of the IPKF in March 1990 - gradually taken control of towns and villages that it could dominate.
As the last soldiers of the IPKF left the island’s shores in March 1990 the LTTE rapidly
moved-in to locations where the IPKF had been and filled the ‘vacuum’. And President
Premadasa’s government -  desperately trying to keep the ceasefire intact - didn’t do anything 
to prevent this.
For nearly three months [March, April and May 1990], with little interference from Colombo, the 
Tigers have policed the north and east, levied (some say extorted) taxes, and eliminated their 
remaining rivals. Most ominously, they have started to reconstruct the bunkers and booby traps 
which caused such carnage among Indian troops.57
During the 1989-1990 period when the government and LTTE were having talks President 
Premadasa’s government had given strict orders to the armed forces and police to refrain from 
any action which could be perceived as provocative by the LTTE and a reason for it to re-ignite 
the insurrection. Army personnel were very careful of the way they interacted with the LTTE. 
They were under strict orders to do nothing which could provoke the LTTE. No Officer 
wanted to be accused by higher authorities of being responsible for re-igniting the conflict.58
Excluding the large Sri Lankan armed forces bases, smaller camps and police stations, by 
early June 1990 large segments of even major towns like Trincomalee and Batticaloa were
*v The Guardian, 16 June 1990, ‘Sri Lanka's bloody conflict returns to square one’. 
58 Sri Lanka Army, 1999: 447, Sri Lanka Army: 50 Years On, 1949-1999.
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under the effective control of the LTTE. During April and May 1990 an uneasy
stalemate existed in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. During these months Premadasa’s 
government frantically tried to maintain the ceasefire with the LTTE.
By early June 1990 the atmosphere was very tense in the Batticaloa District, Eastern
Province. The Sri Lanka Army reported that the LTTE had by that time opened 30 to 40 small
outposts with bunkers in and near Batticaloa town.59 And the LTTE insisted that its
permission be obtained for the police, armed forces or government officials to travel to
various parts of the town in the course of their official duties. The Sri Lanka Army states that:
This situation was brought to the notice of the higher command and the civilian bureaucracy 
who were negotiating with the LTTE at that time. But the Security Forces were explicitly told 
to co-operate with the LTTE to bring about a peaceful settlement to the conflict [emphases 
added].60
However, on 11 June 1990 LTTE re-ignited the insurrection with attacks on Sri Lanka police 
stations, and by encircling army camps. All the initial attacks took place in the Eastern 
Province, in two attacks the LTTE killed 10 soldiers and 8 policemen.61
Concurrently all army camps and police establishments in both the North and East were 
surrounded by the LTTE. In the East, army camps and police stations in Batticaloa, Trincomalee 
and Ampara Districts were surrounded. By 12-13 June the LTTE had captured 25 police 
stations in the Eastern Province. " The LTTE asked the policemen to surrender saying that 
they would be released to the government. The government -  desperately under the impression 
that the ceasefire could be salvaged even through last minute negotiations -  gave orders for the 
Police to surrender. But in an action which no person in the government anticipated -  and 
about which the government received confirmed information only some weeks later, “in many 
cases, the police were driven to forest clearings, made to lie down, then shot. More than 150 
bodies have been found so far, and 650 policemen are still missing, presumed dead.”63
Sub-Inspector Pulhiri Ranaweera said that all 115 policemen who had surrendered at his station 
on the assurance that they would not be harmed had been massacred. “We were taken into the 
jungle after being blindfolded,” he said, his voice a little above a whisper. “Then we were 
stripped of our belongings and uniforms and made to lie down. Then they sprayed us with rifle 
shots. I pretended to be dead and though they shot at me the bullet just grazed my head”.64
y) Of the three Districts which composed the Eastern Province -  i.e. Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai 
Districts - Batticaloa District had the largest percentage of Tamils.
60 Sri Lanka Army, 1999: 445, Sri Lanka Army: 50 Years On, 1949-1999.
61 See The Independent, 12 June 1990, ‘Tamils attack' and The Guardian, 12 June 1990, ‘Tamil Tigers kill 18 in 
new fighting’.
62 The Independent, 16 June 1990, ‘Fiercer fighting in Sri Lanka’.
63 The Times (London), 5 July 1990, ‘Tigers promised fight to finish’.
64 The Times (London), 18 June 1990, ‘Sri Lanka killings resume amid ceasefire collapse’.
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The official casualty record notes that 410 police personnel were killed in the 
Eastern Province between 11-13 June 1990 65
The nature of the Tigers offensive has appalled most Sri Lankans, including many 
amis, an t e oreign community. The Tigers entered police stations after the police 
a een or ere by their superiors to lay down their arms. In many cases, the police 
were driven to forest clearings, made to lie down, then shot. More than 150 bodies have 
been found so far, and 650 policemen are still missing, presumed dead.66
The army camps in the East too were surrounded by the LTTE who called upon them to 
surrender and said that they would not be harmed and handed over to the government at the 
Batticaloa airfield.67 But the Commanding Officers of these army camps did not surrender. 
One of them prevaricated “in order to buy more time and avoid being found fault with for 
starting the war . All the others too stalled for time. This was fortunate because if they had 
surrendered they too would have been executed and their weapons and equipment captured by
the LTTE. The army camps were encircled and attacked but none were overrun. The smaller and 
indefensible ones were abandoned and the personnel withdrawn to larger camps.
While the initial attacks were taking place President Premadasa was still urgently trying to 
negotiating with the LTTE and re-establishing the ceasefire. Minister of Foreign Affairs 
A.C.S. Hameed was at the forefront of these efforts. But these efforts were in vain as by 16 
June widespread fighting was taking place in the Eastern Province.69
By 18 June the government stated unequivocally that a state of ‘war’ existed in the North and 
East. “The ceasefire in the northeast has been a b a n d o n ed said Ranjan Wijeratne, [Deputy] 
minister of defence, [...] “The northeast o f  the  coun try  is in a situa tion  o f  a ll-ou t w ar and 
military commanders have been given authority to use any operational measures necessary to 
defeat the guerrillas,” Mr Wijeratne added [emphases added].70
Government Re-Captures Populated Centres in the East: Operation Sledge
Hammer. Operation Sledge Hammer was the first Operation to be launched by the government
after the LTTE’s attacks.71 Regaining control of both Provinces was not possible given the 
strength of the LTTE and government forces and the degree to which the insurrection had
^  Official Roll of Honour, 1977-2003.
66 The Times (London), 5 July 1990, Tigers promised fight to finish*.
67 Sri Lanka Army, 1999: 446, Sri Lanka Army: 50 Years On, 1949-1999.
68 Sri Lanka Army, 1999: 447, Sri Lanka Army: 50 Years On, 1049-1999.
69 The Independent, 16 June 1990, ‘Fiercer fighting in Sri Lanka*.
70 The Times (London), 19 June 1990, Tamil rebels face all-out war launched by Colombo*.
71 The Times (London), 16 June 1990, Troops advance on bases held by Tamil Tigers’.
developed up to that time. What was achieved by the army was to re-capture
the large populated towns and areas along the East coast, and, to defend the armed forces
bases and camps in Jaffna Peninsula and in the Vanni.72 Practically all personnel who could be 
spared in the East were deoloved on the o ffends ________ i _____
LTTE
which is inexcusable given the actions of the LTTE over the previous months.
Tactical Retreat by LTTE in the East. It is with heavy fighting that the army was able
to enter Batticaloa town. 74 LTTE
the extensive jungles in the hinterland while the army controlled the highly populated area - i.e. 
the narrow strip along the coastline. The villages and little town lets further inland -  sometimes 
as little as 7-8 Kms from the coast -  were under the control of the LTTE. It needs to be kept in 
mind that these LTTE controlled areas were not permanently fixed areas. In the later years the 
army carried out many search and destroy’ type operations into the scrub jungles, small villages 
and rice fields which lay inland from the East coast. In turn, the LTTE too made many forays 
into the army controlled areas: it carried out ‘hit and run’ attacks on army foot patrols; ambushed 
army road convoys; detonated IEDs when the opportunity arose; assassinated Tamil civilians -  
MPs, local government politicians, and civil administrative employees - whom it determined 
were collaborating with the armed forces and police. “For their part, the Tigers are withdrawing
into the tropical forests from where they can, as in the past, launch hit-and-run attacks, mine 
roads and blow up bridges.”75
After Sledge Hammer accomplished the initial capture of main towns and territory the army 
launched several smaller ‘search and destroy’ operations in the East during the rest of 1990.
LTTE 76 These operations
n
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The Guardian, 16 June 1990, intensive army drive to dislodge Tigers: Guerrillas blamed for 'massacre' of 
Sinhalese police’.
The Sunday Times, 24 June 1990, Taking a hammer at the LTTE’. The government’s official press release 
mentions practically every senior Officer in the defence establishment except the Minister of Defence -  i.e. 
President Premadasa -  as being was involved in the planning or implementing the Operation in some capacity or 
another. Obviously the President would have been kept informed. The participation of such a wide range of the 
senior-most officers was a manifestation of the priority and urgency accorded to it by the government. And a 
public relations exercise to reassure the Sinhala public. Strategies for the implementation of Operation Sledge 
Hammer were planned by Deputy Minister for Defence Mr. Ranjan Wijeratne, Lt.General (Rtd) Cyril Ranatunge 
(Secretary, MoD), Air Chief Marshall (Rtd) Walter Fernando (Secretary to the State Minister for Defence) along 
with the armed forces’ commanders and the IGP. It was reported that they all met together on a daily basis. 
Lt.General Hamilton Wanasinghe (army commander) was placed in overall charge of the operation. He worked 
“in conjunction with” Vice Admiral Ananda Silva (navy commander), Air Marshal Terrence Gunawardena (air 
force commander), and Mr. Ernest Perera (Inspector General of Police). Maj.General J.R.S. De Silva was the 
Northern area commander and Maj.General Denzil Kobbekaduwa was the Eastern area commander.
74 The Times (London), 20 June 1990, ‘Colombo army takes battle to Tamil bastion’.
75 The Times (London), 29 June 1990, ‘Despair grips Sri Lanka as war grows more brutal’.
76 The Guardian, 20 June 1990, ‘Army assault drives Tigers from east’.
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were targeted at destroying LTTE cadres who had infiltrated back into specific
populated areas along the coast of the Eastern Province. This was a constant process which
occurred throughout 1990-1994 between the armed forces and the LTTE. The LTTE did its
utmost to have a presence in all Tamil populated town lets and villages areas in the East. It
had to as it was necessary to keep the insurrection alive. The LTTE also needed supplies,
intelligence, and recruits from the Tamil population. When under pressure by the army the
LTTE cadres eithei withdrew into the jungles inland from the coast while some stayed 
clandestinely amongst the Tamil people.
Army under Siege in the Jaffna Peninsula. While the populated areas of the East were
gradually re-captured by the army, in the North the situation was different. In the North the army 
was in camps and large bases encircled by the LTTE.
The heaviest fighting, however, is in the north. The government-held Palaly air base, close to 
Jaffna, was under intense artillery fire, and the Tigers were reported to be using three armour- 
plated bulldozers in assaults on Jaffna Fort. Later the army said it had broken out of Palaly base,
using shells, mortars and helicopter gunships to drive the Tigers back, but the fort remained under 
siege.77
In the Jaffna Peninsula and the Vanni the LTTE was in a much stronger position than it was in 
the Eastern Province. The civilian population was entirely Tamil and the armed forces were in 
camps and large bases located at strategic positions throughout the area. When it re-ignited the 
insurrection, the LTTE attacked all the army camps then existent in Tondaimanar, 
Valvedditturai, Point Pedro, Mandaitivu, Elephant Pass and Jaffna Fort™ (see Map 5.1). The 
main bases of Palali and Karaitivu were not attacked as they were large, well supplied and 
defended and could not be approached close enough.
In any event, it is the present author’s deduction79 that LTTE’s initial objective at this time was 
to make the army’s smaller bases and camps untenable and force them to be abandoned. The 
LTTE succeeded in achieving this objective.*0 By the end of 1990 in the Jaffna Peninsula the
77 The Independent, 21 June 1990, ‘Fighting divides Sri Lanka’.
78 Jaffna Fort army camp had a prestige value and the army and government were initially reluctant to withdraw 
from it. But it soon became clear that the Fort was untenable -  it could not be regularly re-supplied as the LTTE 
had surrounded it. Eventually the troops in the Fort were withdrawn through a large-scale military operation - 
Operation Thividha Balaya, which incorporated all three of the armed forces.
79 Based on a close examination of the LTTE’s attacks during these years.
80 The attacks on these camps were not large-scale frontal attacks meant to rapidly overrun these camps. If that had 
been done the LTTE’s casualties would have been too high. The LTTE merely used mortars, RPGs, heavy machine 
guns and small arms fired from the outer perimeters of the camps to keep the personnel within these camps pinned 
down, under siege and thereby underscoring the insecurity of these camps. The LTTE was in control of the territory 
in between them and the main Palali Base. Palali Base had large stocks of ammunition and non-perishable supplies 
which could last for months. The army camps at Tondaimanar, Valvedditturai, Point Pedro and Mandaitivu were 
abandoned and there was an orderly withdrawal to Palali Base very soon alter the LTTE’s attacks on 11 June 1990.
Karaitivu (Navy), Palali (Army and Airgovernment was left only with bases in
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force) and Elephant Pass (Army).
Landlocked Army Camps in the Vanni in Very Grave Danger. In the ‘Vanni’ region
south of the Peninsula the situation was as follows: there were three isolated and land-locked 
army camps at Mankulam, Kokavil, and Kilinochchi. These three landlocked camps were the 
ones in greatest danger. These three camps were located along the strategically important A-9
and withdrew its personnel to safety (see Map 5.2). The army had large camps in Mannar, 
Vavuniya and Welioya. These camps and bases were on the ‘outer-rim’, so to speak, of the
under pressure by firing mortars at them. The LTTE also ambushed army foot patrols in the 
jungles surrounding these large camps thereby deterring the army from launching reinforcement 
or rescue operations of the three landlocked camps.
81 In the previous years when the IPKF was operating in these areas these camps had been supplied by truck convoys 
along the A-9. During that period the LTTE carried out guerrilla attacks on the IPKF but these camps could be 
supplied and reinforced by land. The LTTE was operating in a guerrilla mode from the jungles.
82 The Guardian, 15 June 1990, ‘Tigers move fight to north of Sri Lanka’.
83 This deterred any attempt by troops in Mullaittivu to make forays towards Mankulam or Kokavil and try to 
reinforce them. In June-August 1990 the LTTE did not attack Mullaittivu camp in a serious fashion. Mullaittivu was 
on the eastern coast of the island and could be supplied by navy vessels and air force helicopters.
main road which linked Vavuniya to Elephant Pass. These camps could not be supplied by land
O |
and therefore highly vulnerable. From mid-June 1990 onwards the LTTE encircled these three
o ?
camps and kept them under siege. Simultaneously, the LTTE kept the army base at Mullaittivu 
under pressure with attacks using mortars and small arms.83
As soon as hostilities resumed the army abandoned its camp at Kondaichchi on the west coast
Vanni (see Map 5.2). They were not directly attacked by the LTTE but the LTTE kept them
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Map 5.2. Armed Forces Camps in the ‘Vanni’ which were Overrun, Withdrawn or 
Retained
From June 1990 onwards LTTE concentrated its attentions on Kokavil, Mankulam, and 
Kilinochchi. Kokavil was a radio relay station and had only about 1+ platoon of troops. 
Mankulam had about 200 troops; Kilinochchi had about 150 troops.84 The LTTE’s strategic 
objective in attacking these camps was very clear: if these camps could be destroyed then the 
entire ‘inner’ areas of the Vanni would come completely under the control of the LTTE (see Map 
5.2).
Kokavil Army Camp Captured and all Personnel Killed, July 1990. Kokavil was
the smallest camp with the least amount of personnel. The LTTE tactically correctly attacked it
o c _____
first. The Kokavil camp was overwhelmed on 11 July 1990 and all its personnel killed. ' The 
Official Roll of Honour indicates that 29 personnel were killed on that day.86 Military sources 
acknowledged that “the base is surrounded by dense jungle patrolled by the Tigers.’’87
If so why was this camp’s personnel not withdrawn as soon as the LTTE’s attacks began? It 
was very clear from the beginning that Kokavil could not be re-supplied and reinforced. It
GO
could be re-supplied and re-enforced for a limited time by helicopters. The needless loss of 
the soldiers at Kokavil camp was a manifestation of the army’s high command lack of a 
proper appreciation of the danger to the camp and a high degree of incompetence. Landlocked
84 The Independent, 26 July 1990, ‘Sri Lankan troops lift siege’.
85 The Island, 13 July 1990, ‘Death toll not known’.
86 Official Roll of Honour, 1977-2003, data from Spreadsheet.
87 The Guardian, 14 July 1990, ‘Tigers lake base in jungle siege’.
88 But that too at great risk to the aircraft because the moment LTTE cadres with heavy machine guns and RPGs 
arrived in the area the helicopters were in danger.
and isolated camps like Kokavil, Kilinochchi and Mankulam camps
should have been withdrawn as soon as hostilities began. They did not have secure supply
routes and were therefore completely untenable. Camps and bases (the larger the camp or
base, the better) like Palali, Mullaittivu and Mannar were relatively secure because they were
near or on the sea coast itself and therefore they could be approached and re-supplied over 
‘open ground’ i.e. the Ocean.
Orderly Withdrawal of Kilinochchi Army Camp, July 1990. The loss of Kokavil
camp concentrated the minds of the Army’s high command on the vulnerability of the remaining 
two land-locked camps, Kilinochchi and Mankulam. On 19 July, eight days after Kokavil, the 
army earned out Operation Gajasinghe. Some 500 troops from Palali were first transported by 
helicopter to Parantan located south of Elephant Pass. Subsequently, these soldiers moved to 
Kilinochchi in the face of some LTTE resistance, linked-up with the troops at Kilinochchi base 
and then all of them made an orderly withdrawal with all their weapons, equipment and soldiers 
back to Elephant Pass camp. They had to face harrying attacks by LTTE fighters who were 
around their moving column but the operation was successfully completed.89 Both the army and 
the LTTE made tactical mistakes in relation to the timing of their actions related to Kilinochchi. 
Fortunately for the army, it did not suffer any consequences.90
Disorderly Rout of Mankulam Army Camp, November 1990. The LTTE maintained
its encirclement of Mankulam camp, regularly attacking with mortars and machine gun fire. 
Mankulam was further south on the A-9 road than both Kilinochchi and Kokavil (see Map 5.3) 
and was in an even more precarious situation 91 On 15 July 1990 the army dropped fresh troops 
by helicopters in the vicinity Mankulam camp. They joined the troops at Mankulam camp and
^  Sun, 21 July 1990, Troops liberate Paranthan' and The Independent, 26 July 1990, ‘Sri Lankan troops lift 
siege’.
90 After the fall of Kokavil the army took eight days to launch Gajasinghe. This was far too long a delay but the 
army did not have to pay a price because of the LTTE’s mistake (see below). The 8 day delay may have been the 
result of the lack of troops to launch the Operation and other reasons. Whatever the reasons, it was a risk but 
fortunately for the army it didn’t suffer any loss. In the case of the LTTE, it should have quickly exploited the 
shock-effect of its victory at Kokavil on the government’s civilian leaders and the army’s high command. The 
LTTE should have overwhelmed Kilinochchi within a day or two after Kokavil and not given the army those 8 
days. But the LTTE did not attack immediately: it may have thought it had more time to deal with Kilinochchi 
camp; it may not have anticipated a Gajasinghe type operation; or it may not have had sufficient cadres to carry-
out an attack on the scale that was needed in the case of Kilinochchi camp -  which had more than 4 times the 
number of soldiers who had been at Kokavil. Whatever the reasons the opportunity slipped away from the LTTE. 
Two days after Gajasinghe on the night of 22 July the LTTE attacked some troops who were still at Parantan and 
killed 9 and wounded 35 but the emplacement was not overrun.90 Later all army personnel at Parantan too were 
quickly withdrawn north to the larger camp at Elephant Pass.
91 The air force continued to re-supply the camp as best as it could by dropping supplies and ammunition from 
helicopters. The helicopters had to stay at a sufficient height to avoid the worst of the LTTE’s heavy-machine gun 
anti-aircraft fire. Inevitably some of the supplies fell outside the camp perimeter and into the hands of the LTTE.
the defence of the camp was temporarily shored-up. 92 By November 1990 the
number of troops in Mankulam were reported as 30093 In Mankulam camp’s case a fresh
Gajasinghe type operation would have been even more dangerous and difficult than 
Kilinochchi.94
In any event the army did not do anything proactive. It just re-supplied as best as it could and 
allowed the situation to continue for another 4 months. The LTTE maintained its pressure on 
Mankulam camp over the following months but simultaneously built-up a sizable attacking force 
near Mankulam. Then on 23 November 1990 the LTTE, after gathering an estimated 1,500 
cadres and heavy weapons launched a very forceful attack on Mankulam camp95 After 2 days of 
fighting the remaining soldiers at Mankulam were forced to abandon the camp and all their 
heavy weapons and ammunition.'6 “Tamil Tiger rebels have captured an important army camp
in northern Sri Lanka in possibly the bloodiest battle of the seven-year civil war, the defence 
ministry confirmed yesterday [emphases added].”97
Mankulam was a disorderly rout and reflected very badly on AHQ and the senior officers of the 
army. In effect Army HQ abandoned the soldiers at Mankulam who had to save themselves as 
best they could.9S This is mentioned here to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that the Sri
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Sun, 16 July 1990, ‘Mission to relieve Mankulam soldiers; rescue Kokavil survivors: Troops launch fresh 
offensive in North’.
93 The Independent, 28 November 1990, ‘Troops escape’. Here again, in the assessment of the present author the 
army made another tactical error. Instead of shoring-up the camp, what the army should have done was a 
Gajasinghe type operation and withdrawn its personnel, weapons, ammunition and other equipment. Depending 
on tactical criteria the army could have either withdrawn northwards to Elephant Pass or southwards to 
Vavuniya. Better still, Operation Gajasinghe's should have withdrawn both Kilinochchi and Mankulam at the 
same time.
94 The reasons were, first, the LTTE had experienced Gajasinghe and seen what the army could do; second, by 
delaying the army had given the LTTE time to prepare counter-measures; third, Mankulam was even deeper in 
the Vanni jungles than Kilinochchi so the reinforcement troops would have had to fight their way, both to and 
from Mankulam camp, for much greater distances; fourth, the air force’s helicopters would have been in greater 
and greater danger depending on how close they came to Mankulam to disembark the reinforcement troops; fifth, 
if the army implemented an operation similar to Gajasinghe then the reinforcement troops would have had to re-
fight their way on the same route all over again and the LTTE had already had an (inadvertent) rehearsal . But 
the problem was that, in fact, a Gajasinghe type operation was the only option the army had as the air force just 
did not have enough helicopters to implement a complete helicopter-bourn operation. If such a helicopter-bourn 
operation had been attempted the air force risked the loss of most of the helicopters in its fleet.
95 The Guardian, 26 November 1990, ‘Heavy losses as Tigers ‘capture army stronghold’.
96 Fortunately this did not include any artillery guns. But did include heavy and light mortars, heavy machine 
guns and the stock of ammunition. The fleeing soldiers took only their personal weapons and whatever 
ammunition and food they could carry while moving fast.
97 The Guardian, 27 November 1990, ‘International News in Brief: Tigers' victory’.
98 It needs to be mentioned here that the army and the government did not have many options in relation to 
Mankulam. Reinforcing Mankulam by troops marching overland was extremely dangerous and could very well 
resulted in those troops too getting wiped out as well. Helicopter bourn operation could have resulted in the air 
force losing all the helicopters that it deployed. This would have had consequences to all the other camps and 
bases which -  when required -  needed to have some communication via helicopter. However, the government 
and army could have made proactive decisions after Kokavil’s loss in mid-July 1990. But AHQ managed to get 
some supplies through but beyond that just waited. The LITE’S final attack came in November, 4 months after 
the falloff Kokavil. This is inexcusable. What AHQ should have done soon after (or better, simultaneously with)
years suffered from innumerable
Lanka armed forces and police during these
leadership, analy.ieal and tactical deficiencies, and this is just one example* S™ll of
sold,ere and individual soldiers tried as best as they could to make thei, way southwards through 
the jungle to government controlled territory in the Vavuniya area. THe retreating soldiers were
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A significant number
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the skies and searched for groups of surviving troops. Some of the fortunate ones were picked up 
by helicopters and brought to safety in Vavuniya.101 By 29 November Ranjan Wijeratne stated 
that 117 armed forces personnel had been rescued by air force helicopters.102 The Official 
Roll of Honour mentions that 75 army personnel were killed in Mullaittivu District during 23-
A 4 ______ i m
24 November 1990.
LTTE
strategy in the Vanm had achieved success. Map 5.3 is an aggregate map which indicates all
overrun
army
camps in Mannar, Vavuniya, Welioya, Mullaittivu, Elephant Pass, Palali and the Navy base at
Karaitivu
‘circumference’ of the Northern Province. The rest of the area -  and its population - was
LTTE
and Palali, and the navy base on Karaitivu island were the only locations under government
LTTE
The viability of all these bases depended entirely on whether they had secure supply lines.
Operation Gajasinghe, was to have ordered the Mankulam troops to break-out of their camp and make an orderly 
withdrawal to Vavuniya (along the A-9 road, directly southwards, see Map 5.2). In late-July 1990 the troops at 
Mankulam were better nourished, had less wounded personnel amongst them, had more ammunition, had more 
serviceable trucks and jeeps -  in effect, in all military aspects they were in much better shape than they were 4 
months later in November 1990, after being besieged with daily mortar and small arms fire by the LTTE.
J Details about these deficiencies can be dealt-with in this Thesis only to the minimum degree necessary for this
Thesis.
100
The Island, 26 November 1990, ‘Soldiers pull out of Mankulam camp’. Desperate fire fights would have 
taken place within the Vanni jungles. Sometimes the soldiers would have won and have managed to escape to 
Vavuniya. At other times not, and then their bodies would have been stripped of their kit and weapons and their 
bodies left to decompose or consumed by jungle animals.
101 Interviews with air force pilots who flew on such sorties and The Island, 27 November 1990, ‘In bid to spot 
soldiers: Aerial survey of Mankulam jungles’.
102 The Island, 30 November 1990, ‘Ranjan on Mankulam Camp attack: Helicopters pick-up 1 17 soldiers’. 
Wijeratne was the Deputy Minister of Defence.
103 Official Roll of Honour, 1977-2003, data from Spreadsheet. These were soldiers who died during the final 
attack on the camp and also killed in the jungles.
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Mg»nar had to be supplied ‘external lines of communication’ by sea or helicopter. Occasionally urgent supplies or 
high ranking officers would be transported by helicopter. The road link between Mannar and Vavuniya ran through 
territory which was contested. While the LTTE allowed civilian buses and trucks to ply on these roads, vehicles of 
the armed forces or police could be ambushed at any time. After being checked for IEDs and picketed, infrequent 
truck convoys would be run. By contrast Vavuniya was well connected via ‘internal lines of communication’ by road 
and rail from the south. In the Welioya area the many camps had secure ‘internal lines of communication’ from the 
rest of the country to its south. Mullaittivu army base, however, was isolated on the east coast and could be re-
supplied only by sea or helicopters. Further north was Elephant Pass (EPS) base. At this time - early-1990s - it was 
a battalion* sized camp which dominated a tiny strip of land which joined Jaffna Peninsula's isthmus to the ‘Vanni’ 
region south of the Peninsula. Both the A-9 road and the former railway line went though this point. EPS was a 
strategic ‘choke-point’ and a camp which was there from at least the 1950s. When the IPKF was in Sri Lanka EPS 
could be supplied by trucks from Palali. But once the IPKF left and the entire area between EPS and Palali came 
under LTTE control EPS became isolated. EPS had to be supplied by helicopters from Palali. Palali army plus air 
force base was a very large base having accommodation for many thousands of troops at any one time. Palali was the 
armed forces’ largest and main base in the Jaffna Peninsula. While it too had ‘external lines of communication' by 
sea and air its re-supply was reasonably assured. It had large reserves of food and ammunition and was the main re-
supply base for the other camps in the North. It had a well equipped hospital, refrigerated supplies, ammunition and 
weapon stores and numerous other facilities. The air force’s Palali airfield could handle the largest fixed-wing aircraft 
of the air force and was situated within the perimeters of this large base. So too was the Kankesanturai (KKS) 
harbour. The large Navy base at Karaitivu obtained its supplies from Palali Base and via independent navy supply 
vessels.
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launched a very large and well-planned attack on the Elephant Pass Base."* ___________
land locked and the only means of re-supply was by helicopter.105 The LTTE made the correct 
analysts that it was the most vulnerable of the army bases in the North. In many ways it was 
like Mankulam base with the exception that the eastern sea coast was not too distant. If the
LTTE
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victory, and most important of all, unhindered communication between Jaffna peninsula and 
the ‘Vanni’ region immediately south of the peninsula.
LTTE
------ o
reconnoitring helicopters and the senior officers at Palali main base and at AHQ in Colombo
LTTE
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was not an easy task as it had to be done over several hundred metres of relatively open land - 
the exact distance depended on the direction from which an attack was launched. Therefore
LTTE
AK-47 type arms and heavy machine guns for the attack. 1
LTTE also used some improvised armoured vehicles which had a considerable shock effect 
on the defending troops.107 These were ordinary earthmoving bulldozers over which LTTE 
mechanics had welded steel plates.108 According to army sources these vehicles had
LTTE 1
In addition, LTTE
Ceylon Daily News, 19 July 1991, ‘Balavegaya column makes Headway: Troops within 3 miles of camp’.
m
105 At lhis time this camp had a strength of approximately 800 men. The area surrounding the camp is lowdying 
and bare of trees and large vegetation. It’s a shallow lagoon most of the year. The soil was saline and arid and 
the vegetation are clumps of coarse grass and weeds. The camp itself was a collection of crude shelters and one 
storey buildings surrounded with trenches, sandbags, barbed wire fences and mine fields.
106 Ceylon Daily News, 12 July 91, ‘Grim battle at Elephant Pass: Forces inflict heavy Tiger Casualties’.
107 The Independent, 15 July 1991, ‘Tamil attack’. These bulldozers had been stolen by the LTTE from the army 
or private contractors or government corporations such as the abandoned cement factory in KKS, Jaffna.
108 Ceylon Daily News, 15 July 91, ‘Fresh siege of Elephant Pass camp repulsed: 70 Tigers killed as forces hit 
back’.
109 The Island, 13 July 91, ‘Attack on Elephant Pass enters third day: Army knock bulldozers down, repulse 
attack’.
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armour protection. According to the government the LTTE had mobilised 
four armoured bulldozers and “hundreds” of tractors."0
In the first days of the LTTE’s attack one of the policies adopted by the government was to
impose a curfew over the entire northern province of the excluding the Sinhala populated area
south of Vavuniya.111 The objective was to prevent as much as possible the LTTE bringing
more cadres to the Elephant Pass battle. In spite of this measure LTTE moved supplies and
personnel during the night and under jungle cover, and managed to keep up the attack on 
Elephant Pass camp.
The Army s Successful Amphibious Reinforcement Operation: Operation
Balavegaya-1. When the LTTE s attack on Elephant Pass began, the government and the
army quickly decided that the base could not be allowed to fall to the LTTE. This could not be
another Mankulam-type fiasco. The government was very firm on this. The army’s high
command rapidly developed a counter-operation to link-up with the troops at Elephant Pass and
rescue them. This was Operation Balavegaya-1. It was an amphibious operation which began
on 14 July 1991, four days after the LTTE began its attack. It was led by Maj.General Denzil
Kobbekaduwa and Brigadier Vijaya Wimalaratne. After considering several options it was
rapidly decided that a large force would be transported in landing craft from the Trincomalee
navy base and landed on the a suitable location on the east coast of the isthmus of the 
* 112
Peninsula. ~ In the face of intense LTTE counter-attacks the troops landed on the beach at 
Vettilaikerni. With great difficulty a beachhead was secured. Then the troops began to fight their 
way towards Elephant Pass camp.113
The LTTE kept on attacking the troops at Elephant Pass while concurrently attacking the task 
force column which was inching its way from Vettilaikemi to Elephant Pass and attacking the 
beachhead at Vettilaikemi itself.114 During the initial days and weeks of the attack the initiative 
was with the LTTE and Elephant Pass camp may have been overrun. However, the army column
il0 Ceylon Daily News, 19 July 1991, ‘Balavegaya column makes Headway: Troops within 3 miles of camp’. It 
needs to be noted that all these “hundreds” of tractors were not of the armoured variety. Both the army and the 
LTTE had discovered by this time that normal farm tractors with Hat bed trailers were the best means of field 
transport in the rough terrain in the North and East. They were widely used for transporting personnel and 
supplies by both the LTTE and the armed forces.
1,1 Ceylon Daily News, 12 July 91, ‘Grim battle at Elephant Pass: Forces inflict heavy Tiger Casualties’.
112 The Independent, 16 July 1991, ‘Navy joins battle to lift Tamil siege’.
113 The Guardian, 18 July 1991, ‘Sri Lanka troops cut by Tigers’.
114 Ceylon Daily News, 17 July 1991, ‘Relief on the way to besieged soldiers at Elephant Pass: Troops halfway 
there in dogged advance’
fought-on. More than 600 Tamil rebels and
78 soldiers have died in nine days of the------------------— « T V U v u III 11111
most intense combat since the Tamil independence drive began eight years ago 11 11
army
troops at Elephant Pass on 2-3 August. During the three week battle the government claimed
LTTE
wounded. 11 When Balavegaya-1 finally ended the army’s task force comprised of
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LTTE
)le that the LTTE mobilised its maximum military 
camp and also to resist the task force. The LTTE
the task force from landing and then fighting its way to Elephant Pass. The army, the government
and the Sinhala people in the south rejoiced at the task force’s achievement. Maj.General
Kobbekaduwa was feted as a national hero by newspapers and his popularity amongst the 
Sinhala increased even further.118
However, it was worrisome that by July 1991 the LTTE had been able to develop the military
capability to, first, launch a nearly successful attack against Elephant Pass camp and second,
resist the advance of a task force of approximately 6000+ troops for three weeks. This had to be 
analysed and digested by the army.
The confrontation has led to a reappraisal by the army o f the rebels’ strength and capabilities. 
The Tigers have evidently organised themselves along conventional military lines, with a ranking 
system. Lieutenant-General Hamilton Wanasinghe, the army commander, admitted: “The Tamil 
Tigers can no longer be considered only as a guerrilla outfit. They can field large numbers of 
men, redeploy fighters from elsewhere in the war zone when required, and are armed with 
weapons like machineguns, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars to match the Sri Lankan 
army's armour and field artillery [emphases added].”" 9
What did this type of capability signify in relation to the insurrectionary process as a whole? 
What did these capabilities indicate as to the specific ‘phases’ that the LTTE may be able to 
enter? Was ‘strategic parity’ and ‘strategic offensive’ possible in localised areas?
116 
I
118
The Independent, 20 July 1991, ‘678 killed in Tamil battles’.
,u The Sunday Island, 4 August 1991, ‘Tigers routed at Battle of Elephant Pass: Army enters besieged camp’.
17 The Sunday Island, 4 August 1991, Tigers routed at Battle of Elephant Pass: Army enters besieged camp’.
The reader should refer to Part I of this Chapter where Major General Kobbekaduwa, his popularity and his 
death are discussed. It was victories like saving EPS camp that cemented General Kobbekaduwa’s popularity 
with the Sinhala people.
110 The Times (London), 2 August 1991, ‘Sri Lankan troops push within sight of besieged camp'.
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The Army’s ‘encirrlpmpnt’ affna Peninsula Strate
LTTE
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With the army taking the lead - to exert an enormous effort to save the camp from being
overrun. This was a very worrying and sobering experience for all senior officers.120
After the Elephant Pass camp was saved, the army began a deep analysis of what the LTTE’s
strategic objectives were for it to have expended such a great deal of its cadres and resources 
to try and overwhelm Elephant Pass camp.121
In August-September 1991 the army modified its then extant strategy and introduced an 
additional objective of ‘encirclement of Jaffna Peninsula’. This new strategy was a military 
secret in August-September 1991 and was revealed in parliament only more than a year later 
by chief government spokesman Ranil Wickremasinghe in parliament in December 1992.
they [i.e. the army] have decided to leave the jungle area open and then they put a 
ring around the whole of the Jaffna Peninsula confining the LTTE into that a rea” 122
army 123
LTTE
able to capture Elephant Pass then it would have been able to freely move its cadres, heavy 
weapons, vehicles, food supplies and ammunition, back and forth from the Jaffna Peninsula to
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
to overwhelm Palali base such a loss would spell the end of the government’s control of the 
Northern Province unless it established an equivalent base. Third, if and when the army made 
an attempt to launch an operation from Palali base the LTTE would have been able to
J*>() ------------------------------------
Although Operation Balawegaya-1 had technically been a victory for the government - in the sense that the 
LTTE had not been able to achieve its objective - the army and the government had to accept that the LTTE’s 
military capabilities had unquestionably grown considerably larger and also more sophisticated when compared 
to the pre-July 1987 period. It is the present author’s assessment that the LTTE’s ‘trial through fire’ when it 
fought the IPKF during October 1987-March 1990 contributed substantially to its increased military capability. 
This is an aspect which has not caught the attention of most military historians and analysts who have studied the 
Sri Lankan conflict. More research is needed, and will be done, to empirically substantiate this assessment.
121 As recalled in an interview, March 2008, Colombo, with Major General (Retd) D.Kalpahana, who was a 
Colonel who commanded one of the Brigades of the Task Force at that time. He recalled that these questions had 
begun to be discussed by officers at Major General Kobbekaduwa’s field HQ while Operation Balawegaya- 1 
was still underway and the link-up with EPS camp had not yet happened.
122 Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe, Official Government Spokesman, Sri Lanka Parliament Hansards, 16 
December 1992: Col. 3239-3240. This strategic addition was a counter to the perceived strategy of the LTTE
123 Interviews with former Army Commander (1 Jan 1994 to 30 April 1996) Lt.General (Retd) G.H. De Silva,
July 2008, Colombo. Also see Sri Lanka Parliament, Hansards, 16 December 1992: Col. 3239-3240
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By July 1992 the army's new strategy was (inad.enemly?) revealed when Sri Lankan
papers earned articles with titles such as 'Strangulation of the Jaffna Peninsula' “  It
then became undoubtedly clear tha, the army was embarked upon an attempt iso,ate the
Jaffna Peninsula from the rest of the Northern Province.
The Army ‘Seale O ff Jaffna Peninsula, October 1991 to July 1992
So the army began a series of Operations through which i, intended permanently prevent 
the free movement which the LTTE sough,. To do this the arm , had occupy all the 'choke 
pom s' and islands between Jaffna Peninsula and the Vanni region. Accordingly, from 
October 1991 onwards the aim , began to implement this plan which lasted till July 1992.
Then, onOperation Valampun-1 began on 18 October 1991 and was completed in two days.
22 October 1991 Valampuri-2 landed troops on the Pooneryn promontory. That this was a part 
of the army’s strategy was acknowledged by the government in parliament on 24 November
1993:
J s m b lL h e d 'o ^ ^ n  f r S, S r leX CT prising the Army CamPs and the Navy base was established on 18 October 1991, immediately after Operation Valamfuri. The primary
|hb p 'Ve f°.r 'he establ'shment of this complex was to seal off the movement of terrorists into 
the Peninsula from the South and vice versa.
In June 1992 the army launched Operation Balawegaya-2. This operation lasted from 28 June 
to 11 July 1992 and was a fiercely resisted by LTTE cadres in the area.
Government forces in northern Sri Lanka have launched a huge offensive aimed at cutting Tamil
Tger guerrillas off from their largest stronghold, the Jaffna peninsula. Several thousand troops
backed by tanks, helicopter gunships and naval fire, are reported to be forcing their wav from the 
east coast towards Elephant Pass, where a garrison is stationed.128
12
l25 See The Sunday Island, 19 July 1992, ‘Strangulation of the Jaffna Peninsula’
Its objective was to expand and strengthen the army’s hold on Kayts, Mandaitivu and Punkudutivu islands 
which lay very close the Jaffna Peninsula on its western side. Due to the tactical difficulty of supplying and 
defending these islands the LTTE's positions on these islands were unsustainable and it wisely withdrew sfe 
Ceylon Daily News, 21 October 1991, ‘Kayts, Mandaitivu islands fall into forces lap: Valampuri a ‘Walkover’
Pome Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe, Hansards, 24 November 1993: Col.333. The troops rapidly besan 
establishing a large joint army-navy base at Pooneryn. 6
Ceylon Daily News, I July 1992, ‘Dogged thrust by Balavegaya forces: Depleted Tigers hit and run’
The Guardian, 29 June 1992, ‘Tamil Tigers under threat’.
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The objective of this Operation was to bring under army con.ro, an entire strip of la0<1 from 
e tilaikerm on the eastern coastline of the isthmus to Elephant Pass camp.
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Lagoon
LTTE
Jaffna Lagoon. The LTTE used normal fibreglass boats fitted with outboard motors normally 
used for fishing, and, other boats with powerful engines it utilised for operations at sea and in 
the Lagoon. It used these vessels for attack and for transport purposes. Most of these boats 
operated from Sea Tiger bases on the east and west coasts of the peninsula. Some of these
boats were modified as suicide weapons and against the navy’s Fast Attack Crafts (FACs)
and Patrol boats.
LTTE
from Jaffna Peninsula across the Lagoon to the ‘Vanni’. Passengers had to pay for the service.
dinghies fitted with machine-guns. To avoid AM
visual detection by the armed forces
these journeys were always done in the middle of the nigh, or early in the morning. However, 
there was a limit to this non-detection as the armed forces swiftly installed small radar stations
o f  ------ -- .  t  ^
LTTE
Kilah, an abandoned small fishing village on the eastern shore of the Jaffna Lagoon to 
‘Kunch,’ Parantan, another abandoned fishing village on the ‘Vanni’ edge of the Jaffna 
Lagoon. The army and navy bases in Pooneryn and Elephant Pass sometimes fired artillery or 
heavy machine-guns at these convoys, and the convoys were also attacked by Inshore Patrol
12Craft (IPCs).
LTTE
armed forces. It carried out attacks on navy boats, escorted the passenger boats with armed 
boats, and used sea mines to restrict the operation of navy vessels. The following accounts are 
a few examples of LTTE counter-actions. On the 31 January 1993, a 65kg. sea mine designed 
to explode on impact was recovered by the navy in the Jaffna Lagoon east of Sangupiddy.130
On 22 February 1993, the LTTE attacked the army defensive bunkers on the perimeters of the
Pooneryn Base. This was not a full-scale attack intended to overrun the Pooneryn Base, but 
almost certainly an ‘exploratory’ attack to gauge the strength of the Base’s defences, the 
location of bunkers and numerous tactical intelligence. On 25 February 1993, a navy Inshore 
Patrol Craft (IPC) was blown up by a Tiger sea mine. Two sailors were killed and 3 were and 
wounded.11" By August 1993 LTTE attacks had increased in intensity. On 26 August 1993, Sea 
Tigers destroyed another navy IPC (Inshore Patrol Craft), damaged another and killed 5 navy 
personnel.111
5.6: The LTTE’s Highly Destructive Attack on Pooner 
Navy Base, 11-13 November 1993
Arm
In the early morning of 11 November 1993 the LTTE launched a very large-scale attack on 
Pooneryn Base. It was estimated that at least 2000 LTTE cadres took part, although the LTTE
*2y IPCs were 30-foot long, shallow-draft vessels mounted with swivelling heavy machine-guns suited for operating 
in the Jaffna Lagoon and the shallow waters along the sea coast.
130 Ceylon Daily News, 2 February 1993, ‘Navy spots Sea Tiger mine afloat in Jaffna lagoon’. Three days prior 
to that a sea tiger transporting a similar mine was shot and killed.
131 Ceylon Daily News, 23 February 1993, T iger attack on Pooneryn repulsed’.
132 Ceylon Daily News, 27 February 1993, ‘Two sailors killed three injured by mine blast in Jaffna lagoon'.
133 The Island, 27 August 1993, ‘Sea Tigers in boats launch attack with machine guns: Navy vessel destroyed, five 
killed in lagoon’.
never revealed any figures.134 This included
LTTE
land fighters and Sea Tigers. While two
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south and the east, a large group of Sea Tiger cadres attacked the navy’s base at Nagatevanturai,
stealthily approaching the base, across the Jaffna Lagoon, from the direction of Kilali in the
north-east. They moved undetected across the Jaffna Lagoon in a large flotilla of boats (see Map
5.5 below).
—5: Qvervievv of LTTE’s Attack on Poonervn Base. 11-13 Nnvrmhcr
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(Source: reproduced from The Sunday Island, 14 Nov. 1993, ‘Army Moves Back into Pooneryn’. The original 
information given in the newspaper’s map was accurate except for one tactical detail: the LTTE’s ground attack 
cadres were composed of a group from the south and another from the east. The error is probably a mistake as 
the fact that a large LTTE group attacked from the eastern side of the Base was mentioned in several newspaper.
This error was been rectified by present author in Map 5.5. The black arrow pointing westward from the East was 
added by the present author as it is missing in the original Map.)
The Tamil Tigers have inflicted the worst defeat on the Sri Lankan armed forces since the 
Tamil insurgency began 10 years ago, killing hundreds of their troops yesterday and seizing a 
vast amount of war booty. At least 200 Sinhalese soldiers and sailors - possibly as many as 500 - 
died in a Tiger attack on a military base at the Jaffna lagoon in the north of the country. (...] The 
chief military spokesman, Brigadier Nalin Angammana, said: “It is a very big attack. All we 
know at the moment is that casualties are very high.” Another officer described it as “the worst
setback for 21 years". The army has suffered very heavy casualties in Tamil Tiger attacks twice
before - in 1986 and, more recently, last July - but never on this scale. Although the fighting is
not yet over, the Tigers appear to have gained virtually free access to their heartland, the Jaffna 
peninsula [emphases added].135
Estimates given to present author in August 2008 by a number of army officers including former army
commander Lt.General (Retd) G.H. De Silva who, in November 1993, was the Chief-of-Staff at Army HO 
Colombo.
135 The Guardian, 12 November 1993, ‘Hundreds Killed in Tiger Attack’.
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against beaches on which reinforcements could land 138 Sea r  • k  "
• r  °uld land' Sea T'gers in boats also fought the
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rce men tx by amphibious landings Cose the base and iighiing was reported between 
navy and sea-borne rebels." '»  As the fighting on the base continued throughout , , .  , 2 and 
ovember. a„ ihree amted forces made a maximum effort prevent a complete collapse of 
. Bests ITte a„ force used all the aircraft which i, could muster -  the Pucara ground aback 
aircra t, tat- achett, SF-260s and F-7 jet fighters on Close Air Support (CAS), the Bell-212s
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140helicopters in gunship mode and the Mil-Mi-17s as tactical transports.
When news of the Pooneryn attack reached Colombo there was a fluiry of activity. Careiaker
Pres,den, D.B.Wrjetung, dimmed the commanders of all three armed forces to regain con,ml
of Pooneryn "a, any cos,” ™ Clearly the governmen, (comedy, realised ,ha, fo, very valid
,d political reasons Pooneryn base could not be allowed to be completely
While reinforcement troops were not immediately available from Elephant Pass or 
Mannar, the army rapidly set about organising a reinforcement operation.
military
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, 4 0  The Independent, 13 November 1993, ‘Tamils resist relief attempt’
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President after President Premadasa was assassinated by the LTTE on I May 1993 W3S apP°'med
Militarily it would be a very bad defeat for the army and the government While a ureal Heal
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ore Politically, the citizens of the country and the international community (which was closely following 
events) could come to the conclusion that resistance against the LTTE was pointless y 8
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(Source: Reproduced from Sunday Tunes, 14 Nov. 1993, ‘Pooneryn re-captured: Over 400 soldiers dead another 400 
wounded’)
On 14 November 1993, 950 reinforcement troops managed to land on the Pooneryn 
promontory by sea and air.144 They then linked-up with a group of more than 500 Pooneryn 
Base soldiers who had managed to hold-on to one section of the Base.145 By this time the 
LTTE had begun to withdraw to the Vanni jungles and to Jaffna Peninsula by boats taking 
with them their dead and the large amount of captured weapons and ammunition.146
Up till that time this was the battle which caused the highest casualties to both sides in a single 
encounter. The government stated in parliament that the total number of army personnel in 
Pooneryn had been 56 Officers and 2,236 Other Ranks. The total number of navy personnel had 
been 268.147 The government acknowledged that 8 officers and 233 Other Ranks had been
1 48_
killed in the attack but made no mention of the many hundreds of personnel missing. This was 
a deliberate ploy to minimise the shock on the Sinhala public and to minimise the political 
damage to the government. Eight months later, in July 1994, a Colombo newspaper reported 
that in addition to the above number confirmed killed a further 4 Officers and 396 Other 
Ranks were missing due to the Pooneryn attack. Over the subsequent years it became clear 
that all those originally classified as missing-in-action had in fact died. Therefore a total of
144 Of them 800 landed by sea while 150 were landed by helicopters. See The Island, 15 November 1993, ‘Army 
inside Pooneryn base -  Brigadier Nalin Angammana’.
145 Sunday Times, 14 November 1993, ‘Pooneryn re-captured: Over 400 soldiers dead another 400 wounded’.
146 The Independent, 15 November 1993, ‘Sri Lankan troops break siege of key army base’.
147 Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe, Sri Lanka Parliament, Hansards, 24 November 1993: Col.333.
148 Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe, Sri Lanka Parliament, Hansards, 24 November 1993: Col.335.
641 military personnel had been killed by the LTTE. 149 LTTE
from 407 cadres150 to 425 killed.151
LTTE
LTTE 152 An initial estimate of the value of
the weapons and equipment ios, mentioned Rs.300 million.”  A great amount of weapons and
ammunmon were undoubtedly captured by the LTTE.” 4 These losses were a great insult to the 
armed *----------- - ---------- -
electorate. The Sinhala public was shocked at the scale of the losses.
army
army
anonymously quoted in a government-owned newspaper as having said that:
“the situation as turning out to be extremely serious for all military operations in the 
north, particularly m the peninsula. We have to remember that the LTTE now has 
possession of enough military hardware to equip a modern brigade, including
nrtlllprv nnri nrm rm f  T K I p   ------- ---  *1____.  .  _ T- °  ’ o
fe LTTE
may now be able to hamper our aerial operations on which so much depends. 155
This was a surprisingly candid statement. It appeared in a government-owned newspaper in the 
immediate aftermath of the attack. Clearly the senior officer who made this statement knew that 
his statement did not reflect well on either the army or the government. But this doesn’t 
necessarily mean that this officer was anti-government. It was a reflection of this officer’s
LTTE’s military
weapons it had captured. 156
150
The Sunday Leader, 3\ July 1994:7, ‘Mass graves - only epitaph for fallen heroes’.
The Sunday Observer, 14 November 1993, ‘Daring sea born landing saves besieged camp: Rescue troops enter 
Pooneryn’. F
151 The Island, 15 November 1993, ‘425 cadres killed, confirms LTTE’.
152 The Island, 12 November 1993, ‘Tigers retaliate fiercely for Kilali attack Two bases attacked?: 200 army navy
men killed’. ’ y
153 Ceylon Daily News, 15 November 1993, ‘Sporadic mortar fire, evacuation of wounded begins: Fresh troops link 
with Pooneryn forces’.
154 The Island, 15 November 1993, ‘Army inside Pooneryn base’ and Ravaya, 21 November 1993. A list of the
material reported in the press included (the number lost is within parenthesis): two T-55 Main Battle Tanks, one of
which subsequently destroyed by the air force; 120mm heavy mortars (04); 0.50-inch calibre Heavy Machine-Guns
(11); M203 grenade launchers (03); 106mm recoilless rifle (01); Light Machine-Guns (54); T-56 assault rifles (394);
M-16 assault rifles (11); RPG launchers (19); a Radar set; and a great deal of ammunition. Five navy patrol craft
moored at the navy base (most probably IPCs) armed with 0.50-inch calibre heavy machine-guns were also captured 
by the LTTE.
155 Ceylon Daily News, 15 November 1993, ‘Sporadic mortar fire, evacuation of wounded begins: Fresh troops 
link with Pooneryn forces: Tigers too take heavy losses’.
156 Interviews and discussions the present author had with with many army officers at this time reflected these 
concerns.
A few days after the attack official army
spokesmen went into ‘damage limitation’
public relations mode and tried ,o downplay ,he seriousness of the attack. Although in public the 
government and the army tried ,0 shnrg-off the whole issue, members in both institutions
M  1  — _  __1  «  1  ,  |  •
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had acquired by that time. Sinhala civilians living in the country realised this fact too. Although
army
and other government sources. 157
army
istrated that the LTTE had the capacity to plan and carry 
army put on a brave face and said that the LTTE had no
overrun
military
Nonetheless the tactics of the attack, the damage done to the base and the weapons captured, the
LTTE
observers in the army, government and Sinhala civilians knew this. 158
army in its public statements said that the LTTE
LTTE
LTTE
fought the Indian and the Sri Lankan armies for many years and knew that it would inevitably 
have to suffer considerable casualties in an attack on this scale. The army’s assessment missed
LTTE
military capability where it could attack a large military
ammunition
LTTE
Jaffna which killed 13 soldiers (which contributed to the launching of the pogrom-riots of that
LTTE
the Pooneryn attack.
As tends to happen in all protracted insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, the government tried to control the 
information which got into the public realm. The government appointed ‘official spokesmen’ for each of the 
armed forces and police and instructed all other personnel to refrain from talking to the press. But journalists
searching for scoops and stories managed to circumvent these restrictions and unofficially get in contact with 
military personnel and obtained information from them.
158 Extensive discussions which the present author had in November-December 1993 with persons from all of the 
above ‘constituencies’.
This increase in the LTTE military capability over the preceding 10 years
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s ength. It was clear that the army’s counter-actions up to that time were not having a qualitative
LTTE
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course of the Pooneryn attack a total of mote than 1000 persons from both sides of the conflict -
LTTE
miiikhy engagements reach this scale i, is one indicator that the insurgents may have am.ed
LTTE
prove in the future tha, i, could srrsm/r, this level of casualties and maintain militant
effectiveness. Whether Ihe Sri Lanka government had the capacity to endure high casualties and 
defeats, however, was also a factor in the equation.
5.7: The Decline and End of the UNP Government. NovPmhPr 1QQ4
After the near-total loss of Pooneryn, 1994 was a year of relatively little military activity in 
the North and East. In the East the army held on to the populated areas along the coastline and
LTTE
LTTE
nothing conclusive occurred.
The UNP government’s end can be said to have begun from the Pooneryn attack in November
1993 to the UNP Government’s defeat in Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in August 
and November 1994, respectively.
By 1994 the UNP government had become very unpopular amongst the Sinhala electorate and 
after 17 years in power was suffering from entropy. By 1994 the UNP had been in power-  
both in Parliament and in the Presidency -  for 17 years. Significant proportions of the Sinhala 
voters were weary of the UNP and wanted a change. The main Opposition party -  the SLFP -  
was increasing in popularity. For the Sinhala voters one of the main factors was the 
government’s inability to deal conclusively and effectively with the secessionist insurrection. For 
ordinary Sinhala citizens it was incomprehensible why the army should suffer casualties in the 
many hundreds, and eventually totalling thousands, at the hands of the LTTE. Pooneryn was the 
most recent case in point. In Pooneryn the armed forces lost the largest number of personnel in a 
single attack. In the aftermath of Pooneryn the Opposition parties made outlandish allegations 
that the UNP government was ‘betraying’ the Sinhala nation to the LTTE and implied that that 
the military set-backs were deliberately perpetrated by the government. These allegations were
cleverly mixed-up by the Opposition with the
LTTE
late President Premadasa’s transfer of
Z44
Opposition and the government were aware that many crucial elections were due in 
1994. Provincial Council Elections were due in early ,994 and also Parhamentaiy and 
Presidential Elections had to be held in late 1994. The late President Premadasa’s transfer of 
rmhtary equipment to the LTTE -  an action which most Sinhala people could comprehend only 
through words like ‘treason’ and ‘traitor’ - was repeatedly mentioned in Opposition propaganda 
meetings and publications. Although President Premadasa himself died in May 1993 the 
insinuation was that there were ‘other forces’ within the UNP government which were
LTTE
army
LTTE
this added fuel to the fires of speculation.
The elections for the Provincial Council of the Southern Province were held on 24 March 1994.
UNP
was not very significant except that it served as a ‘political barometer’ to the mood of the Sinhala 
electorate. “Sri Lanka’s ruling party has suffered its worst election defeat in 17 years in a 
provincial poll seen as a vital pointer to the presidential contest in December.”160
The Parliamentary Elections were held 18 August 1994 and that too was won by the SLFP-led
alliance and Mrs. Bandaranaike’s daughter Chandrika Kumaratunga became the Prime
Minister.161 The Presidential elections were held on 9 November and Chandrika Kumaratunga
was elected as President with 62% of the votes cast. She polled almost 2 million votes more than 
the UNP candidate.162
Personal conversations with many civilians and military officers. Such non-textual and oral means of 
communication are very significant in Sinhala society. While it is difficult at present to give documentary 
sources for these stories, the present author continues to investigate these accounts. The present author 
living in Sri Lanka throughout this time and observed and noted these speculations and conspiracy theories.
160 The Guardian, 26 March 1994, ‘Sri Lankan Left wins region poll’.
was
161
162The Times (London), 19 August 1994, ‘Daughter of turbulent political dynasty takes helm in Sri Lanka’. The Guardian, 11 November 1994, ‘Sri Lankans vote for PM and Peace’.
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— : Conclusions: period from March 1990 to November 1994
After the exit of the IPKF in March 1990, the LTTE re-ignited the insurrection in June 1990. 
The re-ignition of the insurrection, and, the information about the transfer of weapons to the 
LTTE discredited President Premadasa in the eyes of the Sinhala electorate. This was 
something from which Premadasa never completely recovered, politically. The intensity of 
the fighting which ensured during these 4>/2 was the highest that it had ever reached up till 
1994. During these years the LTTE carried out a series of targeted assassinations which killed 
a very forceful Deputy Minister of Defence, Ranjan Wijeratne, the most popular army 
general, General Kobbekaduwa and also President Premadasa. These assassinations had a 
seriously destabilising effect on government policymaking as discontinuities were created. 
Concurrently, this period also witnessed the army being given an unusually high degree of 
autonomy to determine strategy. This revealed the UNP government’s flawed understanding 
of its responsibility for developing a coherent counterinsurgency project. Such a 
counterinsurgency project should have been the highest priority of the government. The 
military strategy should have been a part of a joint political-military counterinsurgency 
project proactively developed by the government as a whole. The measures to address Tamil 
grievances had to come from, and be legislated by, civilian politicians. In any event the army 
did not have the Constitutional authority to decide such policies nor the political skills to 
negotiate and make compromises. Strategically, nothing resembling a 3-phased Clear-Hold- 
Build counterinsurgency strategy could be implemented because in the North the army was 
able only to hold on to some large bases and ‘encircle’ the Jaffna Peninsula by capturing and 
establishing large bases on the land routes connecting the Peninsula with the ‘Vanni’ region.
In 1990 the military actions were composed of a large number of operations to re-capture 
areas in the East from the LTTE, and to hold-on to selected bases in the North. In the 
Northern Province the army was in serious difficulties, confined to its large bases. The rest of 
the area was controlled by the LTTE, including Jaffna City. In the years 1991-1993 what the 
army did was to attack and ‘Clear’ specific areas such as the areas surrounding its main bases. 
The purpose was to give greater protection to these bases and put them out of LTTE mortar 
range. Then the army would ‘Hold’ these areas. But as these areas were devoid of Tamil 
civilians these were not counterinsurgency ‘Clear-Hold-Build’ type operations. However, 
these operations furthered the government’s overall effort in the sense that these large bases 
were retained under government control - if they had not existed then the LTTE would have 
established a separate state very rapidly. The mere existence of these bases forced the LTTE
to devote time and effort to attack them, and 
made from these bases.
forced the LTTE to avoid the forays
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In the East, the army Cleared and brought major populated centres along the coast under its
control. The LTTE was present in the jungle areas and villages approximately 7-10 kilometres
inland from the coast. The coastline north of Trincomalee was progressively more insecure
and was not dominated by the army similar to the coastal belt south of Trincomalee. The army
maintained control of most of the coastline south of Trincomalee and carried out ‘search & 
destroy’ forays into the jungles.
Overall, these government military operations served to ensure that the LTTE didn’t have a
complete free run of the North and East but cumulatively also did not result in a diminution of
the LTTE. In November 1993 the LTTE attacked the army-cum-navy base at Pooneryn and
caused very high casualties, demoralised the military, and further diminished the Sinhala
people’s support for the UNP government. By 1994 although a great deal of fighting had
taken place the LTTE was nowhere near defeat. On the other hand neither was the LTTE able
to overwhelm, as it may have wished, the army bases in the North or the East. It was a
stalemate. But the Sinhala people had lost confidence in the UNP to bring a conclusive end to
the LTTE s insurrection and voted them out at both the Parliamentary and the Presidential 
elections.
1. Did the Sri Lanka government have Political Purposes?
Yes, it did. And these political purposes played the determining role in the overall direction 
of government policy. Primarily and these purposes were:
• That a separate Tamil state would not to be allowed to be formed in Sri Lanka. This 
was a non-negotiable objective.
• That the LTTE’s power would be contained to the degree the government was able to.
2. Did the Sri Lanka government give security to the Tamil population?
No. The situation of Tamil civilians was very similar to the previous period i.e. July 1983 to 
March 1990. Large areas of the Northern Province came under the control of Tamil 
insurgents. Actually the situation was worse from the government’s point of view because, for 
example, the entirety of Jaffna City and the complete Peninsula, with a population of at least 
200,000 was under LTTE control. The armed forces were in control of only the large bases 
such a Palali. The Jaffna Fort base too had ceased to be under army control and the troops had 
to be withdrawn. The Tamil civilians were not governed by the Sri Lanka government but by
the LTTE. These Tamils looked to the
LTTE tor security. Tamils who lived
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under Sr. Lanka government controlled areas -  such as Colombo and also areas in the East -  
were subject to suspicion and surveillance.
3. Did the Sri Lanka government neutralize the Tamil insurgents
By and large, no. However in as much the army lost 4000+ personnel killed in action (see
Table 5.1) the LTTE too would have lost cadres around the same figure. However, definite
figures for the LTTE cannot be given as the LTTE never released verifiable casualty figures
(which is understandable as a great deal of tactical military intelligence can be deduced by 
such information, especially if dates and locations are given).163
4. Did the Sri Lanka government gain and maintain popular support of the 
Tamil people?
No. By this time the majority of Tamils in the Northern Province and a significant number in 
the Eastern Province were living in areas under LTTE control. As a matter of fact the 
situation was worse than in the previous phase (July 1983-March 1990) because the entirety 
of Jaffna City and Peninsula, except the large military bases, were under LTTE control.
These Tamil civilians did not have any contact with the Sri Lanka government and did not 
support the government.
5. Did the Sri Lanka government separate the Tamil insurgents from their 
support base?
LTTE
government from the Tamil people, especially those Tamils living in the Northern Province. 
A similar situation prevailed in the Eastern Province too wherever government forces merely 
held onto their camps and some of the main roads.
6. What were the relationships the Sri Lanka government’s 
counterinsurgency operations had with the Law?
The Emergency regulations activated in June 1983 continued to as before. As the Tamil
insurrection escalated, legal provisions became increasingly harsher. Concurrently, extra-
judicial killings also began.
Tin
It is relevant to mention here that the same applies to armed forces casualties as well. The armed forces’ 
‘Roll of Honour’ which has been of great utility to this present study was printed in 2005, i.e. 11 years after 
1994. And that too during a period when there was a ceasefire with the LTTE.
SriLanka Centr?' g°ver"ment Impact upon thec • T w in d i government impac
insu^rec«on?Vernment S eff°rtS l° C°Unter the Tamil secessionist
By and large, No. And this was a great relief for the Sri Lanka government during 1990-
1994.
This was a massive change from the Indian policy of the previous phase, i.e. up to March
1990. After the IPKF was compelled to leave Sri Lanka, the Indian central government seems
to have done a thorough review of its intervention in Sri Lanka (this has to be deduced by
analysts such as the present author as the Indian government has not released any such
information).
Furthermore, with the LTTE’s assassination of Rajiv Gandhi the entire Indian governmental
system received a huge shock and realisation dawned that such interventions could grievously
hurt India’s own core interests.
Chapter 6 
Conclusions
6.1: Introduction
The objective of this Thesis is to analyse the efforts by the UNP government of Sri Lanka to 
counter the Tamil secessionist insurrection during the 17 years from 1977 to 1994. The 
analytical framework utilised for this task is grounded in British and United States 
counterinsurgency doctrine which spans approximately 50 years from the writings of the 
pioneers in the 1960s, to the most recent US and British Army doctrine. Using the insights 
from this literature seven research questions were identified by the present author:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Did the Sri Lanka government have Political Purposes?
Did the Sri Lanka government give security to the Tamil population?
Did the Sri Lanka government neutralize the Tamil insurgents?
Did the Sri Lanka government gain and maintain popular support of the Tamil people?
Did the Sri Lanka government separate the Tamil insurgents from their support base?
What were the relationships the Sri Lanka government’s counterinsurgency operations 
had with the Law?
Did the Tamil Nadu and the Indian central government impact upon the Sri Lanka 
government’s efforts to counter the Tamil secessionist insurrection?
The counterinsurgency campaigns of the Sri Lanka government 1977-1994 are analysed using 
these seven research questions.
The 1977-1994 period can be divided into three qualitatively different phases, each separated 
by clear and dramatic breaks from the others. The first is from the UNP’s election victory in 
1977 to the pogrom-riots of July 1983. The second is from the 1983 pogrom-riots to the exit 
of the Indian army from Sri Lanka in March 1990. The third is from the re-ignition of the 
Secessionist insurrection by the LTTE in June 1990 up to August-November 1994 when the 
UNP lost both parliamentary and presidential elections and therefore ceased to be the 
counterinsurgent. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 deal, in chronological order, with these three periods.
Our analytical work is deeply complicated by the fact that in the second of the above two 
phases, i.e. the phase dealt-with in Chapter 4, the Indian central government was a pivotal 
player in the process. Eventually, in July 1987, India used pressure on both the Sri Lanka 
government and the Tamil secessionists to arrive at an Agreement called the Indo-Lanka 
Accord. However, this Agreement could not be implemented and eventually the Indian forces
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left Sri Lanka in March 1990. Subsequently, the secessionist insurrection was re
ignited by the LTTE with its attacks against the Sri Lanka government. In the other two
phases too, i.e. Chapters 3 and 5, the picture is not straightforward as we see President
Jayewardene making mistakes and tacitly facilitating the pogrom-riots. In the 1990-1994
period (Chapter.5) President Premadasa is faced with enemies from within his government
and is also at a loss as to what strategy he should adopt which could out-manoeuvre and
defeat the LTTE. What eventually transpired was that he was out-manoeuvred and then 
assassinated by the LTTE.
Throughout this period the three main counterinsurgents -  i.e. President Jayewardene, Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President Premadasa -  made serious errors of judgment (especially
of the LTTE) and also on many occasions worked at cross purposes with one another. Such
incoherencies are severely detrimental to a counterinsurgency effort. In the case of the errors
of judgement of ex-Prime Minister Gandhi and President Premadasa, both paid for the errors
with their lives. Working at cross-purposes is clearly seen when the Indian central
government provided military training to Tamil insurgents, allowed Tamil Nadu to give
sanctuary to the Tamil insurgents and also -  as can be seen when the Indo-Lanka Accord, its
Annexures and Letters are examined — when India manoeuvred to obtain geopolitical
advantages over Sri Lanka. In this context tensions between Sri Lanka and India were 
inevitable.
6.2: Overall Assessment Of the Sri Lanka Government’s 
Counterinsurgency Approach
1. Did the Sri Lanka government have Political Purposes?
Yes, the Sri Lanka government did have a set of clear Political Objectives. As all recognised 
counterinsurgency theorists and manuals such as Thompson1, FM 3-24 (US Army)2 and 
Countering Insurgency (British Army)3 emphasise, any government implementing a 
counterinsurgency campaign must have clear political objectives.
The Sri Lanka government clearly stated policy was that a separate Tamil state would not be 
allowed to be formed in Sri Lanka. This was a non-negotiable political objective and was 
consistent throughout the 1977-1994 period. From 1977 onwards the government offered
1 Thompson, 1966: 50-58, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam.
2 See US Army, 2006: 1-20, Counterinsurgency. They are explained in detail in pp. 1-21 to 1-24.
3 British Army, 2009: 3-2, Field Manual, Volume 1 Part 10, Countering Insurgency.
District level devolution and de- centralisation of power. But the Tamil
parliamentarians and the Tamil insurgents refused to accept this offer. The Sri Lanka
government did not accept that the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka were the
‘traditional homeland’ of the Tamil people. The government also opposed to the merging of
the Northern and Eastern Provinces into one territory called the ‘North-East’ or ‘North-East 
Province’.
The above being said, however, the Sri Lanka government was unable to develop an overall 
counterinsurgency campaign plan where -  while achieving the above objectives -  it could 
address the reasonable grievances of the Tamil people and defeat the Tamil insurgents. This 
proved to be a tar too complicated and difficult a task for the Sri Lanka government. The 
reasons which contributed to this were, first, the Tamil insurrection grew immensely after the 
pogrom-riots. Second, the insurgents were assisted by the Tamil Nadu and Indian central 
governments. Third, the Indian central government insisted on becoming an active participant 
in the search for a solution during the period 1983-1987, and eventually, in the text of the 
Indo-Lanka Accord, forced the Sri Lanka government to compromise its stance on the merger 
of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. However, during the entire period 1977-1994 the Sri 
Lanka government did not give-in to the Tamil secessionists campaign to divide the country.
2. Did the Sri Lanka government give security to the Tamil population?
As noted in both FM 3-24 (US Army)4 and Countering Insurgency (British Army)'*5, this is a 
significant task that a counterinsurgent government should strive to achieve. However, except 
for the first 4-5 years after being elected to power in 1977, the government could not achieve 
this. At the beginning of its tenure from July 1977 to approximately 1980, the government 
was able to give some degree of security to the Tamil people. However, with the gradual and 
unstoppable escalation of the insurrection there is evidence that from around 1980 two policy 
trends had emerged within the government. One of them supported negotiations with Tamils. 
The other was a sinister policy which advocated a ‘Pogrom against Tamils’. There is very 
substantial corroborative evidence from many separate sources to the existence of this trend. 
President Jayewardene’s tacit condoning of the ‘pogrom-against-Tamils’ tendency was a 
judgement with very long-term negative consequences. This pogrom-riot paved the way for 
the escalation of the Tamil insurgency, the unending agitation in Tamil Nadu and the
4 See US Army, 2006: 1-20, Counterinsurgency. They are explained in detail in pp. 1-21 to 1-24.
5 British Army, 2009: 3-2, Field Manual, Volume 1 Part 10, Countering Insurgency.
intervention by the Indian central government. Pr, sident , aye„a,dene
lacked the foresight to have nipped this trend in the bud, and it manifested itself in the 
pogrom-riots of July 1983.
Therefore, it has to be concluded that by June-July 1983 the government was not giving
adequate security to the Tamil population. After the 1983 pogrom-riots the security of Tamils
worsened to a substantial degree due to a combination of factors: the Tamil insurrection
increased with more daring and effective guerrilla attacks and armed forces and police
casualties increased to unprecedented levels. Concurrently, the government’s military and
police actions against the insurrection increased in severity and this had unavoidable impacts 
upon the security of Tamil civilians.
After the IPKF left in March 1990 the LTTE began to control large areas of the North and 
East and Tamil civilians living in these areas came under LTTE control. Tamils who lived 
under Sri Lanka government controlled areas — such as Colombo and also some areas in the 
East -  were subject to suspicion and surveillance. The cumulative result of all this was the 
further decrease in the security of the Tamil population.
3. Did the Sri Lanka government neutralize the Tamil insurgents?
On the whole, no. This is a straightforward military-police task that any counterinsurgent 
government must strive to achieve at least to some appreciable degree. Both FM 3-24 (US
6 7
Army) and Countering Insurgency (British Army) mention this is their respective lists of 
counterinsurgency tasks. Although during these 17 years the military did conduct many 
operations, the Sri Lanka government was, however, unable to neutralize Tamil insurgents to 
an appreciable degree which could have a strategic result. In the 1977-1983 period, although 
the government tried to neutralize the (still) quite small number of Tamil insurgents, it was 
unable to do so. In July-December 1979 when the army was placed in charge of Jaffna 
District, Tamil insurgents made a tactical retreat to Tamil Nadu and thereby completely 
escaped the government.
In the 1983-1987 period the Tamil insurgents were on the strategic and tactical offensive and 
implemented skilful mobile guerrilla warfare which the Sri Lanka army found very difficult to 
cope with. Gradually the government forces began to get isolated to their camps. After the 
exit of the IPKF in March 1990, the military situation for the government became worse than
6 See US Army, 2006: 1-20, Counterinsurgency. They are explained in detail in pp. 1-21 to 1-24.
7 British Army, 2009: 3-2, Field Manual, Volume 1 Part 10, Countering Insurgency.
the previous periods. From June 1990 to November 1994 the Sri Lanka army lost 
4000+ personnel killed in action, and the combined police, navy and air force casualties were 
another 1000 (see Table 5.1). Although it can be assumed that the LTTE too would have lost 
equivalent number of cadres, this still did not amount to ‘neutralizing’ the Tamil insurgents.
people?16 Sn Lanka government 8ain and maintain popular support of the Tamil
Both FM 3-24 (US Army)8 and Countering Insurgency (British Army)9 mention this as an 
important task that a counterinsurgent government should strive to achieve. However, by and 
large, the Sri Lanka government was unable to achieve this. Although there were some Tamils 
who supported the government in the 1977-1983 period, most Tamils in general were either 
neutral towards the government or tacit supporters of the TULF or Tamil insurgents - it needs
to be recalled that the vast majority of them had voted in support of the TULF’s secessionist 
platform in the parliamentary elections of July 1977.
After the 1983 pogrom-riots the Tamil peoples’ support for the government reduced to a 
negligible level. Gradually, with the escalation of the insurrection larger and larger numbers 
of Tamils began to live under the control of the insurgent groups. From March 1990 onwards, 
the LTTE filled the vacuum left by the IPKF, and the situation became even worse: the 
entirety of Jaffna City and Peninsula, except the large military bases, came under LTTE 
control. Such Tamil civilians did not have any contact with the Sri Lanka government and did 
not support the government. Therefore, the answer to this question has to be ‘negative’.
5. Did the Sri Lanka government separate the Tamil insurgents from their support 
base?
Most counterinsurgency theoreticians and practitioners from pioneers such as Thompson10 
and Galula to FM 3-24 (US Army) " and Countering Insurgency (British Army)13 stress the 
importance of a counterinsurgent government separating the insurgents from the people. In 
the Sri Lankan case, however, the government was unable to achieve anything close to even a 
minimum degree of such separation during the entire 17 year period discussed in this Thesis.
8 See US Army, 2006: 1-20, Counterinsurgency. They are explained in detail in pp. 1-21 to 1-24.
9 British Army, 2009: 3-2, Field Manual, Volume I Part 10, Countering Insurgency.
10 Thompson, 1966: 50-58, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam.
11 Galula, David 1964, Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.
12 See US Army, 2006: 1-20, Counterinsurgency. They are explained in detail in pp. 1-21 to 1-24.
13 British Army, 2009: 3-2, Field Manual, Volume I Part 10, Countering Insurgency.
uring the 1977-1983 period Tamil insurgents lived amongst the Tamil
people and they were well protected and hardly any were captured by the government. After 
the 1983 pogrom-riots
the government’s military situation worsened, especially in the North and large areas in the
East as well. By late-1986 and early-1987 the army was comalled within their camps and
could move out only in very strong columns. Obviously, in such a situation there could be no
normal contact with the civilian population. Therefore the insurgents succeeded in separating
the government from the Tamil people, the exact opposite of what should have happened in
a successful counterinsurgency. A similar situation prevailed in the Eastern Province too
where government forces merely held onto their camps and some of the main roads. This
general situation prevailed in the North and East, along with small tactical changes vis-a-vis
government-controlled versus LTTE-controlled areas, up till the end of 1994. Therefore, the 
answer to this question has to be ‘negative’.
6. What were the relationships the Sri Lanka government’s counterinsurgency 
operations had with the Law?
While many counterinsurgency theoreticians and Manuals advocate that counterinsurgent forces 
act within the Law, in practice many counterinsurgency campaigns have had difficulties in 
implementing this. The difficulties faced by the Sri Lanka government have not been very 
different from those faced by other governments faced by similar situations. In early June 1983 
several very harsh provisions of the Emergency Regulations were brought into force by the 
government. These provisions suspended the need for a Coroner’s investigation of persons killed 
by armed forces and police action. Within Sri Lanka’s post-colonial political culture these 
regulations have meant that the armed forces and police could use deadly force and destroy 
bodies without any magisterial enquiry.
President Jayewardene’s position was that these harsh provisions were necessary to protect 
police and armed forces personnel from legal action being taken against them. With the 
escalation of the insurrection after the 1983 pogrom-riots the Emergency Regulations 
activated in June 1983 continued to as before, and powers were increased. Over the course of 
the subsequent years extra-judicial killings and “disappearances” of suspected Tamil 
insurgents began to occur. Therefore it has to be concluded that the Sri Lanka government’s 
counterinsurgency operations led to violations of the strict boundaries of the Law.
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government’s efforts to counter “*  “  ^
and Indi3n Centra' g° VernmentS Played 3 crucial role in Sri Lanka, 
ng 1977 ,983 the mterference was re.atively mild. But after the ,983 pogrom-riots the 
•nterference from Tamil Nadu ,„d  Delhi rose t0 an „nprecedemed |cvd
During 1983-1987 the Indian cemra! government implemented a W h a c k ' policy where it
U .-up the military capabilities of Tamil insurgents (while the Tamil Nadu state government
and tts people too assisted the Tamil insurgents in numerous ways). Concutremly. India
app ted intense dtplomatte pressure on the Sri Lanka government to agree to very high
egrees of devolut.on of political power. Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and his policy
advisors were of the opinion that this was the paih to diminishing the Tamil ihsutrection.
Inly 1987 Indta intervened directly and coerced Sri Lanka to sign the ludo-Lank. Accord and
also forced an Amendment to the Sri Lanka Constitution (the 13* Amendment). Under the
provistons of the 13"' Amendment a system of Provincial Councils was created in Sri Lanka.
This led to the merging of the Northern and Eastern Provinces and created the North-East 
Provincial Council (NEPC).
LTTE
to agree with the terms of the Indo-Lanka Accord and end the secessionist insurrection. But 
the LTTE attacked the IPKF and re-ignited the insurrection -  this time fighting India’s armed 
forces. The LTTE revealed through its actions that it wanted nothing less than a separate state.
LTTE
--------- n u u  a g i c c u  IU
a negotiated solution within a united Sri Lanka. Consequently the NEPC functioned for a
short time and was then dissolved. And then, till the end of 1994 -  the end-date of this Thesis
-  the insurgency raged in the North and the East and there was no possibility of implementing 
the Provincial Council system in the North-East.
IPKF
government seems to have done a thorough review of its intervention in Sri Lanka. By this 
time Rajiv Gandhi’s party had lost the elections and he was no longer India’s Prime Minister 
India adopted a “hands-off’ approach to Sri Lanka. This was a welcome relief for the Sri
LTTE
Nadu. With this assassination the entire Indian governmental system received a huge shock 
and realisation dawned that the intervention in Sri Lanka had grievously hurt India’s own core
interests. Thenceforth no further Indian 
affairs during the period relevant to this Thesis.
intervention took place in Sri Lanka’s
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B , 1994 large area* of the North and the Ear,, and many hundreds of thousands of Tamil
LTTE. Although the LTTE
LTTE
effect did run something akin a separate state in large areas of the North and East from
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IPKF)
•Dismal failure' are the words that best describe the UNP government's achievements by
UNP
and had to exit government.
LTTE
LTTE
it controlled large swathes of land in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and at least 
300,000+ Tamil civilians. The LTTE’s increase in military capability over ten years is clearly 
illustrated when its capabilities of 1983 (ambush and killing 13 soldiers) are compared to 
1993 (when it attacked large Army-cum-Navy base in Pooneryn and killed at least 650 
military personnel and stole truckloads of weapons and ammunition). This being said, 
however, the Sri Lankan government doggedly hung on and refused to cave- in and as, 
mentioned earlier, something akin to a stalemate existed at the end of 1994 at which point the
UNP
6.3: Limitations of this Thesis and Suggestions fo r  fn r fh p r
research
This Thesis reveals the need for further research in several areas. Some of these areas branch 
off directly from this Thesis while others are somewhat distantly connected. First, the need to 
research the 15 year period from January 1995 to May 2009. This Thesis ends in November 
1994. But from January 1995 to May 2009 a great many important military and political 
events and processes took place. This is an important subject for further research.
Second, the need to research and understand the inherent problems and difficulties 
governments face when trying to develop political reform packages in ethnically deeply 
divided societies. The persistent difficulties - discussed to a moderate degree in this Thesis - 
faced by postcolonial governments of Sri Lanka, including the 1977-1994 period, are good
examples of this. This is a vast and
complicated subject which requires
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volumes of its own and could not be included in this Thesis.
: r r C : her reSearCh "  the gr° Wth and of «•* Tamil secessionist
in this Thesis n , " ”  ' r 16'  31X1 °Pera“0nal m  ° f the Tamil insnrgency are not analysed in depth
■ isis space as the subject matter of this Thesis is already large and
“  h “  COnCUraMly malySe in deplh "*  Tamil <"» W  as wel,. Tha, subject
es researc in its own nght. Some research on the subject has already been published in 
books and articles but more remains to be done.
a ° f reS6arCh W0Uld be the humamtanan issues and human rights violations which 
occurred during both the insurrection and government counter actions. While a number of
reports and books on this subject have already been published by organisations such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch there is need for more work.
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Kalith: a Sinhalese’ religion Buddhism. An MP in Sri Lanka from 1977 to 
, P, - - w en he was assassinated. Born in 1936 November, assassinated in April 1993
(when he was 56 old). He qualified as a Barrister (UK) and later obtained a degree in law
from Harvard University (USA). He was made a Presidents’ Counsel in Sri Lanka in 1985. He
was a member of the UNP and served as a cabinet Minister for a number of subjects such as
Education, Trade, Shipping and National Security under President J.R. Jayawardene. He was
also a Deputy Minister of Defence and was involved in various operations against the LTTE
in the 1980s. Later he formed his own party in 1990 called the Democratic United National 
Front (DUNF).
Balasingham, Anton: a Sri Lanka Tamil, born in 1938. Died in December 2006 due to
serious illness. Balasingham was a British citizen. He was a Journalist until he joined the 
LTTE. He led the LTTE team at the Thimnn t a l k s  i n  1 QR S  C \r \ f \  U / Q C  O n o r t
theoretician and strategist from the 1990s onwards.
LTTE
Chelvanayakam, S. J. V.: a lawyer by profession and a Protestant Christian Sri Lanka Tamil. 
He was born in March 1898 and died in April 1977 in Jaffna. He was a MP from 1947 to 1952 
and represented the Kankesanturai electorate. In subsequent elections from 1956 onwards he 
was elected again as an MP. Towards the end of 1972 he gave up his seat in Parliament as he 
was not in favour of the new constitution. He was the Deputy Leader of the All Ceylon Tamil 
Congress (ACTC) from 1944 to 1949. The ACTC under G.G. Ponnambalam joined with the 
UNP in 1948. This led Chelvanayakam to form a new party along with others from the ACTA 
in 1949 and it was called the Illankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK). He was its leader until 
1972. In 1972 May he together with ITAK and some other Tamil parties formed the Tamil 
United Front (TUF) with him as leader. During the latter part of the 1970s the TUF changed 
its name to Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) and Chelvanayakam was its leader until
1977.
Dias Bandaranaike, Sirima R.: a Sinhalese, religion Buddhism. Born in April 1916 and died 
in October 2000. She became the leader of the SLFP and elected as Prime Minister in 1960 
soon after the assassination of her husband S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in 1959. Thereby she 
became the first woman Prime Minister in the world. She was in office till 1965, and re-
elected again from 1970 to 1977. And 1994-2000. It was during her tenure in office that the 
1972 Republican Constitution created.
Dissanayake, Gamini: was born in Kandy, Sri Lanka in October 1942. A Sinhalese, religion 
Buddhism. A lawyer by profession. Later he obtained an MPhil degree from the University of
Cambridge, UK in International Rehtinn^ n ,  • • rs- 273
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was the impeachment motion against President P n,d°"Lanka Peace Accord- and the other 
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death He began his political career as a member of the Lok Sabha in 1981. He was the Prime
Minister of India from October 1984 to December 1989. From 1985 to 1991 he was the
^989tn d  D h al Nnatl°Hnal Congress- He was leader of the opposition during December 
9 and December 1990. He was a key leader who was involved in the Indian intervention 
in Lanka in 1987.
Jayawardene, Junius Richard (JR): was bom in September 1906 and died of natural causes 
in November 1996. A Sinhalese, religion Buddhism. He was a lawyer and began his very long 
political career as an activist in the Ceylon National Congress (CNC) in 1938. He joined the 
UNP when it was formed in 1946, and was Finance Minister in the first Cabinet of Ceylon in 
1947 under D.S. Senanayake. He was in the opposition from 1956-1965. He was a cabinet 
Minister in the UNP government of 1965 to 1970. Leader of the Opposition from 1970 to 
1977. In the parliamentary elections of July 1977 the UNP under Jayewardene’s leadership 
won a huge victory obtaining 5/6lh of parliamentary seats. He became the Prime Minister. He 
was in that position from July 1977 to February 1978. In February 1978 he amended the 
Constitution and created an Executive Presidency and thereby became the first Executive 
President of Sri Lanka. In 1982 he was re-elected for a second term of six years until 1989.
The 1983 riots against the Tamils and the signing of the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord took place 
during his tenure in office.
Kobbekaduwa, Denzil: was born on the 27 July 1940 and died on 8 August 1992. A 
Sinhalese, religion Buddhism. Lt. General Denzil Kobbekaduwa was a much loved, very 
popular, respected and highly decorated officer of the Sri Lanka Army. He was killed when 
the vehicle he was in went over an LTTE land mine. He joined the army as a cadet officer in 
May 1960. Thereafter, he went for training to RMA, Sandhurst, England. He was a graduate 
of the British Army Staff College, Camberley and the Royal College of Defence Studies 
(RCDS). In 1990 he became a Major General, and in 1992 he was posthumously promoted Lt. 
General.
Mathew, Cyril: A Sinhalese, religion Buddhism. Was a cabinet Minister of the UNP 
government under President J. R. Jayawardene from 1977 onwards and during the 1980s. He 
was the MP for the Kelaniya electorate and was well known for his stance against Tamil 
Eelam. In 1984 he was expelled from the cabinet as well as the UNP by President J. R.
1989 at the a g e ^ f77^ 1& hardlme against the Tamil community. Died of natural causes in
274
®0m  in N ° Vember 1954 and k illed  b V L » k a
Tamil youth, formed the Tamil New T.geTs JVn t T I n l^ fM ayT he T N T a' °n8 " 'd  ^  
LTTE and Prabhakaran was its leader until his death y re"amed 35 the
w a H m S e ^ T t h e f ^ ^  re' igi° n Buddhism‘ B°™ in June 1924, Premadasa
as a member of the UNP and served as a cabinet Minister. He was Prime Minister of Sri
U nka from February 1978 to March 1989 (under President JR Jayawardene). From January
was assassinated b “  ° f Sn U "ka and in office until May 1993. PremadasI
Colombo in IQQ  ^ W ^  ° f the LTTE dunng the UNP Ma>' Day Procession,Colombo, in 1993. Was 68 years when he was killed.
Wijeratne, Ranjan: A Sinhalese, religion Buddhism. Born on 4 April 1931 and was a planter
by profession. He started out as a politician in 1988. Just prior to this he worked in high posts
as a public servant and was also a commissioned officer in the Volunteer force of the Sri
Lanka Army. In 1988 he joined the UNP and served both as its Chairman and General
Secretary. He entered parliament as a UNP national list member in 1989 and was a Cabinet
Minister under President Premadasa. He served as Minister of State for Defence Plantation
Industries and Foreign Affairs. Killed by LTTE IED in Colombo, March 1991. Posthumously 
promoted General.
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Anexure-3.1
Empirical Details of Increasing Deterioration of ‘Law & Order’ 
rom May to Mid-July 1983: the impact of Increased Tamil 
Insurgent Attacks & retaliatory anti-Tamil mini Riots by Sinhalese
Anti-Tamil Student Unrest at Peradeniva University
1983 Mav -1 6
ay 1983 anti-Tamil agitations began occurring at the University of Peradeniya, Kandy
™ .  arf "  T  rS °  7 ami' students Iived in residential halls. On the night of Wednesday 
ay 1983 organised attacks were made by some Sinhala students on Tamil students
staying in residential halls. On 12 May a Tamil Lecturer was assaulted.1 From Friday 13 May
onwards about 1,200 Tamil students fled the University in great hurry and went to Jaffna and
other parts of the country.‘ Many Sinhala students and lecturers helped and protected Tamil
students and assisted them to travel to safety. This was gratefully acknowledged by Tamil
students who gathered together at Jaffna University on 15 May.3 The Tamil students were
eager to resume their studies and returned to Peradeniya University at the beginning of June.4
But in the face of fresh intimidation by agitators, Tamil students again hurriedly fled to their
homes on 12 June. The University was closed for an indefinite period from 13 July onwards.6
The Vice-Chancellor said that politically motivated individuals were playing a role in inciting
the students to carry on with their demonstrations.7 Although not specifically mentioned in the
press, when assessed contextually, this was a reference to anti-Tamil Sinhala agitators, both 
students and non-students.
Sun, 16 May 1983, Students Return: All is Calm at the Campus . This headline was misleading as subsequent 
events revealed. This headline was meant to have a calming effect on the readers. The text of the complete article 
reveals many details of the role played by agent provocateur Sinhala students.
2 Sun, 19 May 1983, ‘Team to probe campus incidents’.
3 The Island, 16 May 1983, Resolution Passed at Jaffna Varsity Premises: 300 P’deniya Tamil U’grads thank 
Sinhala Dons, Colleagues’. In the present author’ assessment these were well-meaning acts by Sinhalese students 
and staff who were deeply embarrassed by the actions of the Sinhalese attackers, and, grateful Tamil students 
expressing their gratitude. Both groups wanted reconciliation and to resume their interrupted university studies 
as soon as possible. But there were much more stronger and sinister forces -  i.e. Tamil insurgents and Sinhalese 
planning anti-Tamil riots -  who were at work in the greater society and within the student body and it is they 
who eventually won. During the subsequent years the Universities were sometimes closed for months at a 
stretch. Many of the Tamil students could not resume their university studies: some joined the insurgents, others 
migrated or fled abroad, others gave-up their studies and found employment in Sri Lanka or abroad.
4 The Island, 12 June 1983, ‘Alleged assault on P’deniya Tamil students: Fresh tensions as bid to boycott 
lecturers aborts’. Other incidents were reported from three more student resident halls and an attempt had been 
made to set fire to the doors of two residential rooms (which probably had Tamil occupants, although this is not 
mentioned in the newspaper). On the night of 8 June four Tamil students were assaulted. When the Vice- 
Chancellor of the University suspended a few students related to incidents which had occurred many months 
earlier, many of the rest of the students began vociferous demonstrations on Campus and clashes between 
student groups also began to occur around 11 June.
5 The Island, 12 June 1983, ‘Alleged assault on P’deniya Tamil students: Fresh tensions as bid to boycott 
lecturers aborts’.
6 The Times (London) 18 July 1983, ‘Armed police in Sri Lanka close university’. By mid-July 1983 student 
demonstrations on campus were assessed by the University authorities as uncontrollable.
7 Ceylon Daily News, 12 July 1983, ‘Peradeniya varsity closed indefinitely: All students ordered to leave 
campus’, and, Sun, 12 July 1983, ‘Demos getting out of control: Peradeniya University closed’.
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uradhapura, Kandy, Kalutara. Nuwnrn Fliya and Pollonnaruwa
Districts
The Tabie hdow gives details of small scale anti-Tamil rioting and disorder against Tamils in 
» “ S ho0:.‘ ,h'  “ Un'ry- C° l0mb0 C"y -  are deaf, will,
.Table 3A: Small scale anti-Tamil riots and Disorder in the Conntr 
excluding Colombo & Trincomalee 1983
Date
«  Y
Incident 1 Govt 
Response 
(as mentioned 
in the press)
1 Location 
& District
1 Province
Source
1 June Arson & damage 
to Vavuniya 
Bazaar.
At least 100
buildings
affected.
Curfew
Imposed
1 Vavuniya 
Town, 
Vavuniya
North (a)
2 June 1 Riotous mobs break 
shops and attempt 
to loot.
1 Police act firmly.
1-day curfew 
| declared
1 Kurunegala 
Town, 
Kurunegala
North-
Western
(b)
2-3 June 
2-3 June
1 Arson
* i
1 Police act firmly 1 Divulapitiya, i 
Gampaha_____
1 Western (c)
Attempted arson Police act firmly Minuwangoda, 
Gampaha______
Western p )
2-3 June 1 Attempted arson Police act firmly Negombo, 
Gampaha______
Western p )
2 June Colombo-Jaffna 
train’s Tamil 
passengers
assaulted___________
n.a. Talawa,
Anuradhapura
North-Central h d )
4 June 1 Tamil Doctor’s 
house attacked, 
robbed, and burnt. 
| Doctor injured
1 Kurunegala Police rush to 
house
Kurunegala [ 
Town,
Kurunegala
North-
Western
75
1 2-6 June 23 shops burnt and 
destroyed
n.a. 1 Kurunegala 1 
Town,
Kurunegala |
North-
Western
(0
Between 
1 2-6 June
1 Shop set on fire 1 Police act rapidly 1 
and limit damage
Teldeniya, I 
Kandy
Central 1 (f)
Between 
| 2-6 June
1 1 man killed by 1 
petrol bomb
n.a. 1 Negombo, 1 
Gampaha
Western 1 (0
1 6 June 3 Tamil &
2 Muslim 
shops burnt 
by mob
Curfew declared. 1 
Police patrol
Panadura, 1 
Kalutara
Western 1 tg)
Between 
2-7 June
Arson and looting n.a Talawakelle, 1 
Nuwara Eliya |
Central (h)
Between 
2-7 June
Arson and looting 1 n.a 1 Nawalapitiya, 1 
Nuwara Eliya |
Central 1 (h)
Between 1 
2-5 June
Trains attacked n.a Moragollagama,
Kurunegala
North- f  
Western |
0)
Between 
2-5 June 
Between 
2-5 June
Trains attacked
Passengers in 
3 trains moving 
between Colombo 
-Jaffna attacked
n.a
Police 
Investigate
Hingurakgoda, 
Pollonnaruwa 
Ganewatte, 
Anuradhapura
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North- 
Centra^ 
North-Central
6 June Bomb exploded in
Batticaloa-Jaffna
Bus.
Driver injured
n.a.
Jayanthipura,
Pollonnaruwa
North-Central
n.a. -  not available
Sources: Table 3A:
(b) Ceylon Daily News, 3 June , ‘Looters took to their heels'.
n e  Island, 4 June , -Police deployed lo curb violence: K'gala. Divulaphiya, NegombST 
(d) Ceylon Daily News, 4 June , ‘Passengers a s s a u l t e d * . _______
‘Kurunegala'T6’ ^  ^  ’ 'D°C,° r P3yS ‘° K’ga'a P° lice’ [Note; ‘K’Sala’ was a shortening of
.(f) Ceylon Daily News, 8 June , ‘Over hundred arrested*. ______
(g)  Sun, 7 June , ‘Sporadic incidents’ and Ceylon Daily News, 7 June , ‘Five Shops gutted7;
(h ) The Island, 8 June , 'Security intensified in Colombo South*.
(i) The Island, 6 June , 'Special police squads to round up trouble makers: Hunt on for wanted criminals’. 
Q) The Sunday Observer, 6 June , ‘Army, Navy keep order’.
(k) The Island, 7 June , ‘Driver hurt as bomb explodes’.
Table 3B: Anti-Tamil Disorder and Mini-Riots in Colombo 
1983
une
Date Incident Govt
Response
(as
mentioned 
in the press)
Source
1 Between 1 Mob sets Pharmacy on fire. Knife attack on owner & son 
2-5 June in Ratmalana, Colombo
Curfew
imposed ( 3 )
1 6 June 1 2 Houses attacked & robbed Dehiwela, Colombo Police act 
firmly.
1-day curfew 
declared |
( b )
1 Approx.7 1 arson and looting Bambalapitiya, Colombo 
June
Police act 1 
firmly |
' (b)
1 Approx.7 1 arson and looting Wellawatte, Colombo 
1 June |
Police act 1 
firmly |
(b)
1 Approx.7 1 arson and looting Dehiwela, Colombo 
1 June |
Police act 1 
firmly |
(b)
1 Approx.7 1 arson and looting Ratmalana, Colombo 
| June |
n.a. 1 (b)
Between Doctor attacked with knife; house attacked by mob in Mt. Lavinia, 
2-7 June Colombo
Police action 1 
praised 
by Doctor
(c)
8 June
Kumar Ponnambalam’s House located in Colombo-7 (an elite area of 
the City), Colombo Cit
n.a. -  not available
n.a.
Sources for Table 3B as reported in the press
(a) The Island, 6 June , tPharmacy set on fire: owner, son attacked'
jb2 The Island, 8 June , ‘Se7IH:n^ n M :^ c 0|ombo S^TiT  
_(c) Ceylon Ua.IyN e w s ^ u n t  ----------1
M l  f  \ 7 _____ f \  t
z /e
( V Ceybn Daily Ip, h ^
Table 3C: Anti-Tamil Violence anf) Mini.Rintc 
June 1983 Trincomalee. 2nd - 11
Date
Between 
2-6 
June
5 June
Between
7-9
June
Incident
Arson, murder, looting, damage to property. Fishing boats 
& equipment destroyed. Reports of a Tamil youth shot 
dead, a stabbing incident, a Mill, bookshop, saloon attacked 
and damaged. Trincomalee town and environs.
Pillayar Kovil in China Bay & Mansion Hotel on Main 
street attacked & damaged by mobs. Fires in various parts 
of Trincomalee town and environs.
A Tamil youth stabbed to death. Mullipuram 
in Kantalai, Trincomalee
Govt 
Response 
(as mentioned 
in the press)
Navy, army and police 
deployed on ‘Internal 
Security’ posture patrolled 
the area
Navy, army and police 
deployed on ‘Internal 
Security’ posture patrolled 
the area
n.a.
Source
Between
7-9
June
A Tamil youth working in shop shot dead by gang who 
came to loot the shop. Morawewa, Trincomalee
n.a
9 June I Sub-Postmaster, a Tamil, shot at by gang at Uppuvelli,
Trincomalee
n.a.
n.a.11 June I Two bombs thrown at Trincomalee MP Sampanthan’s
house, Trincomalee Town.______________________
n.a. -  not available
Sources:
(a) The Island, 7 June 1987, ‘Situation still tense in Trincomalee’.
(b) Sun, 10 June , ‘Trinco returns to normal’.
(c) The Island, 12 June , ‘Two bombs flung at Trinco MP's house'.
as reported in the press
Table 3D: Evidence of Government’s Public Order Actions before July 
1983 Riots -  Examples of Armed Forces’ Deployed on ‘Internal Security’ to 
assist the Police. 2nd- 7th June. 1983
Date Deployment Location 
& District
Province Source
2-5 June Army assisted Police Kurunegala, Kurunegala District North-
Western
(a)
2-5 June Army assisted Police Kandy,
Kandy District
Central (a)
2-5 June Navy assisted Police Peliyagoda, Gampaha District Western (a)
2-5 June Navv assisted Police Negombo, Gampaha District Western (a)
2-4 June Army &/or Navy assisted Police Ratnapura, Ratnapura District Uva (b)
2-4 June Armv &/or Navy assisted Police Balangoda, Ratnapura District Uva (b)
2-4 June Army &/or Navy assisted Police Kalutara, Kalutara District Western (b)
2-4 June Armv &/or Navy assisted Police Galle, Galle District Southern (b)
2-5 June
------------------------ * -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------
Police search vehicles Divulapitiya, Western (c)
2-5 June Police search vehicles
2-5 June
2-7 June
2-7 June 
2-7 June 
2-7 June 
2-7 June 
2-7 June
Sources:
Police search vehicles
Preventive arrests
Preventive arrests 
Preventive arrests 
Preventive arrests
Preventive arrests______
Police open fire on rioters
Sources: See Annex.3.1
Gampaha District
Minuwangoda,
Gampaha District
Kurunegala,
;ala
Kurunegala,
Kurunegala District________
JYincomalee, Trincomalee. District 
Negombo, Gampaha District
K T  • * _ I
Mt. Lavinia, Colombo District 
Panadura, Kalutara District 
Kurunegala, Kurunegala District
n.a. -  not available
Western
North-Western
(a) Ceylon Daily News, 6 June , ‘Round up criminal elements - m v '
(b) The Sunday Observer, 5 June , ‘Army, Navy keep order’. -------- 1
(J) ’ , ? eCia‘ P°lice ” luads 10 round UP trouble makers: Hunt on for wanted criminals’,
(d) Ceylon Daily News, 8 June , ‘Over hundred arrested’. ----------------------------------
Table Resurgence
Trincomalee and environs, from
Anti-Tamil Disorder and Mini-Riots
rox une 1983
Date
13 June
By 15 
Jun
27 June
Up to 30 
Jun
30 Jun
27-30
Jun
Up to 30 
Jun
By 2 Jul
Incident
5 bomb attacks; Prima Factory bus stopped and 
workers assaulted
Rioting & disorder in Trincomalee
Govt 
Measures (as
reported in the
press)_____
Location & 
District
Source
12-hour curfew
(Dusk-to-Dawn) 
increased to 19- 
hour curfew.
50 rioters arrested
Trincomalee 
town and 
environs
Trincomalee
High increase in rioting. Many shops set on fire 
A ‘mini-war' like situation reported in the main 
market area; 2 Hindu temples set on fire
Army and Navy 
deployed to 
restore order. 
Open fire on 
rioters. Indefinite 
curfew declared.
Trincomalee
town
By 30^ June nine (09) people had been killed; 
entire rows of shops set on fire; in Uppuvelli area 
15 houses set on fire
48-hour curfew
declared Police, 
Navy and Army 
patrols arrested 
75 persons_____
Trincomalee
and
Uppuvelli
20 houses at Nochchikulam and 20 houses in 
China Bay set on fire
n.a. Nochchikulam 
and China Bay, 
Trincomalee
Serious disorder and rioting continued 48-hour curfew 
extended 
continuously for 
65- hours. Lifted 
for 6-hours and 
then re-imposed.
Trincomalee
town
Serious disorder and rioting continued
Serious disorder and rioting continued. By 2" 
July sixteen (16) people reported killed. Actual
number may have been higher.
By 1st July 300 
persons under 
arrest. 100 in 
Police custody & 
200 in army 
custod 
Civil
Administration in 
Trincomalee
Trincomalee
town
Trincomalee
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suspended. Navy
Commander
Rear-Admiral
Asoka De Silva
appointed
‘Coordinating
Officer’ of
Trincomalee
District
Sources:
n.a. -  not available
(a) Ceylon Daily News, 15 June , ‘ 19-hour curfew in Trinco’.
(b) Observer, 15 June , ‘50 held over Trinco violence’
(c) The Island, 29 June , Trinco mini-war: Army, Police open fire’.
(d) Ceylon Daily News, 30 June , ‘Trinco death toll now nine: President orders crackdown on violence’.
(e) Sun, 2 July , Civilian Administration Suspended: Navy Commander Takes Over Trinco’.
/  C \  P   1 T_ _ 1  i r r s  • I ^ - _ _ . ^
(Q Sun, 1 July , ‘Trinco Curfew Lifted for 6 Hours’
(g) The Island, 1 July , ‘Trinco violence: 300 in custody’.
(W The Island, 9 July , Trinco situation must not be allowed to take turn as Jaffna: Amirthalingam’,
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Annexure-4.1
Guerrilla Attacks by Tamil Insurgents. To enable the reader to obtain an overview of Tamil 
insurgents tactics.
Insurgent Attacks from October 1983 to end-1984
Table 4A: Insurgent Robberies fmnsfl 
North & East, Oct. 1983 to Aug. 1984
ieting Government Banks) in the
Incident Target of 
Robbery
Date District Province
Source
10 armed youth attacked Batticaloa 
Katchcheri (i.e. the Govt’s main 
Administrative Office). They stole 99 
shotguns and cash (Rs. 12,000)
Batticaloa
Katchcheri
17 Oct 
1983
Batticaloa East
(a)
A 10-12 armed gang robbed cash 
(Rs.238,000)
Not
mentioned
14 Nov 
1983
not mentioned North
(b)
4 armed youth robbed cash, Rs. 
1,392,000.
General Post 
Office, Jaffna
14 Nov 
1983 (b)
Peoples’ Bank robbed of Jewellery 
(Rs. 36 million) and Cash 
(Rs.240,000)
Kattankudy
Branch
mid-Jan
1984
Batticaloa East (C)
25 strong gang rob Peoples’ Bank of 
Jewellery (Rs. 5 million)
Chankani
Branch
mid-Feb
1984
Jaffna North (d)
25 strong gang armed with machine 
guns rob Peoples’ Bank of Jewellery 
(Rs. 12 million)
Kinniya
Branch
22 Feb 
1984
Trincomalee East (e)
Armed gang rob 2 safes from Bank of 
Ceylon. Safes abandoned when fired 
upon
Velannai
Branch,
Kayts
24 Feb 
1984
Jaffna North (0
Armed gang rob Bank of Ceylon of 
cash ( Rs. 950,000)
Point Pedro 
Branch
9 Apr 
1984
Jaffna North (g)
15 strong armed gang rob Bank of 
Ceylon of cash (Rs.1.2 million)
Stanley Road 
Branch, 
Jaffna Town
10 Apr 
1984
Jaffna North (h)
Bank of Ceylon robbed of cash 
(Rs. 1.4 million) & foreign currency 
(Rs.38,000)
Kilinochchi
Branch
early- 
Jul 1984
Kilinochchi North (i)
A gang of 50 rob Bank of Ceylon of 
two Safes and 6 guns. Safes happened 
to be empty
Jaffna
Branch
Early-
Aug
1984
Jaffna North ©
i  r i c  i M u u u ,  v w u u v i  « -  — ................ ......................... ........ ............................................................... ..................................................................................................................................................................
(c) Sun, 14 January 1984, ‘Armed gang hits Kattankudy People’s Bank: Biggest Jewellery Heist in History: 
Haul over Rs. 36 million’.1 1 (1 U  1 V/ V V I  IX vJ. »/ M M  M M *  * ■ ■ ■- ~ 1
(d) Daily Mirror, 15 February 1984, ‘Armed gang holds up People’s Bank again: Five branches closed
immediately’.---------- --------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------
(e) Daily Mirror, 23 February 1984, ‘Kinniya Bank hit for Rs.l2m. by 25 member gang’.__________________
(f) The Island, 25 February 1984, Gunfight at Pannai causeway: Police fire at getaway terrorists: one dead, safe
recovered’.
(g) The Ceylon Daily News, 10 April 1984, ‘Daring hold-up of Bank of Ceylon at Point Pedro: Youlhs get
away with Rs. 9.5 lakhs’._________________ __________________ ______—— —----------- -------- —
tht The Cevlon Daily News, 11 April 1984, ‘Curfew in Jaffna: Lalith over radio...We must refuse to be
provoked’. 282
|J i )  Daily Mirror, 3 July 1984, ‘Armed youth rob Killinnr-h.hi -----------------
(J) ,e Island, Augus! I9B4, ' Ierrorists attack Jaffna bank: Take safes with no cash'
Table 4B: Insurgents Attacks on Police Statinnc 1984
:et of Attack Date
Police Station, Am para 
Police Station, Oddusuddan 
Police Station, Chunnakam 
Police Station, Ka 
Police Station, Valvedditturai
Approx. 2-5 Jul 1984
5 Aug 1984
8 Jul 1984_
1984 
14 Aug 1984
Au
Police Station, Kayts
Police Station, Kayts_________
Police Station, Kalawanchikudy 
Police Station, Point Pedro 
Police Station, Chavakachcheri
14 Aug 1984
21 Aug 1984
22 Sep 1984 
4 October 1984 
20 Nov 1984
District
Ampara
Mullaittivu
Jaffna
Jaffna
Jaffna
Jaffna
Jaffna 
Batticaloa 
Jaffna
Jaffna
Province
East
North
North
North
North
North
North 
East 
North
North
Source
Sources:
(a) The Island, 6 July 1984, ‘20 guns robbed from police station’.
(b) Sun, 6 August 1984, ‘Several Casualties: Security forces quell terrorist attacks.
(c) Sun, 9 August 1984, ‘70 Terrorists Killed in Confrontations: Security forces repulse terrorist 
attacks’.
(d) Sun, 14 August 1984, ‘31 guerrillas killed in three incidents within 24 hours: Police repel 
terrorist attack on Kayts station’.
(e) Daily Mirror, 15 August 1984, ‘Fresh attacks on police posts in North repulsed’.
(0  Daily Mirror, 15 August 1984, ‘Fresh attacks on police posts in North repulsed’.
(g) Daily Mirror, 22 August 1984, ‘Attack repulsed for third time’.
(h) The Sunday Observer, 23 September 1984, ‘Two dead in police station attack’.
(i) Sun, 5 October 1984, ‘Forces repulse attack on Pt. Pedro police station’.
(j) The Ceylon Daily News, 22 November 1984, ‘Storming of Chavakachcheri station was 
planned to the minute: Shock attack gave police no chance’.
Table 4C: Insurgents Landmine Attacks, 1984
Location Killed & Injured Date District Province Source
Pt.Pedro-
Valvedditturai
4 STF (killed) 2 Sep 1984 Jaffna North (a)
Alampil 9 Army (killed), 3 
Army (injured)
10 Sep 1984 Mullaittivu North (b)
Kilinochchi 2 Police (killed),4 Police 
( i n j u r e d ) ___________
17 Sep 1984 Kilinochchi North (c)
Mannar- 
Murunkan road
1 Army (killed), 7 Army 
(injured)______________
4 Dec 1984 Mannar North Id )
Kalawanchikudy 8 Police (killed), 1 
civ (killed)
18 Dec 1984 Batticaloa East
Padaviya- 
Pulmoddai road
4 Army (killed) (probably) 19 
Dec 1984
Mullaittivu North (0
Note: STF were the Special Task Force, a commando t
Sources:
(a) The Ceylon Daily News, 3 September 1984, ‘Uneasy calm after North explosion’.
(b) Sun, 11 September 1984, ‘9 soldiers killed in mine blast’.
(c) The Ceylon Daily News, 18 September 1984, ‘Policemen, terrorists killed’.
(d) The Ceylon Daily News, 5 December 1984, ‘12 terrorists die in shoot-out: Landmine kills soldier.
injures seven’.
S h ? p o £ m e n D a%  ' '  ° eCember ,984' ‘Were they lured in‘°  a trap?: Terrorists landmine kills 
(0  Sun, 20 December 1984, ‘Four soldiers killed’.
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Insurgent Attacks During Year 1985
Table 4D; Insurgents Attacks on Police Stations. Army & Navv Cam
1985
Target of Attack
Police Station, Pulmoddai
SLAF Aircraft, Palali Airfield (RPG used for 
first time in Sri Lanka)
Army Camp, Kokkilai 
Police Station, Kilinochchi 
Navy Base, Karainagar 
Police Station, Mannar
Sacred Bo Tree, Anuradhapura, and the killing 
of many civilian pilgrims who were in the 
vicinity
Date
15 Jan 1985 
23 Jan 1985
>rox. 18 Feb 1985 
1 Mar 1985 
3 May 1985 
10 May 1985 
14 May 1985
District
Trincomalee 
Jaffna
Welioya 
Kilinochchi 
Jaffna 
Mannar 
Anuradhapura
Province
East 
North
North 
North 
North 
North 
North- 
Central
Source
(£)
(d)
(e) 
(0 
(g)
Police Station, Eravur 2 Sep 1985 Batticaloa East (h)
4 attacks on Police Station, Vavuniya From 14 to 30 Sep 
1985
Vavuniya North (i)
4 attacks on Police Station, Pottuvil From approx. 16 
Sep to 1 Oct 1985
Ampara East 0)
Police Station, Kilinochchi 23 Sep 1985 Kilinochchi North ( k )
Police Station, Villachchiya 27 Sep 1985 Anuradhapura North-
Central
0)
Police Station, Vavuniya 27 Oct 1985 Vavuniya North (m)
Army Camp, Tondaimanar 30 Oct 1985 Jaffna North (n)
Police Station, Kuchchaveli Around 5 Nov 1985 Trincomalee East (o)
Police Station Vellavelli 24 Nov 1985 Batticaloa East M
Note: RPG means Rocket Propelled Grenade
Sources:
(a) The Ceylon Daily News, 16 January 1985, ‘Pulmoddai police repulse attack’.
(b) The Island, 24 January 1985, ‘Terrorists shoot rockets at army plane’.
(c) Sun, 20 February 1985, ‘After 5-hour gun battle: Posse of soldiers rout the Tigers’.
(d) The Island, 2 March 1985, ‘Head-on clash with security forces: Terrorists killed in Kilinochchi Police station 
siege’.
(e) The Sunday Observer, 5 May 1985, ‘30 Terrorists, 3 Navy men killed: Attack on Karainagar Naval Base 
repulsed’.
(0  The Ceylon Daily News, 13 May 1985, ‘Two hundred terrorists took part in Mannar attack’.
(g) The Island, 16 May 1985, ‘Anuradhapura death toll 146’.
(h) The Ceylon Daily News, 4 September 1985, ‘Twin strike by Tigers in North and East: Terrorists kill two 
TULF ex-MPs & seven policemen’.
(i) The Ceylon Daily News, 1 October 1985, ‘Terrorists attack Vavuniya police with 500 men’. [Note: this news 
item mentions 4 attacks on Vavuniya police spread over 16 days. The last on 30 Sep 1985.]
(j) The Ceylon Daily News, 2 October 1985, ‘Routed terrorists escape by sea: Hit-and-run attack on Pottuvil’. 
[Note: this news item mentions 4 attacks on Pottuvil police spread over 2 weeks.]
(k) Sun, 25 September 1985, ‘First major violation of extended ceasefire: Massive attack on Kilinochchi’.
(l) The Island, 28 September 1985, ‘Mortars used in surprise attack: Security forces repulse attack on
Villachchiya’. . . . .
(m) Sun, 28 October 1985, ‘Vavuniya police station attacked: Four terrorists shot dead in attempted ambush .
(n) The Island, 31 October 1985, ‘Terrorist attack on army camp repulsed’.
(o) The Ceylon Daily News, 6 November 1995, ‘Attack on police station repulsed in 90-minute battle: Terrorists 
routed at Kuchchaveli’.
(p) The Island, 25 November 1985 ‘In RVnlrw r w  u-------u— ---------------------------- ---------------------
repulsed’._________ ’ ‘ 0ne-h°ur-shoot-out: Terrorist attack on Wellawali police
Table 4E: Insurgents Landmine Attarkg 1985
Location
rT'_ — 41 /f 1 «
Killed & Injured Date District Province Source
Tram on Mankulam- 
Murigandy track
28 Army (killed), 17 civs 
(killed)
19 Jan 1985 Mullaittivu North (a)
Kalawanchikudy 3 police (killed) 23 Janl985 Batticaloa East 7b)Eastern Province 9STF (killed) 3 Apr 1985 East East (c)Dehiwatte 4 Army (killed) 20 Aug 1985 1 Trincomalee East (d)
Palampattaru
Komari
6 Navy (killed), 1 civ 
(killed), 2 Navy (injured)
27 Aug 1985 Trincomalee East
Vu /  |
7 5
5 Army (injured)__________ ~ 30 Aug 1985 Ampara East T o
Pollonnaruwa- 
Batticaloa road
5 Army (killed), 4 Army 
(injured)
4 Sep 1985 Batticaloa East 7g)
Pollonnaruwa- 
Batticaloa road
5 Army (killed) 4 Sep 1985 Batticaloa East (h)
Wilgamvehera 3 Army (killed)
4 Army (injured)
4 Sep 1985 Trincomalee East 7 i)
Punani 5 Army (killed), 3 Army 
(injured)________________
5 Sep 1985 Batticaloa East 0)
Morawewa 3 Army (injured) 15 Sep 1985 Trincomalee East 7k)
Siripura 3 Army (injured) 24 Sep 1985 Trincomalee East (1)
Cheddikulam 3 Army (killed), 4 Army 
(injured)________________
24 Oct 1985 Vavuniya North (m)
Bakkiella 6 Police (killed), 2 Police 
(injured)
28 Oct 1985 Ampara East 7 5
Sandiveli 2 Police injured 28 Oct 1985 Batticaloa East (o)
Palampattaru 5 Navy (killed), 2 civ 
(killed)
31 Oct 1985 Trincomalee East (P)
Trikonamadu 2 Army (killed), 4 Army 
(injured)
1 Nov 1985 Pollonnaruwa North-
Central
(q)
Seruwila 7 Police (killed) 6 Nov 1985 Trincomalee East ( r )
Verugal 4 Army (killed) 6 Nov 1985 Trincomalee East (s)
Bar Road Batticaloa 4 Police (killed), 2 Police 
(injured)
16 Nov 1985 Batticaloa East (0
Kokkuttoduvai 6 Army (killed), 7 Army 
(injured)
23 Nov 1985 Welioya North (u)
Kaluwanchikudi STF none (killed) 23 Nov 1985 Batticaloa East ( V )
Dehiwatte-Kantale
Road
5 Army (killed), 3 Army 
(injured), 1 civ (killed)
3 Dec 1985 Trincomalee East ( W )
Note: ‘civ’ means civilian.
Sources:
(a) The Island, 22 January 1985, ‘Yal Devi explosion: Death toll now 48’.
(b) The Ceylon Daily News, 24 March 1985, ‘Landmine kills 3 policemen’.
(c) The Ceylon Daily News, 4 April, 1985, ‘Landmine blast kills 9 policemen’.
(d) The Island, 21 August 1985, ‘Landmine kills 4 soldiers’.
(e) The Ceylon Daily News, 28 August 1985, ‘Landmine kills six sailors and woman in Trinco'.
(0 The Ceylon Daily News, 31 August 1985, ‘Five soldiers injured in landmine blast’.
(g) The Ceylon Daily News, 5 September 1985, ‘Five soldiers killed, 4 hurt in mine blast’.
(h) Sun, 5 September 1985, ‘As violence escalates in the East: Landmines kill eight soldiers’.
(i) Sun, 5 September 1985, ‘As violence escalates in the East: Landmines kill eight soldiers’.
(j)  Sun, 15 Sep 1985, ‘16 Hour Curfew in Trinco’.
(k) The Island, 17 September 1985, ‘Landmine blows up jeep: three soldiers injured’.
(l) Sun, 25 September 1985, ‘First major violation of extended ceasefire: Massive attack on Kilinochchi’
(m) Sun, 25 October 1985, ‘ 3 soldiers killed in blast’.
(n) The Cevlon Daily News, 29 October 1985, ‘Six policemen killed by terrorist landmine’.___________
285(°) The Ceylon Daily News, 29 October IQRS ‘q ;v ---------------------------------- ----------------------
(p) The Ceylon Daily News, 2 November 1985 5  !  n f  y ‘err° riSt landmine’-
(q) The Ceylon Daily News, 2 November 1985’ ‘I , nH S u'!! naVy W' fe & Chlld’ Seven servicemen'-
(r) The Island, 7 November 1985 ‘Two landmine e R‘ ■T''3' W‘fe & Ch‘ld’ Seven servicemen’-
killed’. ndmme exPloslons ln Tnnco & B’caloa: 7 policemen and four soldiers
& £ ISland’ 7 N° Vember ' 985’ ‘TW0 ,andmine eXP'0Si0ns Trinco & B’caloa: 7 policemen and four soldiers
£  w L l md/ Z ? K erVeu I7|nN0° Vember l985’ 4 P°licemen 9 terrorists killed’.
imbu^h Cm 1985’ 'MilitamS W3ge War after letter t0 Delhi: soldiers killed in Mu.laitivu
( v ^ W ,  24 November 1985, ‘Militants wage war after letter to Delhi: Six soldiers killed in Mullaitivu
(w) Sun, 4 December 1985, ‘Five soldiers killed in mine blast’.
Insurgent Attacks During Year 1986
Tabic 4F. Insurgents Attacks against Police, Army, Navy and Air Force
Cam Stations & Establishments. 1986
Target of Attack
Police Station, Vellaveli 
Army camp, Navatkuli 
Army camp, Kilinochchi
Army convoy, Dharmapuram 
Police Station, Kuchchaveli
Date
24 Jan 1986
24 Jan 1986
25 Jan 1986 
31 Jan 1986
District
Batticaloa 
Jaffna 
Kilinochchi 
Kilinochchi
Province
East 
North 
North 
North
Police Station, Mannar 
Police Station, Maha Vilachchiya
Navy Craft destroyed [sea-mine], Nainativu 
Palali Runway, Palali Air Base 
Police Station, Vavuniya
20 Feb 1986 
25 Feb 1986 
25 & 27 Feb 1986
3 Mar 1986 
13 Mar 1986 
16 Mar 1986
Trincomalee
Mannar_____
Anuradhapura
Jaffna 
Jaffna 
Vavuniya
East 
North 
North-Central
North
North
North
Naval Base, Karainagar 28 Mar 1986 Jaffna North
Army Camp, Point Pedro 28 Mar 1986 Jaffna North
Police Station, Valvedditturai 2 Apr 1986 Jaffna North
Police Station, Kilinochchi 2 Apr 1986 Kilinochchi
Army Camp, Tondaimanar
Army Camp, Kilinochchi (3-day attack)
Army Camp, Kilinochchi 
Army Camp, Kilinochchi
7 Apr 1986 Jaffna
4-6 Jun 1986
Navy Base, Karainagar
Police Station, Kalkudah
Police Station, Jaffna
Army Base, Palali
Mannar-Mainland Causeway
SLAF aircraft, damaged by RPG 
Police Station, Oddusuddan
Police living quarters, Pannai
Army Camp, Jaffna Fort 
Army Camp, Point Pedro 
Police Station, Point Pedro
8 Jun 1986 
19 Jun 1986
29 Jul 1986
21 Aug 1986
24 Aug
31 Aug 1986
3 Sep 1986
Kilinochchi
Kilinochchi
Kilinochchi
Jaffna
Batticaloa
Jaffna
North
North
North
North
North
North
East
North
Jaffna
Mannar
4 Sep 1986
7 Sep 1986
7 Sep 1986
7 Sep 1986
8 Sep 1986
Police Station, Tondaimanar 
Army Camp, Jaffna Fort 
Army Camp, Nilaveli 
Police Station, Kalmunai 
Police Station, Akkaraipattu 
Army Base, Elephant Pass (Mortar fire) 
Army Camp, Tondaimanar 
Police Station, Mollipotana 
Army Camp, Wilgamvehera
8 Sep 1986
8 Sep 1986 
8 Sep 1986 
24 Sep 1986 
17 Oct 1986 
1 Nov 1986 
15 Nov 1986
Batticaloa
Mullaittivu
Jaffna
Jaffna
Jaffna
North
North
East
North
Jaffna
15 Nov 1986 
25 Nov 1986 
7 Dec 1986
Jaffna 
Jaffna 
Trincomalee
Batticaloa 
Ampara
Jaffna
North
North
North
North
North 
North 
East
East
East
North
Jaffna 
Trincomalee 
Trincomalee
North 
East 
East
(bb)
(C£)
(dd)
Army Camp, Valveddirm^T
~1 28 Dec 1986 Jaffna
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North
Sources:
(ee)
(a) The Sunday Observer, 26 Januarv iq s a  ‘d  >■
(b) The Sunday Observer, 26 January 1986 iS" a‘taCked’'
(c) The Ceylon Daily News, 27 January 1986 Arm °" h T  H “ "V  camP ^pulsed’.
(d) The Ceylon Daily News, 3 February 1986 th™S- 81 K nochchl smashes TELO attack’,
terrorists killed in K’nochchi battle'. ^ ’ rces tnumPh in all-out offensives on North-East front: 60
m  ' I51,™ 1!,' I t  r ebruar>' l986- ‘Attack repulsed’.
(g) Sun, 28 February5^  ’After three-h’our'^unbaUl^T fr° m VaVUn'ya: Terronsts attack Mannar Police’.
(h) 4 March 1986, ‘Nayy craft explodes F o u L tin g s 'k ™ . °" W' lachchiya rePulsed' ’
(l) Sun, 15 March 1996, ‘Aircraft saved’.
f k ^ t ^ q  M 17 March 1986’ ‘ForCes rePulse a«ack on Vavuniya police’
Z ^ % 7 o T iNr 4] T 1™' a ^ r y camp attacked’-
9 8 6 T ^ s t f a l a c S n o c h r h  1986' Road U s a b l e :  Curfew in K’nochchi ’; to , .  6 June
aga'n: Tw° so'd,ers ,njured‘ ^ 7 June 1986’ ‘F—
tni 70Urne ' ? o ^ ‘Tr 0nStS launch fresh attacks: Sunday curfew in Kilinochchi'.
®  JU,ne, 1 98f ’ ° ne 0fflcer kllled: Temorists attack K’nochchi outpost’.
(q) The Island, 31 July 1986, ‘Terrorists attack naval base’.
(r) The Island, 22 August 1986, Terrorist attack at Kalkudah repelled’.
(s) The Island, 26 August 1986, ‘Tiger attacks on Jaffna go on’
(t) 7776? Island, 1 September 1986, ‘Palaly army camp attacked from Vasivilan School’
(u) The Ceylon Daily News, 4 September 1986, ‘Terrorists blast causeway’.
(v) ■SW?. 5 September 1986, ‘Two terrorists killed, one commando injured: Air Force planes shot at by Tigers’
(w) The Island, 8 September 1986, ‘Police station, Jaffna Fort attacked’.
(x) Sun, 9 September 1986, ‘Terrorists continue major offensive in the north’.
(y) Sun, 25 September 1986, ‘4 service personnel and 8 terrorists killed: Terrorists launch dawn attack in 
Trinco’.
(z) The Ceylon Daily News, 20 October 1986, ‘Shootout at Vakarai ... attack on Kalmunai police station’
(aa) The Observer, 1 November 1986, ‘Troops repulse attacks’.
(bb) Sun, 17 November 1986, ‘Army bases attacked in the north’.
(cc) The Ceylon Daily News, 26 November 1986, ‘Police quell three-hour siege’.
(dd) Sun, 8 December 1986, ‘Terrorists attack Wilgamvehera Camp’.
(ee) The Island, 30 December 1986, ‘Terrorists attack army camp’.
Table 4G: Insurgents Landmine Attacks, 1986
Location____________ 1 Killed & Injured 1 District Province 1 Date Source
Vavuniya -Omantai 
Road________________
6 Army (killed), 2 
| Army (injured)_______
Vavuniya North 6 Jan 1986 (a)
1 Dehiwatte 3 Army (killed) | Trincomalee East 17 Jan 1986 j ib )
Kantale road 4 Army (killed), 32 
civ (killed), 20 civ 
(injured)
1 Trincomalee East , 19 Feb 1986 (c)
Vavuniya-Mannar
road
3 Army (killed), 7 
Army (injured), 2 civ 
(killed)
1 Vavuniya North 2 Mar 1986 Rd)
Colombo-Trincomalee 
| road |
3 Army (killed), 3 
Army (injured)
Trincomalee East 25 Mar 1986 (e)
1 Vavuniya- 1 
1 Medawachchiya road
5 Police (injured), 1 Vavuniya North 25 Mar 1986 (0
1 Kinniya 5 Army (killed), 1 
Army (injured), 2 
Home Guards 
(injured) |
Trincomalee East [ 28 Mar 1986 llg)
Kokavil
8 Armv (killed 7 1 -------- 287
1 Army (injured')
muiiamivu North 2 Apr 1986 1 (h)
lalaimannar ^ .2 Police (killed), 1 civ 
(k ille d )________
| 2 Army (killed), 4 
1 Army (injured)
Mannar
Trincomalee
North
Trincomalee-
9 Apr 1986 T (0
binmapura road East 10 Apr 1986 TO)
1 Pulmoddai 1 Police (killed), 8 
Police (injured)
Irincomalee 1 East 30 Aug 1986
( k )1 Murunkan 5 Armv (TniurpH^
1 Miyankulam 
Gomarankadawala
Kaddaimrirhrhan
3 Army (killed), 4
Army (iniured)
T  7 Air Force (killed), 2 
Air Force (injured), 2 
I civ (killed)
Mannar | North 8 Sep 1986 1 (1) 1
Batticaloa
Trincomalee
East j 15 Apr 1996 (m)
East ITS Apr 1996 (n)
A%U\JUU1UU1 Iv 1 IL1 l u l l  
I iff i ir
2 Police (killed), 1 
Army (killed), 13 
Police or Army 
| (injured)
Trincomalee East 29 Apr 1996
1 (0)
iviuiiur 18 Army (killed), 15 
Army (injured)_____
Trincomalee East [lO M ay 1996
( p )1 rannai causeway 
Vakarai
| 5 Army (injured) Jaffna North |H lu n  1986 (q)6 Army (killed),
7 Army (injured)
Batticaloa East 1 1 Aug 1986
| Vj/ _____________________________  1
Hr)
| Kinniya I""7 Army (killed) Trincomalee 1 East 30 Aue 1986 I (c) I
Kaddaipanchchan 6 Army (injured), 1 
civ (injured)_________
S  W ---A  A  0  A  A
Trincomalee East 31 Aug 1986 (t)
| rulmoddai 6 Police injured Trincomalee 1 East I 31 A n a  1QR6 i 7 i o  1
Murunkan 6 Army (injured), 1 
civ (injured)________
Mannar North 8 Sep 1986
( V )
Vinayagapuram
Padaviya- 
Anuradhapura road
3 STF (killed), 1 STF
(injured)____________
S  W— a  a  •  - A  •
Batticaloa East 1 16 Sep 1986 (w)
6 Police (injured) Welioya/ 
Anuradhapura |
North/North- 1 
Central |
25 Jun 1986 (x)
Periya-Illukulama,
Poonawa-
Medawachchiya road
42 civ (injured) 1 Anuradhapura 1 North-
Central
25 Jun 1986 (y)
Sittaru 16 civ (killed), | 
6 civ (injured) |
Trincomalee [ East 25 Jun 1986 [T z j
1 Manthai, 6 Army (killed),
6 Army (injured)_____________________________________1
7 Police (injured)
Mannar 1 North 13 Jul 1986 | la a j
1 Valachchenai_________________________________________________________________ Batticaloa 1 
Batticaloa |
East
East [~
16 Oct 1986 (bb)
Arasiddy Junction, 
Batticaloa Town
2 Police (killed) | 
6 Police (injured)
3 civ (injured)
28 Oct 1986
' ' 1 
(cc)
1 Karadiyanaru_________ 3 STF (killed)________1 Batticaloa_____ I East_______ 1 Nov 1986 (dd)
Kalawanchchikudy- 
Vellaweli road
8 Police &  STF [ 
(injured)
Batticaloa | East 1 31 Oct 1986 (ee)
Eravur-Karadianar road 3 Police (killed) Batticaloa [ East 1 1 Nov 1986 (fD
| Uliyankulam__________ 11 Army (injured) Mannar_______ 1 North_______1 16 Nov 1986 (gg) 1
Silavathurai-Murunkan
road
2 Army (injured) Mannar North | 20 Nov 1986 (hh)
1 Omantai 2 Army (killed),
3 Army (injured) |
Vavuniya 
Mannar |
North 27 Nov 1986 (ii)
1 Uthmayakkulam, 
Thalladi-Mannar road
2 Army (injured) North 30 Dec 1986 a i )
| Valvedditturai 2 Army (injured) | Jaffna | North 1 30 Dec 1986 (kk)
Note: ‘Civ’ means civilian.
Sources:
(a) Sun, 7 January 1986, *7 die in landmine blast1.______________________________
(b) The Island, 18 January 1986, ‘3 soldiers killed in landmine blast1.______________
(c) The Island, 20 February 1986, Terrorists blast bus: four soldiers, 32 others killed’.
—  m  a  M  A  M  «  A  ■  •  A  ■  A  A  A r m  A  A  A  A A  W  A  A
(d) Sun, 3 March 1986, ‘Landmine blast in Vavuniya: five killed: Troops foil Kach landing by terrorists’.
(e) The Ceylon Daily News, 26 March 1986, ‘Landmine blasts convoy, kills three soldiers’.___________
Q T h e  Ceylon Daily N e w s . iq »a  *n ..,. • -----— -----
7e)Sun 7Q fno2 rr~ ^—F^ccivilians killed’.
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M l!* e  Ceylon Daily New, 7 T  ,m  aVa baSC and a^rm>/ camP attacked
(j) The Ceylon Daily N p w v  11  a  , ^;i m os  »  . ~— r-nr--------------------------------
y . . »  2
B a a s * * - *
( r \  T / ) / ?  / r / z i n / /  1 O  A . .  -____ - 1 ~  **■ ___________ August , ............... ...... . ww__ r
(s) Weekend, 31 August 1986, ~7 killed'h7l
-  S “ n '  ' SePtember l986' 12 servicemen mmred in InnHmin. hi,,,.-
t ~. ~ n’r SePternber 1986, '12 servicemen injured in landmine blasts 
(v) The Island, 9 September 1986 'I a -Hmin. k i.„ . *--■■:....■-------
(wj\ Stun 1 8 QpntamUr^Tno7 To . \---rTr——-------- * ------September
^x) Sun, 26, June 1986, '16 killed & 55 injured in three blasts’. 
jjQ Sun, 26, June 1986, ‘16 killed & 55 injured in three blasts’. 
(z) Sun, 26, June 1986, *16 killed & 55 injured in three blasts’.
^aa) The Island, 15 July 1986, ’Landmine kills six soldiers, injures six’. 
(bb) Sun, 17 October 1986, ’Seven policemen injured’._______
(cc) Sun, 29 October 1986, Tw o policemen killed in landmine explosion’. 
(dd) The Sunday Observer, 2 November 1986. ‘Bomb kills 7 S T F  n W  
(ee) The Island, 2 November 1986, ‘8 hurt in landmine blast’T
—  — — — — — *  * * * * I V /  ^  ^  v  •
(ff) The Island, 2 November 1986, ’Landmine kills 3 policemen’,
(gg) Sun, 17 November 1986, ‘Soldiers injured in blast’.
(hh) Sun, 21 November 1986, Two soldiers injured in land-mine blast’, 
(ii) The Island, 28 November 1986, ’Landmine blast kills 2 soldiers’.
(jj) Sun, 2 January 1987, 'Army officer & three soldiers injured’.
(kk) Sun, 2 January 1987, ’Army officer & three soldiers injured’.
Insurgent Attacks During Year 1987
Table 4H: Insurgents Attacks on Armv Cam 1987
Target of Attack
Army Camp, Navatkuli 
Army Camp, Iddaikkadu 
Army outpost,
Nelliaddy
Army outpost, Kurumbasitty 
Army outpost, Vasavillan
Army outpost, Tholangett 
Army outpost, Vallali
Army Camp, Jaffna Fort
Date
9 Mar 1987 
25 Jun 1987 
5 Jul 1987
District
Jaffna 
Jaffna 
Jaffna
6 J u l1987 
6 J u l1987
Jaffna
Jaffna
6 Jul 1987 
6 J u l1987
6 Jul 1987
Army outpost, Polikandi 
Army Camp, Point Pedro (Mortar fire) 
Army outpost,
Nelliaddy 
Army outpost,
Karaveddi
Navy Base, Karainagar
10 Jul 1987
10J u l1987 
11 J u l1987
11 J u l1987
Army outpost, Polikandi
11 Jul 1987 
II J u l1987
Jaffna
Jaffna
Jaffna
Jaffna
Jaffna
Jaffna
Jaffna
Jaffna
Jaffna
Province
North 
North 
North
North
North
North
North
North
North
North
North
Source
North
North
North
Notes: (i) There are no attacks on Police Stations in the above list because all the police stations had been
ihe ‘Varlam arachclti O p ^ a T o m V w m ^ d ^ a y  in f c v ! "  « * '“  ‘" ‘““a 'a  lire Sri Lankan press as
cornea, ^  “ “ d “  J“" '
Sources:
s e a DaUy NCWS' 10 MarCh l987' 'Rve-hour attaok Navatkuli camp: Terrorists trounced in land-
S  The H and i Z W ’S ^ pV T h a,taCked: Terr° rists ambush and ki" >2 soldiers’.
« « — * 1' ! S :  ' c ^ s “ r , " r „ . : . r r  '*“ h * - — *  -
(f) The Island, 12 July 1987, ‘Fighting still on’.
‘Vadamarachch/fw. ‘ 7  g0vernment’s °P cratl<>'' LIBERATION (better known as the
and JuW 987^^curred w khinT  f u " the Vadamacbchi areas of Jaffna peninsula. The attacks in June
7m I  001:111X611 Wlthln 'he larger fighting underway in the peninsula.)
down by this r  ") a“ aCkS ° n P° ‘iCe Stat‘°nS ^  ‘he 3b0Ve ‘iSt b6CaUSe a" tbe P° Iice stations bad been closed
Table 41: Insurgents Landmine Attacks. 1987
Location
Killed & Injured 1 Date District 1 Province Source
Thalladi______ __________ 1 Army (killed) 14 Jan 1987 | Mannar_____ North "U)
Pt.Pedro ______________ 2 Army (killed)________ 22 Jan 1987 Jaffna______ North (b)
Re)
1 Uyilankulam
T r  | |  | * |  a  a  •
1 Army (killed)________ 22 Jan 1987 1 Mannar_____ 1 North
Kokkadichcholai 12STF (killed) 28 Jan 1987 Batticaloa | East Rd)
Avarantalawa
i *
11 Army (killed),
1 Army (injured),
6 civ (killed),
1 civ ((injured))________
7 Mar 1987 1 Vavuniya North (e)
Poraitivu 2 STF (killed)
3 STF (injured)
25 Mar 1987 Batticaloa 1 East Rfj
Mannar island 4 Army (killed),
| 8 Army (injured)
16 Apr 1987 Mannar North (g)
1 Pulmoddai 15 Army (killed),
3 Army (injured)________
22 Apr 1987 Trincomalee 1 East 1 (h)
1 Maliathivu 6 Army (killed),
2 civ (killed)___________
26 Apr 1987 Trincomalee 1 East [T )
Vallankulam 1 Army (killed), 
8 Army (injured)
27 Apr 1987 Mannar North |1 )
1 Nilaveli & Trincomalee- 1 
| Anuradhapura road |
9 Army (killed), 
6 Army (injured)
14 May 1987 Trincomalee 1 East 1 (k)
Lahugala 1 Army (killed),
4 Army (injured),
2 civ (killed)
20 May 1987 Ampara 1 East 1 (1)
1 Vakarai-Kathiraveli road 1 5 Army (killed) 25 May 1987 Batticaloa East (m)
1 Batticaloa Town 1 1 Police (killed),
2 Police (injured)
30 May 1987 Batticaloa 1 East 1 (n)
Tikkam 3 Army (killed)
10 civ detainees 
(killed)_______________
11 Jun 1987 Jaffna North (o)
| Mutur___________ _______1 12 civ (killed) 11 Jun 1987 Trincomalee | East 1 (p )
1 Kinniyadi 2 STF (killed), I 
1 STF (injured)_________1
15 Jun 1987 | Batticaloa East 1 (q)
1 Pallachchenai__________ 1 1 civ (killed)____________ 15 Jun 1987 Batticaloa 1 East______1 (r)
| Eravur I 4 Army (injured) 18 Jun 1987 | Batticaloa | East 1 (s)
Morawewa
Mannar
Tondaimanar
Tondaimanar
Thikkam, near Pt. PeHm 
Vakarai
3 Army (injured) 1 18 Jun 1987
3 Army (killed),
__  3 Army (injured)
2 Armv
27 Jun 1987
irincomalee 
1 Mannar
^ r\i III> ( K i l l e d )
1 10 Armv (killpH)
4 Jul 1987 Jaffna
1 6 Armv (killed)
11 Jul 1987 
1 12Jul 1987
Jaffna
fnffno
6 Army (killed),
10 Army (injured)
7 Oct 1987
J dl 1 ilu
1 Batticaloa
_ I 9 Army (injured) 1 7 Oct 1987 Trincomalee
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Kumpurupiddi
Sources:
7d) The Cevlnn Dnily m^ v s on j 3nu3 |X 7  * KeT not^nduded - was killed by a smperl.________
Ti8irs: “ ne “ ,3
j g) Sun, 17 April 1987, '4 soldiers killed *  « inj„r..H Hn-,.
al Pulmodda' ~4V ^un’ 27 APnl 1987» E]ght killed in landmine explosion’
]_) Sun, 28 April 1987, ‘Soldier killed in landmine explosion’
x i)f e n ‘,7 5 .May ' 987, 9 SeCUflly personnel ki' led 'n mine blast’ ftwo land m m ^ H ^ T  
(1) The Island, 21 May 1987, T hree killed in min, h i. . , - -------------------1-------------
/  \  #  *  I ,  —  t '  _ .  |  r \  •  »  «  »  a  _ _  _  _  ^
— Z he Ceyl, m  D, aily NeWS' 27 Mav 1987’ ‘Five S0ldiers killed in land^ i"e  blast’
(n) Weekend, 31 May 1987, ‘Landmine explosion in the East’.----- --------------------
T j g !  S  I; | Une 1 !? !' ‘‘° ^ a in e e s , 3 soldiers and 12 passengers: 25 killed in two terrorist attacks’.
[ ' uni;, 987; ' °  delainees- 3 soldiers and 12 passengers: 25 killed in two tenon si Macks’.
(£) The Ceylon Daily News, 17 June 1987, ‘Landmine kills two constables’. “
(r) The Ceylon Daily News, 17 June 1987, ‘Landmine kills two constables’
( q \  T U »  A r _______ t   . o o n  ------------------------------- :-------- ------------------------------ —
------------------------------------  ^ __________________________ »    *  ~  v  v  »  »  V - /  V  V  /  I  I  i  I  I  < 1  I I I  E .  »
js) The Ceylon Daily News, 20 June 1987, Troops wrest landing point from terrorists’. 
(t) The Ceylon Daily News, 20 June 1987, Troops wrest landing point from terrorists* 
ju) Sun, 29 June 1987, ‘Army officer, 2 soldiers killed in explosion’. 1
(v) Sun, 6 July 1987, ‘Landmine kills 2 soldiers’.
(w) The Observer, 13 July 1987, 16 soldiers killed near Thondamanaru’.
(x) The Observer, 13 July 1987, 16 soldiers killed near Thondamanaru’.
(y) The Island, 8 October 1987, ‘Terrorists kill six soldiers, wound 19’.
(z) The Island, 8 October 1987, ‘Terrorists kill six soldiers, wound 19’
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Annexure 4.2
Insurgent Attacks against the Colombo-Jaffna Railway
link, 1984-1987
Incident________
Train services stopped earlier -  
consequent to an earlier attack -  were 
resumed. But stopped immediately by 
Ministry of National Security due to 
renewed insurgent activity
Insurgents attack train which hauled 
water tankers between Jaffna & KKS
Govt Action
No trains 
operated beyond 
Kilinochchi
Date
2 Nov 
1984
Insurgents damaged Kodikamam rail 
bridge
Train could not 
proceed to Jaffna 
but terminated at 
Kilinochchi
District
Kilinochchi 
& Jaffna
Province
North
3 Dec 
1984
2001b weight IEDs exploded under the 
Yal Devi train. A total of nine IEDs of 
which one did not explode. 28 soldiers & 
1 civ (killed), 27 soldiers and 2 civ 
(injured). 11 carriages destroyed
Govt sent 
supplies to Jaffna 
by sea. Military 
supplies sent by 
sea & aircraft 
Rail service to 
North stopped by 
Govt
2 Jan 
1985
Rail track between Vavuniya & 
Puliyankulam blasted a few days after 
rail services resumed after a break of 5 
months
n.a.
Goods and passenger train blown up by 
landmines at Thampalagamam. Driver, 
guard, 4 persons injured. 2 engines and 
9 coaches damaged. Insurgents set fire to 
engine and some coaches
Govt stated that there had been 74 
attacks on the Railway system during 
previous 11 months. Destruction of rail 
track, engines, carriages, abduction of 
train crews and passengers. Loss
reported as Rs.97 million____________
Bomb blast inside inter-city luxury 
carriage (valued at Rs.4 million) which 
had arrived from KKS, Jaffna, after 
passengers had disembarked. At railway
ard, Colombo____________________
Insurgents prevent ildaya Devi train 
leaving Batticaloa for Colombo with 
bombs on rail track and by intimidating 
train crew
Rail service to 
North stopped by 
Govt
Govt stop all 
trains north of 
Anuradhapura 
Not reported.
Rail services to 
north probably 
suspended for 
some time by
Govt_________
All Govt policies 
mentioned in this 
entire column
Train with food & fuel to KKS in Jaffna
All train services 
beyond 
Anuradhapura 
stopped
n.a. (Note: this 
incident occurred 
in the East. Train 
services to the 
East were not 
severed by 
insurgents)
Helicopter borne
Source
(a)
Kilinochchi North
Jaffna North
Mullaittivu North
16
Jun
1985
Vavuniya North 1 (e)
27
Aug
1985
All northern 
districts
North i i o
14
Sep
1985
Jaffna North | (8)
North
Colombo West
Batticaloa East
5 Feb Jaffna North
hijacked. Diverted to 
at Maviddapuram and unloading begun.
Culvert at Parantan blasted. Yal Devi 
train crashed into stream bed. 5 
passengers killed, 30 injured, 5 carriages 
damaged beyond repair
Yal Devi train travelling to Colombo 
halted by insurgents between 
Puliyankulam & Omantai. 927 
passengers ordered out. Engine and 1 1 
carriages blasted with explosives, set on 
fire and wrecked beyond repair. Cost 
estimated at Rs.100 million.
Consequences of above attack
troops attacked 
insurgents and 
recaptured train. 
7 insurgents 
killed________
n.a. (Probably 
culvert repaired 
and train service 
resumed after a 
few days, as 
evidence from
below)________
Train services to 
north suspended
Batticaloa/Trincomalee 
coming to Colombo exploded at 
Veyangoda (approx, dozen miles north 
of Colombo). 13 killed, 50 injured.
Train service resumed after 5 months.
On the first day of resumption insurgents 
blew up two bridges in Jaffna district.
241 passengers stranded______________
Army deployed 
to transport food 
& fuel to the 
north using 
military trucks. 
Trains and 
civilian trucks to 
the north 
suspended 
n.a.
Train services 
further suspended
Govt announced that it would resume 
trains to Jaffna on 25 Feb 1987. On 24 
Feb 1987 insurgents destroyed the rail 
track at two pints; one, between Omantai 
& Vavuniya and the other between
Murikandi & Kilinochchi.________
Insurgents removed toolboxes from 
Pallai railway station in Jaffna peninsula. 
Other insurgents removed 340 railway 
sleepers in Chavakachcheri area.
Train services 
further suspended
Govt forced to 
further suspend 
train services. 
Note: by this time 
Operation 
Liberation (a.k.a. 
‘Vadamarachchi 
Operation1) had 
started
1986
Kilinochchi
Vavuniya
31
May
1986
Gampaha
Jaffna
Vavuniya & 
Kilinochchi 
Districts
mid-
May
1987
Jaffna
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North " (1)
North (m)
North (n)
West (o)
North (P)
North (q)
North "w
North (s)Insurgents blasted and destroyed 100 
feet of track between Kilinochchi & 
Murikandi
early-
Jun
1987
Kilinochchi
Sources:
(a) The Ceylon Daily News, 3 November 1984, ‘No trains beyond K’nochchi’.
(b) The Ceylon Daily News, 4 December 1984, Terrorists attack water train1,
(c) The Island, 3 January 1985, ‘Cabinet decisions: Food to Jaffna by Sea1.
(d) Sun, 21 January 1985, ‘23 soldiers killed: Death toll rises in Yal Devi blast1;
The Island, 22 January 1985, ‘Yal Devi explosion: Death toll now 481
(e) The Island, 22 January 1985, ‘Yal Devi explosion: Death toll now 481 
(Q The Ceylon Daily News, 28 August 1985, ‘No trains beyond A’pura till further notice1
^  ----------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---
A ^ura suspended;______________ Xpl°S'° n ln lnter c"y ExP ^ s :  Train service to North beyond
(j) The Ceylon Daily News. 30 January iq q a  «T~-----:__ _____ ________ _______________
W TheJsland, 6 F e b r u a r v l Q R ^ ^ - p T T ^ ^  halt 'Udaya Devi'.
passengers off & set fire to c L m b l b L ^ S i S , 1" me no™ Yal Devi destroyed: Terrorists force 
100m: Yal Devi wrecked beyond rennir' ’ ' ^server< 30 March 1986, ’Damage estimated at Rs.
fr%\ TL  * c ___ f __ 7Z1 -------------- — *------- !__
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-(o) The Island. I June IQSh esllmat^d al Rs- l0Qm: Yal Devi wrecked heynnH
m g  30 August ! « R S & t e 8 = g y f e 5 a ^ » j ! r *
,_^r, —---- — _ . *--------— ------ ^  UIU3L iiuiuicm track
iL) The Island, 15 Ma j M g g V T i ^ ^ ------------
(s) Sun, 4 June 1987, Terrorists blaiTIoo ft. of northenfrailwav track’
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Annexure 4  ^
InsurSent Bomb A t b w k v  i n  .. ..............c i t
1984-1987
Target of Bomb
-f An a --- -------------
Injury / 
Damage
Location Date Source
1984 _______
Bomb exploded ,n room at Obero, Hotel. Target possibly
sraeli pers° nnel m other Hotel rooms, although Govt 
denied this.
1 civ dead, 
5 rooms 
damaged
Colombo
City
28 Jun 
1984
Tu)
Bomb of 40 sticks ot gelignite weighing 24 pounds found 
in store room in the 14 Story Insurance Corporation 
building. The Ministry of National Security located in 
this building. High profile Ministry newly created after 
| the July 1983 riots. Minister was Lalith Athulnthmnrlai;
None Colombo
City
28 Jun 
1984
1 (b)
Two bombs exploded at Bloemendhal and Nagalagam-----
streets along an oil pipeline linking Colombo harbour,
Sapugaskanda oil refinery and Kolonnawa oil storage
tanks. No damage to main targets. A third bomb found 
and defused.
Bomb exploded neor Forp^horp nnlir'** efotirvr*
15 slum
houses
damaged.
Colombo
City
‘"7 Oct 
1984
pc)
—— r llwai * ponce station, Kotanena 
Bomb exploded at Barnes Place, Colombo-7. Minister 
Cyril Matthew's residence located in the vicinity. 
Minister Matthew deeply implicated in July 1983 
pogrom.
None Colombo
City
22 Oct 
1984
(d)
Rd)
Bomb discovered near Fort Railway station. Exploded 
before it could be defused.
V  J  1 Iff* v v  |  •
Damage to 
windows 
of Station 
and nearby 
shops._____
Colombo
City
f 22 Oct 
1984
(d)
Bomb exploded in Peliyagoda 2 men 
killed
Town just 
north of 
Colombo 
City
| 22 Oct 
1984
Tdj
Bomb exploded at Guilford Crescent, opposite Lionel 
Wendt Theatre, Colombo-7__________________________1
None Colombo [ 
City
22 Oct 
1984
Id )
Bomb discovered at Olcott Mawatha near Fort Railway 
station. Exploded by army bomb disposal unit. |
None [Colombo | 
City
22 Oct 
1984
Id )
1 Bomb discovered near Tower Hall, Maradana. Exploded
by army bomb disposal unit. |
None 1 Colombo 1 
City
22 Oct 
1984
(d) j
1 Bomb exploded at Independence Square, 1 
| Colombo-7_____ __________________________________1
None 1 Colombo 1 
City________ 1
22 Oct 
1984
(d)
Bomb exploded at Saunders place near Colombo | 
| Kachcheri (i.e. Colombo’s administrative centre) |
None 1 7d)
[1985____________________________________
Bomb exploded near the Army Headquarters, Colombo None Colombo
City
29 Apr 
1985
[1986 ___________________________I  1
Bomb exploded within Air Lanka Tri-Star Airliner while 
parked at Katunayaka International Airport.
21 killed, 
41 injured
International
Airport,
Approx. 18 
Km north 
of Colombo 
City__________
3 May T 
1986
(0
Bomb exploded in CTO (Central Telegraph Office) 11 killed,
114 injured
Colombo
City
7 May (gj 
1986
1987
^ ar b°mb exploded near Pettah bus stand pnnH-------■—
in Pettah area - a dense commercial ^ e a t  r  , T ‘Um 
thousands fled the area. Some instances of and TamV “
aTd anrSm0edCrc e s TheSe " "  “ ,led P°>-
Sources:
110 civ, 2 
policemen 
& 1 soldier 
(killed); 
298
(injured).
Colombo
City
21 Apr 1 
1987
15 vehicles 
&
20 shops 
destroyed
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S ™e. '.'.q ” ’Z  b . , » t,i„ IOO„
M l .  .. .............° t 7 ' | " "  7 “  ' »  '■ » " « -  D «.g l„  L , , ------------
bombs in City’. ’ w UP 01 P'P6*106 & cause major fire: Terrorists plant 3
—) Sun< 23 Qctober 1984, ‘Bomb blasts leave trail of dama»p’
_(g) The Island, 8 May 1986. ‘Bomb blasts CTO: 11 dead 'i i a  h.,rt-— -------------------------------
~ ) ^  ISla"d' 22 APri' l987’ ' 15 vehicles mangled: 20 shops gutted: Thousands flee c ~ i ^ i r
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Annexure 4.4
ndo-Sn Lanka Agreement to Establish Peace and
Normalcy in Sri Lanka’,
Annexure to the Agreement’
&
the two Letters exchanged between
President J.R. Jayewardene and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
(Source: Hyndman, Patricia, 1988: 139-145, Sri Lanka: Serendipity Under Siege, England
Spokesman.)
(Note: emphases in Bold and highlighted in grey were added by the present author)
The President of the Democratic Republic of Sri Lanka, His Excellency Mr. J. R.
Jayewardene, and the Prime Minister of the Republic of India, His Excellency Mr. Rajiv 
Gandhi and having met at Colombo on July 29, 1987.
Attaching utmost importance to nurturing, intensifying and strengthening the traditional 
friendship of India and Sri Lanka and acknowledging the imperative need of resolving the 
ethnic problem of Sri Lanka, and the consequent violence, and for the safety, well-being and 
prosperity of people belonging to all communities of Sri Lanka,
Having this day entered into the following agreement to fulfil this objective,
LI desiring to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka;
1.2 acknowledging that Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual plural society consisting, 
inter-alia, of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims (Moors) and Burgers;
1.3 recognising that each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and linguistic identity which has 
to be carefully nurtured;
1.4 also recognising that the Northern and the Eastern provinces have been areas of 
historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have at all times 
hitherto lived together in this territory with other ethnic groups;
1.5 conscious of the necessity of strengthening the forces contributing to the unity, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, and preserving its character as a multi-
ethnic, multi-lingual and multi- religious plural society, in which all citizens can live in 
equality, safety and harmony, and prosper and fulfil their aspirations;
2.Resolve that: 297
2.1 Since the Government of Sri T -mi-.
one administrative unit and also by a Referendum n P6rmit adj° ininS Provinc^  to join to form 
Northern and Eastern provinces a s ^ u f l f n X ,0w:t0 “  may be permitted t0 the
ai s s r an “ r period • * - *
specified in para 2.3), the Northern and F ait ^  ^'8 l° the date ° f the Referendum as 
one administrative unit having onp p1 t i d™ Rrov,nces as novv constituted, will form
Governor, one Chief Minister and on! Rol!iT « ^ l . C°“ncil-Such a "nil wil1 "™  « *
rp ” ILb:  “o“ h ere,"  3 ' De“ ml” ' ' * »  » « ■ *  t *  people of the
(a) The Eastern province should remain linked with the Northern province as one
as specified In pare ^  with the Northern Province
(b) The Eastern Province should constitute a separate administrative unit having its 
ministers"01 Pr° VinCial C° UnCl1 W‘th a separate g°vemor, chief minister and bofrd of
The President may, at his discretion, decide to postpone such a referendum.
2A  All persons, who have been displaced due to ethnic violence or other reasons, will have
the right to vote in such a Referendum. Necessary conditions to enable them to return to areas 
from where they were displaced will be created.
2.5 The Referendum, when held, will be monitored by a committee headed by the Chief
Justice, a member appointed by the President, nominated by the Government of Sri Lanka,
and a member appointed by the President, nominated by the representatives of the Tamil 
speaking people of the Eastern province.
2.6 A simple majority will be sufficient to determine the result of the Referendum.
2.7 Meetings and other forms of propaganda, permissible within the laws of the country, will 
be allowed before the Referendum.
2.8 Elections to Provincial Councils will be held within the next three months, in any event 
before 31st December 1987. Indian observers will be invited for elections to the Provincial 
Council of the North and East.
2.9 The emergency will be lifted in the eastern and Northern provinces by 15 August 1987. A 
cessation of hostilities will come into effect all over the Island within 48 hours of signing of 
this Agreement. All arms presently held by militant groups will be surrendered in accordance 
with an agreed procedure to authorities to be designated by the Government of Sri Lanka. 
Consequent to the cessation of hostilities and the surrender of arms by militant groups, the 
army and other security personnel will be confined to barracks in camps as on 25 May 1987. 
The process of surrendering arms and the confining of security personnel moving back to 
barracks shall be completed within 72 hours of the cessation of hostilities coming into effect.
: f ;  ' »  “*  P“n « *  of law » f „ «  and 
mechanisms of Govemmem as are used in k a " k ' Z ^  ° r8aniSalion! and
now held in custody unde^Th^Prevenhon a8aoeral amnesty to political and other prisoners 
combatants, as well as to those nersnnc t ' T  ‘Sm ACt 3nd ° ther emer8ency ,aws> and to
view to bringing them back I eff°nS t0 rehabilitate mditant youth with a
process 6 ma,nstream of "ad°nal «&• India will cooperate in the
,2||‘ others ^ " "  aC" P' a"d abW'  the above provisions and espee,
2.13 If the framework for the resolutions is accepted, the Government of Sri Lanka will 
implement the relevant proposals forthwith.
2ri4 The Government of India will underwrite and guarantee the resolutions, and cooperate in 
the implementation of these proposals.
2.15 These proposals are conditional to an acceptance of proposals negotiated from 4.5.1986 
to 19.12.1986. Residual matters not finalised during the above negotiations shall be resolved 
between India and Sri Lanka within a period of six weeks of signing this agreement. These 
proposals are also conditional to the Government of India cooperating directly with the 
Government of Sri Lanka in their implementation.
2.16 These proposals are also conditional to the Government of India taking the following 
actions if any militant groups operating in Sri Lanka do not accept this framework of 
proposals for a settlement, namely:
(a) India will take all necessary steps to ensure that Indian territory is not used 
for activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and security of Sri Lanka
(b) The Indian Navy/Coast Guard will cooperate with the Sri Lankan navy in 
preventing Tamil militant activities from affecting Sri Lanka.
(c) In the event that the Government of Sri Lanka requests the Government of India to 
afford military assistance to implement these proposals the Government of India will 
cooperate by giving to the Government of Sri Lanka such military assistance as and 
when requested.
(d) The Government of India will expedite repatriation from Sri Lanka of Indian 
citizens to India who are resident there concurrently with the repatriation of Sri 
Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu.
(e) The Governments of Sri Lanka and India will cooperate in ensuring the physical 
security and safety of all communities inhabiting the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
2.17 The Government of Sri Lanka shall ensure free, full and fair participation of voters from 
all communities in the Northern and Eastern Provinces in electoral processes envisaged in this
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S “ i ^ Vernmen' °f " 'dia f“" c°°P™ ion to ,h . Government of Sri
official languages” 8™8'  S"  Lanka Shal1 be Sinhala- Tamil and English will also belanguages
3. This agreement and the annexure thereto shall
come into force upon signature.
D o -  in Colombo. Sri Laaba.
in duplicate, both texts being equally L i i J " ' ”'" 5a"d hundred ,nd “ v“ .
Junius Richard Jayawardene 
President of the Democratic 
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
Rajiv Gandhi 
Prime Minister of the 
Republic of India
ANNEXURE TO THE AGREEMENT
1. His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India agree that the
e erendum mentioned in paragraph 2 and its sub-paragraphs of the Agreement will be
observed by a representative of the Election Commission of India to be invited by His 
Excellency the President of Sri Lanka.
2. Similarly, both heads of Government agree that the elections to the Provincial Council 
mentioned in paragraph 2.8 of the Agreement will be observed by a representative of the 
Government of India to be invited by His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka.
3. His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka agrees that the Home guards would be disbanded 
and all paramilitary personnel will be withdrawn from the Eastern and Northern Provinces 
with a view to creating conditions conducive to fair elections to the Council.
The President, in his discretion, shall absorb such paramilitary forces, which came into being 
due to ethnic violence, into the regular security forces of Sri Lanka.
4. The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India agree that the Tamil militants 
shall surrender their arms to authorities agreed upon to be designated by the President of Sri 
Lanka. The surrender shall take place in the presence of one senior representative each of the 
Sri Lankan Red Cross and the Indian Red Cross.
5. The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India agree that a joint Indo-Sri 
Lankan observer group consisting of qualified representatives of the Government of India and 
the Government of Sri Lanka would monitor the cessation of hostilities from 31 July 1987.
6. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka also agree that in the terms of 
paragraph 2.14 and paragraph 2.16(c) of the Agreement, an Indian Peace Keeping 
contingent may be invited by the President of Sri Lanka to guarantee and enforce the 
cessation of hostilities, if so required.
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EXCHANGE OF I .F T T F P g
President of Sri Lanka 
July 29, 1987 
Excellency,
Please refer to your letter dated the 29lh of July 1987, which reads as follows:
Excellency,
m rS ? 'T IT 5 ° f thC frie?dShlp between our tw» countries stretching over two millennia and
’ thdcreCT°8T Zln8^ e 'mPortance of nurturing this traditional friendship, it is imperative 
that both Sn Lanka and India reaffirm the decision not to allow our respective territories to be
used for activities prejudicial to each other’s unity, territorial integrity and security.
2. In this spirit, you had, in the course of our discussions agreed to meet some of India's 
concerns as follows:
(i)Your Excellency and myself will reach an early understanding about the 
relevance and employment of foreign military and intelligence personnel with 
view to ensuring that such presences will not prejudice Indo-Sri Lankan relations.
a
(ii) Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made available for 
military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India’s interests.
(iii) The work of restoring and operating the Trincomalee oil tank farm will be 
Undertaken as a joint venture between India and Sri Lanka.
(iv) Sri Lanka's agreements with foreign broadcasting organizations will be reviewed 
to ensure that any facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka are used solely as public 
broadcasting facilities and not for any military or intelligence purposes.
In the same spirit India will:
(i) Deport all Sri Lankan citizens who are found to be engaging in terrorist 
activities or advocating separatism or secessionism.
(ii) Provide training facilities and military supplies for Sri Lankan forces.
India and Sri Lanka have agreed to set up a joint consultative mechanism to continuously 
review matters of common concern in the light ol the objectives stated in para 1 and 
specifically to monitor the implementation of other matters contained in this letter.
Kindly confirm, Excellency, that the above correctly sets out the agreement reached between 
us. Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
Yours sincerely,
(Rajiv Gandhi)
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His Excellency 
Mr. J. R. Jayawardene
President of the democratic Republic of Sri Lanka,
Colombo
This is to confirm that the above correctly sets out the understanding reached between us. 
Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
(J. R. Jayewardene)
President
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Annexure 4.5
The Head of (he Indian Army’s Briefing to the Most 
Senior Officers of the IPKF, sometime in early 1988
orioinT / b e l ™ ' S reProduced below exactly as in the original source. Any errors in the 
original are indicated via footnotes inserted by the present author.
H ark"■a,’ 2006: 161- '65' ■» Sri THe
(page 161) .........................................................................................................
APPENDIX 3
General Sundarji’s Briefing
on Sri Lanka*
*This paper was used by the Indian Army’s then Chief of Army Staff, Gen. K. Sundarji to brief the Core Group
after the first round of lighting between the Indian Army and the LTTE sometime in early 1988. [Major General 
Harkirat Singh] J
1
2
3
COAS [Chief of Army Staff] in his briefing said that the Indian Army has not been 
employed in Sri Lanka for the protection of any one community or to fight Sri 
Lanka’s war with the LTTE but has been deployed for safeguarding the Indian 
national interest. [The] Sri Lankan Government had openly invited other countries 
to assist and in the bargain was prepared to give base facilities, which would have 
threatened Indian security at some time. Therefore, before the situation went out of 
hand, [the] Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE were pressurized to accept 
terms and conditions, which were slightly diluted to their published stand. LTTE 
aspirations were primarily kept in mind, [emphases in bold added by author of 
Thesis]
Initially it was anticipated that [the] role of the Indian Army as IPKF would be mostly 
ceremonial and was accordingly tasked to take the surrender if arms by Tamil militants, 
but later its role was changed to ‘secure’ surrender of arms ad for this purpose, use force 
if need be.
The salient featured of the Accord are as under:
(a) The Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka are to form one administrative unit 
with the Provincial Council, one Governor, one Chief Minister and one Board of 
Ministers. Elections to the Provincial Council will be held within the next three 
months, in any event before 31 December 1987. Indian observers will be invited for 
elections in the Northern and Eastern areas. Till the elections are held, and interim 
government will be formed to run the administration of these two provinces as one 
administrative unit.
(b) A cessation of hostilities to come into effect all over the Island within 48 hours of the 
signing of the Accord. This has already come into being.
(page-162)
(c) Surrender of arms by all Tamil militants and grant of general amnesty to them by the 
Government of Sri Lanka.
(d)
agreement and gUarantee the ^solutions of the
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(e)
11 „ ------me icso
implementation of the AccoPrdrate W“h ^  G° vernment of Sri Lanka in the
(0
(h )
cessation of hosttlTtieTin S^Lnk^ ? ^ ' " 8 f° rCe t0 guarantee and enforce the 
communities. Lanka enSUre Ph>sical ^curity and protection of all
t t reE aSm  P rin ce' m d e V  f f  31 ° eCember 1988 t0 enable People of
ad m in isS ve u J o r  c o n s ^ ' r  l "  ^  Pr° Vince 1S t0 one
Provincial Council. Separate administrat've unit having its own
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
J S Z  CoS„ S , "  T ,  * •  h™  • * »  »  >»>« «  * .
simple majority w,„ be X S 'Z  ^  ^  *
and b“'
Sstem KpJv iL P,r0f“fSel>: r ' T '" 1 by ° 'emberS of a" in the Northern and
was e™dem ’ indiCa,i°ns °f re' “rn of lte affected
l : r 6: l : r r :  Con,“ >',0 °ur hoPes' LTTE. ‘h« dominating militant
L Z V w p  ° y ° T , tage Weap° nS' ma>be hard|y 15 per cent of their known 
g. Since securing a forcible surrender was not part of the Accord it was hoped that
once the political process starts, LTTE would also come round the corner and surrender
During this period LTTE tried to organize themselves politically but to their surprise
they found that they had hardly any following. Most of their meetings specially in the
bastern Province were very thinly attended compared to other functions. The futility of
the political effort dawned on them and they decided to continue their armed struggle 
which they were better placed to wage in Jaffna.
The LTTE has been administering the Northern Province which they were fully in
control [of] and had their whole cadre intact. Therefore, they were probably waiting for
an opportunity to wriggle out of the Accord so that their dominating position in the 
struggle is not undermined by other militant groups.
(page-163)
6.
7.
8.
9.
LTTE was not consistent in their actions. They created hurdles in implementation of
[the] Accord by being unreasonable in their demands specifically, the representation in
Interim Administrative Council for change of Chief Administrator selected by the Sri
Lankan President out of the three names recommended by LTTE, without substantial 
reasons.
LTTE also accused IPKF for acting in a partisan manner against LTTE.
From various indications, like making allegations against the IPKF and reluctance to 
accept the Accord, it was evident that LTTE is desperately trying to wriggle out of the 
Accord and were looking for an excuse. When 13 LTTE persons, captured with 
weapons at [sic] sea by Sri Lankan forces, committed suicide, while they were being 
taken to Colombo, they alleged this as a serious violations of Accord and indulged in 
large scale violence. They killed a large number of Sinhalese in the Eastern Province 
and also members of other Tamil Militant organizations.
President J.R. Jayewardene wanted the IPKF to put LTTE down. But the IPKF did not 
act, as taking an offensive action was not part of the Accord.
10. Later after talks between President J.R. Jayewardene and the Indian Government 
representative, it was decided to act, and terms of IPKF were accordingly rhanreH tn
8 Should be *g\ The Mistake is in Major General Harkirat Singh’s book (page 162). Reproduced here without 
any change.
J2L 2.SS ™ s lead “ ,PKFLTTE pn
aken by IPKF
Jaffna
J T C S  'n T c t r ' J ?  —  .................Pie directions.
effected by COAS. operations and certain changes were
S  L T O  ^  °f d i v e r s i t y  Area, theHO of I TTF  ^ /  , IUUI U1 me university
* nd destroy the TV Station run bv T TTF 
base protection for,. _____ ________ by LTTE The commando
next to thP t Tni\ •«. A * ^ w u aucilem or aiKn LI was landed 
commandos were Z L!l S  'T","der ^  commandos were erroneoasl, landed three Km. away near the ra i lw a y 'l l
toroups never met each other. All personnel of the Sikh
• • • • •
• • • • •  • • • • • • a
(page-164)
LI platoon were killed by the LTTE 
fighting.
Troop of tanks was sent to build up and rescue commandos. They went alone 
™ fired * *  « — * »  en rente and wem lift w h
roundofmam gun when they established contact with commandos.
No effort was made by commanders to establish a link with Sikh LI platoon 
dropped near the University. P'atoon
Six commandos and the whole platoon of Sikh LI were killed in this
T n c t  . .... -----------■> —o '— LTTE run TV station.
Instead of building up on armour and commandos inside Jaffna, commandos
were withdrawn which delayed clearing of Jaffna for many days 
(vm) Various Units of IPKF suffered maximum losses in their initial advance.
Later troops learnt their lessons and casualty figures came down appreciably 
Armed helicopters were employed for operations on the outskirts of Jaffna
whereas inside Jaffna only infantry operations were carried out.
....... -  -------- i vvaaJ u..uw immense constraints, ie
avoiding civil casualty and destruction to civil property so use of heavy
weapons was rested, whereas LTTE well entrenched in build-up area caused
casualty (sic) on IPKF at will. They made extensive use of land mines and
booby traps for this purpose.
Jaffna was cleared and LTTE stronghold captured by 26 
October 1987. Occasionally sniping continues and Jaffna is now fast
returning to normal.
Eastern Province: IPKF is now carrying out search operations and uses [of] 
force if fired upon. LTTE has not been offering organized resistance in this
area any more.
(xiii) The top brass ol the LTTE is still intact. Their command system has suffered 
badly. The IPKF has also suffered badly. The IPKF has captured large-scale 
weapons, ammunition, stores and destroyed the LTTE HQ, training school, 
printing press and large number of their men have been killed.
(xiv) All LTTE men are not as dedicated as is h^ino r -----------
not use cyanide and were captured alive.
(xiii) Operations are being coordinated by GOC-in C  Qnntv, n
located at Madras. y C’ Southern Command now
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(Xiii) io
IPKF
12.
13.
14
15
16
17
18
19.
20.
administration has been undertaken by the IPKF on a war footing. 8
large number of relief camps have been opened where food and essential 
commodities are distributed to civilians. Hospitals have started working Civilian
offTcers Th10" ^  6 T *  ‘S bemg °rganized the IpKF with the help of IASofficers. There are no volunteers for this job
“  ; isTore“kseh „ T d ,y  ‘",tl WaKr SUPP'y h" e b“ n Partia"y reS'0red and
LTTE has vowed to fight IPKF till the end.
On the other hand Sinhalese militants are also organized and propose to resist the 
Accord by force. This of course would be looked after by Sri Lankan Army.
The LTTE has been offered peace and cessation of offensive by the IPKF if they
• | • | ^ arms, which at present they have shown no
inclination whatsoever [of doing].
Even after disarming LTTE, the IPKF is to ensure that both sides implement the
Accord. If there is hesitation on Sri Lankan part, they it may have to be forced. Thus
the IPKF is likely to continue in Sri Lanka for quite some time. There are no chances 
or its withdrawal in near future.
The Sri Lankan Peace Accord has been signed purely in the national interest and 
Indian Army is an instrument to ensure its implementation. Therefore propaganda 
launched in [the] media is quite biased as it is based on half facts.
The Indian Army is carrying out its tasks commendably. There have been certain
cowardly acts which have been suitably dealt with. By and large the forces were not
experienced for battle in built-up areas, as a result [we] suffered certain casualties.
Now they are fully in control and going about their task quite systematically. Efforts to
influence public opinion not to support militants has been undertaken on [a] large
scale. It has started bearing fruit, which is evident from the resistance being offered to 
the LTTE activities against IPKF.
(end of page-165)
9 Wrong numbering in original.
10 Wrong numbering in original.
